

## PAPERBOUNDS

**THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA.** By Shih-Shan Henry Tsai. Univ. of Ind., 1986. 223 pp. \$9.95

According to the 1980 census, says Tsai, a University of Arkansas professor, America's Chinese are her best-educated ethnic group; one of three has a college degree. Yet America's Chinese have not always been successful. Flocking to the United States at the beginning of the last century, Chinese laborers were given the brutal task of building America's railroads. Employers coveted their diligence but despised these aliens who spoke no English and longed for home. By the end of the century, prejudice won out over economics. Congress halted Chinese immigration in 1882 and did not allow it again until World War II, when China became a U.S. ally. After Mao's revolution in 1949, American-Chinese endured a new wave of suspicion. Tsai details the political and cultural status of today's American-Chinese in a country that has often wronged them, and where—though they prosper—many still feel estranged.

**U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT.** By Lawrence Freedman. Princeton, 1986. 235 pp. \$9.95

How do U.S. strategists respond to the Soviet military threat? The naive view is that various intelligence agencies (the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency) present facts and estimates to policymakers who then try to fashion an appropriate strategic response. As cynics see it, competing government branches select estimates that best serve particular agendas, while intelligence agents, seeking to retain their own influence, tailor the information to satisfy the client. Freedman, a professor of war studies at London's King's College, disagrees. He shows that debates

over such issues as the vulnerability of U.S. silo-based ICBMs never hinged exclusively on estimates of what the Soviet Union was attempting to do. Rather, they reflected policymakers' assessment of U.S. military might in the light of larger geopolitical designs, "understood by reference to broader perspectives on the character and sources of strategic strength in the modern world." When opinion regarding American strength in the world splits—as under Gerald Ford (1974–77)—policymakers' views of the Soviet threat vary and American military strategy falters.

**PSYCHO/HISTORY: Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and History.** Edited by Geoffrey Cocks and Travis L. Crosby. Yale, 1987. 318 pp. \$35

In 1910, Sigmund Freud unwittingly launched the field of "psychohistory" with a small study of Leonardo da Vinci's sexuality (or lack thereof), a mystery Freud endeavored to understand. Today, "psychohistorians" routinely operate on the personalities of public figures (e.g., *The Kennedy Neurosis*, by Nancy Clinch, 1973), while "emotionologists" such as Christopher Lasch (*The Culture of Narcissism*, 1979) peer into societies' collective feelings. Can psychoanalytic methods add to our understanding of history? These 18 essays—by both practitioners and critics—continue the debate. Lloyd deMause tells how he came to see warfare as a "bizarre group fantasy" of birth, after noting rhetoric (being "strangled," or "choked," "descending into the abyss" with "naked force") common to both war speeches and birth dreams. Harvard psychiatrist Robert Coles—while conceding the "need [for] more psychologically sophisticated historians"—warns against creating "yet another 'field,'" especially one that is comfortable reducing Nixon, Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi to 'oral' or 'anal' personalities.