



The Hiroshima Prefecture Industrial Promotion Building, one year after the August 6, 1945, explosion of a U.S. atomic bomb directly overhead. The blast, equivalent in explosive power to 20,000 tons of TNT, killed 75,000 Japanese and leveled much of the city.

America's Peace Movement 1900–1986

Since it emerged as a serious political force after the trauma of World War I, the heterogeneous American peace movement has often tapped widespread popular longings: for a world without war, for an end to costly U.S. interventions overseas, and, most recently, for relief from the nuclear threat.

Such sentiments have been understood by U.S. presidents. "I am a pacifist," declared Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940. "We are all pacifists." Peace, observed John F. Kennedy in 1962, "is the rational end of rational men." Long before his Reykjavik meeting last October with Mikhail Gorbachav, Ronald Reagan told a Eureka College audience: "Peace remains our highest aspiration."

In fact, since Hiroshima, world peace of a sort has been maintained in the shadow of the Bomb. Despite an arms race, Soviet expansionism, and bitter local conflicts (e.g., Korea, Vietnam), World War III has not erupted. America's NATO partners in Western Europe remain free and unscathed. Since the tense 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviets have avoided direct confrontation and they have taken some steps (e.g., improving the East-West "hot line") to keep it that way. Deep differences in ideology, national purpose, and behavior divide the superpowers; men still die in battle (Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua); but the whole world is not engulfed.

How has the peace movement affected America's role in the world? Since 1900, its supporters have included many of the nation's notables—Mark Twain, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, Albert Einstein, Benjamin Spock. Its allies, at times, have included leaders in both parties and in the White House. Its varied, often controversial, teachings have helped shape America's political culture to the present day. Here our contributors examine the peace movement's genteel beginnings, its strong impact before World War II, its stormy evolution in the Nuclear Age.

‘BRIDLING THE PASSIONS’

by Ralph D. Nurnberger


June 28, 1914. Sarajevo, capital of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serbian terrorist organization the Black Hand, shot Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. The death of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary set off a chain reaction. By late August, most of Europe was engaged in World War I. The ultimate victims of Princip's revolver would be more than eight million war dead—and the dreams of the leaders of a trans-Atlantic peace movement that had been growing, particularly in America.

Americans at first believed that, as President Woodrow Wilson insisted, the war was one “whose causes cannot touch us.” The U.S. press displayed what the *Literary Digest* called a “cheering assurance that we are in no peril” of being drawn into Europe's bloody quarrel. “Peace-loving citizens,” said the *Chicago Herald*, owe “a hearty thanks to Columbus for having discovered America.”

Indeed, “peace” was a flourishing cause in the United States on the eve of the Great War. Since 1900, nearly 50 new peace organizations had appeared, among them groups endowed by Boston publisher Edward Ginn (the World Peace Society) and Scottish-born steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, whose benefactions had been capped by a \$10 million gift in 1910 to establish the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie thought the Endowment, based in Washington, D.C., could help government officials hasten “the abolition of international war,” the “foulest blot” on civilization. As late as 1913, the editors of the *Peace Forum* could declare war obsolete: Statesmen “realize how ruinous it could be for them to fight.”

Thus August 1914 was doubly shocking to peace advocates. The Reverend Frederick Lynch, head of the Church Peace Union, a U.S. organization of antiwar clergymen recently launched with a \$2 million Carnegie gift, thought that the world had “gone mad.” James Brown Scott, secretary of the Carnegie Endowment, felt “dazed.”

The peace movement had grown up at a time of ferment. Europe, that ancient cockpit of conflict, had survived almost a century without prolonged armed confrontation (the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1870–71 had failed to ignite a larger conflict). While the Great Powers were occupied with empire-building, science and technology had brought such advances as Charles Darwin's ideas on evolution, Max Planck's quantum theory of energy (1900), and Albert Einstein's theory of relativity (1905), as well as



Planting a "Peace Tree," Washington, D.C., 1910. The men at center—Andrew Carnegie, President William H. Taft (with spade), Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, and Elihu Root—aimed to end all war by "arbitration."

ways of making steel and steam and internal-combustion engines. Still, there was reason to share Henrik Ibsen's fear that the rapidly advancing world was "sailing with a corpse in the cargo."

The ambitious Germans were building a large navy, and along with their neighbors were embracing such military innovations as conscription (used by all the Continental powers after 1871), the torpedo, the mine, the machine gun, and smokeless gunpowder (patented by Alfred Nobel between 1887 and 1891). *The Future of War* (1902), by Polish scholar Ivan Bloch, and *The Great Illusion* (1910), by British economist Norman Angell, argued that armed conflicts would henceforth engulf whole nations. To Angell, war was now unthinkable; to Bloch, it was "impossible except at the price of suicide."

Across the Atlantic, immigration and industrialization were re-drawing the social landscape in the United States.

From only 35,000 miles at the end of the Civil War in 1865, U.S. railroads had grown to nearly 200,000 miles of track by 1900. As Americans moved West, new arrivals landed in force; nearly 1,285,000, mostly from Eastern Europe, debarked during 1907 alone. Between 1880 and 1910 the urban population tripled to 45 million; by 1920, most Americans were city and town dwellers. As

demands increased for better housing, improved working conditions, and access to political power, reformers launched the Progressive Era. Civic clubs, church groups, and new mass-market magazines like *Collier's* and *McClure's* all embraced what Kansas editor William Allen White called "the cult of the hour," a faith "in the essential nobility of man and the wisdom of God." Human progress was possible if the proper mechanisms could be put to work.

Reformers like Jane Addams set up settlement houses to help the urban poor; muckraking journalists investigated the sources and uses of wealth; unions sought to upgrade labor conditions; the Women's Christian Temperance Union took on "Demon Rum." But of all the reform goals, "peace" was the most socially respectable.

'Cult of Cranks'

Peace had been a human preoccupation for centuries, of course, going back well before St. Augustine's fifth-century assertion that "it is more honorable to destroy war by persuasion than to destroy men by the sword." In America, peace had first been the province of such religious sects as the Mennonites, the Brethren, and the Society of Friends (Quakers). Secular interest in peace appeared early.* But the *organized* movement began in 1815, with the founding of "peace societies" in New York by David Low Dodge and in Massachusetts by Noah Worcester. Both grew out of Northern opposition to the inconclusive struggle with Britain in the War of 1812. The Massachusetts group became part of the New England-based American Peace Society, launched in 1828 by William Ladd.

The Civil War divided Ladd's group, many of whose members backed the Union for its antislavery stance. Alfred Love, a deeply pacifist Quaker wool merchant, broke away to start a rival Universal Peace Union in 1866. By 1890, the "movement" consisted mainly of the American Peace Society, Love's group, and a few even smaller organizations. Most Americans were uninterested in the cause.

But by the late 19th century America was becoming a world power. Commodore Matthew C. Perry's ships had opened Japan to the West, financiers like J. Pierpont Morgan were forging links with European capital, and the 1898 Spanish-American War, highlighted by easy naval victories in Cuba and the Philippines, seemed to show

*Benjamin Rush, the Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence, proposed a cabinet-rank secretary of peace in 1789.

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that America could play a global role, as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) said it must. The movement's aims grew beyond mere opposition to violence; indeed, a new generation of peace-group leaders often disdained "pacifists." Inspired as much as unnerved by technology, these leaders sought "practical" and "scientific" means of barring wars. And, they felt, their country was now strong enough to be heard.

The movement's ideas—that nations would abide by codes of international conduct; that U.S. democratic traditions would keep America out of "unjust" wars and permit combat only to preserve freedom—reflected the convictions of its upper-middle-class leadership. Members of peace societies were mostly Northeastern, Anglo-Saxon, and well educated; nearly two-thirds had professional degrees. They shared a faith that Americans, at least those like themselves, were morally blessed and could show others (especially the Europeans) how to avoid conflict. Peace, wrote Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, in 1911, was "a practical political issue," one on which "it seems destined that America should lead." The peace movement was "no longer a little cult of cranks."

Musing on Lake Mohonk

Typically, its leaders had come to prominence during the business expansion of the late 19th-century Gilded Age, a term coined by one of Andrew Carnegie's confidants, Mark Twain. Few were veterans of war or the tempering trials of elective politics. But they were men used to telling others what was best for them.

Educators like Stanford's president David Starr Jordan and Columbia's Nicholas Murray Butler, who scorned the "useless sentimentalism" of older peace societies, joined the movement to stress *rational* solutions to international problems. Editors and publicists (Holt, Edwin D. Mead) promoted peace proposals. Lawyers, viewing peace as a legal challenge, were much in evidence.

None were more so than Elihu Root, a New York corporate attorney who served presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt as secretary of war (1899–1904) and state (1905–09). "Square Root" was stern, aloof, and a brilliant administrator, "the wisest man I ever knew," said Roosevelt. Around him grew a "Root cult" of lawyers and State Department officials like James Brown Scott, a former law professor, absorbed with peace-through-law ideas. During the years before World War I, these "legalists" dominated the movement. Their views captivated the man who did most to give the peace cause visibility, Andrew Carnegie.

Carnegie arrived in America in 1848, and started out as a \$1.20-a-week bobbin boy. By the century's end, the mills he built in the Pittsburgh area produced a fourth of the nation's Bessemer steel

and profits above \$40 million a year (in pre-income tax days). Carnegie's largesse to the cause of peace began even before the 1901 sale of his business for \$480 million to J. P. Morgan, which made Carnegie (said Morgan) the "richest man in the world." More than his money, Carnegie's personal force and his contacts with political leaders in America and Europe lent respectability to the movement.

Like other peace leaders, Carnegie shared the social-Darwinist philosophy that the strongest and "best" elements in society would thrive. He regarded Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals as the glory of civilization; wherever they were adopted, peace and order would follow. Among those who agreed were Alfred and Albert Smiley, Quakers and ardent Progressives who owned a hotel on upper New York State's Lake Mohonk, where they had often held conferences on improving conditions for Indians and Negroes. Persuaded that the old peace societies' lack of influence stemmed from their habit of decrying war without proposing remedies, the brothers hosted a meeting on peace in June 1895. The educators, editors, lawyers, businessmen, clergy, politicians, and generals invited were directed not to dwell on the "horrors of war or the doctrine of 'peace at all hazards.'" They should explore "scientific" ways of settling disputes.

Remember the *Alabama*

New York University Law School dean Austin Abbot argued that conflicts should be "submitted to human reason, and some competent arbiter shall decide what is right." At length, the conferees agreed that "the feasibility of arbitration as a substitute for war is now demonstrated." The Smileys decided to make the "Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration" an annual event, at which guests in black tie could carry on their deliberations while invigorated by fine cuisine and the bracing Catskill Mountains air.

Arbitration was not a new idea. During the fourth century B.C. the Greek historian Thucydides described as "criminal" nations that would not submit disputes to a "tribunal offering a righteous judgment." In 1306 a Norman lawyer, Pierre Dubois, called for a Congress of States, a court of arbitration that could use economic and military sanctions to maintain peace. In America, by the late 19th century the settlement of labor issues by third parties had won acceptance. Arbitration had also been used in international disputes.

One example was the *Alabama* case, involving a U.S. claim against Britain for damage caused during the Civil War by a Confederate raiding ship that sailed with British crewmen and arms. Eager to restore good relations with Washington, the British dropped an earlier refusal to arbitrate (because "national honor" was involved). In 1872 an arbitral commission awarded the U.S. government \$15.5 million for losses wrought by several British-backed raiders. America

and Britain, Carnegie asserted, had "taught the world Arbitration."

Even as the Smileys' guests were conferring at Lake Mohonk in 1895, President Grover Cleveland's Democratic administration jumped into a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana (now Guyana) that London had refused to arbitrate. Cleveland was harassed both by charges that he was pro-British (anathema to Irish-American Democrats) and by congressional calls for arbitration. His secretary of state, Richard Olney, told London that under the Monroe Doctrine America was "practically sovereign" in the Western Hemisphere, and hinted that Congress would demand military action if the British did not arbitrate. When Lord Salisbury, the prime minister, demurred, Cleveland announced that Washington would decide the border issue and view British failure to comply as aggression.

