

and other U.S. allies in East Asia. Since the end of World War II, U.S. presidents have based their Pacific policy on the twin tenets of free trade—with the United States serving as “a guaranteed consumer market for [Asian] export-led economies”—and containment of the Soviet Union and its allies. Today, Sanders believes, that policy is dangerously outmoded.

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are no longer economic dwarfs. In 1987, the United States incurred a trade deficit of \$60 billion with Japan and \$38 billion with the other East Asian nations—together accounting for about two-thirds of the U.S. trade deficit. By the turn of the century, the “gross regional product” of these nations will equal that of North America.

Meanwhile, to “contain” the Soviets, the United States keeps 330,000 military personnel, nearly half its Navy ships, and several Air Force fighter wings in or near East Asia. The annual cost: some \$50 billion, or 18 percent of the Pentagon budget.

Trying to cope with altered economic realities of the U.S.-Asian relationship, Washington has pressed Japan and other Asian nations to open their markets to U.S.

goods. It has looked to Tokyo for increased military “burden sharing”; some Democrats in Congress want Japan to expand its defense spending from \$50 billion annually to \$100 or \$150 billion. But the Japanese have already accepted new defense burdens and are reluctant to add more. Throughout East Asia, trade disputes have fed anti-American sentiment. (One recent survey revealed that 66 percent of South Koreans favor a complete pullout of U.S. troops.) In the United States, “the mounting cost of [U.S.] political leadership and diminished economic strength is sowing seeds of resentment.” In short, Sanders argues, simply tinkering with the old formulas will not work.

With Mikhail Gorbachev in power in Moscow, he believes, there is less need for containment in Asia; the United States can safely reduce its military commitments in the Pacific and use the savings to cut the federal budget deficit. To ease trade tensions, Tokyo could use its economic power to help build up struggling Asian nations, such as the Philippines, which would become customers for the Japanese and other East Asian goods that now flood U.S. markets.

## *Moscow's Vote*

“How Moscow Votes in U.S. Presidential Elections” by Jiri Valenta and John Cunningham, in *Orbis* (Winter 1989), 3615 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

Since World War II, Soviet leaders have taken more than a passing interest in U.S. presidential campaigns. During the weeks before the election, that interest becomes “an all consuming . . . fever,” according to one high-level defector.

Valenta and Cunningham, professor and student at the University of Miami, respectively, argue that, during a close race, Soviet leaders “appear to believe that they have sufficient leverage to influence the outcome” through words and acts.

The Kremlin has “a certain affection for non-ideological Republicans,” and it prefers men it knows to untested candidates. In 1948, however, the Kremlin openly

backed third party candidate Henry Wallace over President Harry S. Truman and the GOP's Thomas E. Dewey. Stalin's public support (along with that of the U.S. Communist Party) may have cost Wallace enough votes to help Truman eke out a narrow victory over Dewey.

The Kremlin apparently picked no sides in the two contests between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson (1952 and '56), seeming to believe that Stevenson's defeat was inevitable.

In 1960, the Soviets saw Vice President Richard M. Nixon as “reactionary,” and looked upon John F. Kennedy as weak and likely to be “vulnerable to pressure.” That

is why, Nikita Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, he delayed the release of a captured U.S. spyplane pilot, Gary Powers, until after the election.

In 1968, during the Vietnam War, the Soviets hatched an "October surprise" to keep Nixon from defeating Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in a close race. On October 31, days before the election, Moscow's clients in Hanoi suddenly agreed to serious peace talks with the United States; LBJ suspended U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Nixon later said that the "surprise" almost cost him the election.

The Kremlin remained offstage during the elections of 1976 and '80. But Ronald

Reagan's tough policies convinced them that he would not be another Nixon, whose détente policies had been a surprise. One reason for the Soviet walkout at the Geneva arms limitation talks in 1983, according to *Pravda's* Viktor Afanasiev, was an unwillingness to hand Reagan a foreign policy triumph. It did not work.

Over the years, the Soviets have gained a more sophisticated knowledge of presidential politics, the authors say. In 1988, Gorbachev subtly favored George Bush. Has the Soviets' intervention made a difference? Not likely. And they have been notable failures at predicting the behavior of U.S. presidents.

## *Terrorists And Dollars*

"The Costs of Terrorism: A Cross-National Study of Six Countries" by Christopher Hewitt, in *Terrorism* (No. 3, 1988), Crane, Russak & Co., 3 E. 44th St., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Terrorists the world over hope to achieve their various political goals by disrupting societies, spreading fear, and provoking governments into repressive acts. What about their *economic* impact?

To find out, Hewitt, a University of Maryland sociologist, analyzed terrorists in six nations: Cyprus's anti-British EOKA (1955-59); Uruguay's revolutionary Tupamaros (1962-72); the Irish Republican Army and its Protestant rivals in Northern Ireland (1968-87); the Basque ETA separatists in Spain (1973-87); and various revolutionary (mostly left-wing) groups, such as the Red Brigades, in Italy (1969-81) and West Germany (1967-81).

First, surveying terrorist "self-financing," Hewitt found substantial country-to-country variations. In West Germany, for example, kidnappings for ransom by the leftist Baader-Meinhof gang and other fac-

tions were relatively numerous and costly (\$22.5 million); in Northern Ireland, there were none. The Basque ETA exacted a heavy toll in "revolutionary tax" extortions from local businessmen (\$65 million).



*Terrorism in Spain: In October 1986, in San Sebastian, a Basque ETA militant on a motorbike attached a magnetic bomb to General Rafael Garrido Gil's car, killing him, his wife, and his son.*