

supplied by Cuba and Nicaragua. The rebels have inflicted some \$2 billion in damage, nearly canceling out the \$3.3 billion in aid (not counting covert grants) provided by Washington during the 1980s. Captured rebel documents show that the FMLN is bent on military victory. It regards participation in peace talks only as war by other means.

U.S.-provided arms and aerial gunships have helped the army force the guerrillas to operate in groups of five to 20 men, rather than company- and battalion-size units, but they remain effective. Combat "regularly occurs within 10 miles of the capital," reports LeMoyne. During the last year, the FMLN has murdered a number of

local officials and mayors and issued many death threats—"the first time the rebels have appeared to be as abusive to civilians as the army has." Apparently, the FMLN fears the successes of a new U.S. Agency for International Development program aimed at helping villages directly.

In the long run, LeMoyne says, the odds may be against the rebels. Unlike their predecessors in Nicaragua and Cuba, they cannot conceal their doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist ideology to win broad public support. But unless the Salvadoran government and army can be persuaded to further reform themselves, LeMoyne suggests, it will not matter much for the people of El Salvador which side wins.

Ethiopia's Cloud-Cuckooland

"The Tragedy of Ethiopia's Intellectuals" by Forrest D. Colburn, in *The Antioch Review* (Summer 1989), P.O. Box 148, Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387.

Jubilation swept the campus of Ethiopia's Addis Ababa University in 1974 when army officers put 81-year-old Emperor Haile Selassie in a Volkswagen and literally drove him from power. Ethiopian intellectuals abroad, writes Colburn, who teaches at Princeton, hurried home to help with "the construction of socialism."

During the 1960s and '70s, the American-backed university had been an intellectual headquarters for the African Left. Many of its best students were sent to the United States and Western Europe. They returned radicalized, adding to the ferment at the campus of 18,000, where the political debates on the steps of the language building never seemed to end.

Fifteen years later, the eucalyptus-shaded main campus slumbers. There are no demonstrations, no debates, no newspapers—no signs of interest at all, Colburn says, in learning or in the daunting problems of this east African state. It is the poorest nation in the world (per capita annual income is \$110), it lost a million people to famine in 1986, and has been slowly bled by a long civil war in Eritrea.

In the aftermath of the gentle "revolution" of 1974, the intellectuals fell to sometimes bloody quarreling among

themselves and with Major Mengistu Haile-Mariam's military junta (the Derg). Though committed to the intellectuals' Ethiopian Socialism—nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture—the military was not committed to sharing power. In 1977, it killed hundreds of students and others during the Red Terror.

But Ethiopia's woes have not bred disillusionment with socialism. "Ethiopia's own experience is dismissed by its intellectuals as an anomaly, one that does not pose many questions for socialist theory," according to Colburn. Many blame the military for the nation's problems—"we have too many revolutionary slogans and not enough revolutionary deeds," says one professor—yet are embarrassed by their early support for it. Students who can select neither their majors nor their careers feel they have little control over their own destinies, much less the nation's. And, of course, there is the fear of repression.

Colburn sympathizes with but cannot forgive the abdication of the intellectuals: "If the best and the brightest of Ethiopia are not actively involved in searching for solutions . . . the dismal statistics of malnutrition, disease, environmental disaster, and war are even gloomier."