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
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


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





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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Editor's Comment

One thing becomes clear from any survey of serious scholarly work on U.S. energy policy: There isn't much. Since the 1973-74 oil crisis, the past, in particular, has been neglected. The research emphasis, encouraged by sizable foundation grants, has been on the energy future, seen darkly or brightly depending on the author and the choice of statistics.

Americans like discussing the future. But our memories are short. "Energy" was not even an issue in the 1980 presidential campaign, one year after the upheaval in Iran and another doubling in the price of OPEC oil.

Thus, the publication of *Energy Policy in Perspective* seems especially welcome. Just issued by the Brookings Institution, this pioneering history of the politics of energy since 1945 was researched and written by Duke University economist Craufurd D. Goodwin, who is a senior Wilson Center adviser, and four noted collaborators.

As Goodwin makes clear, most of the accessible post-1945 documentation lies in the U.S. executive branch: the presidential libraries, the federal agencies' archives. Much material in congressional, corporate, and diplomatic files is still unavailable. Hence, Goodwin & Co. tend to tell the complex story from a White House perspective. But their achievement is a major one. They remind us that today's energy problems did not begin in 1973, and that today's proposed remedies, including "synfuels" and oil stockpiling, date back to Harry Truman's day. Why nothing got done is the big question these scholars seek to answer.

By arrangement, we publish a 44-page summary of *Energy Policy* in this issue, with added charts and information. We agree with Professor Goodwin that knowing "where the United States has been in energy policy is essential to determining where it should go."

Peter Braestrup

PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

What Swing to the Right?

"The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election" by Everett Carl Ladd, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1981), Ste. 500, 619 West 114th St., New York, N.Y. 10025.

Early studies of the 1980 presidential election indicate that ethnicity, religion, educational and economic achievement, and even geographical ties ceased to be sure predictors of voter preference. But have Ronald Reagan and the Republicans forged a new and lasting conservative majority? Not according to Ladd, a political scientist at the University of Connecticut.

The erosion of historic party alignments that began three decades ago continued in 1980. In 1964, for instance, Protestants were 6 percent more Republican than the country as a whole, and Catholics 15 percent less—a difference of 21 points. By 1980, the gap had shrunk to 6 points, the smallest in U.S. history. Of American ethnic groups, only Hispanics and blacks showed a distinctive party allegiance, favoring Jimmy Carter by 18 and 69 percentage points respectively. That solidly democratic black vote, in fact, gave Carter the South against Gerald Ford in 1976; white voting patterns have lost their regional biases. In 1980, Carter garnered 34 percent of all white votes in the Northeast, 32 percent in the West, and 37 percent in his native South.

Democrats lost their historic status as the party of the "economically dispossessed." In 1980, only 9 percentage points separated Carter and Reagan voters with annual incomes under \$10,000. Reagan did almost as well among people lacking high school diplomas (45 percent) as he did among college graduates (50 percent). Moreover, anticipated new political fault lines never materialized. The votes of white "born again" Christians and other white Protestants were indistinguishable.

Thirty years ago, 20 percent of American voters claimed to be Independents; in the 1970s, 30 to 35 percent did. In 1980, their share had

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT



Ronald Reagan's landslide victory and the Republican takeover of the Senate struck cartoonist Mike Keefe as a political earthquake.

Michael Keefe, the Denver Post.

jumped to 40 percent, and even among party members, partisan feelings waned. In one CBS News/*New York Times* poll, 43 percent of the Democrats and 47 percent of the Republicans surveyed saw no "important differences" between the parties.

Ladd points to a growing public ambivalence about government as the cause of America's political "dealignment." A majority of Americans, according to several surveys, believe that government should regulate the economy and provide a wide array of services. But they also have grown less tolerant of government inefficiency and waste. This explains the urge by voters to turn the "in's out," writes Ladd, but it hardly promises a "stable new majority" for any President.

Politics and the Supreme Court

"Elements of Extrajudicial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter" by Bruce Allen Murphy, in *The Georgetown Law Journal* (Oct. 1980), 600 New Jersey Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.

"When a priest enters a monastery," observed Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wistfully in 1943, "he must leave . . . worldly desires behind him. And this Court has no excuse for being unless it's a monastery." Despite their cloistered image, Justices (including Frankfurter) have plunged into political frays at least since 1817, when Justice Joseph Story and Representative Daniel Webster joined forces to steer a new bankruptcy act through Congress.

According to Murphy, a political scientist at Penn State, Justices Frankfurter and Louis D. Brandeis best exemplify the two most common styles of behind-the-bench activism—the former the ebullient lobbyist, the latter the discreet string-puller.

Appointed by Woodrow Wilson in 1916, Brandeis was reluctant to give up his progressive causes. His solution: He tapped Harvard professor Felix Frankfurter in 1917 to serve as his "political lieutenant" and armed him with a generous expense account. At Brandeis's behest, Frankfurter penned articles on subjects ranging from the Immigration

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Act of 1924 to the "economic problems of the merchant marine" for liberal journals such as *The New Republic* and *The Nation*. Frankfurter but-tonholed administrators and got Brandeis's allies named to various New Deal agencies. And he broached progressive legislation with Congressmen. Only on rare occasions did Brandeis address a President directly. He personally helped draft Britain's Balfour Declaration in 1917, recognizing claims to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. And after the ailing Wilson left office, Brandeis contributed to "the Document," a Democratic blueprint for regaining the White House.

By the time Frankfurter joined the Court as a Roosevelt appointee in 1939, he was well-schooled in judicial influence-peddling. But he chose to run his own show. Frankfurter called or wrote to his friend FDR almost daily and lobbied tirelessly for Lend-Lease aid to Britain. He also masterminded the replacement of ineffective Secretary of War Henry Woodring by the imperious Henry Stimson, on the eve of World War II. While modestly calling himself a "prisoner of the Bench," Frankfurter drafted portions of the Revenue Act of 1940, and even wrote speeches for Roosevelt.

The Constitution is silent on the subject of judicial politicking. Lacking a voting constituency, judges are disciplined only by their own consciences, writes Murphy. But most Supreme Court Justices have defended limited activism. Asked Chief Justice Warren Burger in a 1978 speech, "If the Judges, whose lives are devoted to these problems, are not qualified to advise on such matters, one may well ask 'who is?'"

The Myth of the Machine

"The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control" by Kenneth R. Mladenka, in *The American Political Science Review* (Dec. 1980), 1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Sophisticated students of American politics "know" that big-city machines parcel out parks, fire-fighting equipment, school improvements, and other public services to reward supportive precincts and punish opponents' strongholds. And no one ran a tighter ship than Richard J. Daley, Democratic mayor of Chicago for 21 years until his death in 1976. Yet Mladenka, a Texas A & M political scientist, has found that, at least during the 1960s and '70s, the professional judgments of Chicago's bureaucrats—not the promises of politicians—determined the distribution of many services, regardless of what candidates said before election day.

Take Chicago's parks. In 1967, non-Democratic wards were actually more likely to get new facilities than were Daley bastions. By 1977, the picture had changed—slightly. Pro- and anti-Democratic wards got a nearly equal share of new equipment; Daley precincts were more apt to get gymnasiums and swimming pools, while opponents' neighborhoods got more golf courses.

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Chicago's fire department developed along apolitical lines, as well. In 1965, inner-city black and racially mixed wards averaged 3 and 4 firehouses, respectively, while outlying wealthier white wards averaged only 2—even though both groups supported the Daley machine. The imbalance was righted over the next 13 years, as the city closed 41 stations and built 24 new ones. A private management consultant firm proposed the correctives, with good reason. Roughly 75 percent of the city's fire stations in 1965 had been built before 1931. Owing to population densities of the era, more firehouses were built in what later became the inner city. Yet, in 1978, after the department's resources had been reallocated, Mladenka found virtually no correlation between a ward's Democratic vote and its share of fire protection.

Some Chicago aldermen insist that they can summon help for their constituents with a quick phone call. But while their boasts may please the voters, Chicago's bureaucrats have been making the big decisions based on need, not cronyism.

'One Nation . . .'

"How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South?" by Edward Pessen, in *The American Historical Review* (Dec. 1980), 400 A St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

Countless histories portray the American Civil War as the inevitable collision between two vastly different societies—the North, industrialized, capitalist, urban, predominantly middleclass, and the South, agrarian, feudal, socially stratified. Yet a new body of scholarship indicates that these differences have been overblown, relates Pessen, a historian at the City University of New York.

North and South were most sharply distinguished by slavery. The 250,000 blacks living above the Mason-Dixon line in 1860 comprised just over 1 percent of the North's population, while black slaves made up nearly one-third of the South's 12 million inhabitants. But only 20 to 25 percent of Southern white farmers owned slaves, and only 1 in 10 could boast more than 30. As in the North, most whites were self-sufficient, small farmers. In both North and South, half the free adult males held less than 1 percent of all property, while the richest 1 percent owned 27 percent of the wealth. In fact, the South's percentage of free white landholders exceeded the North's.

Politically, North and South were like fraternal twins. In general, neither region permitted blacks to vote. And throughout the country, small farmers, laborers, craftsmen, clerks, and shopkeepers elected lawyers, merchants, businessmen, and large property holders to govern and represent them. Democrats and Whigs alike drew strong support from above and below the Mason-Dixon line. Between 1829 and 1860, as many Northerners as Southerners occupied the White House.

Recent—and still controversial—findings that slavery benefited Southern whites economically challenge the standard portrait of planters as "precapitalist" aristocrats who let racism override the profit

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The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

Few whites owned slaves in the ante-bellum South.

motive. And though the South's industrial output averaged less than one-fifth the nation's total during the ante-bellum decades, it kept pace with the developing Northwest.

Despite variations in climate, diet, labor systems, and self-image, both North and South were primarily rural, capitalist, chauvinistic and expansionist. Their lemming-like march to Civil War, concludes Pessen, "may have been due, as is often the case when great powers fight, as much to their similarities as to their differences."

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*Worrying
the Soviets*

"Advances in Antisubmarine Warfare" by Joel S. Wit, in *Scientific American* (Feb. 1981), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Since the 1960s, the United States has pursued arms control agreements with the Soviets that, in theory, encourage both superpowers to shift from highly accurate land-based ICBMs to sea-based missiles, which are less accurate but also less vulnerable to surprise attack. So far, the Russians have not put any great reliance on their sea forces. Recent surges in American antisubmarine capabilities may only convince

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the Kremlin that it has been right all along, reports Wit, a senior researcher at the Library of Congress.