The Lake Mohonk conferees, seeing Anglo-American rapprochement as a key to world peace, urged the two countries to negotiate an arbitration treaty covering future disputes. Although Salisbury thought arbitration "one of the great nostrums of the age," Britain was approaching a war with the Boers in South Africa. Peace with Washington looked attractive. In January 1897, Olney concluded an arbitration pact with the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote. Although the newly elected Republican president, William McKinley, endorsed it, the Senate rejected the treaty, out of a concern that it would limit U.S. sovereignty. Still, U.S. peace advocates saw the Olney-Pauncefote accord as a model for the future.

40 Bishops, 27 Millionaires

Indeed, "peace" seemed to be gaining momentum.

The year 1897 also brought Alfred Nobel's endowment of an international peace prize. With military costs soaring, in 1898 the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, invited all nations to a conference the following year to discuss "the great idea of universal peace."

Although that year would also see the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the conflict hardly ruffled U.S. peace advocates. A few pacifists were opposed; Alfred Love was burned in effigy in Philadelphia for his pains. But the jingoist view of McKinley's secretary of state John Hay that the fight against Spanish imperial oppression was "splendid" was widely shared. To American Peace Society secretary Benjamin Trueblood, the war was "a temporary disturbance." The Mormon Church, ending a half-century of pacifism, supported McKinley. Suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton said that "though I hate war," she would be "glad" to see Spain "swept from the face of the earth."

Focusing on the tsar's conference, due to convene in The Hague in May 1899, Boston clergyman Edward Everett Hale and publicist Edwin Mead began a journal, the *Peace Crusade*, to tout the event and build support for an international arbitration panel. At the confer-

HENRY FORD'S 'PEACE SHIP'

On November 24, 1915, at New York City's Biltmore Hotel, automaker Henry Ford faced waiting newsmen. "We're going to try to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas!" he announced. "I've chartered a ship and some of us are going to Europe." Ford's ultimate aim: "To stop war for all times."

So began a strange 17-month odyssey. Shocked by the carnage of World War I and fearful that America would join it, Ford aimed to end the European conflagration with "faith and moral suasion." He would set up a conference of nonbelligerents who would keep sending peace proposals to the combatants—too proud to cease fire on their own—until acceptable terms were found.

The idea had come out of the International Congress of Women held earlier that year at The Hague. One participant, a stout Hungarian feminist-pacifist divorcée named Rosika Schwimmer, went to the United States to seek sponsorship. The Wilson White House turned her down. Not so Ford, who, at age 52, was so horrified by the war that he would "give all my money—and my life—to stop it." At the Biltmore, Ford said he had asked 100 "representative Americans"—state governors, businessmen, educators, peace workers—to join the conference project. Press coverage of the "flivver diplomacy" plan was unflattering. One headline: FORD CHARTERS ARK, PLANS RAID ON TRENCHES. Said a Boston *Traveler* editorial: "It is not Mr. Ford's purpose to make peace; he will assemble it." Although such invitees as Harvey Firestone, Helen Keller, and Luther Burbank wished Ford well, the only acceptee who was well known in Europe was Chicago reformer Jane Addams.

The "Ford Peace Ship"—the Scandinavian American Line's *Oscar II*—sailed from Hoboken on December 4, as a dockside band played "I Didn't Raise My Boy To Be a Soldier" and cheers rose from a crowd that included Thomas Edison and William Jennings Bryan. But during the 15-day voyage to Christiania (now Oslo), Norway, the 143 peace pilgrims—Ford and 68 conference delegates, 35 students, 28 journalists, and 11 hangers-on—were embroiled in what a news dispatch from the ship called "teapot tempests and hencoop hurricanes" on various issues. The delegates included "name" folk like Addams and *McClure's Magazine* publisher S. S. McClure, but most were obscure writers, teachers, clergymen, and activists—"the queerest lot,"

ence, the 26 delegations responded to the urging of the U.S. representative, former Cornell president Andrew D. White, to "give the world" the beginning of a "practical scheme of arbitration." A "Permanent Court of Arbitration" was created where countries could have disputes settled by third-party judges selected from a list. The American Peace Society's president, Robert Treat Paine, descendant of a signer of the Declaration of Independence, thought the Hague meeting transcended "any human event which has ever taken place."

There were many doubters, among them Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded McKinley as president in 1901. A strong navy and an "efficient, though small army" were still vital, he said. "No

wrote one observer, *New York Times* correspondent Elmer Davis.

Put off by the advance publicity—including the revelation that a “black bag” that Schwimmer carried did not, as intimated, contain messages of support by officials of the warring nations—European pacifists refused to embrace the expedition in Norway. Ford, weary of the squabbling and pleading influenza, sailed back to New York four days after *Oscar*'s arrival. As Schwimmer, styling herself the group's “expert adviser,” led a tour of neutral countries in search of backing, troubles mounted. The secretary of the Anti-War Council, an influential peace society based in the Netherlands, wrote to Ford that he was “familiar with Mrs. Schwimmer and her ways,” and was wary of extending any cooperation.

In February 1916, Schwimmer et al., having recruited unofficial representatives from Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, organized the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation in Stockholm. After much wrangling, the delegates composed an *Appeal to the Belligerents* calling for, among other things, the creation of a world congress. The Appeal, like the conference itself, was well publicized—and ignored by both the Allies and their foes.

Back home, Ford soon forgot the peace mission. He had opposed military preparedness—“No boy would ever kill a bird if he didn't first have a sling-shot or a gun.” But, in February 1917, when Germany announced all-out submarine warfare in the Atlantic, he assured President Wilson that Ford plants would produce arms if needed. The mission was told that all Ford funding—he spent \$520,000—would be cut off on March 1. Six weeks after the end of what newsmen dubbed Ford's “grand tour pacifism”—and historian Walter Millis called “one of the few really generous and rational impulses of those insane years”—America was at war and the Yanks were bound for the battlefields of Europe.



Rosika Schwimmer

Hague Court will save us if we come short in these respects.” Privately, he disliked “the Carnegie crowd” and thought arbitration “nonsense.” With peace as with temperance, he wrote, the “professional advocates” tended toward “a peculiarly annoying form of egotistic lunacy.” Still, in 1905 Roosevelt cheered those advocates by naming as his secretary of state Elihu Root, who set about preparing for the second Hague conference, due in 1907.

As it approached, peace advocates held rallies in Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis, and San Francisco. A four-day National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York, underwritten by Carnegie, drew more than 40,000 observers; the 1,253 delegates, among them eight

cabinet members, two former presidential candidates, four Supreme Court justices, 19 members of Congress, 40 bishops, 10 mayors, 60 newspaper editors, 18 college and university presidents, and 27 millionaires, shuttled among sessions in Carnegie Hall and banquets at the Astor Hotel. Reflecting Root's influence, TR's message to the meeting endorsed arbitration as the best method "now attainable" for ending disputes. Washington would seek "a general arbitration treaty" and "power and permanency" for the Hague Court.

Root, Scott, and other legalists valued arbitration as a step toward a formal international court with permanent judges and an accepted legal code. Wars, Root argued, were best prevented not by arbiters, but by rulings on "questions of fact and law in accordance with rules of justice." Yet the 1907 Hague conference did not create a world court; delegates could not agree on how to select judges.

Taft's Lament

The legalists did not abandon that goal. But for the time being Root's focus shifted to bilateral arbitration treaties. A series of them (with Britain and six other countries) had been negotiated by Secretary Hay, and amended into meaninglessness by the Senate. Root felt that even weak pacts were better than none. He negotiated 24 that the Senate accepted; the treaties were watered down to exempt disputes affecting the "vital interests, independence, or honor" of the involved nations.

Prospects for arbitration rose after William Howard Taft, a conservative lawyer with close ties to the peace movement, succeeded Roosevelt in 1909. In a remarkable New York speech that year, Taft embraced treaties that did *not* exempt disputes involving "national honor" or "vital interests." Unlimited arbitration of international disputes "will be the great jewel of my administration," said Taft.

Carnegie, not previously a strong Taft backer, was thrilled. "No words from any Ruler of our time," he wrote the president, were so "laden with precious fruit." He decided to back Taft's treaties, and to finance a study/advocacy foundation, the Carnegie Endowment.

Although Taft did conclude general arbitration pacts with Britain and France, the president had mixed feelings on arbitration as a means of preventing war. It was "strange," Taft said later. In espousing arbitration even on matters of national honor, "I had no definite policy in view. I was inclined, if I remember rightly, merely to offset the antagonism [in Congress] to the four [new] battleships for which I was then fighting, and I threw that suggestion out merely to draw the sting of old Carnegie and other peace cranks." Now it was becoming "the main fact" of his term.

Taft campaigned in 24 states for his treaties, which the *Los Angeles Times* had called the most praiseworthy presidential initia-

tive since the Emancipation Proclamation. The opposition was led by Roosevelt, Mahan, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-Mass.). Lodge disliked both "mushy philanthropists" and the notion of creating a body that "might consist of foreigners" assuming powers that rightly belonged to "the President and the Senate." Roosevelt felt that the nation should never arbitrate matters "respecting its honor, independence, and integrity." Ending his friendship with Taft, TR ran against him as a "Bull Moose" Progressive in the 1912 presidential campaign.

In the Senate, Lodge led efforts to amend the arbitration pacts to death before passage. Then both Taft and TR lost the 1912 race to Democrat Woodrow Wilson. As for the treaties, Taft lamented that he hoped "the senators might change their minds, or that the people might change the Senate; instead of which they changed me."

Despite their setbacks at The Hague and at home, the legalists' influence in the movement expanded. Root and Scott had launched the American Society of International Law in 1906; Scott edited the *American Journal of International Law*. In 1907 Root helped establish an international court: the Central American Court of Justice, a regional dispute-settling body. Scott and Baltimore lawyer Theodore Marburg formed the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in 1910; that year Root was made the Carnegie Endowment's first president, and in 1912 he became the first sitting or former U.S. secretary of state to win the Nobel Peace Prize.* Carnegie funds flowed to other organizations, such as the American Peace Society, which set up a Washington headquarters.

Swords into Plowshares

The arbitration advocates and legalists enjoyed proximity to power. Root once said that the Carnegie Endowment was "almost a division of the State Department, working in harmony [with it] constantly." But Woodrow Wilson's arrival in the White House was unsettling. Peace leaders, while pleased with Wilson's moralistic approach to foreign policy, were not sure where he stood. He had joined the American Peace Society, but he had not been active in the movement or comfortable with its leaders' hopes for arbitration and a world court.

When Wilson, as president, sent troops in 1914 to settle a border dispute with Mexico, some peace leaders called for arbitration (though most did not; nationalism seemed more important, particularly in the case of a smaller nation in the Western Hemisphere). They did not hail Wilson's choice as secretary of state: Indiana-born William Jennings Bryan, the three-time Democratic presidential can-

*The others: Frank B. Kellogg (1929), Cordell Hull (1945), George C. Marshall (1953), Henry A. Kissinger (1973). The only U.S. presidential winners: Theodore Roosevelt (1906) and Woodrow Wilson (1919).

didate and eccentric "Prince of Peace," who liked to give supporters miniature plowshares made from a melted-down sword. Bryan's favored antiwar device was "conciliation treaties," which would have nations submit disputes to an international commission for investigation before going to war; as he saw it, the study period, usually about a year, would allow passions to fade and peace to prevail.*

After August 1914, everything changed, including the peace movement.

Initially, the mainstream peace leaders and organizations opposed American intervention in the war. But they soon favored U.S. participation to save the hard-pressed British and French, to defend the idea of international law. The Carnegie Endowment, the American Peace Society, the Church Peace Union, and the New York Peace Society were all ahead of Wilson as he gradually veered from peace candidate in 1916 (his reelection slogan: "He Kept Us Out of War") to warrior in April 1917, when he committed the nation to a struggle that would "vindicate the principles of peace and justice."

Women, Wobblies, Social Workers

Many Progressives, worried that a war effort would eclipse domestic reform, also veered around—with a nudge from philosopher John Dewey. He wrote in the *New Republic* that the war had come at a "plastic juncture" in history and could well yield benefits, such as progress in "science for social purposes." The mainstream press, especially after America declared war on Germany, was not gentle to diehard peace advocates. When Columbia fired two faculty members for opposing the sending of conscripts to Europe, the *New York Times* said that the university had "done its duty."

With the peace establishment's turn toward intervention, antiwar activity was increasingly dominated by political figures previously not active on foreign policy issues—notably on the Left.

Among them was labor organizer Eugene V. Debs, founder of the American Socialist Party and the International Workers of the World (the "Wobblies"), who opposed U.S. involvement in the European struggle. He was jailed for three years after giving an antiwar speech in 1918, joining more than 1,500 other Americans arrested under a wartime antisediton law. Women's rights activists concentrated on peace questions: Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Anna Howard Shaw opposed what Catt called the movement's "over-masculinized management." A Woman's Peace Party emerged in 1915. That year, too, New York City social workers, socialists, and union members formed the American

*Bryan negotiated several such "cooling-off" treaties, but World War I erupted as they were being signed. Britain signed less than a month after the shooting began. (The Germans never signed, but Bryan somehow felt they had endorsed his idea "in principle.")

Union to agitate against any U.S. military build-up. But they were not the kindred spirits of the lawyers and legalists who had sought to eliminate war before 1914. Nor did they ever command a wide following among intellectuals and prominent politicians; their turn would come much later.

Essentially, the "establishment" peace advocates like Root, Scott, Holt, Carnegie, and Butler were *conservative* reformers. They hoped to maintain the relative stability in Great Power relations that had marked the late 19th century, and firmly believed that the use of Anglo-American legal concepts could accomplish that. During the deceptive calm of the prewar years, they had become increasingly optimistic, encouraged by their own prestige and the acceptance of many of their proposals by high U.S. officials. But while they considered themselves "internationalists," they ignored violence in colonial areas, accepted U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and, most important, failed to recognize Europe's growing rivalries and the rise of German militarism.

For a time, their views were often echoed abroad. Three years before Sarajevo, the London Peace Society's secretary declared that "never were Peace prospects so promising." But those who dealt with the world as it was saw things differently. Speaking of arbitration, Lord Salisbury expressed amazement at "those who could have believed in such an expedient for bridling the ferocity of human passions."

Elihu Root, as president of the Carnegie Endowment board until 1925, continued to believe. So did James Brown Scott and Nicholas Murray Butler. Looking to the future, when Europe was in flames early in 1915, ex-president Taft, Hamilton Holt, Theodore Marburg, and Harvard's president A. Lawrence Lowell established the League to Enforce Peace, dedicated to devising measures (e.g., economic sanctions) to *compel* compliance with the verdicts of a world court. Among those opposed was Root, who had been awarded his Nobel Prize in part for his work on arbitration.

As World War I raged on, Root and James Brown Scott remained convinced that "world opinion" would supply all the enforcement power an international court might need. However, like many others, Andrew Carnegie, who died at 83 in 1919, the year after the Armistice, never recovered from the shock of 1914. "All my air-castles," he said, "have fallen about me like a house of cards."

BETWEEN THE WARS

by Robert Woito

Europe, 1940. In a stunning blitzkrieg, German troops invaded Denmark and Norway in April, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in May. The British force in France, cut off from its French allies, was evacuated from Dunkirk, leaving most of its equipment behind.

As Hitler's Panzers drove toward Paris, Winston Churchill, the new British prime minister, made a desperate plea. He secretly asked President Franklin D. Roosevelt to declare an emergency and lend warships, aircraft, and other arms to Britain. Roosevelt was sympathetic. But "neutrality" laws passed by Congress were an obstacle. Churchill warned that delay might bring a British government that would *not* fight. By June 12th, when Paris fell, FDR's dilemma was acute. Should America abandon Britain and prepare to defend the Western Hemisphere? Or should it aid the British and hope that they could hang on? There were not enough U.S. arms to do both.

Resisting pressure from isolationists, peace movement leaders, and pessimists like Joseph P. Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, who thought Britain a lost cause, Roosevelt decided to send aid. Between June and October 1940, some 970,000 rifles, 200,500 revolvers, 87,500 machine guns, 895 75-mm artillery pieces, 316 mortars, and ammunition were shipped to Britain. After obtaining from London a pledge that Britain's fleet would never be surrendered, and obtaining the use of bases in Newfoundland and Britain's Caribbean isles, Roosevelt bypassed Congress to transfer 50 aging U.S. destroyers to the Royal Navy by presidential order.

The drama helped to expose America's unpreparedness. As late as July 1940, the American army, with 291,031 men (and 350 usable tanks), was not much larger than the Belgian army, which had succumbed to the Nazis in a few days. The nation's unreadiness had many causes. U.S. military strategy had been based on a World War I model that assumed a ground stalemate in Europe and British control of the Atlantic. And after the Great War, a disenchantment with European politics had set in among Americans, who came to view that conflict as a blunder from which European leaders had learned little. When the Depression struck, the economic crisis reinforced this isolationist impulse.

Perhaps most important, as we shall see, a small band of peace movement leaders succeeded in shaping the U.S. approach to world politics. Their constituency expanded to include mainstream business, educational, women's, and world affairs organizations. Their goals



"Come on in, I'll Treat You Right. I Used to Know Your Daddy." In 1937, when the New York Daily News ran this cartoon by Clarence D. Batchelor, conflict loomed in Europe and Asia, but memories of World War I were still powerful. Batchelor's work won a Pulitzer Prize.

became U.S. policy in the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact "outlawing" war and in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. Yet their failure to recognize the true face of totalitarianism, and their perennial discomfort with the reality of power in world politics, had much to do with the crisis that Roosevelt faced in 1940, as Hitler gazed across the English Channel, a conquered Europe at his back.

For two decades, the peace movement had capitalized on the backlash of U.S. public opinion against World War I. The war to make "the world safe for democracy" had seen the fall of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg dynasties—and U.S. troops had tipped the balance in favor of the Allies in 1917–18. But little more than 12 months of combat had cost America 116,516 dead and more than \$30 billion.

World War I was the first modern war. Before it, as Paul Fussell has written, the word "machine" had a positive connotation; it was "not yet inevitably coupled with the word *gun*," as it would be after horrors like the Second Battle of the Marne, in which 280,000 men perished in twenty days. The barbed-wire realities of trench warfare shredded Wilsonian idealism. As Hemingway would write in *A Farewell to Arms* (1929), "abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments,

and the dates." Antiwar novels such as Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) became best sellers.

The Treaty of Versailles mocked President Wilson's promise of "peace without victory." The victors imposed a reparation debt of \$33 billion on Germany, helping to frustrate the nascent German democracy and fuel a desire for revenge. And Britain and France ignored the Wilsonian principle of self-determination by dividing up Germany's colonies. Wilson *did* get the Allies to create a League of Nations, which would provide for collective security against aggressor states. But he could not win Senate approval of the League Covenant. His hopes for U.S. participation in the League (and the World Court at The Hague) were dashed by forces led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-Mass.), who saw the League as dominated by European powers who had stumbled into war in the first place.

A Naval 'Holiday'

In 1920, an electorate weary of the sacrifices required by the pursuit of idealistic world goals turned against Wilson's Democrats and elected Republican Warren G. Harding, who promised "not nostrums but normalcy." The United States was soon launched on what F. Scott Fitzgerald would call the "gaudiest spree in history." Industrial growth, the Tin Lizzie, jazz, and the booming stock market signaled what Harding's successor, Calvin Coolidge, called "a state of contentment seldom before seen."

Not everyone was as content as Silent Cal thought. The Senate's rejection of the League gave new impetus to the formation of peace advocacy organizations like the League of Nations Association and foreign affairs education groups like the Council on Foreign Relations. Three months after the Armistice, the American Union Against Militarism persuaded Congress to reject the War Department's proposal for compulsory military training. The Great War had already given birth to the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). But the main instrument for broadening the movement was the National Council for the Prevention of War (NCPW), launched in 1921 by Frederick Libby, a Maine-born Quaker and Congregational minister who had served with the Friends' relief group in France.

Libby wanted to unite what he saw as the big five natural opponents of war—farmers, churchmen, women, labor union members, and educators—behind such goals as arms reduction and "the sub-

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stitution of law for war." He recruited 26 major organizations as NCPW members, among them the Foreign Policy Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National League of Women Voters, and the National Education Association (NEA). With a board that included such notables as Mrs. Louis Brandeis and Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, and a Washington staff of 52 and six regional offices, the NCPW promoted its views via its member groups. The NEA, for example, reevaluated how war/peace issues were treated in high school textbooks and urged teachers to talk about Woodrow Wilson's ideals and about arbitration of international disputes.

To be sure, the new peace groups had opposition. The Navy League, for instance, was created in 1920 to counter the postwar "tide of anti-preparedness and pacifism." But President Harding courted the peace lobby, and pressed the first U.S. attempt at strategic arms control, a nine-nation conference on curbing the size of navies, held in Washington in 1921.

The conference led to treaties under which the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan agreed to a 10-year "holiday" from the building of capital ships (battleships and aircraft carriers) and set limits on the size and number of such vessels.* The treaties, widely hailed as a triumph for peace, in fact were gravely flawed. They imposed no limits on smaller ships, such as submarines. The lack of enforcement provisions made their violation by the Japanese a simple matter. (The Germans, who agreed to similar terms in a 1935 treaty, also cheated with impunity.) Yet, this first effort at arms limitation was popular with Americans; Congress did not authorize Navy ship construction up to the treaty limits until the eve of World War II.

Enter the Left

President Coolidge, in his turn, paid heed to the peace movement. When Mexico's nationalization of U.S. oil and mining properties stirred talk of war, pressure from Protestant clergy and pacifist groups prompted the Senate to call for arbitration, and Coolidge went along. Coolidge retained enough leeway, however, to dispatch the Marines in 1927 to end a generals' rebellion in Nicaragua.†

Developments overseas should have given pause to the peace movement. At the end of the decade, Adolf Hitler took control of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany. In Italy, Benito Mussolini dissolved

*New capital ships were limited to 35,000 tons displacement each, and an overall tonnage ratio of 5:5:3 was set for Britain, the United States, and Japan; i.e., the British and Americans could each have capital ships totaling 525,000 tons, and the Japanese could have 315,000 tons. France and Italy were limited to one-third of the U.S. and British tonnage, or 175,000 tons each.

†There were few protests from pacifists. But one of the rebel generals, Cesar Augusto Sandino, who fled to the hills to launch an abortive guerrilla campaign, was hailed as a hero by the U.S. Communist Party and by the pacifist editor of the *Nation*, Oswald Garrison Villard.

parliament and established his fascist dictatorship in 1928. That year, in the Far East, Japanese forces made their first moves toward an invasion of Manchuria. But Americans, said the *Philadelphia Record*, "don't give a hoot in a rainbarrel who controls North China."

The peace movement reached its diplomatic apogee in 1928-29. In Paris, a 15-nation conference adopted the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, drafted by U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg. In all, 62 countries agreed to "renounce war" and settle disputes by "pacific means." The Senate added reservations to U.S. ratification: No one *had* to act in case of a treaty violation, and Washington would reserve the right to interpret the pact's application in the Western Hemisphere. Skeptics like Senator Carter Glass (D.-Va.) viewed the treaty as "worthless, but perfectly harmless." But peace leaders such as the FOR's Kirby Page were euphoric: "Delegalizing war," he said, was the movement's "most vital" idea yet.

With Kellogg-Briand, pacifists like Page and Libby believed that their no-more-war goals were in sight. To liberal internationalists, such as James Brown Scott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Clark Eichelberger, influential head of the Chicago office of the League of Nations Association, the 1920s had been a less



In February 1941, a "Mother's Crusade" prayed that Congress would not send Lend-Lease aid to Britain. Yet, asked a Presbyterian Tribune editorial, "what do pacifists propose while the world is under the German terror?"

auspicious decade. The Senate spurned the League of Nations; a Coolidge-led effort to bring the United States into the World Court also foundered on isolationist opposition. But neither the president nor the Congress nor the press bemoaned such setbacks.

Domestic woes dominated the headlines with the 1929 Wall Street crash and the worldwide depression. By 1932, U.S. unemployment reached some 12 million. Socialist ideas and organizations gained favor as capitalism faltered, and they fit comfortably in the peace movement. A. J. Muste, the Marxist labor organizer turned pacifist, became an FOR leader. Socialist Gus Tyler spoke for the Marxist Left when he asserted that "capitalists" would "fling workers into war." The U.S. Communist Party, obedient to Moscow, had its own League against War and Fascism, and controlled the American Student Union. The "merchants of death" analysis—which blamed the Great War on a conspiracy among munitions-makers—became popular; even business-oriented *Fortune* magazine spread the notion. But the conspiracy theory gained its greatest impact through the 1934 Nye Committee hearings on the arms industry.

