

---

 FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE
 

---

come routine; in Fiscal Year 1987, for example, 31,059 Guardsmen trained in 35 nations, including West Germany, England, and South Korea. Moreover, each of four regular divisions in the Army currently is allotted a "round-out brigade" from the National Guard that would bring the division to full combat strength in time of war; Newland predicts that more such arrangements will follow as congressional budget cuts further reduce the Army's personnel.

Gubernatorial efforts to inhibit the training of National Guard units, Newland contends, are unwise, because of the vital role such units could play in any overseas conflict. Governors, he suggests, should "find other avenues to air their foreign policy differences with the president."

### *A Pacific Century?*

"The Myth or Reality of the Pacific Century" by Christopher Coker, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1988), MIT Press, 55 Hayward St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

In 1898, during the U.S. conquest of the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, Theodore Roosevelt noted that America's future as a world power lay not with Europe, but with East Asia: "The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn."

During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev each alerted their respective countrymen to the need for increased national presence in the Pacific. But such sentiments, argues Coker, a lecturer at the London School of Economics, do not mean that the locus of military and economic power will shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The idea of a "Pacific century," he contends, is "a peculiarly American obsession" and it is not shared by Asian nations.

If these nations (including Japan and China) fused their economies, they would constitute the world's largest trading bloc; in 1984, these countries accounted for 40 percent (\$700 billion) of the world's exports, compared to 33 percent (\$277 billion) from the European Community. But Asia's nations compete fiercely against one another; there is little chance that they will join against the West or the Soviet Union. Even the region's strongest powers, China and Japan, show little sign of moving toward economic cooperation.

Moreover, the odds that the Asians will forge a *military* bloc as powerful as NATO are even lower. Unlike Europe, where the West unites against the threat of Soviet aggression, there is "no common adversary" in Asia. Non-Communist Southeast Asian nations, for example, fear Vietnam's large and experienced army; Vietnam fears China's. Although the Kremlin's Pacific Fleet is now the largest single Soviet naval force, Coker believes that the Japanese would rather act as negotiators between the superpowers than rearm for self-protection.

Coker predicts that the 21st century will be one in which global power will be shared among the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. In various ways, these four will compete as fiercely in the Atlantic as in the Pacific. The vision of Asia as *the* future arena of international rivalry, he observes, is a vision held "by many in the United States but surprisingly few on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean."