“Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice” by Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, in International Security (Winter 2003–04), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Univ., 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

When the goal is to prevent war crimes, genocide, and political killings, how much should principle yield to pragmatism? Political scientists Snyder, of Columbia University, and Vinjamuri, of Georgetown University, argue that human rights advo­cacy groups may do more harm than good in the long run by insisting on the application of universal standards to the prosecution of individuals responsible for atrocities: “Pre­venting atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently depend on striking politically expedient bargains that create effective political coalitions to contain the power of potential perpetrators of abuses.” In other words, deals must sometimes be struck with devils—by providing amnesty, say, for past abuses, or even by ignoring them. For example, in September 2002, to avoid undermining progress toward peace and stability in Afghanistan, United Nations administrator Lakhdar Brahimi resisted calls from outgoing human rights commissioner Mary Robinson to investigate alleged war crimes by key figures in the new UN-backed government there.

The first order of business in countries where atrocities occur—and where those who committed abuses may remain powerful—should be to establish, through bargaining and negotiation, the fundamental political and institutional conditions that will make justice possible. Absent those conditions, attempts to implement universal standards of criminal justice may actually weaken norms of justice by revealing their ineffectiveness.

Snyder and Vinjamuri examined 32 civil wars fought since 1989. Of the nine instances in which “human rights abuses were reduced, peace was secured, and the degree of democracy was substantially improved,” only three—East Timor, the former Yugo­slavia (except Macedonia), and Peru—involved trials for individuals accused of atrocities. In general, say the authors, trials helped to end abuses only where local criminal justice institutions were already fairly well established. Like tribunals, amnesties “require effective political backing and strong institutions to enforce their terms.” And truth commissions, another favorite instrument of human rights advocates, “have been useful mainly” when, as in South Africa, they have made amnesties politically acceptable.

In Iraq today, a trial of the captured dictator Saddam Hussein appears to be in the works. But, the authors warn, extensive use of war crimes trials there, “in the midst of ongoing instability and powerful potential spoilers, as well as in the face of efforts to rebuild the basic institutions of the state,” would be an ill advised move.