That probe grew out of the joint labors of Dorothy Detzer, leader of the WILPF, and progressive Senator George Norris (R.-Neb.). They went over the Senate's 96-member roster to determine who should conduct hearings on the arms manufacturers. One by one, senators were eliminated: copper interests too strong in one state; impending elections in another; militaristic sentiment too high in a third. Finally, one name was left: Senator Gerald Nye (R.-N.D.). Detzer persuaded Nye to lead the investigation; he, in turn, let Detzer choose his committee's chief investigator, and join its staff.

FDR Afloat

Bankers like J. P. Morgan, munitions makers such as the Du Pont brothers, and others who had been involved in arming the Allies in World War I were called to testify on Capitol Hill. Every new witness seemed to confirm that a conspiracy among greedy capitalists had drawn America into the conflict. Even scholars who had once advocated U.S. intervention, like the eminent Charles Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, concluded that there had been a conspiracy. The theme of the hearings, as historian James MacGregor Burns has observed, was that "Germany was not so guilty after all. The Americans had been saps and suckers."

The Nye probe led to passage of a series of Neutrality Acts (1935-37), reluctantly signed by President Roosevelt, that made it illegal to lend money or export arms to belligerents. Initially, at least, U.S. arms could not be supplied even to *victims* of aggression.

The isolationist mood expressed by the laws reflected popular sentiments. The American Legion's motto was "Keep Out, Keep

WAR AND PEACE ON CAMPUS, 1935-41

"We consider that America is endangered. We are for American peace as part of world peace. For peace, we maintain, is indivisible."

So argued a November 1940 letter to the *Yale Daily News* from August Hecksher II, a recent graduate. Hecksher, chairman of the campus William Allen White Committee—named for the Kansas editor who had abandoned pacifism to champion U.S. arms aid to embattled Britain—was ahead of his time. Even then, when Axis forces were on the march in Europe, North Africa, and Asia, isolationist and pacifist sentiment dominated U.S. college campuses. The chairman of the *Yale Daily News*, Kingman Brewster—later a Yale president and Jimmy Carter's ambassador to Britain—led the campus chapter of the America First Committee. Brewster argued that "the peace and sovereignty of the United States is the 'last best hope on earth,'" and that U.S. involvement in the war on Britain's side would be "disastrous."

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Many other students agreed. In 1940, Cornell undergraduates sent the White House a dummy tank bearing a plea to "Dear President Roosevelt" to "keep America out of war." The nation, argued the University of Iowa's *Iowan*, must stay out "at any cost." America, echoed the University of Minnesota's *Daily*, "can be an effective democracy only if it can remain at peace."

Such sentiments were fraught with ironies. U.S. students had been prowar in 1917, and appalled during the 1930s by Franco's rebellion in Spain. But by the late 1930s, their save-democracy zeal had faded: A Gallup poll after the 1940 Nazi invasion of Norway found only two percent of college youth in favor of U.S. intervention on the Allied side. Far less war-wary than their students, faculty members and university heads largely backed President Roosevelt's efforts to increase U.S. military strength. Speaking at Berkeley in 1940, Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, endorsed the arms build-up "without reservation" and warned that "those who prefer to fiddle while Rome burns . . . shall get little sympathy from me."

The backlash after World War I had been exploited by several youth organizations, mostly on the Left, through the early 1930s—e.g., the Young Communist League, the National Student League, the Young People's Socialist League, and the Socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy. Such groups, often in concert with religious organizations, sponsored numerous demonstrations; on a "Peace Strike Day" in April 1935, some 175,000 college

Ready." The Girl Scouts modified their "too-militaristic" uniform. The *Chicago Tribune*, the *New York Daily News*, and the Hearst press were strongly isolationist. Women's groups supported neutrality, and farmers opposed increased armament (96,000 signed a petition to that effect in 1934). College students chanted "No more battleships, we want schools" (Vassar), organized the Veterans of Future Wars (Princeton), joined national one-day boycotts of classes,

students (out of a total of perhaps one million) across the country briefly quit their classrooms.

But more important than the Left (on many campuses, students were generally conservative during the 1930s) was the pull of pacifism and isolationism. At the University of Kansas, students put up white crosses "in memory of the tragic betrayal of 1917" and otherwise demonstrated to show that, as peace leaders said, the student body was "declaratively against war and all the agents of war." At the University of California, worry over war was so strong by 1937 that the elected student government created a "Peace Committee"; after Hitler took Poland in 1939, its leaders circulated a petition saying that "we will volunteer for prison rather than volunteer for service if the United States enters this war."

Why did most students oppose intervention against Hitler for so long? Following the June 1940 fall of France, a *New Republic* writer found a generational cause: "After two decades of faithful tutelage by their formerly disillusioned elders, students profess to understand both the causes and the effects of wars and are determined to keep out of them."

But some students felt otherwise. At Harvard, senior John F. Kennedy wrote to the *Crimson* arguing that "the failure to build up her armaments has not saved England from a war, and may cost her one. Are we in America to let that lesson go unlearned?" A Yale senior, McGeorge Bundy, a future Kennedy national security adviser, led a chapter of the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Taking the other side, a future *New Frontiersman* (and Kennedy in-law) at Yale, law student R. Sargent Shriver, joined America First because, he said, "we weren't prepared" for war.

By the time classes resumed in the autumn of 1941, stay-out sentiment was fading. The *Daily Princetonian*, stoutly antiwar in 1940, now considered isolationists to be "merely obstructionists." At the University of Missouri, undergraduates held a "War Dance," and Harlan Byrne, the new editor of the *Student*, declared that "we must tip our weight to the British side of the battle scales. Perhaps this will mean war participation." The *Cornell Sun* asked: "When shall we declare war?"

The answer, of course, came that December. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, student pacifism and isolationism all but vanished—even at such antiwar citadels as the University of Kansas. Said the *Daily Kansan*: "This shall be a bitter fight to the finish."

and took the Oxford Pledge against military service.* Of Libby's "natural constituencies" for peace, only labor stood aloof.

Such were the domestic political circumstances under which Roosevelt had to operate. Burns notes that during his first term

*The pledge stemmed from an Oxford Union debate in 1933, after Hitler came to power, on the proposition, "That this House refuses in any circumstances to fight for King and Country." The Union voted 275 to 153 in the affirmative (which Winston Churchill, then out of office, called "shameless").

(March 1933–January 1937), FDR “seemed to float almost helplessly on the flood tide of isolationism.”* A Roosevelt proposal in 1935 that America join the World Court was not only blocked in the Senate but publicly derided by such varied critics as Louisiana populist Huey P. Long (“the Kingfish”), humorist Will Rogers, and Father Coughlin, the “radio priest” who blamed the nation’s ills on internationalists and the “Morgan, Mellon, Mills, Meyer” cabal of Eastern money men.

Roosevelt’s hope, according to Burns, was that the American people would be “educated by events” as to the impossibility of isolationism. Events were not lacking.

Sympathy for the ‘Have Nots’

The Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931, ignoring international protest and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In America, both the pacifist and internationalist wings of the peace movement urged an embargo of arms shipments to Japan, and backed U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union as a counter to Japanese influence in Asia. But fissures in the movement appeared. Eichelberger and other liberal internationalists called for “collective security” measures, e.g., arrangements with America’s European allies to try to contain aggression via the application of diplomatic and economic sanctions. The radicals turned their focus from preventing a war to keeping America out of the war whose opening moves had already begun.

Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 was followed by German rearmament (while the U.S. Congress focused on the Nye hearings and neutrality legislation). In 1935, the League of Nations proved impotent (again) in the face of Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia—another blow to those Americans who had put faith in international organizations. Then the Japanese advanced from Manchuria into China proper. Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and in March 1936 his troops reoccupied the Rhineland; again Britain and France did not rise to the challenge. General Francisco Franco, with help from Italian “volunteers” and the German Condor Legion, won a brutal civil war in Spain, ousting the Republican government supported by Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Axis was taking shape.

Yet, in America, movement leaders like Kirby Page urged sympathy for Japan and Germany. These nations, said Page, were “have nots” who were shut out of global markets; they wanted only a larger role in a world economy dominated by the trans-Atlantic powers who sought peace only because they were “haves.” The AFSC, the WILPF, and the FOR, leading an Emergency Peace Campaign (1936–38), proposed to “Keep America Out of War” and urged political and economic steps to build “a just and peaceable world order.”

*Indeed, his wife Eleanor gave the \$72,000 in speaking honoraria that she earned in 1935 to the pacifist-isolationist American Friends Service Committee.

The new facts of totalitarian intent and capability were ignored.

After his 1936 reelection, Roosevelt moved gingerly to challenge the isolationist consensus. In a famous speech in Chicago, FDR likened aggression to an epidemic that must be placed "in a quarantine," and warned of "international anarchy" that could not be avoided "through mere isolation or neutrality." Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact had long since been mocked by bloodshed on three continents, Roosevelt still shared the internationalists' view that concerted action could avert a world war. But what to do?

Time was short. In November 1937 the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was established, and Hitler revealed to his generals his plans for Eastern Europe's subjugation. Roosevelt considered various responses, including an Armistice Day conference at the White House where foreign diplomats would be pressed to join a new effort to agree on principles for peaceful international relations. In January 1938, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles argued that a comprehensive conference called by the United States (now the world leader in industry, finance, and trade) might avert war; the agenda could include economic sanctions against aggressors (which neither the League nor Kellogg-Briand required) and the reshaping of the depressed world economy to deal with the have/have not issue.

Niebuhr's 'Suffering World'

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain, when sounded out on the Welles plan, asked Washington to wait. A "measure of appeasement," he suggested, might lead Germany and Italy to spare the militarily feeble democracies. Roosevelt consented; in any event, he doubted that a U.S. initiative in Europe would have much domestic support. And America had little military strength, aside from its fleet (concentrated in the Pacific), to support its diplomacy.

Pacifist leaders feared that the White House aimed to break down antiwar sentiment in the country, perhaps with an eye to an alliance with Britain. In March 1938, the month that Hitler annexed Austria, the main peace groups—Libby's NCPW, the FOR, and the AFSC—joined the Socialist Party in a rally at New York City's Hippodrome Theater. Some 4,500 of the faithful, including Dorothy Detzer and Wisconsin senator Robert La Follette, Jr., applauded as Norman Thomas argued that "collective security means war."

A countercurrent was slowly building, however. At the same time as the Hippodrome rally, 650 prominent members of such internationalist organizations as the Carnegie Endowment, the Foreign Policy Association, and the League of Nations Association met in Washington. The League's Clark Eichelberger called for an international conference to reform the world economic system. Failing that, he advocated collective security and changes in the neutrality laws to

permit the president to embargo arms to aggressors only.

In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, meeting Hitler in Munich, agreed to Nazi territorial claims on strategically critical, heavily armed, democratic Czechoslovakia as a guarantee of "peace in our time." Press commentary on Munich illustrated shifts in American opinion. The *New York Times* editorialized that Hitler had "accomplished by a mere ultimatum what Bismarck failed to achieve with armies." Collective security with Britain was "indispensable."

Chamberlain's "peace in our time" was short-lived. In early 1939, Mussolini sent Italian troops into Albania (his first European conquest) and signed a "Pact of Steel" with Hitler. Shaken by these events and Franco's triumph in Spain, FDR sent appeals to Hitler and Mussolini; the messages called for peace and asked the dictators pointblank to promise not to attack any one of a list of 31 nations. Responding sarcastically in the Reichstag, Hitler said he understood the impulse of "Mr. Roosevelt" to feel "responsible for the history of the whole world," but regretted that he could not help. "I, sir, am placed in a much smaller and more modest sphere."

After concluding his surprise Nonaggression Pact with Stalin, temporarily uniting the world's two largest totalitarian powers, Hitler



At a New York "America First" rally, May 1941: Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Charles Lindbergh, Kathleen Norris, Norman Thomas. After Pearl Harbor, Wheeler said, "The only thing now to do is to lick hell out of them."

invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and subsequently divided that stricken republic with his new partner. Britain and France finally decided to oppose Hitler. World War II had come—and with it, turmoil in the American peace movement.