Aiding the U.S. antisubmarine force is the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), bands of "hydrophone" sensors deployed along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of North America, Europe, the Soviet Union, and East Asia. SOSUS can fix an enemy sub's position to within 50 nautical miles. New sensors under development, involving a network of satellite, land, air, and sea "eyes and ears," will enable U.S. forces to track enemy submarines with great accuracy. Sonar will be supplemented by satellite readings of disturbances on the ocean surface, by infrared and laser devices, and by instruments that will measure the geomagnetic anomalies caused by a sub's hull.

Over the next decade, the U.S. attack submarine force is expected to grow from 73 to 90, including 10 deep-diving, super-quiet, nuclear-powered *Los Angeles*-class boats. These vessels will carry advanced Mark-48 torpedoes and a deadly combination torpedo-cruise missile. Moreover, the new CAPTOR mine, effective at depths of nearly half a mile, will make it possible to close off the North Sea gap between England and Greenland—the Soviets' gateway to the Atlantic.

The Soviets, meanwhile, suffer from a shortage of trained submarine crews and maintenance facilities; as a result, they station only about 11 percent of their 87 missile subs at sea at any given time (versus a rate of 60 percent for the United States). According to Wit, the Soviets are so worried about U.S. antisubmarine forces that they have tightened security measures in the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and other principal operating areas close to home; and they have developed long-range submarine ballistic missiles capable of striking U.S. targets from these safe zones.

If Moscow perceives great danger to its submarine force, it may rely even more heavily on land-based ICBMs than in the past. This would force Washington to reciprocate, thereby magnifying the advantage to the Soviets of launching a disarming first strike.

Qaddafi's Rise

"The Libyan Menace" by John K. Cooley, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1981), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

He has underwritten terrorism in Europe and the Middle East, forged military ties with Moscow, demanded Israel's destruction, and attacked his African neighbors (most recently, Chad). Yet Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, the unpredictable 39-year-old ruler of oil-rich Libya, is in part an American creation, argues Cooley, a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*.

U.S., British, and French support of Libya's corrupt King Idris during Qaddafi's student days in the 1950s and '60s spurred his resolve to create a socialist, Islamic "people's republic." His September 1969 coup d'état initially worried Western oil company executives accustomed to bribing Idris and his court. But U.S. officials quickly recognized the young colonel's Revolutionary Command Council. Qaddafi's

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fierce anti-communism soon turned the Nixon administration into an active booster. The colonel helped block a communist coup in the Sudan and denounced Soviet diplomatic initiatives throughout the Middle East. In December 1969, CIA warnings enabled Qaddafi to head off an impending coup by disgruntled Army colleagues. Two years later, the CIA and British intelligence foiled a takeover plot by Idris loyalists.

By 1973, however, Qaddafi's radicalism (Libya sheltered the Palestinian terrorists who attacked Israeli Olympians in Munich in 1972) had angered Washington. And Qaddafi decided that American support of Israel made the Soviet Union Libya's natural superpower ally. Since then, Libya has turned into a storehouse for \$12 billion worth of Soviet weapons that Western intelligence officers fear have been "prepositioned" by Moscow for a war in the Middle East or Europe. Submarines, cruise missiles, and intercontinental bombers may soon follow.

Until now, oil has tied Washington's hands toward Qaddafi. Libya is the United States's third-largest oil supplier, providing 11.2 percent of American imports. But Saudi Arabia and Algeria might agree to standby arrangements to reduce U.S. dependence on Libyan crude. Cooley urges U.S. funding for the multinational military force proposed by the Organization of African Unity to resist future Libyan aggression. And he recommends pumping more foreign aid into the nations of the neighboring Sahel region (especially Niger and Mauritania), whose weakness and poverty make them easy prey to Qaddafi's ambitions.

Gray Area, Gray Prospects

"The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control" by Lawrence Freedman, in *Survival* (Jan.-Feb. 1981), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London, WC2E 7NQ, United Kingdom.

The recently launched U.S.-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe seem likely to fail, writes Freedman, a researcher at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Both superpowers have long stationed medium-range bombers and nuclear missiles (also called "theater nuclear weapons" or "gray area weapons") in Europe. The Soviets' weapons are capable of hitting Western Europe but not North America; American and NATO arms can reach the Soviet heartland. Until 1976, an uneasy stability existed. Then the Kremlin began deploying sophisticated SS-20 missiles with 2,750-mile ranges and multiple warheads throughout Soviet territory. NATO leaders feared that these missiles would politically divide the West by greatly boosting Russia's threat to Europe but not to America. In late 1979, they responded with their own missile build-up plans.

But NATO members such as Belgium and the Netherlands insisted that the West begin negotiating for gray area arms control, as well. Towering obstacles threaten the success of U.S.-Soviet talks begun last October, Freedman asserts. (British and French nuclear forces will not be discussed.) Many American gray area weapons, for instance, are

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carrier-based fighter-bombers capable of reaching Russia but unlikely to be used against Soviet targets. Washington wants them left off the agenda. One-third of Russian medium-range weapons face China and have nothing to do with the West in Moscow's eyes. But U.S. officials contend that they could be transported west in an emergency.

The Carter administration anticipated no real progress in gray area arms control until the start of SALT III. But then SALT II was shelved by the United States after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Freedman contends that coupling the gray area talks to strategic arms negotiations might aid both efforts. He proposes restricting aggregate U.S. and Soviet arsenals to 2,650 medium- and long-range nuclear weapons. Within these ceilings (400 weapons higher than SALT II currently allows), each country could choose its weapons mix. The plan would answer the West's objections to the SS-20 by requiring the Soviets to include such missiles under SALT restrictions on multiple-warheads. The pact would also limit the U.S. fighter-bombers that Moscow fears.

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*The Home
Financing Glut*

"Too Much Capital for Housing?" by Anthony Downs, in *The Brookings Bulletin* (Summer 1980), 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

U.S. builders and realtors warn that high interest rates and tight controls on credit are throwing the housing industry into depression. But Downs, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that, as it is, far too much capital is going to finance home purchases.

"More American capital flows into mortgages for housing [28.5 percent in 1977] than into any other single use, including business investment or state and local finance," Downs reports. The reasons are quickly apparent. Not only are mortgage interest payments and property taxes deductible from taxable income, but proceeds from home sales are often exempt from capital gains taxes if the seller buys another home. And inflation magnifies these benefits. Since home-buyers can put down as little as 5 percent, any big jump in a house's value means a big tax-free profit on equity; meanwhile, the real cost of fixed mortgage payments declines. Business equities, by contrast, are eroded doubly by inflation and by tax rules that assess depreciating assets at historic value rather than replacement cost.

As a result, most Americans now choose housing—not stocks and fixed interest bonds—as their primary investment. They are buying homes at a younger age and are willing to sacrifice a larger share of their current salaries (24 percent in 1979) to do it. This rush to buy has sent home prices skyrocketing.

The present rate of investment in home financing rivals the catch-up

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period of 1950–65, when builders raced to meet demand suppressed by the Great Depression and World War II. But there are differences: In 1979, 22 percent of all home buyers were single. More important, the annual ratio of all residential mortgage lending to the total cost of *newly built* homes has risen, from 66.5 percent in the 1950s to 144.9 percent in 1978. What we are witnessing, maintains Downs, is simply heavier refinancing of the “existing inventory.”

Downs urges local governments to reconsider bans on new construction when prices of existing homes soar. And the federal government should lessen the tax advantages of housing compared to other kinds of investment. There should be incentives, as well, for borrowers who finance new construction or rehabilitation. Finally, savers should be paid higher interest rates, not only to shift capital from home financing to more productive forms of investment (i.e., energy development, business expansion) but also to prevent a long-term savings decline that could permanently damage the economy—and cripple the housing industry in the process.

Productivity Crisis?

“Productivity and Reindustrialization: A Dissenting View” by Gregory Schmid, in *Challenge* (Jan.-Feb. 1981), 901 North Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603.

Too many American workers—that is one economist’s explanation for the U.S. decline in productivity growth during the 1970s.

From 1948 to 1965, the hourly output of private sector workers grew an average of 3.2 percent annually. Over the last six years, this figure sank to 0.6 percent, the lowest non-Depression level since World War I. But Schmid, an economist at the Institute for the Future in Menlo Park, Calif., points out that during the last decade and a half, the Baby-Boom generation grew up. That and the record influx of working women expanded the labor force by 28 million, compared to a 13.8 million increase between 1948 and 1965. This rise in labor supply has held down wages relative to other costs. In fact, the *real* hourly wage of the average nonfarm worker (adjusted for inflation) has declined 0.6 percent annually since 1974. Meanwhile, the cost of factories and machinery has been rising. Consequently, more businessmen have been favoring less-efficient, labor-intensive manufacturing processes.

Even so, Schmid claims, levels of capital investment have remained surprisingly stable. Though the real rate of growth in per worker investment is now falling slightly (by an average of 0.4 percent annually since 1974), investment as a proportion of gross national product is higher today than during the boom years of the 1950s and ’60s (9.9 percent versus 9.2 percent). American industries such as automobiles and consumer electronics, which have postponed large new research and development efforts, have been easy prey for imitative foreign competitors. But U.S. manufacturers of sophisticated, capital-intensive products—aircraft, power generators, plastics—actually increased

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their export surplus from \$3.3 billion to \$5.8 billion during the '70s.

The fall in labor productivity growth rates has stirred congressional support for remedies such as accelerated depreciation schedules, lower capital gains taxes, and higher investment tax credits. But these measures would only rob Washington of badly needed revenues and either force other tax increases or deepen the inflationary federal deficit, contends Schmid. Threatened industries can best be sheltered through outright trade protectionism. The productivity problem will solve itself in the '80s, as the work force's rate of growth slows to one-third its peak level, and the relative cost of labor rises once again, encouraging corporations to use more efficient, labor-saving machinery.

The High Cost of Fence-Sitting

"American Neutrality and Prosperity, 1793-1808: A Reconsideration" by Donald R. Adams, Jr., in *Journal of Economic History* (Dec. 1980), Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, P.O. Box 3630, Wilmington, Del. 19807.

