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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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*NATO's Problem*

"Europe's Security Dilemmas" by Christoph Bertram, in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1987), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's recent arms control overtures have hurt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by creating friction among the 16 member nations. The chief issue: Does NATO still face a major Soviet threat in Europe?

Bertram, diplomatic correspondent for West Germany's *Die Zeit*, argues that NATO should by no means ease up, since "it is precisely because of a heavy [NATO] investment in military strength that Europe enjoys considerable stability." Any unilateral lowering of NATO's military guard would "undermine that stability." Even a serious détente initiative by the Kremlin could end up strengthening the USSR's presence in Europe—especially if Moscow's new *glasnost* (openness) breeds trouble in the Eastern bloc, inviting a Soviet military crackdown.

Alliance leaders should not forget Europe's need for a nuclear deterrent, says Bertram. NATO might even consider deploying a force of U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles (e.g., 200 Tomahawks). During the coming decade, he adds, NATO may face "severe manpower reductions" in its conventional forces. With new curbs on the Pentagon budget, U.S. manpower will be the first item to suffer. Moreover, West Germany's *Bundeswehr* may shrink by as much as 10 percent during the next seven years, owing to a "decline in available conscripts."

"There cannot be a non-nuclear NATO doctrine," Bertram concludes. "There can be no notion of limiting the risks of war to Europe, and no alternative, in terms of deterrence, to U.S. nuclear weapons dedicated to the European theater."

Why? Even a more favorable balance in conventional weapons would not rule out a Soviet attack. "As history has repeatedly shown, resourceful attackers can be weaker than defenders and still succeed."

*Backward Dominoes?*

"Losing and Winning: Korea and Vietnam as Success Stories" by Douglas Pike and Benjamin Ward, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1987), 1800 K St. N.W., Ste. 400, Washington, D.C. 20006.

Many historians regard the Korean and Vietnam wars as U.S. military blunders. Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Project, and Ward, an economist, both at the University of California, Berkeley, disagree. They argue that the two wars were "twin U.S. successes."

The images of the fall of Saigon and of U.S. forces retreating from northwestern Korea, they note, "are not the stuff of which victory is made." Yet consider the circumstances under which the United States intervened in both wars: fighting was already under way, and the U.S. allies were losing. The main objective: to contain a looming communist