Some former movement leaders had already changed their minds. Influential Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, once a mainstay of the FOR, had abandoned pacifism in the early 1930s; now he abandoned neutrality as well. "In a suffering world," Niebuhr wrote, it was wrong to "identify the slogan 'Keep America Out of War' with the Christian gospel." Other recantations came from historian Walter (*The Road to War*) Millis and liberal lawyer Charles P. Taft. Taft still admired the pacifists he had known in the Emergency Peace Campaign, but he was "glad there are not too many."

Debating the Draft

Libby, Thomas, and Detzer still claimed that the United States could best serve peace by observing strict neutrality. Yet events were thinning the diehards' ranks. Libby's NCPW, which lobbied hard (and unsuccessfully) against increased funds for the U.S. Navy in 1938, lost several affiliates, among them 11 Jewish organizations and the American Association of University Women. Libby soon moved into a strange-bedfellows alliance with the militantly isolationist (but decidedly nonpacifist) America First movement. The NCPW even mailed out some 140,000 copies of a "stay out of war" speech by America First's hero-aviator, Charles Lindbergh.

As the conflict began in Europe, America's military weakness preoccupied the White House. During the months of deceptive calm following Poland's division between Hitler and Stalin, Roosevelt began to press Congress for rearmament; but the strength of isolationism was such that he also pledged not to send "your boys" outside the Western Hemisphere.

The "phony war" in Europe ended in 1940. As German bombers began the Battle of Britain and U-boats threatened to cut the island nation's Atlantic life line, Roosevelt sent Churchill the 50 destroyers he had requested. Isolationist reaction was intense. FDR, said the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, was "America's first dictator."

While Britain struggled against the Luftwaffe, Italy readied an attack on Greece, and Japanese forces threatened Indochina, Roosevelt sought an unprecedented third term. His Republican challenger, Wendell Willkie, charged that FDR's promise to avoid a foreign war was "no better than his promise to balance the budget." But the isolationist-pacifist opposition had begun to crack. Willkie, an internationalist, did not fight Roosevelt over foreign policy until just before the 1940 election. In September, with Willkie's backing, Congress passed a Selective Service Act—providing for 900,000 conscripts

who would serve for one year and only in the Western Hemisphere.

In 1941, Roosevelt proposed the "Lend-Lease" bill, authorizing him to sell, lend, or lease supplies to Britain. Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D.-Mont.) charged that the aid program would lead to war and "plow under every fourth American boy." Norman Thomas asserted that the "certain evils" of U.S. involvement in the war against Hitler outweighed "the uncertain good we might accomplish." But this was the isolationists' and pacifists' last rhetorical hurrah.

The bill passed, with the aid of some reformed anti-interventionists. Although Libby thought the bill "monstrous," one of his NCPW founders, Mrs. Harriman, testified that the Norwegians had been subjugated "like sheep" because they were "peace-loving" and the Germans had posed as "their best friends." Reinhold Niebuhr argued that a war to prevent "the exploitation of the weak by the strong" was just. He launched the new journal *Christianity & Crisis* to combat pacifism and isolationism in Protestant churches.

Even so, as the 1940 Selective Service Act neared expiration, scarcely four months before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt faced bitter isolationist and pacifist opposition to an extension. The measure passed the House of Representatives by one vote. The *New York Times* found that narrow margin "deeply regrettable," but was relieved "that the new American Army will be kept intact."

Nothing but Faith

Thus, while the peace movement had begun to unravel as war loomed during the late 1930s, the antiwar sentiment that it fostered and exploited remained strong in Congress and among the public. As late as autumn 1941, polls reflected a kind of national schizophrenia. Gallup surveys showed that 70 percent of Americans felt that it was "more important" to defeat Germany than to stay out of war; but 83 percent opposed a congressional declaration of a state of war, even as FDR dispatched Marines to Iceland, and U.S. Navy ships began to escort convoys to Britain.

During the interwar years, the various elements of the peace movement—internationalists, pacifists, isolationists, and assorted opportunists on the Left and Right—converged, diverged, recombined, and split again under the impact of world events. And yet the movement gained an unprecedented level of influence on U.S. foreign policy. Disillusionment over the Great War, traditional isolationism, and liberal Protestant moralism made for a powerful combination. Franklin Roosevelt is widely considered to be the paradigm of a strong president; but FDR clearly felt constrained. Only at the eleventh hour, with the 1940 election behind him, did he seek to break the hammer lock that the peace movement and its isolationist allies, with their mass following, had on U.S. foreign policy.

But the movement's legislative success during the 1920s and '30s was soon mocked by events. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, the movement's great achievement in diplomacy, became a synonym for wishful thinking. The chief effect of the neutrality laws was to make Europe safe for Hitler and East Asia safe for Tojo.

The peace movement, like the isolationists, fundamentally misread the signs of the times. Movement leaders looked back to World War I as an evil to be avoided, and forward to a future without war; but they never looked down, as it were, to the facts on the ground in front of them. Attacking the "merchants of death" may have been morally and politically satisfying. But it diverted attention from the rise of totalitarianism. The movement's leaders were largely blind to the aggressive designs of Germany, Italy, and Japan. When such designs were acknowledged, they were explained away as the reactions of "have nots" to trans-Atlantic economic hegemony.

And finally, when the totalitarian threat could no longer be ignored, the movement ran out of ideas: As Norman Thomas admitted, it "had nothing to offer in the problem of stopping Nazism . . . except for a religious faith."

Could the internationalist approach to peace—championed by Clark Eichelberger and, after 1937, less forcefully by FDR—have worked? The question is moot, since the alliance between isolationists and organized pacifists eroded the liberal internationalists' constituency. Could Roosevelt have helped rally such a constituency? His anxieties about Hitler, expressed as early as 1933, were not matched by a willingness to challenge the ideas that the peace movement had been teaching the U.S. public.

FDR believed that the White House would be an ineffective base from which to confront the radicals' allegations that "American intervention" in Europe, even in the form of collective security arrangements, would only lead to war. "Events," the president hoped, would undercut the peace movement and dissolve isolationism. Eventually they did, but at the expense of American military readiness, and at the cost of an Axis-dominated Europe and East Asia.

Isolationism was routed, not by argument and presidential leadership, but by the Japanese bombs that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Roosevelt now had the constituency to support an active U.S. role in the struggle for the survival of freedom. From a distance of decades, it is difficult to avoid the judgment that, because of their chronic difficulties in grappling with the realities of power in the world, the leaders of the American peace movement of the inter-war era made World War II more, not less, likely.

A LONG MARCH

by *George Weigel*

On June 12, 1982, between 500,000 and a million Americans rallied in New York City's Central Park in support of a "nuclear freeze"—a ban on all further increases in nuclear weaponry. The *New York Times* editorialized the next day that "hundreds of thousands of demonstrators . . . can't be wrong." Conservative columnist Joseph Sobran saw the great "freeze" demonstration rather differently: "The rally was actually a broad coalition of people who hate the West and people who don't hate people who hate the West."

About a year later, America's Roman Catholic bishops adopted a pastoral letter on war and peace that was broadly sympathetic to the ideas that had generated one of the biggest political demonstrations in U.S. history.

Eighteen months after the bishops' letter, President Ronald Reagan, who had been vigorously denounced by the Central Park orators and whose defense policy had been sharply criticized by the bishops, was overwhelmingly reelected, carrying 49 states.

Has the peace movement since 1945 been a success, or a failure? It has, in fact, been both. How that can be is a complicated tale.

The years immediately after World War II were a time of great hope and energy in the American peace movement. These were the days when the United Nations (UN) was established at Lake Success, New York, with 51 member countries; when 17 state legislatures passed resolutions supporting world government; when many of the scientists who had created the atomic bomb organized to prevent its further use; when Emily Balch, of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) won Nobel Peace Prizes (in 1946 and 1947, respectively). The awesome fact of nuclear weaponry, and a widespread popular belief that the war's sacrifices ought to be redeemed by a more humane future, gave the postwar movement a special élan.

The bomb seemed both curse and blessing. The curse was clear from John Hersey's *Hiroshima* (1946), a vivid account of the Japanese experience. The blessing lay in the widely shared perception that atomic weapons meant "the end of world war," as Vannevar Bush put it. Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, called the bomb the "good news of damnation"; the threat of global destruction made a "world society" imperative. Dwight Macdonald, editor of the radical journal *Politics*, described Hiroshima as "Götterdämmerung without the gods." Norman Cousins, in a famous



Military observers at an atomic weapons test at Frenchman's Flats, Nevada (1951). U.S. armed services were becoming interested in low-yield "tactical" devices; pacifists' protests came later.

1945 *Saturday Review* essay, "Modern Man Is Obsolete," argued that the concept of national sovereignty was "preposterous now."

A 1946 Gallup poll indicated that 52 percent of the public supported national disarmament and an international police force responsible for keeping the peace, while only 24 percent were opposed and 22 percent undecided. Even Reinhold Niebuhr, better known for attacking sentimentalism in foreign policy, was caught up; he wrote veteran activist A. J. Muste that, while the "whole development culminating in the atomic bomb is terrible," its existence "may increase the fear of war sufficiently so that we can build a real world organization. Therein lies our hope."

The world-government movement was the child of prewar liberal internationalism, whose leaders, such as Clark Eichelberger, had first tried to build a legal framework to prevent war and then championed U.S. entry into the war against Hitler. Founded in 1947 as a merger of 16 preexisting world-government organizations, the flagship agency of the revitalized movement, the United World Federalists (UWF), espoused a minimalist approach: a "world government of limited powers, adequate to prevent war." The UWF was led by Cord Meyer, Jr., a highly decorated Marine veteran; among its vice-

presidents were Cousins, Grenville Clark, Thomas Finletter, and Carl Van Doren. By 1949 the UWF had 659 chapters and 40,000 adult dues-payers, who tended to be East Coast urban whites, liberal, Protestant, and affluent.

The UWF was neither radical nor pacifist; its leaders wanted to work in the political mainstream. Meyer, who proposed general and complete disarmament under the umbrella of a world federation, supported military deterrence as an interim step, and endorsed the Truman administration's Marshall Plan of aid to war-torn Western Europe (opposed on the American Left as the "Martial Plan" and by Senate Republican conservatives, notably Robert A. Taft of Ohio, as a "give-away" to foreigners).

Urgency and Opportunity

Although some traditional pacifists welcomed the world-government advocates, others were skeptical. Emily Balch of the WILPF voiced "a very considerable distrust of government as such," and could "see no reason to be sure that a world government would be run by men very different in capacity from those who govern national states." Many pacifists preferred a "functionalist" approach: building international community through people-to-people cooperation. The UN Security Council, according to them, was not an instrument of peace; the UN Economic and Social Council was. Pacifists and nonpacifists alike criticized many world-government schemes as too abstract; Muste and Niebuhr agreed, for example, that brotherhood and a sense of international community could not be willed into existence by a world constitutional convention.

The politicization of the atomic scientists was the second key to the peace movement's postwar resurgence. Physicists who had supported President Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki joined with those few who had opposed using the nuclear weapon to form the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists in 1946. The Committee meant to "arouse the American people to an understanding of the unprecedented crisis in national and international affairs precipitated by the atomic discoveries."

But the scientists' new activism was not just alarmist; they felt responsible for the peaceful use of the extraordinary power they had put into human hands. The famous "minutes-to-midnight" clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, launched in 1945

*George Weigel, 35, a former Wilson Center Fellow, is president of the Washington-based James Madison Foundation. Born in Baltimore, he received a B.A. from St. Mary's Seminary and University (1973) and an M.A. from the University of St. Michael's College (1975). He wrote *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1987), and is the editor of *American Purpose*.*

by nuclear researchers in Chicago,* was not so much a symbol of fear as an emblem of urgency and opportunity: Something drastically new had entered the human condition, and it required new understandings and a new world politics, sooner rather than later.

The scientists enjoyed some immediate successes: Congress, for example, passed the 1946 McMahon Act providing for civilian control of U.S. atomic research. But the scientists' measured approach was not welcomed by everyone in the peace movement. Muste, for one, argued that global annihilation, not the Soviet Union, was the real enemy; he urged that U.S. scientists simply refuse to participate in weapons research. Albert Einstein agreed, but Hans Bethe said that a scientists' strike "would only antagonize the public of the United States who would rightly accuse us of trying to dictate the policies of the country." Edward Teller wrote that scientists have "two clear-cut duties: to work on atomic energy under our present administration and to work for a world government which alone can give us freedom and peace."