Heeding George Washington's warnings against entangling foreign alliances, the young United States stood aloof from the Napoleonic Wars of 1793-1807. Adams, an economist at Southern Illinois University, disputes the popular view among historians that neutrality produced economic, as well as political, benefits.

Some statistics do indicate that America prospered from war-torn Europe's need for supplies. U.S. exports, which languished at around \$16 million annually between the end of the Revolution and the wars' outbreak, surged to \$26 million in 1793 and peaked at \$101 million in 1806. Shipping earnings nearly quadrupled, to \$42 million, by 1807; and American builders expanded annual ship construction to 100,000 tons. Commercial bankers and marine insurers also thrived.

But most of the new exports were "re-exports"—sales of finished goods made from imported, not domestic, materials. And inflation accounted for much of the remaining dollar gains. In fact, in constant dollars, *domestic* exports per capita dipped from \$5.75 in 1793 to \$5.38 by 1807.

Moreover, the rise in shipping earnings represented a windfall profit. While the United States' share of world trade tonnage grew by 47 percent during the neutrality era, Europe's mounting demand for goods permitted American shippers to hike freight rates nearly 114 percent. This hurt American exporters, who traded in bulky, low-value foodstuffs and raw materials. It also raised the cost of imports for American consumers. Prominent as Northeastern merchants were, their good fortune should not be confused with general prosperity. In 1800, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland accounted for 91 percent of the country's exports. Real wages, even in Philadelphia shipyards, declined during the neutrality years.

Finally, observes Adams, historians tend to forget the direct costs of America's stance. Though Britain and France paid lip service to neu-

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trality, each attacked hundreds of American ships on the high seas. By 1805, U.S. losses in ships and cargo may have reached \$32 million and had spurred an eightfold jump in outlays for a stronger Navy.

Americans On Their Own


"Self-Employed Americans: Their Number Has Increased" by T. Scott Fain, in *Monthly Labor Review* (Nov. 1980), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

What do most chiropractors, authors, paperhangers, and peddlers have in common? They are self-employed. And, reports Fain, a former Bureau of Labor statistics economist, the number of Americans who choose to be their own bosses is growing.

After more than two decades of steady decline, the ranks of self-employed Americans swelled by 1.2 million (to 8.2 million workers) between 1972 and 1979—even though agricultural self-employment dropped from almost 1.8 million to less than 1.6 million. And the trend is accelerating. After the 1974-75 recession, self-employment jumped by 12.4 percent—compared to a 10.8 percent gain in the number of wage and salary workers.

Female self-employment surged by 43 percent between 1972 and 1979, five times faster than the rate for men. The women's average annual income was low, however—\$1,878 in 1978—primarily because so many self-employed women work part-time. Men still account for 75

THE REBOUND IN U.S. SELF-EMPLOYMENT



Source: *Monthly Labor Review*, November 1980.

The number of nonagricultural self-employed Americans increased sharply after the 1974-75 recession, exceeding the rise in nonfarm wage and salary earners by a margin of 6 percent.

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percent of the self-employed. The average age of self-employed workers has dropped appreciably. In 1972, 41.2 percent were less than 45 years old; by 1979, 51.0 percent were. Blacks continued to be underrepresented, with 5.5 percent of the total. Unlike whites, they tend to be clustered in blue-collar and service jobs.

The self-employed have traditionally gravitated to service occupations—as restaurateurs, shopkeepers, lawyers. But between 1972 and 1979, their presence in industry grew markedly—especially in construction, where they accounted for one-third of total employment gains.

The self-employed still work longer weeks than wage and salary workers, but the gap is narrowing. In 1965, they labored 46.8 hours per week, while their salaried counterparts worked only 39.5 hours. By 1979, the respective figures were 41.9 and 38.4 hours. Self-employed males still earn less than their wage and salary counterparts (\$10,240 versus \$12,016 in 1978).

Self-employment in the United States is probably growing even faster than these figures indicate, adds Fain. The Census Bureau lists separately 2.1 million workers who have incorporated their businesses. And government statistics exclude America's millions of moonlighters.

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The 'Baby Doctor' as Social Engineer

"The Unstable World of Benjamin Spock: Social Engineering in a Democratic Culture, 1917-1950," by William Graebner, in *The Journal of American History* (Dec. 1980), Organization of American Historians, 112 North Bryan St., Bloomington, Ind. 47401.

In May 1968, when student protests rocked Columbia, one university administrator blamed Dr. Benjamin Spock for spoiling a generation with permissiveness. But a new kind of discipline and a deep sense of citizenship were what the world-famous pediatrician hoped to encourage with his *Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care* (over 23 million copies sold since 1946). So writes Graebner, a historian at the State University of New York, Fredonia.

Baby and Child Care was Spock's response to the economic depression, war, and European fascism of the 1930s and '40s. At the heart of these problems, he believed, were parental mistakes. Influenced by psychologists Lois Murphy and Kurt Lewin, Spock viewed the typical infant as an incipient savage—fearful, frustrated, insecure, potentially aggressive, but potentially good as well. The wrong kind of discipline—cross looks, angry scolding, or threats—could turn a baby into a demagogic leader or a passive follower. ("If mealtime becomes a struggle,"

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wrote Spock, the baby "builds up a balky, suspicious attitude toward life and toward people The problem may last for years.")

The key to rearing responsible citizen-democrats was to assuage a child's insecurities by setting up daily routines, occasionally by seeking his opinions before making major decisions, but above all, by staking out the parents' clear leadership role. Parents should exude an air of "cheerful certainty." They should avoid presenting choices, arguments, or explanations. Yet, Spock emphasized, children's duties should be presented as positively as possible. The pre-schooler forced to change bedrooms to make room for a new baby, for instance, should be told that "he is graduating because he is a big boy." Properly reared children, Spock stressed, would *want* to go to bed on time.

Spock's ideas were part of a larger intellectual infatuation with social engineering that emerged during the interwar years. Industrial psychologists such as Ordway Tead and Elton Mayo were calling at the time for factory relations based on cooperation instead of contracts and arguing that managers should "lead," not "boss." These and other scholars were certain that encouraging individuals to form their own conclusions would foster not only self-discipline but a "heightened sense of obedience to constituted authority."

The Vietnamese in America

"Vietnamese in America: Diversity in Adaptation" by Kenneth A. Skinner, in *California Sociologist* (Summer 1980), Department of Sociology, California State University at Los Angeles, 5151 State University Dr., Los Angeles, Calif. 90032.

There were only 15,000 Vietnamese living in the United States when the communists took Saigon in April 1975. (Most were students or the wives of American servicemen.) By December, an estimated 135,000 more had arrived. These newcomers were different from earlier immigrant waves, reports Skinner, a Widener College anthropologist.

Most were urban, white-collar, and well-educated. Yet unlike earlier immigrants, the Vietnamese were prevented, at first, from carving out their own enclaves. Fearing that a sudden flood of foreigners would antagonize Americans already concerned about unemployment and declining real wages, federal organizations, such as the interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees, dispersed the Vietnamese with sponsoring families across the country.

Some refugees arrived with only the clothes on their backs; others had spirited suitcases filled with gold out of the country. Roughly half were Catholic—coming from a country where 9 out of 10 are not. And half of the family heads were two-time exiles, having previously fled North Vietnam for the South after the armistice of 1954. Politically, they ranged from fervent anticommunists, to liberal intellectuals, to apolitical farmers. Beginning in 1977, persecution, famine, and economic stagnation brought a second surge of 50,000 Vietnamese (the

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"boat people") to the United States. Many were ethnic Chinese expelled from their homes as tensions between Beijing and Hanoi mounted. Most were poor, uneducated, and rural.

Poor American blacks and Hispanics in Louisiana, Iowa, and elsewhere have protested over the public housing, job counseling, and training extended to the refugees. But the newcomers seem to be moving quickly off the dole. Though one-third of Indochinese households received some public assistance in 1977, it amounted to less than 10 percent of their total income.

In fact, as a whole, the Vietnamese are adjusting well to their new home. By 1977, half had relocated, mainly to boom states such as Texas and California (which now has 40 percent of all U.S. Vietnamese). Few found jobs as prestigious as those they once held in the old country. But even in 1977, 93 percent of the adults were working. That year the average Vietnamese-American household income topped \$9,600 [versus the U.S. average of \$16,100].

Disney World as American Mecca

"Walt Disney World: Bounded Ritual Space and the Playful Pilgrimage Center" by Alexander Moore, in *Anthropological Quarterly* (Oct. 1980), 620 Michigan Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20064.

To the more than 13 million people who flock to Lake Buena Vista, Fla., every year, Walt Disney World is simply America's most spectacular amusement park. To Moore, an anthropologist at the University of Southern California, it resembles a pilgrimage site, an American Mecca or Lourdes.

The author, who bases his study on "a number of systematic visits to Walt Disney World," describes a typical trip to the park as a rite of passage in the "cult of technological and industrial order."

Disney World, observes Moore, is located far from the nearest town, on a 2,300-acre expanse of Disney-owned land. The long journey itself elevates the pilgrim families above their less devout neighbors and friends. To reach their destination, visitors must pass through a number of cleansing commercial and symbolic barriers. Access to the complex is restricted to a private highway through unblemished countryside. In mammoth parking lots, tourists shed their cars (the last reminders of their previous identities). And they entrust their fates to an army of young, uniformed attendants who guide them in their journey through the symbol-laden Magic Kingdom.

The park itself is divided into several "North American utopias," from the childhood storybook setting of Fantasyland to the adolescent world of Adventureland; from the small-town America glorified along Main Street, USA, to the exaltation of high-tech known as Tomorrowland. Shrine-like, larger-than-life theaters such as the Hall of Presidents evoke America's most cherished myths. The collective experience of watching a robot Abraham Lincoln walk and talk, Moore believes,

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moves Americans from all over the nation to reaffirm their shared culture and heritage.

Walt Disney World's pervasive ritualism comes as no surprise to anthropologists, who believe that play and ritual stem from the same human impulses. Both are "make believe." Both help relieve the frustrations and anxieties of everyday life. Disney World's popularity, Moore concludes, indicates that increasingly secular Americans must turn to "grand play" to fill needs once satisfied by religious ritual.

