he built to house his smallish collection of old masters, furniture, and Greek and Roman sculpture, a replica in Malibu of the villa owned by Julius Caesar's father-in-law. But Getty Museum officials must count carefully. To comply with federal rules for tax-exempt charitable organizations, they must spend 4.25 percent of the museum's assets annually. At last reckoning the Getty endowment was worth \$2.9 billion—nine times that of New York's Metropolitan Museum.

As Westerman, a former *Business Week* editor, observes, this means that the Getty must spend some \$123 million each year to comply with IRS regulations. And the art establishment frets about a consequent "Getty factor," inflation in the art market. Indeed, the Getty has paid record prices for a painting (\$10.4 million for Italian Renaissance artist Andrea Mantegna's *Adoration of the Magi*) and a document (\$123,000 for Paul Gauguin's Tahitian diary, *Noa-Noa*). Critics say that two costly (\$7 million apiece) purchases, among them *The Annunciation*, attributed to 15th-century Flemish master Dieric Bouts, may be fakes bought in haste.

The Getty's president, Harold Williams, a former chairman of Norton Simon Inc., dismisses such criticism as mere "background noise." The Getty is transforming itself from a small outfit—the Malibu museum has just 12 parking places as well as a limited collection—to a major enterprise. Pending the 1992 completion of a new "Getty Center" on 740 acres adjacent to the present museum, 500 Getty staffers camp in several Los Angeles–area offices. They oversee various projects—one of the world's best photography collections, a large art history library (500,000 volumes), a program to "overhaul the art-education system" of U.S. elementary schools, a computerized catalogue tracing the provenance of art works from the Middle Ages on, and the restoration of ancient monuments in Egypt and other countries.

Getty officials say that they are as chary of spending as was their benefactor, who kept a pay phone at his English estate. Of the Getty staff, 450 earn under \$30,000. Travel budgets are said to be Spartan, paper clips counted, goals kept high. Insists museum director John Walsh: "We don't talk about money here."

OTHER NATIONS

Spain's Gambler

"Political Pragmatism in Spain" by Meir Serfaty, in *Current History* (Nov. 1986), 4225 Main St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19127.

Last year, Spain finally entered Western Europe. In March, it won Common Market membership. In a June referendum, Spanish voters backed Madrid's 1982 decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Ho-hum? Not at all, says Serfaty, a Brandon University political scientist. Spain's 1986 moves firmed up a key part of the Atlantic alliance's southern flank. And this was the doing of Madrid's ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which once viewed the future of the new post-Franco, democratic Spain as non-NATO and neutral—a southern Sweden.

Spain did not go that way, says Serfaty, thanks to the "pragmatic" PSOE chief Felipe González, prime minister since 1982.

The PSOE won power in 1982—in the third election of the post-Franco era—partly by *opposing* NATO, which Spain, under Antonio Suarez's conservative regime, had just joined. With the youthful (44) González's victory came a dilemma. For economic reasons, he wanted Common Market membership, but negotiations dragged. The French, fearing Spanish rivalry in agriculture, were cool. And other Common Market leaders—Britain's Margaret Thatcher, West Germany's Helmut Kohl, and Italy's Bettino Craxi—now had doubts about Spain's NATO commitment.

González played tough. Every time the Common Market talks stalled, he threatened to hold a referendum on Spain's NATO membership. Slowly, Madrid's Common Market prospects improved. As they did, notes Serfaty, González "moved his party away from its anti-NATO stand." During a 1983 visit to West Germany, he hailed Bonn's decision to welcome new U.S. missiles. On Spanish television he declared that "Spain cannot be here and now a neutral country." Late in 1984, as the Common Market bargaining reached a crucial point—France was still opposed—González played his referendum card. He announced the oft-threatened vote on NATO, and, waffling carefully, said he would ask for approval of NATO membership only in a "political sense." To appease PSOE left-wingers, he would seek to reduce the U.S. military presence in Spain.

The Common Market approved Spanish membership in principle in March 1985. González then set the NATO referendum for March 1986. Despite wide opposition—from pacifists, Greens, Communists, even royalists—NATO was approved. Says Serfaty: "González's gamble paid off." He "consolidated" Spain's role in the Western alliance while maintaining his popularity. Spain has the highest unemployment (22 percent) of any industrialized country. But Spaniards were pleased enough by recent economic growth and falling inflation—1986's eight percent rate was well under the 1977 peak of 26.4—to return the PSOE to power last June.

González's main feat, says Serfaty, has been to transform the PSOE into the most "conservative" socialist party in Western Europe.

Moscow's Deal With Damascus

"The Soviet-Syrian Relationship" by Pedro Ramet, in *Problems of Communism* (Sept.-Oct. 1986), U.S. Information Agency, 301 Fourth St. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

Keeping a political satellite in stable orbit is a tough job, even for tough people like the Soviets. Consider Moscow's difficulties with Syria.

Ramet, who teaches International Studies at the University of Washington, notes that Moscow's Damascus connection is typical of Soviet patron-client relationships. There are no shared goals. Characteristically, Moscow seeks to "institutionalize" a Soviet role in a region's politics through a client; the client seeks aid "at the lowest possible cost."

Moscow forged its Syria link during the mid-1960s with arms shipments. Thereafter, the Soviets encouraged Syria's President Hafez Assad to build up a state-run economy, thinking that this would make him a good