Africa's 'Soft Authoritarianism '

Africa's 'Soft Authoritarianism '

"Africa" by Marina Ottaway, in Foreign Policy (Spring 1999), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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"Africa" by Marina Ottaway, in Foreign Policy (Spring 1999), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

A new generation of leaders has begun to emerge in Africa, but its members are not committed to democracy. Indeed, they are "extremely suspicious of popular participation and even more so of party politics," writes Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Instead, she says, these new leaders— including Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, and Rwandan vice president Paul Kagame, all of whom came to power by winning a civil war—are intent upon building a strong government, maintaining security and stability, and promoting economic development.

They believe, she says, "in a mixture of strong political control, limited popular participation, and economic liberalization that allows for a strong state role in regulating the market—South Korea, Taiwan, and even Singapore are viewed as models to be emulated." In other words, what used to be described as "soft authoritarianism."

The instability of Africa today, argues Ottaway, results from the weakness of the independent states left behind by the European colonial powers, exacerbated in recent years by economic decline. "The authoritarianism of many African governments, coupled with their incapacity to project power throughout their [own] countries, has provided a fertile breeding ground for armed opposition movements" in such places as Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Chad, and Senegal.

It is appealing to think that the failed African states could revive themselves by embracing democracy and the free market, says Ottaway, but it is also unrealistic. "Elections and economic reform do not cause domestic armed movements to disappear, nor do they prevent conflicts in decaying neighboring states from spilling over borders."

With the Cold War over and French influence in Africa waning, the political order imposed by the colonial powers is truly at an end, Ottaway observes. Determining a new balance of power among the states, one that can be sustained without outside intervention, will probably entail conflicts. "Conflict is probably an intrinsic part of an African renaissance and not necessarily a sign of the so-called coming anarchy."

 

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