Invasion of the Robber Barons

"The Rise of American Boarding Schools and the Development of a National Upper Class" by Steven B. Levine, in *Social Problems* (Oct. 1980), 208 Rockwell Hall, State University College, Buffalo, N.Y. 14222.

During the late 19th century, upper-class Americans in the Northeast began packing their sons off to exclusive rural boarding schools. Most of these institutions were new, founded by tightly knit Boston families such as the Peabodys and the Lowells. These patricians intended to shield their children from the "vulgar" offspring of new industrialists who had been invading local private day schools. But their attitude would soon change.

Between 1883 and 1906, seven of today's best-known prep schools were founded: Lawrenceville, Groton, Hotchkiss, Choate, St. George's, Middlesex, and Kent. The five that already existed—Andover, Exeter, Hill, St. Paul's, and St. Mark's—enjoyed a sudden boom. Of the lot, Andover and Exeter set the highest standards and admitted many worthy middle-class students, relates Levine, a Harvard law professor. But Groton, St. Mark's, St. Paul's, St. George's, Middlesex, and Kent (collectively called "St. Grottlesex") prized breeding over intellect. They excluded poor boys via \$25 application fees (by contrast, Harvard imposed its first such fee—\$10—in the 1950s). And they counted on Latin tests and character references to keep out the *nouveaux riches*.

But rising costs soon strained the Bostonians' dwindling assets. (As late as 1930, 5 of the 12 schools lacked endowments.) Many young Brahmins owed their presence at St. Grottlesex to inherited wealth. Their great-grandfathers had made fortunes in the China trade, which had declined in the 1830s. Their fathers and grandfathers had entered the professions or had founded the banks and brokerage firms that were being eclipsed by the rise of J. P. Morgan and the New York financiers. When new captains of industry such as Walter Chrysler and Andrew Mellon came knocking, offering libraries, gymnasiums, and cash, trustees at the 12 could not turn them—or their sons—away.

This change of heart had great financial implications during the first half of the 20th century, says Levine. Dormitory friendships formed among the scions of bluebloods and robber barons at St. Grottlesex ripened into boardroom alliances between old and new wealth. A new

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Near the end of Henry A. Coit's long (1856–95) tenure as first rector at St. Paul's, Eastern prep schools were swamped by applications. Many patricians sought sanctuary for their sons from the growing influence of nouveau riche industrialists.

From *Memories of a Great Schoolmaster* by James P. Conover. Courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Co.

generation of patrician bankers needed the parvenues' business, and the parvenues needed the patricians' investment expertise and connections. At the same time, Levine writes, St. Grottlesex admissions policies, which continued to give preference to alumni sons, sought to create a self-perpetuating upper class, while assuring the pre-eminence of the subtle rules and social graces of Brahmin society.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Precision Journalism?

"Journalism and Social Science: A New Relationship?" by David H. Weaver and Maxwell McCombs, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter 1980), Elsevier North Holland, 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

At least 162 U.S. daily newspapers now conduct public opinion polls. The U.S. census of 1980 is being reported by newsmen more than any of its predecessors ever were. And at least one paper, the *Detroit News*, has started its own demography beat. Weaver and McCombs, journalism professors at Indiana and Syracuse universities, respectively, credit changes within American journalism schools for the rising popularity among newsmen of "situation reporting" and social science techniques.

Like Benjamin Franklin, many early newspaper reporters were printers first and writers second—graduates of the "School of Life." More formal journalism training began in the 1870s at universities such as Missouri and Columbia. English departments offered the first journal-

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ism classes. There, ex-newsmen stressed writing, editing, and printing techniques, not reporting.

Then, in the 1930s, Willard Bleyer created a "Ph.D. minor" in journalism in the University of Wisconsin's political science and sociology departments. More emphasis began to be placed at the graduate level on systematic observations of the external world. Universities began filling their journalism faculties with social scientists. Bleyer's disciples helped found new journalism programs at Stanford, Northwestern, and Michigan State, and molded thousands of reporters and journalism teachers in their image. By 1978, a survey of 77 journalism master's programs showed that 61 percent required a course in social science data analysis.

Today, one of the most ardent advocates of such "precision journalism" is Philip Meyer, research director for Knight-Ridder [owner of 33 American dailies]. Meyer has stated that reporters and social scientists share the same goals: "finding facts, inferring causes, pointing to ways to correct social problems, and evaluating . . . such correction." But the press's leap into social science has left some newsmen and academics uneasy. Not all newspaper investigators have adequate training. And, worries opinion analyst Burns Roper, journalists are now "in a position of making news, not merely reporting it."

*Fear, Violence,
and the News*

"Reporting Crime and Fearing Crime in Three Communities" by Walter B. Jaehnig, David H. Weaver, and Frederick Fico, in *Journal of Communication* (Winter 1981), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

Murderers and rapists, understandably, are more likely to make newspaper headlines than are shoplifters and cat burglars. But what effect does this editorial focus on violence have on readers?

Three researchers in journalism at Indiana University compared regular newspaper readers' views on crime with local press coverage in a medium-sized city (Indianapolis, Ind.), a big-city suburb (Evanston, Ill.), and a small New England town (Lebanon, N.H.). They found that fear is much more closely linked to column inches than to actual crime rates.

For example, the percentage of all news stories devoted to violent crime in the *Indianapolis Star* in 1976 (10.1) was nearly twice as great as that in the *Chicago Tribune*—read by respondents in Evanston. And more than twice as many *Star* readers (63.6 percent) as *Tribune* readers (26.1 percent) professed to be "very concerned" about becoming crime victims. But when the answers of those who relied mainly on television for news were included, the survey results changed. Forty-three percent of all Indianapolis respondents were "very concerned" about suffering criminal attack, versus 28.6 percent of Evanston residents. This gap is much closer to the 50 percent difference between the violent crime rates of the two cities recorded by the FBI (.006 per capita in Indianapolis versus .004 percent in Evanston).

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Moreover, Indianapolis, for example, experienced roughly 8 times as many burglaries and thefts as violent crimes, but stories on rape, murder, and assault represented nearly 70 percent of the *Star's* crime reports. Such emphasis on violence, the authors argue, strikes undue alarm in citizens' hearts. Worse, they fear, skimpy coverage of property crimes may lead to "unrealistically low concern with the kinds of crime most citizens are most likely to encounter."

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Islam and the West

"Moslems and the Modern World" by
Godfrey Jansen, in *The Economist* (Jan. 3,
1981), 515 Abbott Dr., Broomall, Pa. 19008.

From the carnage of the Crusades to the televised invective of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, Muslims have opposed the West's power and cultural influence. Is there any hope of accommodation?

Jansen, a correspondent for the *Economist*, writes that Westerners who expect Muslims to become "more like us" may be disappointed. The continuous "mental agonizing of Christian rethinkers" such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Küng has no Islamic counterpart. Islam is a "clear and simple faith," with proscriptions for daily conduct set out in minute detail in the Koran.

Moreover, Muslims today are repelled by the lack of spirituality in the West. "Because Islam still has about it some of the austerity of the desert," explains Jansen, consumerism is regarded as a worse threat than communism, "which is, after all, a sort of alternative faith" embraced by few in the Islamic world.

By contrast, Jansen notes, the features of Islam to which Westerners most object are considered social or legal, not spiritual: corporal punishment; the ban on usury; the inferior status of women. The last poses the greatest obstacle to Western understanding. Muslim bankers routinely extract "service charges" from borrowers; and severe whippings and amputations for adulterers and thieves were abandoned throughout much of the Muslim world for two centuries prior to their sporadic revival in the 1970s. But the Koran unambiguously holds that "men are in charge of women" and ordains that a daughter inherit half what a son receives. Ironically, relates Jansen, Muhammad's intent was to give oppressed women of the time at least minimal rights. And, elsewhere in the Koran, he asserted women's "spiritual equality."

For East and West to come to an understanding, Westerners must educate themselves in Islam. And Muslims must learn to interpret the "administrative" sections of the Koran (written when Muhammad was ruler of Medina) in the more tolerant spirit of earlier chapters revealed at Mecca. Islam, says Jensen, needs a Martin Luther—a "strong-willed, loud-mouthed, impatiently confident socio-religious reformer." Re-

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grettably, he writes, the only Muslims showing this kind of boldness are the "latter-day fundamentalists" who seem determined to turn back the clock to the 8th century.

Plato Revised

"Plato's Ideal Bedlam" by I. F. Stone, in *Harper's* (Jan. 1981), Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 2620, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

Platonic philosophers have often described their mentor's treatises on government as blueprints for social and political progress. Stone, a Washington journalist and student of Greek, disagrees. He contends that to Plato (427?-347 B.C.) the notion of progress (or any change) was contemptible. The esteemed philosopher envisioned what 20th-century man would call a police state, complete with thought control and a strict caste system.

In Raphael's School of Athens (1511), Plato's gesture to the sky symbolizes a devotion to abstractions. Did this lead him to espouse what modern man calls fascism?



Detail from Raphael's School of Athens.
Stanza del Vaticano, Rome.
ALINARI/Editorial Photocolor Archives.

Plato fought a "lifelong vendetta" against the Athenian democracy that allowed him to teach freely, Stone avers. Speaking through Socrates in the *Republic* [Plato often used his colleagues to express his own opinions], he contended that man would find happiness only when philosophers became kings or kings became philosophers. It was, says Stone, "a schoolmaster's dream." Only Platonists would be allowed to rule. Plato urged the establishment of a state religion, censorship of poetry and theater (especially that which celebrated material progress), and the banning of nonconformist academics from the classroom. He envisioned a hierarchical society headed by mathematical mystics—their lives of contemplation sustained by an unarmed working class (*doulous*, a Greek word for slaves that Platonists have chari-

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tably translated as “commoners”).

A secret police (*phylakes*—by which Plato meant “guards,” not the more benign “guardians”) would spy on the populace and weed out potential troublemakers. Like Hitler, Plato wrote of creating a New Man—best evidenced by “Socrates’” suggestion that the kings expel all subjects over age 10 and mold the young to fit their designs.

Plato sought a stable perfection, not progress. His *Republic* was preoccupied not with the needs, pains, and cares of the “here and now” but with discovering the abstract laws of the universe, in which he saw the “only unchanging, and therefore true, reality.”

