

war as a tendency toward pure primordial violence, constrained by politics and chance events.

He also developed concepts that help soldiers understand (and anticipate) the day-to-day vagaries of war. His notion of friction, writes Cannon, was "an elegantly stated predecessor of Murphy's Law," which held that countless minor incidents inevitably lower the level of military performance. A related concept is the "culminating point," the notion that a combat unit's effectiveness falls rapidly after reaching its peak.

But American officers have been most bewitched by Clausewitz's emphasis on politics. Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., a prominent military journalist, has cited Clausewitz in arguing that American leaders never understood the true nature of the Vietnam War and thus failed to carry the battle to North Vietnam. But others apply Clausewitz differently. They say that the mistake was not recognizing the paramount importance of winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. Clausewitz surely would have been pleased by the dialectic.

Secret Friends

"The Covert French Connection" by Richard H. Ullman, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1989), 11 Dupont Circle N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

In 1966, a huffy President Charles de Gaulle led France out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's integrated military command, and evicted NATO headquarters and troops from French soil.

The causes of the rupture were many and complex, but among the most significant was U.S. opposition to the development of a French nuclear force. Yet seven years later, according to Ullman, a Princeton political scientist, top officials in Paris and Washington were secretly cooperating to bolster France's nuclear *force de frappe* and to coordinate French defense plans with NATO's. Until now, virtually no one except a few top U.S. and French (and probably Soviet) officials knew about it.

The secrecy was enforced by the desire of de Gaulle's successors after 1969—Pompidou, Giscard, and Mitterand—to maintain the illusion that they were sticking to the Gaullist "go-it-alone" defense policy, of which the "home-grown" *force de frappe* was the proudest symbol. And until 1985, a variety of U.S. laws barred the sharing of information about the physics of nuclear weapons with any allies except, in effect, Britain.

Beginning during the Nixon administration (1969–74), U.S. nuclear specialists skirted these laws by resorting to "negative guidance." Their French counterparts,

seeking to determine which of, say, six ways of miniaturizing warheads was best, were invited to play a game of "20 questions" to get the answer. Other information—e.g., about missile technology—could be legally passed along, although some was withheld.

Has it all been worth it? Ullman credits the secret cooperation with the growing warmth of high-level Franco-American relations. NATO's coordination of nuclear targeting with the French has reduced the risk of instant armageddon in case of war. More important has been the coordination of conventional forces—where NATO is weakest—since President François Mitterand took office in 1981. While France has not formally rejoined the NATO command structure, it has agreed in case of war to reinforce NATO troops in West Germany and to provide bases for U.S. forces.

But there are minuses. French plans to expand the *force de frappe* to 1,000 warheads could greatly complicate the arms reduction efforts of the two superpowers. More important, Ullman says, "France's allies are entitled to wonder about the solidity and durability of military linkages with a government that does not have the confidence to acknowledge their full extent to its own public."

After the Cold War

The Cold War is over!

On that startling assertion, many of the people who make their living by thinking and writing about strategy now seem to agree. And yet the latest postmortems and prospectuses in the nation's leading periodicals have hardly been full of skyrocketing and glee.

Conservatives, who might have been expected to erupt in delirious celebration, seem almost gloomy. For dizzying claims of victory and somber afterthoughts none exceed those of Francis Fukuyama, deputy director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff. Writing in the *National Interest* (Summer 1989), Fukuyama declares the end not only of the Cold War but of history itself.

By "history" Fukuyama does not mean the sort of stuff historians usually write about but history as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel conceived of it: a struggle through which Reason is realized in this world. We have, Fukuyama believes, reached "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and Deng Xiaoping's in China, even if they are eventually reversed, amount to running up the white flag of surrender in place of the red flag of communism. No longer will communism, the last great competitor of 18th-century liberalism, move the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world, and thus history.

What's wrong with that? "The worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism," Fukuyama glumly predicts, will give way to an obsession with grubby consumerism and "the endless solving of technical problems."

Reaching despair by a slightly different route in *Encounter* (July-Aug. 1989), George Walden, a Conservative Member of Britain's Parliament, considers the end of the Cold War "not a moral rebirth of nations, but the triumph of the managerial ethic"—a victory won simply because communism has failed to put food on the tables of its people. "How shall we know who we are without the defining adversary?" Walden frets. He fears that the victory will finally reveal the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the West.

Fukuyama and Walden comprise what might be called "the enemy is now us" camp.

But other thinkers have had no difficulty imagining other forces and "isms" to replace communism as the West's nemesis.

"At enormous cost to the Russian people," argues historian Hugh Ragsdale in the *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Summer 1989), Moscow maintains "a semi-civilized order over two parts of the world almost infinitely disorderly. The first is the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the area that gave us World War I and World War II. The second is the Soviet side of the [Muslim] 'crescent of crisis.'" The preservation of order in these areas, he contends, "is more vital than the progress of human rights." The West, he is aghast to say, must do all it can to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet empire into chaotic religious and nationalist turmoil.

