
 POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Further, ERA foes in nonratifying states were more knowledgeable, more passionate, and more interested in the amendment than proponents were. The dissenting voices were louder, since more opponents were registered to vote, and had voted in a previous election. While 38 percent of ERA opponents in 1976 knew whether their state legislatures had acted on the amendment, only 21 percent of supporters knew this.

The ERA failed, the authors contend, because "the largest shifts in public opinion, which often precede policy innovations, went *against* ERA," and by 1980, the majority supporting ERA had "vanished entirely." After the federal amendment died, many states that ratified the ERA in the early 1970s—such as New York and Wisconsin—later reflected this collapse of popular support by rejecting state ERA's of their own. Public opinion in the states that rejected ERA, the authors conclude, "seems unlikely to shift in favor of the amendment in the near future."

Ike the Diplomat

"Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?" by Barton J. Bernstein, in *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (Sept. 1987), Gainsborough House, Gainsborough Road, London E11 1RS, United Kingdom.

In his 1963 memoir *Mandate for Change*, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), recalling his "grave misgivings" about atomic weapons, contended that he had warned Secretary of War Henry Stimson in 1945 against using the bomb. "It was my belief," Eisenhower asserted, "that Japan was, at the very moment, seeking to surrender."

But did Eisenhower really warn Stimson? Bernstein, a historian at Stanford University, thinks not. "Strong circumstantial evidence" suggests that Eisenhower did not, in 1945, question the atomic bomb's use.

Consider Henry Stimson's diary. Stimson mentions discussing the A-bomb on many occasions; but the bomb is not mentioned in the two discussions he records having had with Eisenhower in July of 1945. (Far from a warning, Stimson writes in his entry for July 20, 1945, that he had a "pleasant chat" with Eisenhower.) Both Manhattan Project director Gen. Leslie Groves and Stimson aide Col. William Kyle say that it would have been "out of character" for Eisenhower to dissent from the opinions of his superiors in Washington. Eisenhower, Bernstein contends, "was not likely to tell the Secretary of War what Stimson did not want to hear."

Moreover, memoirs by contemporaries supporting Eisenhower's claim fail to stand up to rigorous scrutiny. Eisenhower's son John, in his memoir *Strictly Personal* (1974), wrote that his father was depressed by his meetings with Stimson, but he did not suggest that his father felt the atomic bomb's use was wrong. A statement from Eisenhower in Gen. Omar Bradley's 1983 memoir *A General's Life*, which supports "Eisenhower's own post-war recollections," was inserted after Bradley's death by ghostwriter Clay Blair. Blair admits that he did not solicit Bradley's opinions before writing the passage.

The "only supporting evidence" that Eisenhower opposed the bomb in

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

1945 consists of statements Eisenhower made 15-20 years afterward. Were these later statements true? Barring a new primary source (such as an Eisenhower diary), Bernstein believes that they cannot *definitely* be proven false. But Eisenhower, like others, was known to tailor "important remembrances to suit his needs." For example, Eisenhower in 1945 was "quite optimistic" about postwar relations with the Soviet Union—but years later he said he had tried "to warn Roosevelt about the Soviets."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Saving South Africa

"A Capitalist's Conundrum" by Anthony Sampson, in *Regardie's* (Dec. 1987), 1010 Wisconsin Ave. N.W., Ste. 600, Washington, D.C. 20007.

Many American politicians argue that U.S. corporations should sell off their South African subsidiaries. "Our country is implicated in the terrible system that blights South Africa," says Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.). "Our corporations have benefited from the apartheid economy."

Sampson, British author of *The Seven Sisters* and *The Changing Anatomy of Britain*, argues that "disinvestment" from South Africa is neither a wise nor a moral policy. Foreign corporations, he contends, "must not just pull out of an evil system but work toward producing a more equitable one."

Foes of apartheid, Sampson believes, have taken "an overly dogmatic view of corporate involvement." By insisting both on sanctions by the United States government against South Africa *and* on disinvestment by U.S. business, the anti-apartheid movement "made a mistake."

Economic sanctions against South Africa, in Sampson's opinion, are useful as a tool to convince whites "that continuing apartheid won't pay off for them." But disinvestment leaves former U.S. subsidiaries in the hands of South African corporations that feel no pressure to make reforms. General Motors (GM), for example, instructed its South African subsidiary not to sell equipment to the South African Army or police and to abide by the "Sullivan Principles" calling for integration of offices and equal opportunity for blacks. After GM sold a subsidiary in South Africa in October 1986, the new owners made clear they "had little regard for unions and had no inhibitions about selling to the military."

The "most damaging" corporate pullout from South Africa has been that of foreign banks, such as Chase Manhattan and Barclays. These international banks have denied credit needed for the South African economy to expand. Without foreign loans, says one Barclays official, South Africa will find it "increasingly difficult" to "promote economic growth to employ the ever-growing non-white population."

U.S. corporations, Sampson contends, should stay in South Africa and work toward ending apartheid. "The greatest danger," he warns, is that disinvestment will allow Americans to "gratefully wash their hands of South Africa and leave its blacks to their fate."