Back to Jewish Basics

“Sixteenth-Century Christian Hebraica: Scripture and the Renaissance Myth of the Past” by Jerome Friedman, in *The Sixteenth Century Journal* (vol. 11, no. 4, 1980), LB 115, Northeast Missouri State University, Kirksville, Mo. 63501.

The Protestant Reformation fractured the Christian world, as the followers of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–64) assailed the Catholic Church for rampant corruption, excessive secularization, and doctrinal claims of papal infallibility. The period also witnessed increasing calls for Christianity to return to its Jewish roots, writes Friedman, a Kent State University historian.

Theologians known as Christian Hebraists strongly objected to the “fourfold method of exposition” developed by Church officials to study the Bible in the 7th century. They charged that this complex system—which allowed the text to be interpreted literally, allegorically, morally, and eschatologically—permitted Church leaders to manipulate God’s word. These mavericks relied on original Hebrew texts and rabbinical sources to place both the Old and New Testaments in true historical context. Thus, Martin Bucer (1491–1551), an excommunicated Dominican monk, claimed that most of the Psalms composed by David and other Old Testament figures could not be viewed as prophecies of Christ’s coming. Sebastian Münster (1488–1552), a Franciscan geographer who converted to Lutheranism, filled his copy of the Gospel of Matthew with notes on Jewish holidays, customs, and places.

Though Catholic leaders warned of the grave dangers of Judaizing Christianity, most Protestants agreed with these calls for a “return to scripture.” Nevertheless, they balked when radical Hebraists charged that the Church had fallen from God’s grace by abandoning Jewish customs. Luther, for example, strenuously objected to demands for worship on Saturday, the Jewish sabbath. And Spanish theologian Michael Servetus (1511?–53) was burned at the stake by Calvinists for insisting that the doctrine of the Trinity—adopted at the Council of Nicaea in 325—was “un-Christian” because it did not conform to Jewish dogma.

The Reformation interest in Hebrew teachings and ritual represented “a most extreme form of the Renaissance myth of the past,” concludes

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Friedman. Just as literature and art from the 14th to the 16th centuries were influenced by nostalgia for an idyllic past, so the "ancient church" became an ideal for religious reformers.

Hitler's View of Christianity

"The Portrayal of Christianity in the History Textbooks of Nazi Germany" by Gilmer W. Blackburn, in *Church History* (Dec. 1980), American Society of Church History, % William B. Miller, 305 East Country Club Lane, Wallingford, Pa. 19086.

After annihilating the Jews of Germany, Adolph Hitler planned to eliminate what he saw as an even greater "Semitic" threat to Aryan culture—Christianity. In 1943, recounts Blackburn, a Gardner-Webb College historian, the Reich's school book historians mounted a subtle attack against this "alien Asiatic spirit" that had suppressed and diverted pagan Germany's militaristic drives.

In the textbook *So Ward Das Reich*, for instance, sixth through eighth graders read a mixed review of Charlemagne (742–814), leader of the southern German Franks. The Nazi authors praised him as "a more powerful adversary" than the northern German Saxons he conquered and thanked him for uniting the warring Germanic tribes. At the same time, they accused him of ruthlessly forcing the Saxons to forsake their warrior-like Aryan gods and "crawl to the Cross." However, rejoiced the textbook writers, the Saxon conversion was superficial; die-hard German peasants passed their pagan sagas from generation to generation. Nazi authors could not bear to admit that their pagan ancestors—unlike the Jews—had abandoned their beliefs in the face of conquest and persecution.

Nazi historians writing on the Gothic Age tried to convince school children that the designs for Germany's magnificent cathedrals were inspired by pagan symbols. And they bewailed the deaths of 180,000 of the 200,000 German knights who joined the First Crusade—killed "not in battle for their people and fatherland, but in the service of the papist will-to-power."

Martin Luther proved especially troublesome to Nazi authors. They depicted the Reformation as an "unspeakable misfortune" that thwarted German unity by setting Catholics against Protestants. And they denounced Luther's "great work"—the translation of the Bible into German—for driving "the Jewish spirit and Jewish thought deeper into the German folk than ever before." Yet they also invoked Luther's xenophobic German nationalism and anti-Semitism (especially his tract, "Concerning the Jews and their Lies").

A desire to close ranks obsessed the Nazis, and "Christianity was clearly seen as a rival for the German people's allegiance," writes Blackburn. But the Nazis' main objection to Christianity went deeper. As Julius Streicher, editor of *Der Sturmer*, crudely put it, "I prefer having no God at all than the same God as the Jews."

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*Report Card
on Gene Splicing*


"Applications of Recombinant DNA Technology" by Ronald Wetzel, in *American Scientist* (Nov.-Dec. 1980), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511.

Since 1972, breakthroughs in genetic engineering have vastly increased man's ability to create life. Wetzel, a scientist at Genentech, the California bioengineering firm, reviews recent progress in "gene splicing," or recombinant DNA technology.

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is a chainlike molecule from which genes are made—the chemical packets, found in every cell, that carry inherited characteristics. In nature, this information is transmitted throughout an organism when the double-stranded DNA chains unravel and form new molecules during cell division. DNA manipulation was made possible by the discovery of certain enzymes (natural chemical catalysts) able to cut the chains into links of varying lengths and "glue" them back together in varying combinations.

By unraveling and "replicating," DNA molecules help transmit inherited traits throughout an organism. Genetic engineers are learning to duplicate and manipulate this process in the lab.

Courtesy of Pan Books Ltd.



Arrows indicate direction of rotation

This "recombination" enables researchers to transfer genes between different cells and organisms (so far, experiments have focused on simple bacteria). Once the desired traits are transferred, the new hybrid can increase its numbers endlessly through replication.

Recombinant DNA technology has already sped up mass production of proteins such as interferon, the antiviral agent that may cure cancer. Once, even minute amounts of such proteins could be manufactured only after researchers deciphered their amino acid structures. Today, scientists skirt this wide barrier by breeding the gene that man-

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ufactures interferon. Similar techniques have made the production of insulin and human growth hormones much more efficient.

Gene splicing's potential for creating new life forms promises still more useful breakthroughs. Wetzel observes that the transfer of genes from bacteria that eat plant cell walls to yeast could produce microbes capable of turning grain and agricultural waste easily into gasohol. Gene splicing may also leap the biological barriers to cross-breeding different species of plants and animals to produce desired combinations of traits—to increase crop yields or improve livestock. Understanding the mechanisms that enable genetically identical cells to produce many different types of organ tissue may lead to the discovery of new hormones capable of controlling animal behavior—for instance, the cow's mating patterns.

One eventual application of genetic engineering may involve operations that replace faulty genes and then reinsert their host cells in the human body, thereby attacking genetic diseases such as sickle cell anemia at their source. And replacing malfunctioning genes in human sperm and egg cells could wipe out genetic birth defects.

Violating the Law

"The Cosmic Asymmetry between Matter and Antimatter" by Frank Wilczek, in *Scientific American* (Dec. 1980), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

In theory, the universe should be teeming with both matter and antimatter. The laws of physics stipulate that for every particle of matter there exists an antiparticle, equal in mass but opposite in electrical charge. Astronomers believe that equal amounts of matter and antimatter existed at the universe's creation. According to laws of conservation, this balance should have been preserved during all chemical and physical reactions.

But antimatter is rarely found outside the world of laboratory experiments. Why? New findings in subatomic physics and cosmology indicate that, under extreme conditions, the laws of conservation can be violated. So reports Wilczek, a Princeton physicist.

Wilczek's analysis begins with the proton, a constituent of the atomic nucleus and the least massive particle of matter with a positive electric charge (designated "+1" by physicists in the accounting system of "baryon numbers" used to keep track of electric charges during reactions). The proton's stability had been the most compelling proof of conservation law.

But particle physics research suggests that proton decay is possible. Further, the concept of quarks (which replaced protons, neutrons, and electrons in scientists' eyes as the fundamental units of matter) and the forces governing their behavior has led physicists to hypothesize the existence of a massive, unstable "X" particle. This particle might induce proton decay—and might itself decay into unequal amounts of matter and antimatter. Researchers have already found a strange par-

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ticle called the *K meson* that decays this way. So far, the *K meson* is unique, and *X* particles are sure to be extremely rare. But asymmetrically decaying particles (especially the heavy *X*) would probably have been formed constantly by particle collisions in the high energy environment of the universe's first moments.

According to the widely accepted "Big Bang" theory, developed in 1922, all matter was originally squeezed into a super-hot, super-dense lump that exploded with such force that the galaxies created then are still hurtling outward into empty space.

Wilczek posits that during the first microseconds after the bang, the universe abounded with collision-borne *X* and "anti-*X*" particles. As this primordial jetsam cooled, the collision rate subsided. Extant particles began to decay asymmetrically, creating more protons than anti-protons. Still whirling at extraordinary speeds, countless positive and negative particles annihilated one another whenever their paths crossed. By the time the universe was one one-thousandth of a second old, most of the surviving particles were protons, freezing the universe into its present matter-antimatter imbalance.

One of a Kind

"The Japanese Brain" by Atuhiro Sibatani, in *Science* 80 (Dec. 1980), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

A Tokyo medical researcher has startled fellow countrymen with his newly published assertions that Japanese brains are not like those of Westerners and other Asians, reports Sibatani, an Australian biologist.

While studying speech impairments, Tadanobu Tsunoda of Tokyo Medical and Dental University found that in most human brains, the work of processing sounds is divided. The brain's left half, the language center, generally handles consonants and consonant-vowel combinations. The right half processes isolated vowels and all other sounds—including machine noises, music, animal calls, and nonverbal human utterances (e.g., laughter and sighing). This is especially true for right-handed people.

But most of Tsunoda's Japanese patients processed most sounds in the left hemisphere. The exceptions were mechanical noises and Western music, which, unlike traditional Japanese music, does not try to mimic the human voice. Tsunoda believes that a distinctive trait of the Japanese language has caused this exceptional reliance on the left hemisphere. Japanese is rich in vowels—one can construct complex sentences without a single consonant.

