The source: “Latin America’s Left Turn” by Jorge G. Castañeda, in Foreign Affairs, May–June ­2006.

The Peruvian presidential election that pitted Alan García against Ollanta Humala this past June highlighted two facts of life about Latin American politics. The region is thoroughly dominated by the political Left, and the Left itself is neatly divided into two competing groups. The winner in Peru, García, represents the “modern” Left, while Humala represents the resurgent “populist” tradition. The United States, argues Jorge G. Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico, has no choice but to support one of Latin America’s two ­Lefts.

The spread of democracy beginning in the 1980s and the persistence of widespread poverty and inequality virtually foreordained the Left’s rise. The market-­oriented reforms and other policy changes that began in the middle of that decade failed to pro­duce sufficient econ­omic growth. “The impoverished masses,” Castañeda says, “vote for the types of policies that, they hope, will make them less poor.” The collapse of the Soviet Union helped by freeing leftist parties from charges of foreign ­control.

Both Latin Lefts emphasize social improvement, fair distribution of wealth, national sovereignty, and (to varying degrees) democracy. The modern Left, however, took its original inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution and has had a historical experience much like that of Europe’s socialist parties. It has acknowledged its own past errors and those of its former ­role ­models, the Soviet Union and Cuba. It has a genuine commitment to democracy, emphasizes social policy within “an orthodox market framework,” and values good relations with the United States and other Western countries. In recent years, that has been a formula for success in ­Left-­governed countries such as Chile, where new president Michelle Bachelet continues a modern Left reign dating to 1990.

The populist Left, on the other hand, is a “peculiarly Latin Amer­ican” phenomenon, whose ancestry includes such storied figures as Juan Perón, who came to power in Argen­tina in the 1940s. The contemporary populist resurgence began in 1998 with the election of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez , who has since been joined by Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez in Uru­guay, and, recently, Evo Morales in Bolivia. Populist leaders are waiting in the wings else­where, notably Mexico, where Andrés Manuel López Obrador has a good chance of win­ning this year’s presidential ­election.

Although widely seen as champions of the working class, the populists have “no real domestic agenda.” Stri­dently nationalistic, they are intent on picking fights with Washington in order to whip up popular sup­port and on playing to the crowds by nationalizing industries such as oil and gas (which gives them control over vast revenues). Such economic policies as they have amount mostly to crony capitalism, and their respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is tenuous at ­best.

Washington’s best option is actively to support the “right Left,” Castañeda argues. That means signing a free-trade deal with Chile, negotiating in earnest on trade with Brazil, and otherwise helping responsible leftists deliver the goods to voters. The leaders of the “wrong Left,” mean­while, need to be reminded of their countries’ commitments to democ­racy and human rights and of the imperative of continuing to build an “international legal order.” But Washington must “avoid the mistakes of the past,” even if that means allowing Chávez, for example, to acquire nuclear technology from Argentina, as long as international safeguards are in place. If it acts wisely, the United States could help the region “finally find its bearings.”