The scientists' movement fissured during the controversy over thermonuclear weapons that followed the first Soviet A-bomb test (1949). James B. Conant, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Bethe, and Enrico Fermi opposed a U.S. effort to develop the H-bomb; Teller supported the project. A political and moral impasse had been reached, and by the end of 1950 the Emergency Committee disbanded.

Cold War Realities

Pacifists and radicals who had been the peace movement's mainstays before Pearl Harbor were also active in the war's aftermath. The New York-based War Resisters League got fresh leadership from conscientious objectors who had been radicalized by their experience in Civilian Public Service camps and federal prisons during the war. These men argued for nonviolent resistance and "direct action" tactics. Muste and David Dellinger launched the Committee for Non-Violent Revolution (1946) and the umbrella organization Peacemakers (1948); draft and tax resistance were key planks in the Peacemakers' program, which was partially inspired by Gandhi's campaigns in India.

The postwar detente between peace movement veterans (radicals, pacifists, and anarchists) and new recruits (the world-government and atomic scientists' groups) was short-lived. Cold War realities—the Soviet atomic bomb, the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan to internationalize nuclear materials, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, and finally the 1950 Communist invasion of South Korea—eroded the movement's high hopes. Tensions among peace advocates were exacerbated by

*The *Bulletin* (circ. 27,000) remains an important voice for scientists today.



Labor Party "Ban the Bomb" rally in London's Trafalgar Square (1958). Nuclear pacifism (and anti-Americanism) has long been a theme of the Left, threatening NATO cohesion in Britain, West Germany, Holland.

former vice president Henry Wallace's Progressive Party presidential bid in 1948, and the controversy over Communist penetration of his campaign organization.*

Peace, it now appeared, required more than a great act of U.S. political will. The Berlin blockade was the last straw for Dwight Macdonald, who abandoned pacifist politics for cultural criticism. Cord Meyer left the UWF for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and by 1951, 16 states had repealed their resolutions in favor of world government. The Korean War led world constitutionalist G. S. Borgese to remark dourly that "ideas, too, have their Valley Forges." The atomic scientists were never able to heal their rift; like the World Federalists, they soon faded from a leadership position in the movement. The movement's postwar euphoria had been broken by the realities of foreign totalitarianism.

Movement historians often describe the first half of the 1950s—

*Wallace ran for president after breaking with Truman over the latter's anti-Communist foreign policy, which Wallace called a "bi-partisan reactionary war policy." He proposed sharing nuclear weapons technology with the Soviets. He won 1,157,140 votes, notably in New York City and Los Angeles. Among his supporters: South Dakota political science professor George S. McGovern. Among his sternest critics: Socialist candidate Norman Thomas.

the years of the Korean War, Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950-54 crusade against domestic Communism*, Eisenhower prosperity, and mass middle-class migration to the suburbs—as the “nadir” of the American public effort for peace.

The good feeling of the Eisenhower era seemed to muffle political activism. The costly Korean War ended in 1953, and if Americans had not triumphed, neither had they been defeated. Stalin died, and in 1955 Ike met Stalin's successors, Nikolay A. Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, at the first postwar summit. The subsequent “spirit of Geneva” led to hopes for progress in Soviet-American relations. The president took the initiative with “open skies,” the most radical arms control verification proposal ever made: the United States and the USSR would exchange blueprints of their military facilities and allow unobstructed overflight of each other's territory to permit observers to check treaty compliance.

Climbing Fences

But the Soviets rejected Ike's proposal, the Cold War continued,† and eddies of anxiety over the bomb remained. They surfaced and the peace movement regained public visibility through the controversy over testing thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

Two new organizations, reflecting the centrist-radical division in the peace movement, were born in the late 1950s.

The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), led by pacifist Clarence Pickett and liberal internationalist Norman Cousins, opened its campaign for a unilateral U.S. suspension of atmospheric nuclear testing with a full-page ad in the November 15, 1957 *New York Times* headlined “We Are Facing a Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed.” SANE, whose name was suggested by psychologist Erich Fromm, capitalized on intense public concern over the health effects of nuclear tests in the atmosphere (would strontium 90 end up in the milk drunk by American children?). Demonstrating how nuclear anxieties could be focused through the single-issue prism of a test ban, SANE had 130 chapters and 25,000 members by mid-1958.

Cousins and Pickett still endorsed disarmament under an effective international legal system. But they also understood that the test ban was a more immediately achievable objective, one that could be grasped by their primary constituency, which resembled that of the

*McCarthy had the support of G.O.P. conservatives, e.g., Senator William Knowland (R.-Calif.), who combined hostility to the domestic left with neo-isolationist wariness of a U.S. role in Europe's defense against the Soviet threat. U.S. membership in NATO, for example, was opposed both by Senator Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio) and by the *Nation*, a revival of the old anti-interventionist coalition of the late 1930s.

†In 1956, Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian uprising, and there was saber rattling over that year's Suez Crisis. Khrushchev visited America in 1959, but the 1960 U-2 incident involving the Soviet downing of a U.S. “spy plane” ruined Eisenhower's chances for a career-capping accord at the aborted Paris summit.

postwar world-government movement: urban professionals, liberal whites, typically Protestant or Jewish.

While SANE became a vehicle for liberals and centrists, the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA) was created by radical pacifists who declined to be bound by SANE's deliberately moderate education-and-lobbying approach. Founded in the autumn of 1958 by movement veterans including the ubiquitous A. J. Muste, CNVA conducted nonviolent "direct action" campaigns against nuclear weapons and testing. CNVA's protest ships *Golden Rule* and *Phoenix* sailed into U.S. nuclear-testing zones in the Pacific Ocean. CNVA activists also mounted campaigns against the ICBM base near Omaha (the 75-year-old Muste climbing over the base's fence to seek arrest) and the Polaris submarine yards at Groton, Connecticut (successfully "boarding" the missile submarines *George Washington*, *Patrick Henry*, and *Ethan Allen*). Those Northeast-based college students who joined the Groton civil disobedience campaign were a harbinger of the hurly-burly of the decade to come.


Antinuclear activism also began to attract prominent Protestant theologians, much as pacifism had been popular among them in the 1920s. By early 1959, the influential John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary was writing Muste that "for the first time I agree with you that, if the USA did take the initiative along your lines, this would probably be a better policy in terms of prudence as well as in terms of ethical sensitivity." The path to the 1960s was being charted on many fronts.

A Higher Loyalty

The peace movement of the late 1950s was also influenced by the successful nonviolent techniques of civil rights activists in the South. The demonstration, the sit-in, and other civil disobedience techniques developed by black leaders like Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin (a World War II conscientious objector), and James Farmer were not only congruent with CNVA tactics, they also helped white clergymen make the transition from the politics of persuasion to the politics of nonviolent coercion. The civil rights movement thus became a kind of training exercise for Vietnam-era peace activists.

By May 1960, SANE had developed sufficient political weight to stage a test ban rally in New York City's Madison Square Garden. Walter Reuther, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alfred M. Landon, and Norman Thomas spoke; telegrams from Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, and Jacob Javits were read aloud. Three years later, Norman Cousins played a back-channel role in the test ban negotiations as a private emissary between President Kennedy and Soviet premier Khrushchev. Kennedy expressed his gratitude by presenting to Cousins one of the original signed copies of the Partial Test Ban Treaty,

PEACE, WAR, AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 1945-1986



following its Senate ratification in September 1963.

SANE—and the protests of Muste and the CNVA—could thus claim a considerable success. SANE's leadership had demonstrated an impressive ability to marshal significant public support behind a middle-of-the-road peace agenda. But something was missing. SANE's 1957 declaration—that the “challenge of the age is to develop the concept of a higher loyalty—loyalty by man to the human community”—was a noble and, in many respects, true statement. But could that “higher loyalty” be married to a peace politics that recognized totalitarianism's threat to peace and freedom? Would the peace movement take the relationship between peace and freedom as seriously as it took the relationship between peace and disarmament? As public attention turned from the test ban to Vietnam, events demanded answers to these questions.

The Rout of the Liberals

President John F. Kennedy is often remembered for telling an American University graduating class, in June 1963, that peace was the “necessary rational end of rational men,” and for undertaking his peace initiative that helped gain Soviet agreement to the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

But the Kennedy administration, all in all, gave the peace movement of the day little satisfaction—a fact now largely forgotten. Kennedy entered the White House on a pledge to “get America moving again”—which meant, among other things, Pentagon budgets and ICBM deployments considerably larger than those of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy's presidency included the bungled CIA invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, confrontations with the Soviets over Berlin, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the beginning of a U.S. military commitment in the Second Indochina War. And it was Vietnam—not nuclear weapons—that led to the enormous expansion of the radical wing of the peace movement, the eclipse of nuclear pacifism, and the rout of the movement's liberal centrists during the years after Kennedy's assassination.

Criticism of American intervention in Southeast Asia was not confined to the peace movement. Political realists like Hans Morgenthau and Niebuhr opposed U.S. policy on pragmatic grounds: Vietnam was the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. Republicans and liberal Democrats attacked Lyndon Johnson for duplicity. Congressional hostility to the war during the late 1960s and early 1970s also reflected anxieties over constitutional questions of executive authority in foreign policy, and led to the constraints of the 1973 War Powers Act. Senior military leaders, obediently mute in public, had grave misgivings about President Johnson's refusal to settle on a coherent Vietnam strategy, or to mobilize the country in

THE ARMS CONTROL CONUNDRUM

“Defense is moral; offense is immoral!”

So said Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin, pounding the table at a June 1967 summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro, New Jersey.

As Robert S. McNamara, LBJ's secretary of defense, writes in *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age* (1986), Kosygin was dismissing U.S. concern about a new ABM (antiballistic missile) system around Moscow. This Soviet innovation, said the Americans, would force a major increase in U.S. nuclear forces to ensure “deterrence” against attack.

Two results followed. First, Washington developed Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRVs, for each intercontinental ballistic missile—the “cheapest way,” notes McNamara, to expand U.S. nuclear forces. Second, in 1969 Richard Nixon began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the centerpiece of an “era of negotiations” with Moscow.

Today, that history seems ironic. The latest summit, Ronald Reagan's October meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, broke up over a U.S. ABM plan, Reagan's antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars.” And despite 17 years of SALT—or, as Reagan calls it, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)—atomic weaponry has grown. From 1970 to 1985, the U.S. nuclear warhead total rose by 275 percent. The Soviet figure: 533 percent. The two nations' arsenals each now hold some 10,000 weapons.

On the U.S. side, the early arms control impetus grew out of the internationalism that shaped other postwar policies. E.g., during the 1940s, U.S. officials, hoping that wide prosperity would ensure peace, fostered the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But Josef Stalin refused to take part—just as he balked at the *first* U.S. nuclear arms control effort.

That was the 1946 Baruch Plan. It called for full nuclear disarmament in stages, following a treaty setting up controls by an international agency and providing for United Nations-imposed sanctions on violators. But the Soviets, still developing their own atomic technology, demurred. They wanted America's nuclear weapons destroyed *before* controls were established.

After the 1957 Soviet launch of the first satellite (Sputnik I) and intercontinental missile, President Dwight Eisenhower asked Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev to discuss ways to bar a “surprise attack” by either side. The talks, in Geneva, failed when the Soviets raised other issues.

An atmospheric testing moratorium begun in 1958 was ended (by the Soviets) in 1961. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets—who then had 300 strategic nuclear weapons to America's 5,000—pressed a build-up. In 1963 President John F. Kennedy tried to end *all* atomic tests, but Moscow insisted on allowing underground blasts. By the late 1960s, the Soviets were approaching nuclear “parity,” and were still working on an ABM system.

The 1972 ABM treaty negotiated by the Nixon administration placed sharp limits on antimissile defenses, to leave population centers on both sides open to attack. This was to sustain the logic of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD)—the basic concept urged on Lyndon Johnson by Robert McNamara

during the 1960s. MAD held that neither side would launch a "first strike" if its civilians were left vulnerable to a retaliatory attack. Still, Washington, and then the Soviets, proceeded with MIRVs, even as SALT continued. During 1975-80, the number of Soviet warheads more than doubled.

The SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) treaties did "cap" strategic *launchers* (missiles and bombers) at 2,400 on each side; and no more than 1,320 could carry MIRVs. Though SALT II, never ratified by the U.S. Senate, expired in 1985, and neither treaty put a lid on *warheads*, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals are now in the rough equilibrium that is favored by most "mainstream" arms control theorists. What is sought from arms control now?

