OTHER NATIONS

Lenin, Laba notes, felt that unions should merely be "transmission belts" of doctrine from party to people. In Poland, a message went from people to party; Solidarity's emergence conferred "a prima facie validity on worker grievances against their rulers.'

Sino-Soviet Amity?

"The End of Sino-Soviet Estrangement" by Steven I. Levine, in Current History (Sept. 1986), 3740 Creamery Rd., Furlong, Pa. 18925.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Beijing's relationship with Moscow has run the gamut: "eternal friendship" during the 1950s, "permanent enmity" during the 1960s and '70s.

Today, says Levine, an American University political scientist, relations between the two Communist colossi are slowly coming full circle.

Although the PRC opened its doors to the capitalist West during the late 1970s, it did not welcome the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until 1982. But economic cooperation soon flourished between Beijing and the Kremlin. In December 1984, Soviet vice prime minister Ivan V. Arkhipov visited China to establish a Sino-Soviet Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Commission—which convened last March—and to agree on doing \$14 billion worth of bilateral business during the 1986-1990 period. In July 1985, Arkhipov's Chinese counterpart, Yao Yilin, signed the economic agreements in Moscow.

As a result, the value of Sino-Soviet trade rose from roughly \$160 million in 1981 to \$1.9 billion in 1985; by 1990, it should reach \$6 billion, close to the present level of Sino-American trade. The Soviets tend to export heavy industrial products (e.g., electrical and transportation equipment, steel); the PRC ships, in addition to raw minerals, food and finished goods such as handicrafts and textiles—items much desired by Soviet consumers. Meanwhile, barter trade along the Sino-Soviet border has been revived. So has ship traffic between northeast China and eastern

Siberia along the Heilongjiang and Songjiang rivers. However, diplomatic progress between Beijing and Moscow has not been as smooth, Levine observes. To be sure, cultural avenues are now open: Soviet and Chinese artists, musicians, and athletes perform in each other's arenas, while more than 200 students from each nation attend the other's universities (up from 10 during 1983-84). But Beijing is hanging tough on its demands for removal of the "Three Obstacles": The Soviet troops on the Chinese border, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and Soviet support of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Despite more than a dozen high-level meetings between Chinese and Soviet officials between 1982 and 1986, Moscow has not budged on these demands; Beijing, in turn, has not allowed the Chinese Communist Party to restore formal ties with the Soviet Communist Party.

Because the PRC and the Soviet Union are still ardent competitors notably for influence in the Third World—Levine does not see them soon reaching a full accord. As Chinese vice prime minister Li Peng put it: "We hope that China and the Soviet Union will become good neighbors, but

they will not become allies,'