Korean and Chinese speakers tested by Tsunoda followed the "Western" pattern—as did Japanese-Americans taught English from birth. (Conversely, Americans raised in Japan and fluent in Japanese acquired Japanese patterns.) To Tsunoda, this indicates that the brain pattern is not *genetically* determined.

Tsunoda also claims that Japanese speakers deal with both emotion and analytical thinking in their left brain hemispheres, whereas West-

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erners and other Asians process emotions on the right. As a result, he speculates, Japanese and, possibly, Japanese-speaking Westerners are more likely than others to make decisions based on intuition and emotion. This, and the fact that the sounds of Nature are also processed by the left side, says Tsunoda, explains the Japanese obsession with living "close to Nature," as evidenced in the art of flower arrangement, the tea ceremony, and the open spaces and indoor gardens of the island's traditional architecture.

Car Engines for 1990

"Is There a Better Automobile Engine?"
by John Heywood and John Wilkes, in
Technology Review (Nov.-Dec. 1980),
Room 10-140, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Mass 02139.

American car buyers are probably stuck with the conventional internal combustion engine through the 1980s. But by the '90s, today's demand for fuel efficiency will have produced new engine technologies, write Heywood and Wilkes, two MIT researchers.

Strong efforts by Detroit automakers, oil companies, and the federal government have already generated several alternative engine designs. All are still highly experimental:

Ford and Texaco are currently testing "stratified-charge" engines that directly inject fuel into the combustion chamber just before ignition. These engines ignite a fuel-air mixture that is rich near the sparkplug at the start of the cycle and that burns quickly enough to recirculate most gases. The result: up to 25 percent better gasoline mileage than from standard engines. Unfortunately, so far, early ignition also leads to engine "knock" (or incomplete combustion).

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating anew the gas turbine, which features few moving parts and a controlled combustion process that cuts down on pollutants. But fuel-efficient models require costly, fragile ceramic components and operation at a constant speed.

The Stirling cycle engine, first conceived in 1816 by a Scottish clergyman, is another possibility. The Stirling repeatedly heats and cools liquid hydrogen to create pressure on the piston. One Stirling model created by DOE and American Motors uses 30 percent less gasoline than today's engines. But technical hurdles remain, such as developing cheap, easily manufactured heater components.

By the mid-'80s, the authors also note, electric cars should be ready for mass-marketing. The development of zinc-nickel and sodium-sulphur batteries, which store more energy than the old lead-acid model, promises 150-mile ranges at 55 mph speeds. The specter of future gasoline shortages seems to have reconciled many urban Americans to such range and speed limitations.

Identifying new nonelectric engines efficient enough to justify mass production will take 5 to 10 more years, the authors suggest. Several winners are likely, varying in horsepower and fuel economy.

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Profits and Pollution

"Making Pollution Prevention Pay" by Michael G. Royston, in *Harvard Business Review* (Nov.-Dec. 1980), Subscription Service Department, P.O. Box 9730, Greenwich, Conn. 06835.

In 1976, the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M), adopted a rigorous antipollution program for its factories in 15 countries. By 1979, the St. Paul-based firm, best known for its Scotch Tape, had saved over \$20 million while boosting production by 40 percent. The secret? Instead of buying costly pollution control devices, company managers redesigned both products and equipment. They also recycled waste materials and water.

But European businessmen still lead the way in turning environmental protection into profits, reports Royston, professor of technology and environment at the Center for Education in International Management in Geneva. Re-using solvents and water helped a Swiss chemical company cut its pollution levels in half while saving \$400,000 a year. A British distillery converted grain residue into animal feeds for an annual return on investment of over 100 percent. In Finland, 98 percent of the dangerous sulfur dioxide fumes produced by copper smelters are now turned into marketable sulfuric acid.

In America, 3M is not alone. Union Camp, a major paper company, converts its mill wastes into fragrances worth over \$1 a pound. Dow Corning cut its annual operating costs by \$900,000 by recovering chlorine and hydrogen during silicon production.

Antipollution programs help strong economies get stronger, notes Royston. Japan climbed out of the 1974 recession after strict environmental laws spurred new building and engineering activity. Indeed, Japanese firms have generated new profits by selling advanced pollution control hardware abroad. In America, the environmental business created 2 million jobs during the 1970s—growing 20 percent a year, to an annual sales volume of nearly \$50 billion.

Turning Waste into Wealth

"Sewage: Waste or Resource? A Historical Perspective" by Christopher Hamlin, in *Environment* (Oct. 1980), Heldref Publications, 4000 Albemarle St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

All mankind's sewage, wrote Victor Hugo in *Les Miserables*, "if returned to the land, instead of being thrown into the sea, would suffice to nourish the world." His words, written in 1862, contain good economic advice for today, writes Hamlin, a historian at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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The use of sewers in early 19th-century Europe choked rivers with sludge, befouled city air, and prompted this 1859 protest from Punch.



In 18th-century England, landlords and tenants battled in court over who owned a tenant's sewage, which could be sold to local farmers as fertilizer. After 1810, as toilets became more prevalent, however, city governments began dumping waste via new underground sewers into nearby waterways. Cholera epidemics throughout Europe ensued in 1832, 1848–49, and 1853. Londoners protesting against filth in the Thames used river water as ink in their angry letters to newspaper editors.

Desperate European leaders and scientists turned to Justus von Liebig. The renowned German chemist insisted that crops needed elements and minerals that could best be supplied by human and animal manure. Before long, several faulty processes (the most popular involved a mix containing alum, cow blood, and clay) were devised to extract nutrients and deodorize municipal sewage. Not until the 1880s did chemists discover that oxygen and oxygen-breathing bacteria naturally turn wastes into harmless, usually odorless carbon dioxide, water, and valuable nitrates. But by then, chemists were learning how to make artificial fertilizers; recycling plans for sewage were forgotten.

Today, Hamlin argues, economic conditions are ripe for a sewage-based fertilizer comeback. The price of petroleum used to make most artificial nitrogen fertilizers has soared roughly 1,000 percent since 1973. Each year 215 million Americans produce sewage containing 1.7 billion pounds of nitrogen—a useable resource. The author argues that the effects of poisonous metals (e.g., cadmium and zinc) often found in treated sewage can be offset by controlling acidity levels in soil and, on occasion, restricting “sludging” to nonedible crops. Already, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Milwaukee sell recycled sewage as dry fertilizer—under trade names such as Hydig and Nu-Earth.

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*Adding to
the Greenhouse?*

"Drainage of Organic Soils as a Factor in the World Carbon Cycle" by Thomas V. Armentano, in *BioScience* (Dec. 1980), American Institute of Biological Sciences, 1401 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22209.

Scientists have recently warned that pollutants emitted by burning fossil fuels may dangerously warm the Earth's atmosphere (the "greenhouse effect"). But another increasingly important source of heat-trapping carbon dioxide has been overlooked—the world's swamps and wetlands after they are drained by man. So writes Armentano, a researcher at Indianapolis's Institute of Ecology.

Coastal and river valley wetlands serve as carbon "sinks." The low levels of free oxygen in water-logged organic soils prevent much of the carbon contained in decaying plant and animal remains from forming carbon dioxide gas and wafting back into the atmosphere. Drainage by man permits the stored carbon to be oxidized.

Measuring oxidation rates and the amounts of carbon released is tricky. Such processes vary with soil depth (virtually unknown for the massive swamps located in northern South America, Indonesia, East Africa, and elsewhere in the tropics), soil composition, wind, and temperature. Swamps drained in various ways for different purposes (crop production, timber, peat, fuel) oxidize at different rates, too.

Nonetheless, data from heavily studied drainage programs in the Northern Hemisphere make fairly reliable estimates possible. The author suggests that the world's swampy organic soils today cover at least 3.8 million square miles [an area slightly larger than the 50 United States]. If, as several studies indicate, drainage programs currently convert to productive use some 143,000 square miles of swampland annually, the carbon currently being released as carbon dioxide every year may approach 164 million tons—8 percent of the estimated CO₂ emitted by oil, coal, and wood combustion.

The natural spread of wetlands in Siberia, northern Canada, and Alaska partly offsets the carbon released from drained swamps. But according to Armentano, drainage today releases more carbon into the environment than remaining organic soils absorb. And massive drainage programs underway or planned in the White Nile basin of the Sudan and Brazil's Pantanal swamp indicate that this peculiar form of carbon pollution will steadily increase.

*Cleaning Up
Chemicals*

"Chemical Transport—Coping with Disasters" by Rebecca L. Rawls, in *Chemical and Engineering News* (Nov. 24, 1980), ACS, P.O. Box 3337, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Just before midnight on November 10, 1979, a 106-car train hauling volatile chemicals derailed 20 miles outside of Toronto, Canada. The crash ignited a mile-high fireball, released a cloud of deadly chlorine

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gas, and forced the evacuation of some 218,000 people nearby. But thanks to efficient local officials and a plan devised by a Dow Chemical advisory team, no one was injured.

Nevertheless, the specter of chemical catastrophes still looms large, reports Rawls, a *Chemical and Engineering News* correspondent. The volume of unsafe industrial chemicals shipped across the United States has grown 80 percent since 1971. Today, 1 truck in 10 and 1 freight train in 3 carry substances officially considered "hazardous." And while only 1 in 5,000 chemical shipments suffers a leak or spill, the 17,524 accidents, mostly minor, reported to Washington in 1979 alone have spurred the creation of industry and government aid programs.

Today, communities can call the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), a 24-hour hot line established by the Chemical Manufacturers Association in 1971 to provide data on the hazards posed by 18,000 different chemicals. Within 20 minutes of a mishap, CHEMTREC can locate manufacturers and freight-haulers who can identify spilled substances and give advice to local firefighters. During the first nine months of 1980, the hotline aided in the cleanup of 2,512 accidents. For its part, the White House Council on Environmental Quality has drawn up a plan to coordinate disaster-fighting by 12 federal agencies, headed by the Coast Guard, with state and local governments.

Difficulties persist. CHEMTREC affiliates complain that chemical-carrying barges with ship-to-shore telephones are legally barred from using the toll-free numbers needed to contact the hot line. The breathing apparatus needed by rescue workers to fight chlorine spills contains volatile compressed gas that the airlines will not carry without prior notice. Lastly, government specialists argue that the best way to overcome persistent local resistance to advance planning for emergencies is to publicize heavily the dangers of chemical accidents—a strategy not likely to please the industry.