Soviet leaders, observes Brookings specialist Raymond L. Garthoff, view nuclear weapons as just one of a range of "economic, military, political, diplomatic, and psychological elements" in their dealings with the West. They can press for curbs now as ardently as they once resisted them. Pessimists (e.g., Colin S. Gray) worry that the Soviets oppose Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative for the same reason they rejected Jimmy Carter's 1977 "Deep Cuts" offer: They seek a first-strike capability. SALT proponents (e.g., McNamara) say that the Soviets, observing U.S. ardor for both SDI and new missiles (MX, Trident II), conclude, mistakenly, that Washington seeks first-strike capability.

On the U.S. side, the Reagan proposals, as they stood post-Reykjavik, were for a 50 percent cut in strategic missiles, sharp reductions in intermediate-range missiles (and their elimination in Europe), a phaseout of underground testing, and a promise not to pull out of the ABM treaty for 10 years. The proposals have not won unanimous praise, even from "doves" who have long sought big cuts. Some want warheads to be slashed by 90 percent. Other specialists ask, why cut at all? Reductions would save little (nuclear forces account for about one-fifth of U.S. military spending); they could force more spending for conventional forces—a political burden for many U.S. allies. Other doubters note that the smaller the strategic forces, the bigger the danger posed by cheating—and the more likely that one side will consider a preemptive first strike, if it thinks few of its missiles would survive an attack.

Some East-West talks yield unarguable benefits. In Stockholm last September, Warsaw Pact negotiators agreed to a NATO proposal to allow each side's observers to conduct "confidence-building" surveys of the other's military ground exercises in Europe—to reduce the chance of (Soviet) "maneuvers" becoming massive surprise assaults. But the plane on which SALT proceeds does not always seem quite so practical, at least where America is concerned.

One reason is that a key factor in White House SALT calculations—and in those of the Kremlin—has long been U.S. public opinion. Post-Reykjavik polls showed wide public support for Star Wars, even though Reagan's refusal to give up SDI prevented an instant deep-cuts deal and led to bitter Soviet complaints. But traditionally, notes Harvard's Joseph S. Nye, Jr., American public opinion "oscillates between twin fears of nuclear war and Soviet expansion." Since the 1960s, he argues, the "glue" that has reconciled these contradictory attitudes has been the hope—justified or not—that a safer world somehow could be gained via Soviet-American arms talks.

support of the war he sent Americans overseas to fight.*

But the impact of these criticisms paled in comparison to the sea change wrought in American political culture by the key teachings of the Vietnam-era peace movement, teachings that had little to do with realist calculations of the national interest, arguments over constitutional "checks and balances," or questions of military strategy.

Amid all the turmoil and upheaval, movement opposition to America's war in Vietnam evolved through three stages: Vietnam as policy error, as moral failure, and ultimately as a reflection of the illegitimacy of America.

De-Nazifying America

By 1967 at the latest, the movement's dominant message was not the horror of war but the corruption of the American experiment; as Father Philip Berrigan put it during the 1968 trial of the draft-file-burning Catonsville Nine, "we have lost confidence in the institutions of this country." America, not war, became the movement's primary target. And while pacifists, anarchists, and liberal internationalists contributed to this evolution in their distinctive ways, the principal influence on the ideological transformation of the Vietnam-era peace movement was the New Left.

The New Left should be carefully distinguished from the Old Left, which found its expression in the small American Communist Party and its allies. The New Left did not consider the Soviet Union the paradigm of a humane future. Nor, contrary to the suspicions of LBJ, was it a disciplined cadre deployed at the pleasure of a foreign power. New Left ideology began, in the 1962 Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as a kind of social-democratic humanism. Rejecting the "depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things," the Port Huron Statement was critical of, but basically optimistic about, American democracy. The job was to transform American society into one in which man's potential "for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity" could be fully realized.

But SDS's originally optimistic humanism would not last three years; by 1965, it had been displaced by a vulgarized Marxism. Lyndon Johnson, the peace candidate in 1964, had already sent the first U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam when SDS president Carl Oglesby took the microphone at a November 27, 1965, antiwar rally in Washington. His speech heralded a decisive shift in the ideology of the peace movement.

*After losing 58,000 men in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders, even as they seek bigger budgets, have become extremely reluctant to intervene overseas—the ill-fated deployment of Marines to Lebanon in 1982–83 was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; there was great skepticism in the Pentagon over President Jimmy Carter's 1979 creation of a "Rapid Deployment Force" ready to go to the Persian Gulf.



During the Vietnam war, actress Jane Fonda sang "anti-imperialist" ballads to encourage anti-aircraft gunners near Hanoi (1972). Other visitors: New Leftist Tom Hayden, writers Mary McCarthy and Susan Sontag.

American liberalism, Oglesby charged, was hopelessly corrupt. The United States government had systematically lied about its post-war actions in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam because it was the tool of "the colossus of history, our American corporate system." This evil system had led America to resist the revolution of the Viet Cong, which was "as honest a revolution as you can find anywhere in history." The problem was "the system." Radical change was required if the movement were to "shake the future in the name of plain human hope." Oglesby and his followers were not impressed by LBJ's claims that "the Great Society" was at hand. There could be no "Great Society," much less a humane society, while the structure of power in American life remained the same.

These 1965 SDS themes would so dominate the leadership cadres of the Vietnam-era peace movement that it often became not so much an antiwar movement as an anti-America movement.

Leaders of the movement traditionally had taught that peace required change in international politics and economics; the Vietnam-era militants specified the primary obstacle to change as an America controlled by the "military-industrial complex." Noam Chomsky, the distinguished Massachusetts Institute of Technology linguistics

scholar, captured the essence of the radical critique in 1967 when he wrote: "The Vietnam War is the most obscene example of a frightening phenomenon of contemporary history—the attempt by our country to impose its particular concept of order and stability throughout much of the world. By any objective standard, the United States had become the most aggressive nation in the world, the greatest threat to peace, to national self-determination, and to international cooperation." What was needed, Chomsky concluded, was "a kind of denazification" of America.

This profound disaffection with America intersected with two other key movement themes: that American "interventionism" and anti-Communism were primary causes of the world's pain. A new isolationism emerged, and was married to a trendy anti-anti-Communism among many American intellectuals.

The movement's growing influence after 1965 was not simply a function of its oft-cited media access, although movement "guerrilla theater" tactics had a natural appeal for television, and the prestige press itself reinforced movement teachings in commentary on the 1970 Cambodia invasion and the 1972 "Christmas Bombing" of Hanoi. Lyndon Johnson's ambiguities and evasions left a vacuum that allowed the movement and its congressional allies to claim the moral high ground. But even more importantly, as the war went on, the primary themes of the Vietnam-era peace movement— isolationism, a moralistic approach to foreign policy, rejection of American institutions—matched old cultural currents in American life. The strategic achievement of the peace movement was its discovery of new audiences for these classic themes.

Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh

Isolationism, which had appealed to farmers and Midwest conservatives and progressives during the 1930s, now attracted literary and intellectual leaders running the gamut of disaffection from Mary McCarthy to Susan Sontag. Moralism, which Reinhold Niebuhr challenged among liberal Protestants before World War II, took new roots among Roman Catholic and other religious activists; Daniel Berrigan was not alone in teaching that "the times are inexpressibly evil." Anarchist dissatisfaction with American institutions had been one traditional element in the pre-Vietnam peace movement; now it flowered anew in the Vietnam-era counterculture.

Did the movement that taught these themes and recruited these new audiences have a significant impact on American public opinion?

Political scientist John Mueller suggests that, while the war in Vietnam was eventually more unpopular than the Korean War, it became so only after U.S. battle casualties "had substantially surpassed those of the earlier war." According to his analysis of opinion

polls, the movement did not *create* the evolving public opposition to America's effort in Southeast Asia, an opposition fed, rather, by White House ambiguity, the failure to win quickly, and years of growing casualty lists.

Mueller also argues that the movement's rhetoric and style had domestic political effects opposite to those intended by its leaders: "the Vietnam protest movement [in 1968] generated negative feelings among the American public to an all but unprecedented degree . . . Opposition to the war came to be associated with violent disruption, stink bombs, desecration of the flag, profanity, and contempt for American values."

The net result, according to Mueller, was that the movement played into the hands of the men it most despised: George Wallace drew 13 percent of the vote in 1968 and Richard Nixon captured the presidency twice. The movement's own paladin, George McGovern, was summarily crushed in Nixon's 1972 landslide. The "Silent Majority" to whom Nixon successfully appealed wanted the war to end but wanted little to do with Viet Cong banners on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Despite all the protests, Congress did not cut off funds for U.S. military activities in Indochina until after Nixon's 1973 "Peace with Honor," an ill-fated cease-fire accord with Hanoi.

From Carter to Reagan

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the antiwar cause's credibility was temporarily shaken by events: Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia, the deaths of thousands in Hanoi's "reeducation" camps, the ordeal of a half-million South Vietnamese boat people fleeing their "liberated" country. As Peter L. Berger, a distinguished sociologist and former member of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, put it in 1980: "Contrary to what most members (including myself) of the anti-war movement expected, the peoples of Indo-China have, since 1975, been subjected to suffering worse than anything that was inflicted upon them by the United States and its allies."

Yet the movement's successes at home during the Vietnam era cannot be denied. As the old liberal consensus on foreign policy crumbled, many of the movement's themes became respectable in crucial opinion-forming centers of American life: the elite universities, the mainline Protestant leadership, women's groups, New York and Boston publishing houses, commentators in the prestige press, and Hollywood.* From these cultural redoubts, movement teachings would continue to affect American political discourse.

*In 1974, for example, Peter Davis's antiwar film, *Hearts and Minds*, won an Academy Award; a congratulatory telegram from Hanoi was read aloud at the Hollywood ceremony. Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake* (1972) won the Bancroft Prize for history and a Pulitzer. Hanoi's "narrow flame of revolution," she predicted, would "cleanse" South Vietnam of the "corruption and disorder of the American war."

UTOPIANS AND ROMANTIC RADICALS?

In Rebels Against War (1984), historian Lawrence S. Wittner, himself a peace activist, described the post-World War II American movement. Excerpts:

Superficially, there may be no reason why an opponent of militarism cannot be an economic conservative, a racist, and a foe of civil liberties. And yet . . . any analysis of [American] peace activists finds them overwhelmingly on the liberal Left. This coincidence of outlook suggests a sharing of certain attitudes: a humanitarian commitment, a basic egalitarianism and a strong belief in individual freedom. They may also have a similar character structure—what some writers have called the “libertarian personality”

[T]he charge of naiveté leveled against the peace movement cannot be totally dismissed, especially with regard to traditional pacifism. . . . Nor is this completely surprising, for, as a social cause based on a moral ideal, the peace movement [has] had an inherent weakness for other-worldliness. . . . Like other utopians and romantic radicals, pacifists could skillfully expose the inanities and injustices of the established order without always posing a relevant alternative.

[Yet] as the history of its two new action thrusts—non-violent resistance and nuclear pacifism—evidenced, [the peace movement] was indeed attempting, however clumsily, to deal with questions of power and its use. Were American policymakers during this period any more “realistic”?

Indeed, America's first elected post-Vietnam, post-Watergate president, Jimmy Carter, at first espoused policies that seemed to reflect Vietnam-era themes, and that illustrated the movement's impact on the thinking of the national Democratic Party, once the internationalist party of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.

The former Georgia governor appeared keen on “anti-interventionism” (e.g., in Iran and Nicaragua). He seemed to view the Soviet Union's policies as essentially defensive, and criticized human rights violations by anti-Communist U.S. allies in the Third World. Carter pledged, during his 1976 campaign against Gerald Ford, to cut defense spending by \$5–7 billion, and a few months after his inauguration warned the American people against an “inordinate fear of communism.” He proposed the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea, tried to establish diplomatic relations with Havana and Hanoi, and in March 1977 tried (and failed) to reach a “deep cuts” nuclear arms reduction agreement with the USSR. Movement alumni gained highly visible administration jobs: Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations, Patt Derian as State Department coordinator for human rights, Samuel Brown as director of ACTION.

Despite his successes in gaining ratification of the Panama Canal treaties and in negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli accords at Camp David, President Carter's foreign policy soon changed under the impact

of events. The drawn-out Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created a widespread impression of American weakness and vacillation. The president sought and won congressional approval for a revival of draft registration (which provided peace advocates with their first opportunity to raise the spectre of "another Vietnam"), and eventually sought major increases in the Pentagon budget.*

Carter's overwhelming defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed, at first, to demonstrate the peace movement's collapse as a political force.

The former two-term California governor, leader of the conservative revival since the late 1960s, came to the White House proclaiming the nobility of American intentions in Vietnam, describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and scoffing at the possibility of meaningful arms control with a Kremlin partner who would "lie, cheat, and steal" to serve his own interests. U.S. defense spending rose dramatically during Reagan's first term. American forces were deployed in Lebanon. The United States invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, and ousted its Cuban-backed "revolutionary" regime. And the U.S. Navy challenged Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi to aerial dogfights over the Gulf of Sidra. Each of these actions drew strong protests from peace advocates and their allies in Congress.

What much of the movement found most offensive was Reagan's policy in Central America. White House support for the antiguerrilla struggle of Christian Democrat José Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador and U.S. pressure on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua directly challenged the post-Vietnam movement's anti-interventionism and anti-anti-Communism, and led to new forms of agitation. Dozens of Protestant and Catholic churches across the country offered "sanctuary" to Salvadoran and Guatemalan (but not Nicaraguan) refugees; the sanctuary movement was, by its own leaders' admission, a political effort to change U.S. policy south of the border.

'Stop Now'

Such opposition to Reagan policy, combined with the post-Vietnam anti-intervention sentiments of many Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives, persuaded Congress to interrupt U.S. military aid to the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels for two years, until it was restored in 1986. Polls indicated that it was the peace movement's description of Central American realities, not the president's, that most Americans believed, and political Washington paid heed.

But it was the nuclear freeze campaign that most dramatically

*Gallup polls between August 1969 and February 1980 showed that the percentage of Americans who believed Washington was spending too little on the military rose from eight percent to 49 percent.

illustrated the peace movement's ability to influence, however briefly, the terms of debate in Washington as it had once done during the Vietnam years.

The freeze effort began during the late Carter years. There had been little progress on arms control since the early 1970s. Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev had signed SALT II in Vienna in 1979. But the treaty's Senate ratification was unlikely; polls revealed public skepticism about the complex agreement, and Carter was committed to the new MX missile program even under SALT II. Nuclear anxieties were intensified by the Soviets' military build-up, by the Carter administration's 1979 "Presidential Directive 59," which shifted the United States toward a "counterforce" (i.e. war-fighting) strategy, and by the fears of domestic nuclear power that had been building among environmentalists and others long before the Three Mile Island drama of 1979.

Couldn't a simpler, more understandable arms control formula be found?

The basic freeze proposal, the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," was drafted in March 1980 by Randall Forsberg, a Boston activist and defense researcher who had once worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The freeze proposal



Dr. Helen Caldicott, holding baby aloft at an antinuclear rally on Boston Common, May 1982. "Somewhere in the last 38 years," she wrote in Missile Envy, "the United States has lost its direction and its soul."

paralleled the simplicity of the movement's basic message during Vietnam: Where the previous generation had reduced the war issue to "U.S., Out Now!", Forsberg and her allies crafted a similarly straightforward answer to the nuclear dilemma; "Stop Now." The superpowers should just stop where they were, ending the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Forsberg's "Call" became the centerpiece of a renascent peace movement that quickly attracted new recruits.

Congress Reacts

As the freeze campaign got under way in 1980-81, for example, such supporters as atomic scientist George Kistiakowsky helped resurrect Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), a long-moribund organization of doctors and other health care professionals who now found inspiration in the rhetoric of a Boston-based Australian pediatrician, Helen Caldicott. Caldicott, PSR, and a series of editorials in the stately *New England Journal of Medicine* claimed that most Americans were unaware of their nuclear peril, and had to be shaken out of their "psychic numbing" by slide shows and films emphasizing the horrors of nuclear war (PSR veterans often referred to these shock treatments as "bombing runs"). There were local rallies and protests, and leaflets. ABC-TV produced the nation's first prime-time nuclear war drama, "The Day After," in November 1983, just as the presidential election season was getting under way.

The Catholic bishops of the United States had already joined the physicians as recruits to the antinuclear cause. An explosion of episcopal criticism followed hard on the heels of Ronald Reagan's 1980 election. Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco charged that the United States had "shifted to a first-strike . . . strategy." Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle called the Trident submarine base in his diocese "the Auschwitz of Puget Sound." Bishop Leroy Matthiesen urged his congregants to leave their jobs at the warhead-assembling Pantex plant in Amarillo.

The bishops' critique, which reflected the movement teaching that the arms race resulted from a failure of American morality and will, eventually led to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace."

The letter, which drew front-page attention in the *New York Times*, and a *Time* cover story, was much less a theology and politics of peace than a commentary on weapons and nuclear strategy. The bishops' final proposals were shaped by conventional arms control theory and aimed at political Washington. Here the Catholic prelates followed the pattern set by their Protestant colleagues during Vietnam: a church-as-lobbyist model took precedence over religious leaders' classic task of culture formation through moral education.

The nuclear freeze campaign, mostly an upper-middle-class phenomenon, was criticized as simplistic by some active disarmament advocates. Among them was Roger Molander, a White House staffer under presidents Ford and Carter and founder of Ground Zero. He thought the freeze was a good way for citizens to express their nuclear concerns, but worried that "there is a little too much of the feeling that the whole problem is in this country and that if we can just get our act together, the Russians will go along."

Almost a year after the Central Park rally, the campaign hit its political apogee in May 1983 when an amended freeze resolution passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 278 to 149. But 90 of the House Democrats who voted for the freeze voted less than a month later for MX appropriations; and the freeze resolution eventually died in the Republican-controlled Senate. Freeze pressure certainly contributed to President Reagan's appointment of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission on strategic forces; but the Commission's recommended development of a small, single-warhead missile ("Midgetman") did not fit the freeze's "Stop Now" position. White House worries over eroding public support, influenced by the freeze campaign, for the traditional U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence may well have been a factor in generating the Reagan administration's antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); but SDI, too, was opposed by virtually all freeze leaders.

Seven out of eight Democratic presidential hopefuls endorsed variants of the freeze during the 1984 primaries; but former vice president Walter Mondale, a freeze supporter and the eventual Democratic nominee, did not make the freeze a central issue in his campaign. In any event, Mondale's crushing defeat by President Reagan seemed to suggest that the American people wanted both arms control *and* military strength.

Hamburger Money

Helen Caldicott, pleading exhaustion, announced her retirement from the antinuclear fray, and in late 1985 Randall Forsberg all but threw up her hands: "The shock of what happened in the 1984 elections [has] left us reeling. It's not that support has gone away. It's just that we've tried everything."

Yet the freeze campaign was an important exercise that, like the Vietnam-era protests, had a pronounced impact on the teaching centers of American life.

The Catholic bishops continued their criticism of the Reagan administration's nuclear policy after the 1983 pastoral letter. The Methodist bishops flatly condemned deterrence in 1986, while the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. issued a study paper entitled "Are We Now Called to Resistance?", which suggested that only massive civil



Mario Cuomo, then lieutenant governor of New York, holds torch of peace at the United Nations building in Manhattan (1982); massive anti-Reagan "nuclear freeze" rally attracted leading Democratic politicians.

disobedience could avert nuclear catastrophe. The Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City was declared a "nuclear weapons free zone." Evangelical Protestants formed "Evangelicals for Social Action," and produced a monthly, *Sojourners*, that carried freeze themes to the country's fastest-growing denominations.

The freeze campaign also stirred up interest in other aspects of disarmament and peace-keeping. Major foundations and individual donors poured millions of dollars into studies of arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations.* Many of them were sober academic exercises. But some were not. For example, Joan Kroc, widow of the founder of McDonald's, distributed thousands of free copies of Helen Caldicott's

*According to the Forum Institute (Washington, D.C.), annual private foundation grants in this area, broadly defined, rose from \$16.5 million to \$52 million in 1982-84. The big 1984 givers (to Harvard, Brookings, M.I.T., et al.): MacArthur (\$18.5 million), Carnegie Corporation, Ford, Rockefeller. Meanwhile, Ploughshares, North Star, and smaller foundations funded scores of advocacy groups, peace lobbyists, and leftist think tanks—e.g., the Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for Defense Information, the American Friends Service Committee, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Peace Development Fund, SANE, Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament, and the freeze campaign itself. By one estimate, there were at least 5,700 local "peace" groups of various persuasions across the nation in 1985. In 1984, for its part, Congress established the grant-making U.S. Institute of Peace, with a modest \$4 million budget.

Missile Envy (endorsed by no less a figure than Walter Cronkite), and gave \$6 million to establish a peace studies institute at the University of Notre Dame. (The institute's advisory board included Evgenii Velikhov, a Soviet scientist and candidate member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.)

Indeed, freeze teachings—that the arms race was an action-reaction cycle; that reversing the arms race was a matter of American will; that the U.S. “military-industrial complex” was the main obstacle to that reversal; that a sort of psychological dysfunction, not real-world differences in values and interests, caused U.S.–Soviet conflict; that the United States and the Soviet Union were morally equivalent culprits in the nuclear dilemma—flavored new “peace studies” programs in high school and college classrooms and a children's best seller by Dr. Seuss, *The Butter Battle Book*.

Stalemates or Breakthroughs?

In the freeze campaign, then, as during Vietnam, the peace movement both won and lost: It lost the 1984 election and the public policy battle—narrowly defined—and may have prompted a backlash, but it made gains elsewhere. The ultimate impact of the freeze campaign remains to be seen.

The post-Vietnam peace movement's importance in American public life has often been masked by its diversity, volatility, and lack of discipline, by Ronald Reagan's victories, by the rise of the New Right, by congressional reaction to the shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign policy realists of both Democratic and Republican persuasion in Washington, D.C., may think of the peace movement as a marginal factor. Peace movement leaders may feel only frustration because Pentagon budgets grow, U.S. aid again reaches Central American anti-Communists, and arms control is stalled. Both groups are wrong. They fail to measure the changes in the nation's political and cultural environment since 1965.

Indeed, Vietnam Moratorium veteran Sam Brown's appraisal of the movement of his day—“We seem to have had little lasting influence on the nature either of American society or its approach to the world”—rings oddly to anyone familiar with foreign policy positions taken in recent years by the United Methodist Church, the National Education Association, several *New York Times* columnists, the Machinists' union, the United States Catholic Conference, the League of Women Voters, and broadcast executive Ted Turner—and by younger Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees.

Drubbings in presidential elections aside, the peace movement, probably by accident, seems to have hit on a strategy: what 1960s

German radical Rudy Deutschke once called "the long march through the institutions." As we have noted, American religion, higher education, prestige journalism, and popular entertainment were deeply influenced by various movement themes during and after Vietnam. The initial impact has already registered in American politics: in the national Democratic Party, and in the constraints felt by even so popular a president as Ronald Reagan.

Yet, despite such gains, public support of the movement has never reached a point of critical mass. Why? For one thing, judging by the polls, its spokesmen have consistently failed to develop a response to the problem of totalitarianism in general, or the behavior of the Soviet Union in particular, that is satisfactory to the general public. Most Americans favor peace and arms control but remain convinced anti-Communists.

The movement's deeper failure lies elsewhere. Even radical movement leaders no longer spell their country's name "Amerika." But the impulse that lay beneath that Vietnam-era grotesquerie—the sense that there is an evil at the heart of an American darkness—seems to remain strong among many peace militants today. They see America as the problem. Most Americans do not. And there lies the basic point of disjunction, in my view, between the movement and the overwhelming majority of the American people.

The peace movement, since Vietnam, has been able occasionally to muster enough domestic pressure to help hobble U.S. policies—in arms control, in Central America, in U.S.–Soviet relations. But its ultimate effect on international politics, like that of its counterparts in Western Europe, has usually been to foster incoherence and stalemate, not breakthroughs. The peace movement's failure to challenge Soviet policy is the reverse of its apparent disaffection with the American experiment. Both sides of that coin have to be addressed, if the peace movement is to gain and hold widespread public support—and if it is to help make the United States a leader in progress toward a world that is peaceful, secure, and free.

