

## POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

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those with less schooling.

Glass drew on data from the National Election Studies (NES) of the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies, which has been recording voters' "likes" and "dislikes" vis-à-vis presidential candidates since 1952. Among people with a college education, 55 percent of candidate evaluations through 1984 have involved such "personal attributes" as: "competence" (dependability, experience), "character" (leadership, integrity, education), and "personal attraction" (appearance, friendliness, sense of humor). Only 42 percent of those with less than a ninth-grade education said that they would cast ballots for or against a candidate because of some personal trait.

Glass did find that, on average, voters more often rated candidates on the basis of character (50 percent) and competence (33 percent) than on superficial appeal (17 percent). This last trivial factor influenced equally the voting decisions of the college-educated and those who did not complete high school. In the elections of 1972 (Richard Nixon versus George McGovern) and 1976 (Jimmy Carter versus Gerald Ford), personal attributes actually outweighed the candidates' political positions in the minds of most voters. Indeed, in 1980, a majority of those voting for Democratic incumbent Carter over Republican Ronald Reagan did so because of the 69-year-old challenger's "age." A perceived "weakness/indecisiveness" in Carter lost him more votes than did any of his policies.

Such voter response can be disheartening, says Glass. Perhaps Americans are justifiably skeptical of campaign promises and cast ballots based on intuition. On the other hand, apathy may also play a part.

Whatever the case, concludes Glass, the scholar's prevailing "rational voter model"—which assumes that voters judge candidates mainly by their political stance—does not hold up.

### *Go West, Republicans*

"Republican Prospects: Southern Discomfort"  
by Richard Scammon and James A. Barnes, in  
*Public Opinion* (Oct./Nov. 1985), American  
Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St. N.W., Wash-  
ington, D.C. 20036.

In recent years, for one party to control both the House of Representatives and the Oval Office has been a rarity. Particularly stymied by this "disalignment" has been the GOP: Although Republicans have won six of the last nine presidential elections, Democrats have kept a majority in the House for 32 years.

With the Democrats controlling 253 of the 435 congressional districts, the Republicans are a long way from bringing about "realignment" in their favor. But they have hopes, and are pinning them on the South. Today, of the 116 House seats allotted to the 11 states of the old Confederacy, an all-time high of 43 are held by Republicans. Indeed, of the 15 net seats that the party gained in 1984, eight were Southern. Yet Scammon and Barnes, a Visiting Fellow and a research associate, re-

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spectively, at the American Enterprise Institute, maintain that the GOP's hopes for the South are misplaced.

Fueling them are Census Bureau predictions. They show the South gaining up to 10 new congressional seats in 1992, after redistricting. But the authors argue that Democrats are likely to seize most of those seats. Holding majorities in all of the South's state legislatures, and nine of 11 governorships, the Democrats dominate local politics. (In 1982, when the South gained eight new seats from redistricting, Democrats captured six of them.) Taking more conservative stances than their Northern counterparts, Democrats in local Southern elections have parried the Republican effort to link them to the national party's liberalism.

Scammon and Barnes suggest that the GOP would do better to target the West, which may get nine new House slots in 1992. With Republicans now controlling the state legislature or governorship in five of the six states expected to gain seats, they also may benefit from redistricting. If they can forge ahead in *both* the South and West, the Republicans may capitalize on a demographic trend. By 1992—for the first time in U.S. history—Southerners and Westerners will together hold the majority in both the Electoral College and the House of Representatives.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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### *Management Vs. Strategy*

"Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis" by Eliot A. Cohen, in *The National Interest* (Winter 1985/86), 1627 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

"There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management." So said Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, commenting on President John F. Kennedy's successful resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cohen, who teaches strategy at the Naval War College, takes issue with McNamara and subsequent "crisis managers." Their approach to global conflicts is flawed, not least because it is based on a brief historical example with little contemporary relevance.

On October 15, 1962, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency identified Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba. One week later, President Kennedy told the Soviets, and the American people, that the missiles must be withdrawn. By October 24, a U.S. naval blockade of 19 warships had intercepted 25 Soviet vessels approaching Fidel Castro's island. Four days later, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove 42 medium-range ballistic missiles from Cuba, and to destroy the Soviet launching sites.

Encouraged by their success, says Cohen, Kennedy's civilian policy-makers became confident of their ability "to handle complex politico-military situations . . . independent of military advice." Thus was born