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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**


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spectively, at the American Enterprise Institute, maintain that the GOP's hopes for the South are misplaced.

Fueling them are Census Bureau predictions. They show the South gaining up to 10 new congressional seats in 1992, after redistricting. But the authors argue that Democrats are likely to seize most of those seats. Holding majorities in all of the South's state legislatures, and nine of 11 governorships, the Democrats dominate local politics. (In 1982, when the South gained eight new seats from redistricting, Democrats captured six of them.) Taking more conservative stances than their Northern counterparts, Democrats in local Southern elections have parried the Republican effort to link them to the national party's liberalism.

Scammon and Barnes suggest that the GOP would do better to target the West, which may get nine new House slots in 1992. With Republicans now controlling the state legislature or governorship in five of the six states expected to gain seats, they also may benefit from redistricting. If they can forge ahead in *both* the South and West, the Republicans may capitalize on a demographic trend. By 1992—for the first time in U.S. history—Southerners and Westerners will together hold the majority in both the Electoral College and the House of Representatives.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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### *Management Vs. Strategy*

"Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis" by Eliot A. Cohen, in *The National Interest* (Winter 1985/86), 1627 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

"There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management." So said Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, commenting on President John F. Kennedy's successful resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cohen, who teaches strategy at the Naval War College, takes issue with McNamara and subsequent "crisis managers." Their approach to global conflicts is flawed, not least because it is based on a brief historical example with little contemporary relevance.

On October 15, 1962, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency identified Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba. One week later, President Kennedy told the Soviets, and the American people, that the missiles must be withdrawn. By October 24, a U.S. naval blockade of 19 warships had intercepted 25 Soviet vessels approaching Fidel Castro's island. Four days later, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove 42 medium-range ballistic missiles from Cuba, and to destroy the Soviet launching sites.

Encouraged by their success, says Cohen, Kennedy's civilian policy-makers became confident of their ability "to handle complex politico-military situations . . . independent of military advice." Thus was born

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the science, or art, of crisis management.

But Cohen argues that the 1962 showdown offers little "historical guidance for American statesmen." When JFK stood "eyeball to eyeball" with Khrushchev, the United States had nuclear superiority and, indeed, a "first strike" capability. Future conflicts will occur under conditions of approximate nuclear parity. The strength of conventional forces will play a larger role, and America's adversaries are more likely to be Soviet proxies than the USSR itself.

Crisis management's emphasis on avoiding military clashes may hamper our ability to win truly unavoidable conflicts. Cohen cites the Vietnam War as a case where short-term political considerations clouded strategic thinking. The Philippines, in Cohen's opinion, may turn out to be another. To avert future military debacles, Cohen suggests that policy-makers look beyond the two-week Cuban affair. Examining episodes that illustrate the overextension of military commitments (Britain after the Boer War), the logistics of coalition warfare (the 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa), and the complexities of small wars (Korea and Vietnam) shows that management is no substitute for strategy.

To keep harping on the Cuban crisis, maintains Cohen, is to allow an exception to displace the rule.

### *NATO's Inherent Difficulties*

"Security and Solidarity: NATO's Balancing Act after the Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces" by Richard K. Betts, in *The Brookings Review* (Summer 1985), Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

When the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed in 1979 to counter a Soviet build-up by deploying 100 U.S. Pershing II and 462 cruise missiles in Europe, its political leaders did not anticipate big trouble. But during 1980 and '81, antimissile protest groups sprang up across Western Europe; the Soviets walked out of arms control talks in Geneva.

Today, with 236 of the missiles in place and the Soviets back in Geneva, much of the uproar has subsided. But Betts, a Brookings Fellow, warns that "it would be naive to believe that these strains [in the alliance] have vanished." The deployment controversy was just the most recent manifestation of the tensions within NATO.

At the heart of NATO's troubles is an inevitable conflict between its "strategic purpose" and its "political solidarity." The alliance must deter Soviet aggression, but it must also avoid heightening public fears of nuclear escalation. Judged in that light, observes Betts, the stationing of Pershing and cruise missiles was a Pyrrhic victory. It enhanced the West's deterrent capability but provoked Europeans' anxiety—even though their leaders requested the missiles in the first place.

Viewed in the West as a sign of U.S. commitment to European security, the new missiles have greatly alarmed the USSR. Hence, Betts