

---

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


---

ways, deteriorated over the last few years. Whereas U.S. trade with China increased by 25 percent during the first nine months of 1985, U.S. trade with India dropped 10 percent from its peak level—\$4 billion in 1983.

The problem is Pakistan, says Chadda. Indian officials view their Muslim neighbor (pop.: 100 million) as a constant threat to India's 763 million, primarily Hindu, people. The countries clash over territorial rights in Kashmir, nuclear issues, and Pakistan's support of India's Sikh extremists, who assassinated Indira Gandhi in 1984. But the White House continues to view Pakistan, bordering on both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, as an ally. Thus, unlike India, which received 82 percent of its arms from Moscow between 1976 and 1980, Pakistan is U.S.-supplied. It received U.S. aid worth \$4.02 billion in 1986; India got \$311,000.

While U.S. policy makers must consider several factors—including the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet attempt to subjugate Afghanistan—in formulating Asian policy, the Indians' main concerns are the security of their Chinese and Pakistani borders. "Strategic ties," remarks Chadda, "are forged in response to a perception of common threats. India and the U.S. do not share common threats." The basic Asian political alignments—U.S.-China-Pakistan, and USSR-India-Afghanistan—remain.

### *The Carrier Gamble*

"Large Carriers: A Matter of Time" by Commander E. J. Ortlieb, in *Proceedings* (Oct. 1986), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 21402.

The U.S. Navy has worked hard to prolong the life of its capital ships, big aircraft carriers. The 15 behemoths now in commission—with nearly 100 aircraft and more than 6,000 crewmen apiece—will serve 40-plus years.

That worries Ortlieb, a systems analyst and retired submarine officer. Given the ships' longevity, he says, the Navy's goals of operating 15 carrier battle groups—a carrier plus supporting craft—and building new carriers until "at least" the late 1990s means that such vessels will remain America's capital ships "for another half-century." Is that wise? he asks.


Carrier defenders say that the ships are irreplaceable; for instance, U.S. power in the Middle East is projected mainly by carrier groups in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. And modern carriers have jet aircraft, nuclear power, and the protection of Aegis cruisers and nuclear attack submarines. Critics point out that carriers face modern *threats* (e.g., homing torpedoes, missiles), and that their survivability has not been tested in combat since World War II.

Ortlieb adds another worry, a historical one: the shrinking time between a weapon's dominance and its decline. Consider, he says:

- The galley ruled the Mediterranean for 1,000 years, as did the Norse longboat elsewhere. But sailing warships made both extinct.
- Steam-driven ironclads outmoded sailing ships within 400 years.
- As the dreadnought ushered in the era of heavily armored, center-line-gun battleships, ironclads became obsolete within 60 years.
- World War II carriers dethroned battleships within 40 years.

A sure sign that "doom is approaching" for a naval weapon, Ortlieb

## FOREIGN POLICY &amp; DEFENSE



*Could many low-cost mini-carriers do the work of a few big ones? Proponents of SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) craft, like the one depicted here by Morgan Wilbur, say that they have the needed large-ship stability.*

argues, is when its “de facto mission has become survival”—which is true, he says, of the heavily defended modern carrier battle group. Thus, the last Mediterranean galleys were huge, “with several hundred galley slaves and hundreds of troops.” The sailing ship “met its fate as an elaborate, ornate, 100–120 gun, 1,000-man ship of the line.” The last battleships carried almost 3,000 men and “bristled with anti-aircraft batteries.”

Each of “the queens,” notes Ortlieb, “fell victim to longer-range offensive systems.” Only “events” will show if carriers can defy history.

### A Smart NATO?

“How the Next War Will Be Fought” by Frank Barnaby, in *Technology Review* (Oct. 1986), Rm. 10–140, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Western Europe are outnumbered—in troops, tanks, and other categories—by the Warsaw Pact forces they face. Thus, should Soviet Bloc units attempt even a non-nuclear attack, NATO’s present policy is to respond quickly with tactical atomic weapons, even at the risk of starting a wider nuclear war.

Barnaby, a physicist and chairman of Just Defence, a British group that promotes *nonnuclear* military strength, argues that this policy is outdated. New weapons—notably “smart” missiles—can stop any nonnuclear assault. A “non-provocative” NATO posture based on such weapons, he