ARTS & LETTERS

*Robinson Crusoe
as Puritan*

"Robinson Crusoe" by Christopher Hill,
in *History Workshop Journal* (Autumn
1980), P.O. Box 69, Oxford OX2 7XA,
United Kingdom.

Analyzing Robinson Crusoe's lonely struggle for survival, Karl Marx saw Man doing what comes naturally—producing for his own needs, not for commerce. Since Marx, critics of many persuasions have refused to read Daniel Defoe's 1719 classic as a simple adventure story.

The now-standard Western interpretation portrays *Robinson Crusoe* as an 18th-century paean to the bourgeois values that reigned in England after the Puritan revolution. But, argues Hill, a former Oxford

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Robinson Crusoe, long seen as the consummate Puritan, modestly clothed himself throughout his lonely tropical ordeal. Defoe's classic may contain a subtle critique of 17th-century English values and prejudices.



University historian, Crusoe's story is more complicated than that.

At first glance, the castaway Crusoe's victory over solitude and a harsh environment seems a testament to his individualistic Protestant faith, the new "spirit of capitalism," and England's imperial expansion. His survival on a desert island and prosperity after rescue are earned by hard work and asceticism. Docile native labor—his man Friday—enables Crusoe to develop his new domain (indeed, the first word Crusoe taught his Indian companion was "Master"). And Crusoe clings to his religious beliefs throughout his 24-year ordeal, initially viewing his lot as God's punishment for past sins.

But Defoe's hero soon begins to question his beliefs, Hill observes. His discovery of a band of Indians, for example, prompts him to ask why God hid himself "from so many millions of souls." He does not condemn the Indians' cannibalism ("How do I know what God himself judges in this particular case?"); he is quick to condemn the racism and ruthlessness of both Spanish conquistadores and agents of the British East India Co.

Was Defoe of two minds on religion, race, and colonialism? Defoe may have been an inconsistent political thinker. Yet, Hill notes, in his life and his writing Defoe consistently denounced the arrogance that early Puritans displayed toward anyone outside the fold. Like his Puritan forerunners, Defoe believed that God "designed the world for commerce." But he saw that world trade had made English prejudices a hindrance. In *Robinson Crusoe*, Hill concludes, Defoe fashioned a sly critique of Puritan intolerance, masking his more controversial views by the use of irony and contrived naiveté.

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A Mechanized Matinée Idol

"A Runaway Match: The Automobile in American Film, 1900-1920" by Julian Smith, in *Michigan Quarterly Review* (Fall 1980/Winter 1981), 3032 Rackham Bldg., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48109.

It was love at first sight. From the start, American silent-film makers saw the automobile as much more than a means of transportation, writes Smith, a film historian at the University of Florida.

Initially, automobiles played the lead in trick films and simple documentaries. But in New York and Hollywood, producers soon realized that the public wanted narrative stories (thanks to D. W. Griffith's 1903 box office hit, *Birth of a Nation*). The automobile's dramatic and comic potential was first displayed in *Runaway Match* (1903), a 5-minute feature about an auto-assisted elopement. Criminals on wheels probably made their debut in *The Gentleman Highwayman* (1905): A robber in a big motor car chases a young couple in a little runabout on a deserted road. In this movie, as in countless others that followed, the auto plays an agent of justice. Not only does the robber's car break down, but the hero uses his vehicle to bowl over the villain and then speed to a nearby town to fetch the police.

Automobiles also served as symbols of social mobility—even though few but the well-to-do could afford them. To give their plots "democratic" appeal, scriptwriters depicted wealthy young heroes variously masquerading as chauffeurs and ambulance drivers to test the love of young women, rich and poor. And in *Putting the Bee in Herbert* (1917), a glimpse of a neighbor's new Packard spurs a scheming wife to push her indolent husband up the corporate ladder. Roused to succeed, Herbert announces his own promotion by driving home in a new sedan.

Few early American films emphasized the hazards posed by the new Motor Age. In fact, most on-screen mishaps produced happy outcomes, such as flat tires on rural roads that allowed wealthy male motorists to be charmed by farm girls. The first cinematographers and movie-goers, says Smith, regarded the automobile as a dream vehicle, destined to bring adventure and success to individuals and progress to the nation.

Hansel, Gretel, and Reality

"Fairies and Hard Facts: The Reality of Folktales" by Eugen Weber, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Jan.-March 1981), Humanities Bldg., Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19122.

Today we regard stories featuring wicked stepmothers and hidden treasures as "fairy tales," divorced from the real world. But Weber, a UCLA historian, argues that they mirrored the impoverished lives of pre-19th century Europeans and contained practical, cautionary advice

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for their peasant audiences.

Take the story of Hansel and Gretel. The abandonment of children at the urgings of stepmothers was common in Europe when chronic hunger, 25-year life expectancies for women, and frequent remarriage were standard. Indeed, many folk tales, in their treatment of food, reflected poverty's prevalence. Meat was so scarce that peasants viewed it as a morsel for Evil Ones, such as the witch who saw Hansel as an entrée; or Sleeping Beauty's mother-in-law, who, in one version of the story, eats little children. Fairy tale characters who are granted three wishes typically ask for pots that will cook endless amounts of porridge or fairy bread that replenishes itself.

Cleanliness was beyond the reach of the poor, as well. Princesses *were* beautiful, their feet *were* dainty, and their skin was white as snow—in contrast to weather-beaten, shoeless farm girls who wore rags and hoed the soil.

The commoners' world was filled with danger. Thieves prowled the forests and highways. Countless French fairy tales warn of the perils of thwarting criminals, who always return to exact revenge. Others stress the risks of marrying strangers, who invariably turn out to be bandits and murderers. And since dialects and language often varied from province to province, many tales told of travelers whose limited vocabularies landed them in jail. Real life seemed so hopeless that the miracles or simple luck that abounded in fairy tales appeared to be the only way of striking it rich. The chances of finding buried treasure, however remote, were nevertheless plausible in the days of old, when the absence of banks made hollow trees or abandoned hovels convenient hiding places for savings.

During the 19th century, living standards rose, and folk tales lost their appeal, at least for adults. By 1900, famine was a bad memory in Europe. Mortality rates fell, resulting in fewer orphans and stepmothers. The repeal of taxes on soap all over Europe made hygiene affordable. And bigger police forces reduced everyday crime and violence. The practical wisdom of folk tales, writes Weber, began to seem nonsensical. The stories were soon relegated to the world of children.

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Korea's Slump

"South Korea's International Economic Relations" by Sang-Chul Suh, in *Asian Survey* (Nov. 1980), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Just as South Korea's unusual economic growth during the 1960s and early '70s was credited to world prosperity and cheap energy, so its recent slump is widely blamed on shrinking markets in the recession-ridden West and soaring prices of imported oil. But Suh, an economist

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at Seoul's Korea University, argues that many of the latest wounds were self-inflicted.

Led by yearly export increases of 40 percent, mostly to the United States and Japan, South Korea's economy grew by 9.4 percent annually from 1962 to 1978. The country's businessmen built a modern industrial base dominated by shipbuilding, electronics, and machinery. But the go-go years ended in 1979. Foreign debt swelled from \$1.1 billion to \$4.2 billion. The consumer price index shot up 21.2 percent, and foreign sales stagnated in real dollars.

Shortsighted domestic policies guaranteed trouble for South Korea even before the nation's oil bill doubled in 1979, Suh contends. After surmounting the first oil crisis of 1973-74, South Korea's leaders optimistically supercharged the economy. They boosted capital investment 33 percent in 1977 and 1978, pouring most new funds into heavy industry. The results: excess capacity, a leap in workers' purchasing power, and shortages of consumer goods that attracted a flood of costly imports. An overvalued currency (the *won*) aggravated the problem by increasing the price of South Korean goods abroad.

The lesson has been learned. In April 1979, 6 months before the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, South Korea reined in its money supply and began channeling private investments into consumer industries. The abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the new system of pegging the won to the "floating" values of major foreign currencies (such as the yen and the dollar) continue under the current President, Chun Doo Hwan.

South Korea hopes to halve its foreign debt and boost the real value of its exports by 12 percent annually by 1986. Korean industrialists, Suh notes, have overcome foreign tariff barriers in the past by turning out new products, such as advanced electric appliances, and finding new markets. Most important, South Korea's fastest growing trade partners now include its thriving neighbors—Taiwan and Singapore, as well as Japan. East Asia's rapid industrialization and growth, Suh concludes, is certain to help ease South Korea's troubles.


Marks of Respect

"Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660" by Orest Ranum, in *Journal of Modern History* (Sept. 1980), University of Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Curtseys, bowing, and salutations seem unlikely pillars of the modern state. But for Louis XIII (1601-43) and his son Louis XIV (1638-1715), the enforcement of strict codes of etiquette was instrumental in establishing the monarchy's authority over 17th-century France, writes Ranum, a Johns Hopkins University historian.

Earlier, kings all over Europe had made sporadic efforts to coerce their subjects, particularly feudal lords, by regulating manners. Uncertainty still remained over whether marks of respect (*honnêtetés* in

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Nobles and peasants alike had to kneel in the presence of France's Louis XIV. The "Sun King" used codes of etiquette to establish his supremacy over 17th-century France.

Musée National du Chateau de Versailles.

France) were due to the royal person or to the State. But Louis XIII's chief political strategist, Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642) saw how the revival of elaborate courtesies extended to clergymen had helped post-Reformation Catholic Church leaders recover much of their lost influence. He consolidated the King's power by greatly expanding the rules of behavior.

In the royal presence almost nothing was too trivial to qualify as a test of loyalty—the movement of a courtier's hands, the height of chairs, the order of arrival and departure. No one dared address Louis without lowered eyes and the salutation "Sire" or "Your Majesty." Failure to comply could mean prosecution and exile. One contemporary writer, Cardin le Bret, equated disrespect for the monarch with a physical attack.

