

OTHER NATIONS

Why has Kenya been a success and Tanzania a failure? The answer, says Zinsmeister, a free-lance writer and demographer, can be found in the economic policies chosen by the founding fathers of each nation.

Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, stressed the use of *harambee* (self-help) to build Kenya's economy. Communally owned tribal lands and some white settler-owned lands were acquired by the government and transferred to small farmers, resulting in a total of 1.5 million households which owned an average of nearly 10 acres apiece by 1984. Most of Kenya's agriculture and industry remained in private hands, and even state owned institutions (such as marketing boards) paid world market prices for farmers' crops. Kenyatta's policies provided the incentives for Kenya to become "a billion-dollar agricultural export powerhouse."

Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, on the other hand, chose a "radical socialist" path. In 1967 Nyerere nationalized most private businesses and, two years later, started a "villagization" program, which forced 91 percent of the rural population to abandon their homes for government agricultural communes.

Nyerere's policies brought disaster. Farmers were forced to sell most of their produce to state-run marketing boards, which cut the prices paid to farmers even as world market prices for those crops rose. Because farmers had no financial incentives, production of export crops (e.g., sisal, cashews, cotton) dropped by 20 percent between 1970 and 1984, while basic food crop production (e.g., maize, rice, and wheat) was cut in half. Foreign exchange reserves fell so sharply that industries could not buy replacement parts or technical expertise. Today Tanzania's government-run factories operate at only 10-30 percent of capacity; Tanzanian industry provides only eight percent of the country's total national output.

Since Nyerere's retirement as president in 1985, his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, has allowed farmers more freedom to sell their crops on the free market, and has authorized a limited reintroduction of private property. Nyerere, however, is still chairman of Tanzania's only political party, and may block future reform. Zinsmeister concludes that Tanzania's "foolish economic ideology" will cause it to lag behind Kenya economically for years to come.

Israeli Fundamentalists

"Israel's Dangerous Fundamentalists" by Ian S. Lustick, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1987), 11
Dupont Circle N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Orthodox Jews have long thrived in the state of Israel. In recent years, says Lustick, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth, some orthodox Jews have joined *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful)—militant fundamentalists whose goals include expanding Israel to its Biblical frontiers and eliminating all traces of "Western-style liberal democracy."

Although *Gush Emunim's* membership is only 10,000, its goals are supported by political parties (mostly members of the right-wing *Likud* bloc) constituting over 35 percent of the *Knesset* (Israel's parliament). Its influence may be even greater: A poll of Israeli leaders taken by the leftist


OTHER NATIONS

magazine *Hadashot* in June 1987 found *Gush Emunim* leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger tied with former prime minister Menachem Begin as one of the two people with "the greatest impact" on Israeli society since 1967.

Followers of *Gush Emunim* derive their beliefs from the teachings of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. Rabbi Kook and his disciples believe that Jews are an *Am Segula* (a "treasured" people) separate and superior to other races or religions. Because Jews, the rabbi's disciples say, are divinely connected with the land of Israel, Palestinians and other Arabs must be "vomit[ed] out" of Israeli territory to ensure the arrival of the Messiah.

Until Rabbi Kook's death in 1982, most of *Gush Emunim*'s energies went into the production of more than 130 settlements in Israeli-occupied territories in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. Since the rabbi's death, the movement has split into two factions. The militant "vanguardist" faction argues that only "spectacular and extra-legal actions," such as illicit creation of settlements in occupied territories, will fulfill God's plan for Israel. The larger "consensus" faction argues that, because Israel will not be redeemed by God for decades (or centuries), proselytizing and building coalitions with potential centrist and right-wing allies is the best way to ensure continued Jewish dominance in Israel over the long term. Both sides agree that they must destroy the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aksa Mosque, Muslim holy sites in the Temple Mount area of East Jerusalem, in order to rebuild the Temple of Solomon on the site.

To curb *Gush Emunim* influence, Lustick concludes, the U.S. should



Israeli fundamentalists often react to attacks by Arab or Palestinian commandoes. Here, Jewish vigilantes patrol the streets of Hebron (on the occupied West Bank) after a guerrilla attack in September 1985.

OTHER NATIONS

increase duties on goods produced in Israeli-occupied territories and increase bilateral educational exchanges, in order to promote democratic and egalitarian values. Such moves might encourage moderate Israelis, who must "show their compatriots just how intolerably dangerous" *Gush Emunim* might become.

The Fading of Eurocommunism

"The Italian Communist Party: Goodbye to Eurocommunism" by Philip A. Daniels, in *The World Today* (Aug.-Sept. 1987), The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10 St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE, United Kingdom.

When the Italian Communist Party (PCI) won 34.4 percent of the national vote in 1976, its highest percentage since the founding of the post-World War II republic in 1946, the Communists seemed on the verge of full participation in government. Since that peak, however, the party's trade union support has weakened, and fewer young people are joining up. PCI voting strength declined to 26.6 percent in 1987. Daniels, a British political scientist, argues that prospects for a Communist resurgence in Italy are dim.

At the peak of its popularity in 1976, the PCI formed a "national solidarity" government with the Christian Democratic Party. The Communist Party never gained the ministries it sought, however, and in 1979 reverted to its former role as the opposition party. An attempted coalition with the Socialist Party (PSI) failed because that party's leader, Bettino Craxi, knew that the Communist Party, three times larger than the PSI, would dominate any partnership. Craxi instead joined the Christian Democrat-dominated governing coalition, serving as prime minister from 1983 until March of 1987. He attempted to isolate the PCI, accusing the Communists of being undemocratic and not truly committed to Italy's alignment with the West.

At the 17th Party Congress in April 1986, PCI leader Alessandro Natta called for a new alliance with European socialist and social democratic parties, particularly the West German Social Democrats. This alliance would replace old ties with French, Spanish, and Portuguese Communists. By accepting Italy's membership in NATO and displaying its independence from Moscow, the PCI has moved closer to the views of European Social Democrats. The goal of Natta's proposed alliance, perhaps based in the European Parliament, would be to forge links with non-aligned nations and "achieve a more independent role for Western Europe between the superpowers." The new coalition would embrace environmentalists and feminists. It has yet to take shape.

Despite their decline, Italy's Communists are still stronger than their counterparts in France, Spain, and Portugal. Why? The PCI is more flexible and self-critical. Yet, as Daniels sees it, the Communists must, like the West German Social Democrats and the British Labour Party, find "a clear vision of the meaning and relevance of socialism in the late 20th century" if they are to survive.