with "grim implications" for Singapore and Malaysia.

Limited U.S. intervention in Asian wars, Pike and Ward conclude, brought stability to noncommunist governments. As Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew once remarked: "The dominoes did fall in Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam War; they fell backwards."

Missile Defense

"Why Are The Soviets Against Missile Defense—Or Are They?" by Anthony Carl Holm, in *Naval War College Review* (Summer 1987), The Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841.

The rhetoric surrounding President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) suggests that the Soviet Union is opposed to antimissile defenses. In fact, notes Holm, an American Political Science Association graduate fellow, both sides have long pursued some form of ballistic missile defense (BMD). As early as 1945, Washington considered BMD, though nearly 10 years passed before development efforts commenced.

"The Soviet Union," says Holm, "attempted to counter U.S. strategic weapons policy by creating an elaborate air defense system in the early 1950s." The Soviets continued BMD research and development throughout the late 1950s, while the Eisenhower administration, mistakenly perceiving a "missile gap" with the USSR, embarked on a massive arms buildup. In 1961, the U.S. had 13 times as many intercontinental ballistic missiles and 14 times as many deliverable nuclear warheads as the USSR.

Following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons "freeze"; Moscow declined, instead increasing the pace of BMD research. That same month, Soviet Major General Nikolai Talenskii outlined Moscow's BMD policy (the "Talenskii Doctrine"), noting that BMD was strictly "defensive," and, in concert with offensive weapons, would enhance "deterrence."

Washington was "lukewarm" on BMD, says Holm, until Moscow started to deploy an antiballistic missile (ABM) system in 1964—its Galosh missiles, "Hen House" early warning radar, and "Dog House" battle management radar. Soon the U.S. Army moved ahead on a phased-array radar, and, by June 1966, completed a prototype battle management radar system to guide Sprint and Zeus missile interceptors.

In November 1969, the two nations began arms control negotiations. The Soviets "aimed at using the ABM Treaty and the attitudes of the détente era to continue BMD research and development and maintain Galosh," observes Holm, "while the United States restrained its ABM deployments." Washington wanted to trim its missile budget, and ABM was not popular in Congress. Ultimately, a Soviet-American ABM Treaty was ratified in May 1972.

Since then, occasional talk of "limited" nuclear conflicts has increased the appeal of BMD to both sides, says Holm. Even a small BMD system could "prevent or neutralize" a limited nuclear attack. Moreover, such systems could "help protect the United States and the Soviet Union from

accidental, unauthorized, third country or terrorist attacks." But the primary reason for Washington's pursuit of its Strategic Defense Initiative, says Holm, is "to achieve technological parity [with the Soviets] in BMD weapons." The arms negotiators in Geneva know that SDI threatens an area where "the Soviet advantage was clear-cut."

The Case for Public Archives

"Expanding the Data Base" by John Lewis Gaddis, in *International Security* (Summer 1987), Harvard Univ., 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Political leaders, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger once said, rarely "gain in profundity while they gain experience." Rather, he added, the convictions formed prior to entering public service are "the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office."

Gaddis, a historian at Ohio University, finds that situation unfortunate. National security matters are too important to have "so little communication taking place between those who devote their careers to studying them and those who temporarily have the constitutional responsibility for actually dealing with them."

Politicians, notes Gaddis, are too busy to read academic journals, especially since political scientists tend to write in "incomprehensible dialects." Straining to make their studies "scientific," they often describe world events in inexact, jargon-laden prose. On the other hand, many historians—"hunters and gatherers" of facts—end up "collecting pebbles on the beach, and arranging them in patterns that may delight the eye but that rarely stimulate the brain."

Political scientists, historians, and policymakers, Gaddis argues, should take greater advantage of the nation's archives. Such records make possible very detailed analyses of recent American history. For instance, owing to archival research, historians now believe that all governments tend to draw back from considering the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars—such as in Korea or Vietnam—fearing that a military failure would undermine the future credibility of the nuclear deterrent. And contrary to popular opinion, no U.S. administration during the early Cold War years actually believed there was an "international communist monolith."

"John Foster Dulles himself," says Gaddis, "not only differentiated between varieties of communism abroad but, as early as 1953, was devising sophisticated strategies for promoting conflicts between them."

Gaddis says Washington should set up a computerized archival data base. Some National Security Council and State Department records, documents pertaining to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and declassified papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, are open to the public, but not always easily accessible.

The notion of a computerized archive is not new, Gaddis notes. More than a dozen U.S. allies—including Great Britain, Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and West Germany—already keep open files. He chides historians and political scientists for not making better use of the existing materials to inject "new ideas" into the field of security studies.