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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**


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state legislators are "much more materialistic, much more poll-oriented, much less willing to do what's tough but necessary" than their part-time, amateur predecessors. True, notes Rosenthal, these upwardly mobile professionals are also younger, better educated, and more likely to devote long hours to their legislative duties than were their "citizen" predecessors. But proceeding directly from law school or graduate studies to the campaign trail, they often lack the broad experience that helped former community leaders to serve their electorates.

In 1963, all members of the Wisconsin state legislature held down regular jobs—as attorneys, businessmen, farmers—in addition to their political posts; by 1983, 72 of the 132 legislators in Madison called politics their only livelihood. All told, Rosenthal estimates that almost "one-third of the nation's legislatures are . . . in the hands of full-timers." Only in the less populous states (Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) do "part-time citizens" still occupy most state house and senate seats, and their numbers are declining.

Increasing demands on state legislators' time is one reason for the influx of professionals, says Rosenthal. Most state legislatures used to meet biennially; today, all but seven convene annually. Rising salaries have also enabled legislators to live as purely political creatures. Although New Hampshire still pays its legislature members only \$100 per year (and no expenses), Alaska and New York pay almost \$50,000. And higher salaries have changed the make-up of state government by luring modest-income folk into the state political arena: Since 1960, the number of former teachers in state legislatures has risen from three percent to more than 10 percent.

Today's state legislatures are suffering from this "new breed" of politician, concludes Rosenthal. Eager to "make it" in office, many careerists waste time needed for the public business on personal image-building and fundraising for re-election. And, when offered a more prestigious political post, they leave the legislature "as soon as they have a shot." All told, Rosenthal suggests, 20 years ago the average state legislator "placed more emphasis on the issues, on the art of legislating, as opposed to the art of politicking, getting elected, and staying elected."

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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*Living with Risk*

"Maintaining Global Stability" by James R. Schlesinger, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1985), 1800 K St. N.W., Ste. 718, Washington, D.C. 20006.

The era of Pax Americana—when the United States clearly enjoyed global military and economic supremacy—is over. Responding to that reality have been two groups of analysts: One group calls for a military build-up to regain past American superiority; the other, for a cutback in the country's commitments abroad.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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Taking issue with both camps is Schlesinger, a former defense secretary now teaching at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. Today, he argues, America must "live with the risks" that have long plagued other less favored nations.

Formerly the United States had little difficulty exerting its will. "Even in circumstances as inherently unfavorable as . . . the Berlin airlift (1948-49)," writes Schlesinger, "the Soviet Union felt obliged to give way." Yet by 1968, Moscow could overlook U.S. protests and assert itself in Czechoslovakia—or, later, in Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1981). The decline of American power vis-à-vis the Soviets also meant that the United States would be "tested" more often by smaller nations such as Iran and Nicaragua.

American responses to such "tests" have been hamstrung by a lack of domestic consensus on what U.S. interests are and how they can best be defended. Furthermore, the trauma of the 1965-1973 Vietnam involvement has, among other things, increased tension between the executive and legislative branches of government, with a suspicious Congress often doing its best to stymie the White House. Schlesinger predicts that this tension will persist: "Whatever the longings of . . . the executive branch to 'roll back the legislative intrusion,' the good old days . . . will not return."

Those who call on the United States to reduce its overseas obligations are guilty of wishful thinking. Citing the uproar that ensued when Jimmy Carter proposed, in 1978, to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea, Schlesinger observes that "for any great power to back away from its commitments is more easily said than done."

That leaves the United States facing a paradox: It *must* reduce its military commitments—except that it *cannot*. Moreover, despite the need for a national consensus, America must preserve its prestige by retaliating—with or without popular support—against terrorists and those who threaten U.S. economic and strategic interests. America may "win some and lose some," Schlesinger concludes, but "try as we will, there is no acceptable way that we can escape from . . . responsibilities or risks."

### *Are 600 Ships Enough?*

"The Growing Navy" by Michael R. Gordon, in *National Journal* (Sept. 21, 1985) 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; "Is That All There Is?" by R. Robinson Harris and Joseph Benkert, in *Proceedings* (Oct. 1985), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 21402.

The U.S. Navy is riding high. Buoyed by a wave of congressional support, and led by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, it is on its way to achieving its goal of a modernized 600-ship fleet by 1989. Gordon, a *National Journal* reporter, wonders whether expansion is coming "at the expense of a balanced naval force."

Congress has approved funding for all but two of the 28 new ships requested by the Navy in the 1986 fiscal year. When completed, those 26 vessels will raise the fleet's total to 560—down from 1,055 in 1968 during the Vietnam War but above the 1980 low of 479. Behind this build-up,