"Landmines: Why the Korea Exception Should Be the Rule" by John F. Troxell, in Parameters (Spring 2000), U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, Pa. 17013–5238.

Citing the need to defend South Korea from attack by North Korea, the United States has refused to sign the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning land mines. But President Bill Clinton has said the United States will sign it by 2006 if effective alternatives to landmines can be found. Troxell, director of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College, fears that the United States may sacrifice a valuable military tool.

The Ottawa Treaty came about as the result of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which focused worldwide attention on the toll the devices were taking on innocent civilians. A 1995 State Department report estimated that more than 100 million land mines in more than 60 countries were causing 26,000 casualties a year, and that some 2.5 million new mines were being planted each year. Today, many fewer new mines are being put in place, and they are outnumbered by the ones being removed. Washington has spent more than $375 million since 1993 to remove mines in other countries, "with the goal," Troxell says, "of eliminating the threat...to civilians worldwide by 2010."

"Dumb" antipersonnel mines, which remain in the ground indefinitely, ready to go off, "are the principal cause of the humanitarian crisis," he notes. But the Ottawa Treaty would ban all land mines, including "smart" ones that self-destruct within hours or days and are usually used to protect antitank mines (also self-destructing). With no effective alternatives, he says, both "dumb" and "smart" mines should remain in the U.S. arsenal.

"Landmines are vital battlefield tools to channel enemy forces into a specific area, or to defend flanks, restricted terrain, or border zones," he says. In the Korean case, "long-duration active mines along the [demilitarized zone] help deter the third largest army in the world" from attacking.

But mines’ military usefulness is not confined to the Korean Peninsula, Troxell argues. They serve as "a combat multiplier" for all U.S. land forces, especially those that are outnumbered when first deployed. Troxell points out that 16 four-star generals and admirals told Congress that in 1997. "While there are legitimate humanitarian concerns related to the indiscriminate and ing to the effectiveness and security of U.S. undisciplined use of these weapons," Troxesll forces and their ability to accomplish says, "there are equally valid concerns relat-assigned missions throughout the world."