William S. Lind, a noted advocate of military reform and head of the Center for Cultural Conservatism, goes even further. Writing in *Policy Review* (Summer 1989), he argues that a Russia freed of communism—the Russia of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and Solzhenitsyn—"could resume her rightful place as part of the West, an ally in the defense of Western culture and civilization." Lind sees militant Islam and "nativist-fascism" (e.g., Peru's Shining Path guerrillas) as emerging threats to the West.

Plenty of other writers, of course, are quite content to stick with the old enemy. Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute warns in *Commentary* (Aug. 1989) that false optimism about the end of the Cold War "is destined to make the world a more dangerous place." In *Policy Review* (Summer 1989), Burton Yale Pines of the Heritage Foundation argues that the Soviets' current weakness provides the opportunity to deliver a knockout blow: the separation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. The *New Republic's* (Dec. 13, 1988) Charles Krauthammer likewise refuses to claim victory yet, but is willing to contemplate a post-Cold War world.

Most likely, he thinks, is the development of a "multipolar" world with five centers of power: the Soviet Union, China, Europe, the United States, and Japan. He sees an opportunity for something grander: "a unipolar system centered on an integrated West of Western Europe, North America, Japan, and with some of the newly industrialized states perhaps joining as well." To what end? Perhaps to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons in the Third World and to launch a global environmental crusade. Perhaps the evolution of a grand confederation of capitalist democracies—a higher form of political organization—could be an end unto itself.

"Multipolarity" is the concept—some would say buzzword—that all of the people who write for the policy journals must reckon with, whether they believe the Cold War is over or not. From the hawkish Jeane Kirkpatrick to Yale's Paul Kennedy, author of *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1987) and a leading advocate of greatly reduced U.S. commitments abroad, many agree that the global dominance of the two superpowers is waning.

As West Germany's Karl Kaiser writes in the *Adelphi Papers* (No. 237), a multipolar world would mean more emphasis on economic competition and less on military competition. East-West antagonism would continue on a reduced scale, but new dangers would appear. More local wars among Third World nations armed with weapons of mass destruction are almost certain; protectionist regional economic blocs involving the larger powers are a troubling possibility.

What is the United States to do?

No grand strategy comparable to the containment doctrine [see p. 104] that has guided the United States since the 1940s has emerged. Instead, several rather vague and frequently overlapping scenarios have been talked about.

In *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1988–89), William G. Hyland, the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, argues that multipolarity offers the United States the opportunity to reduce its military burdens while remaining, paradoxically, "the only true global power."

Going a step further than "retrenchment" in the *SAIS Review* (Summer–Fall 1989), Alan Tonelson, though skeptical of multipolarity as a useful concept, contends that a multipolar world "would make possible—and in many ways desirable—a U.S. return to something like its traditional detachment from international politics." Tonelson, who is writing a book on foreign policy for the Twentieth Century Fund, favors an inch-by-inch reassessment of U.S. in-

terests and commitments around the globe.

Still others see within reach, at last, the prospect of a harmonious world order where international organizations such as the United Nations play a much larger role. An example is Walter Russell Mead's two-part essay in *World Policy Journal* (Spring and Summer 1989). This left-wing "unipolarity," as the editors of the *New Republic* (Sept. 18–25, 1989) point out, is essentially a spiffed-up version of old-fashioned "one-worldism," and a complement to Krauthammer's newfangled conservative "one-worldism."

Not much considered, they add, are several less pleasant scenarios, such as complete international disorder—a world increasingly torn by nationalist, religious, and protectionist passions.

The perspective that seems to prevail within the foreign policy establishment is summarized

by Zbigniew Brzezinski in *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1988). But "America's New Geostrategy," as he describes it, sounds much like the old, despite the former U.S. National Security Adviser's bows to "consensual leadership," especially with the Japanese, and "a more cooperative world system." In the future, he says, "no alternative to a leading

American world role is likely to develop, and America's partners will continue to want the United States to play that role."

Brzezinski may be right, but he is not alone in sounding as though he has wrapped new jargon around old positions. As Tonelson points out, all the talk of multipolar "systems" has so far encouraged strategic thinkers to beg essential questions. If the containment of communism is no longer to be the chief purpose of U.S. foreign policy, what larger purposes, if any, are to replace it? As Francis Fukuyama's post-Cold War funk suggests, the United States tends to turn churlish toward the larger world when lacking a near-messianic mission. Ally-bashing already seems to engage the American imagination far more than does the prospect of "consensual leadership." Whether or not the Cold War is over, the U.S. will need stronger intellectual leadership for the future.

