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conceding the occupied territories to Jordan and Egypt, in exchange for Arab recognition that Israel has a right to exist in peace. Menachem Begin rejected the Land-for-Peace policy, however, during his tenure as prime minister (1977-84), and pushed for the creation of new Jewish settlements on the West Bank.

In the 1984 election, both major parties failed to win a decisive victory. The resulting "National Unity Government"—under which Shimon Peres (Labor) and Yitzhak Shamir (Likud) each agreed to serve as prime minister for two years—has only institutionalized Israeli differences on the Land-for-Peace policy.

Nevertheless, Shimon Peres, who served as Labor prime minister from September 1984 to October 1986, made some headway in foreign affairs. Peres persuaded Morocco's King Hassan to reject the position of hard-line Arab states and help seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement with Israel. He also convinced the Spanish government to establish, for the first time, diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. Moreover, the prime minister's "personality, eloquence, moderation, and energy," as Lewis puts it, have "refurbished" Israel's image abroad.

Despite his diplomatic skills, Peres failed to launch peace negotiations, largely because Israelis themselves could not reach a consensus on what to do with the occupied territories. Even if the premier had managed to reach a peace agreement with Jordan's King Hussein, the Labor-Likud coalition would surely have quashed it. The political standoff, moreover, reflects the sentiments among ordinary Israelis, about half of whom, according to polls, oppose a Land-for-Peace bargain. Such opinions are unlikely to change as long as some 50,000 Jews live in 100 towns and villages on the West Bank.

The current Labor-Likud government may serve the interests of Israeli politicians. But Jerusalem's "Government of National Impasse," as Lewis calls it, can do little to promote peace in the Middle East.

The New China

"China's Confident Nationalism" by Michel Oksenberg, in *Foreign Affairs* (Special Issue 1986), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

During the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations "played the China card" against the Soviet Union. In other words, by establishing friendly relations with Beijing, Washington kept the Kremlin on the defensive. China was happy to help.

But China's new generation of leaders, says Oksenberg, a University of Michigan political scientist, do not want to play that game anymore. China's "confident nationalists" now want to deal with both superpowers. They believe, as Oksenberg puts it, that "China can regain its former greatness. . . . [by using] foreign technology and ideas."

That approach represents a sharp break from the past.

Under Chairman Mao Zedong (1949-76), the Chinese regime distrusted all powerful foreigners, even their postwar Soviet allies. Embittered by the struggles against Japan (1937-45), against Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist regime, and against the United States in Korea, Mao and his subordinates, Oksenberg says, sought mostly to end "national hu-

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miliation and establish China as an equal [power] in the world.”

Under Mao, China's foreign policy was characterized by “authoritative, programmatic statements” and slogans such as “World in Chaos; Situation Here Excellent” or “Down with Imperialism and Its Running Dogs.” Not until after Sino-Soviet relations soured during the 1960s did Beijing make overtures to Washington—as a counter to Moscow. Worried by the Soviets' growing military presence in Mongolia and the Far East, the Chinese relished Soviet-American tension.

China's foreign relations have grown more complex in the 1980s. The Washington-Beijing-Moscow “triangle” has been replaced by a strategic quadrangle that includes Japan, Asia's strongest economic power. And a new generation of leaders, under Deng Xiaoping (premier since 1978), now conducts the nation's foreign affairs.

Having suffered through such Maoist debacles as the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), these men, says Oksenberg, “appear less interested in heroics and immediate gratification on the international scene and more preoccupied with stability and economic growth at home.”

The confident current leaders are more sophisticated, less xenophobic, less paranoid. They see, for example, the Soviets mired in Afghanistan and Democrats squabbling with Republicans in Washington. They are willing to pursue their own interests, even when they irritate Americans—by protesting the Reagan administration's policy toward South Africa, for example, or by inviting Nicaragua's president, Daniel Ortega, to Beijing.

Unfortunately, Oksenberg says, history shows that reform-minded leaders in China seldom last long because “the Westernization that flourishes under their aegis creates a backlash.” Americans, therefore, should not be surprised when Deng Xiaoping warns his compatriots, as he did earlier this year, to beware of “bourgeois liberalism” and “complete Westernization.”

After Chernobyl

“Chernobyl and Soviet Energy” by Judith Thornton, and “Chernobyl and Ukraine” by David R. Marples, in *Problems of Communism* (Nov.-Dec. 1986), U.S. Information Agency, 301 4th St. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

On April 26, 1986, 100 miles north of Kiev in the Ukraine, Unit No. 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant exploded, sending windborne radioactive particles as far afield as Sweden. On April 27, reported the *Komsomol* (Communist Youth League) newspaper:

“A joyless dawn broke, and with it came very difficult problems. The party gorkom [city committee] had issued a request: Komsomol members must go and cover the reactor. Sand will be needed. Find volunteers . . . It would take a lot of sand . . . A boundless sea of sand. No one needed persuading. Well, hardly anyone.”

The Chernobyl explosion's economic consequences have been estimated (in *Pravda*) at two billion rubles—including loss of businesses, farms, houses, crops, and land, as well as the cost of relocating and com-