In the hinterland, Louis XIII's agents went too far. They arbitrarily arrested disrespectful villagers charged with being "public calumniators" or "big talkers." Royal troops quelled any show of resistance and extracted public apologies from local officials. But Paris's resources were limited. The resentment of peasants and barons alike flared into open revolt following the deaths of Richelieu and Louis XIII. The cardinal's unpopular successor, Mazarin, and the King's widow, Anne of Austria, tried to enforce the *honnêtetés*. But civil strife engulfed France until the mid-1650s, when war-weary Frenchmen turned to the teen-aged Louis XIV (the "Sun King") to restore order. The energetic young monarch, like Louis XIII, forced the nobles to kowtow.

His successful insistence on deference culminated in the ultrarefined court society at Versailles, where the most powerful nobles feared to discuss politics even among themselves, and sycophancy became a way of life. By the time Louis XIV died, the power of France's royal regime was truly absolute.

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"Science and Technology in India" by Aqueil Ahmad, in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Nov. 1980), 1020-24 East 58th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

With its 1974 nuclear test explosion and several space shots during the last decade, India seems like a coming scientific giant. Yet the story of Indian science and technology is largely one of misplaced priorities, contends Ahmad, head of the Center for Science Policy at India's Administrative Staff College in Hyderabad.

Counting Ph.D.'s and lab technicians alike, India's scientific work force, which numbered only 188,000 in 1951, now stands at 2 million—third in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union. The nation's research and development outlays have risen 15 percent annually since 1958 (to more than \$500 million).

But more than 60 percent of all R&D funds go to high-prestige atomic energy, space, and defense programs. This emphasis neglects India's most pressing domestic needs, the author argues. For lack of funds, official birth control campaigns cannot cut the birth rate from 35 to 25 per thousand—and thus keep India's population (currently 638 million) below 1 billion in the year 2000. Indian industry will be unable to produce enough steel and fertilizer to meet national demand over the next 20 years. Despite a 1974-79 investment of \$125 million in nuclear power, India will be hard pressed to produce (or import) the energy it will require in 1990. Once-starving India now exports rice, thanks to mechanization, new high-yield grains, and improved water management. But 1 billion Indians will annually need 250 million tons of grain—75 million tons above currently expected production.

Moreover, India's nuclear and defense programs still depend heavily on imported technology and material.

Ahmad urges New Delhi to get back to basics. The government, he suggests, should end its stifling control of the nation's R&D efforts. He urges a new focus—on renewable fuel sources, agricultural techniques, industrial development, and medical research—in order to make science more useful to the average Indian.

Stalin's Gift to Mothers

"Giving Birth to the New Soviet Man: Politics and Obstetrics in the USSR" by John D. Bell, in *Slavic Review* (Mar. 1981), 851 South Morgan St., Rm. 731 SEO, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago, Ill. 60607.

Ever since the 1917 revolution, Soviet leaders have tried to make art, culture, and science the servants of official ideology. Under Stalin, even obstetric medicine became a matter of politics, writes Bell, a University of Maryland historian.

Beginning in the 1930s, health officials encouraged higher birth rates

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to create future workers for Soviet industrialization. Among the major obstacles was women's fear of labor pain. After World War II, Ilya Valvoski, an obscure neurologist in Kharkov, observed that women who feared delivery felt terrible labor pains while those who remained calm suffered considerably less. Convinced that all birth pangs were psychological, he devised a new cure: a program of "obstetric education" among women to wipe out the apprehensions surrounding childbirth, and placebo-like breathing exercises for "fighting" pain.

Valvoski's colleagues frowned on his notions. But a scientific upheaval occurred during the late '40s, when Stalin demanded biological and psychological "proof" of communist theories of the mutability of human nature. Soviet leaders canonized physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) whose experiments with conditioned reflexes allegedly refuted the existence of a soul (thereby validating Marxist "materialism").

The push for "Pavlovian obstetrics" gave Valvoski his chance. Labor pain, he said, was a ploy invented by feudal and capitalist societies to justify the exploitation of women. "Neo-Pavlovian techniques," Valvoski claimed, could "eliminate labor pain as a socio-biological phenomenon." In 1951, the Ministry of Health ordered all Soviet hospitals to introduce Valvoski's methods.

Despite their bogus ideological rationale, Valvoski's practices eased labor pains for many women. But since the mid-1950s, their popularity has declined in the Soviet Union. The reasons have little to do with health: Valvoski's teaching fell out of official favor as Soviet society "de-Stalinized" after the dictator's death in 1953. Ironically, during the same period, Valvoski-like techniques, such as the Lamaze method of natural childbirth, caught on in the West—in response to women's wishes. No such consumer demand is possible under the Soviet system, Bell notes, where medical services are presented as gifts of the state, to be provided or withdrawn as the authorities see fit.

A Black View of the Sudan

"Pax Britannica and the Southern Sudan: The View from the Theatre" by Dunstan Wai, *African Affairs* (July 1980), Oxford University Press, 200 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

For 16 years after independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan's Arab north and its black, Christian, and animist south fought an intermittent civil war. Tensions between the peoples of the two regions still run high. Many Sudanese intellectuals see this disunity simply as an evil legacy of the British, who administered the two regions separately. Wai, a former Wilson Center Guest Scholar and a southern Sudanese researcher at the Rockefeller Foundation, disagrees.

Black-Arab animosity, he argues, stems mostly from long centuries of raids by Arab northerners seeking black slaves in what is now the southern Sudan. Sudan was never a unified territory until the 19th

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Britain's separate administration of the Sudan's Arab north and black south after 1930 kept two traditional enemies at peace. But reunification in 1948 all but assured post-independence civil strife.

Source: Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Sudan, 1973.



century; then Egypt forcibly extended its hegemony south of Khartoum. In 1899, the region passed into British hands after Lord Kitchener helped Egypt crush a Muslim revolt led by the Mahdi. Sudanese Arabs quickly accepted colonial rule and benefited from new schools, railroads, and irrigation projects. But many black tribes in the south continued to resist. There, colonial administrators simply sought to maintain order. In 1930, to avoid Afro-Arab clashes, London formalized its separatist policy, declaring the south off limits to Sudanese Arabs.

Wai contends that continued separation of north and south would have helped blacks, particularly if it had led to a southern merger with British East Africa. But northern nationalists agitated for the independence of the "whole Sudan." Arab businessmen coveted the south's fertile farmland. Egyptian leaders hoped to regain their former possession. All persuaded London to reunify the Sudan after World War II—despite the objections of local British officials and southern chiefs.

To speed the south's development, the British began training black administrators and assisting the rural economy. It was too little and too late, contends Wai. Capitalizing on southern disarray, northerners dominated the Sudan's transition to independence. They blocked most British efforts to create safeguards for the south and largely excluded southerners from the final preparations for self-rule, from 1953 to 1956.

By Independence Day, the black south faced the worst of all possible worlds—the north's active hostility and a local shortage of skills and resources with which to resist domination. Not surprisingly, Wai concludes, Afro-Arab relations soon degenerated into armed conflict.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

“United States National Interests in the Middle East: A New Approach for the 1980s.”

Prepared for the International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. 16 pp.

Author: Les Janka

In a controversial paper presented at the Wilson Center, Janka, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1976 to 1978, argues that American energy security and reduced Soviet influence in the Middle East can be achieved only when the United States recognizes the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

Many Arab leaders are convinced that Israel holds a veto over American Middle East policy, writes Janka. Their belief has been hardened by incidents such as the Carter administration's disavowal—under Israeli and domestic Jewish pressure—of its March 1980 UN vote condemning Israeli settlements in territories occupied after the 1967 war.

The author disputes Israel's claims to be a major American strategic asset; in fact, he says, the Arab-Israeli conflict has only sent Muslim governments [such as Syria, Iraq, and, until 1972, Egypt] scurrying to Moscow for arms and political support. Israel's powerful Army and excellent base facilities would indeed be useful to the United States in a crisis. But the most likely crisis is apt to be one resulting from the superpowers being dragged into an Arab-Israeli war.

Since Israel's occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip began in 1967, reconciling the Palestinians' right to self-determination with Israel's right to security has replaced negotiating an accord between Israel and its Arab

neighbors as the sine qua non of a Middle East peace, according to Janka. The Arab states' unanimous rejection of the Camp David treaties signals the priority they now give to the Palestinian cause.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (“the only spokesman the Palestinians have,” in Janka's view) has not endorsed UN Resolution 242—which recognizes Israel's right to exist. But Janka believes that the PLO is now ready to concede Israel's pre-1967 borders in exchange for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A fledgling Palestinian state, busy building its economy and government, is unlikely to serve as a Soviet puppet, or as a base for terrorism and military operations against Israel, Janka believes. And pledges of economic aid from Western and conservative Arab governments would further inhibit Palestinian extremism—along with Israel's military supremacy and commanding geographic position.

Today, the Middle East supplies 30 percent of American, 67 percent of Western European, and 75 percent of Japanese oil imports. Continued access to Middle East oil is essential to a recovery of America's military strength and its economic health, writes Janka. He adds that adopting this “unfettered view” is also in the interests of Israel, whose security ultimately depends on a strong and prosperous America.

"A National Agenda for the Eighties."

Report of the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, 744 Jackson Pl. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 214 pp.

When word leaked out in late 1980 that this presidential commission would urge Washington to let Midwestern and Eastern cities decay and encourage people and industry to move to the Sunbelt, many of the nation's mayors hit the ceiling. The final report has slightly modified the earlier approach and offers an unusual mix of domestic policy proposals of interest to both liberals and conservatives.

Arguing that "cities are not permanent," the authors observe that cheap energy, good weather, and low wage scales have drawn American business to the Sunbelt for 20 years. This has left older industrial cities such as New York, Detroit, and Cleveland with shrunken tax bases, deteriorating services, and rising joblessness.

Threatened with bankruptcy, mayors have begged Washington to "save" their cities. But, says the commission, massive aid may "sap the initiative of urban governments because of the expectation of continuing support." Washington should help people—not places—adapt to inexorable social and economic changes with expanded job training programs and grants to relocate.

Northern cities can still thrive, the authors claim. Losses of blue-collar jobs will be somewhat offset by expansion of white-collar employment in the financial and "knowledge" industries and in the professions.

The commission recommends replacing current welfare and food stamp programs with a guaranteed annual income set at between two-thirds and three-fourths of the official poverty line [currently \$8,400 for a nonfarm family of four]. While costing the federal government an extra \$15 or \$20 billion, this program would relieve state and local governments of most of their welfare burden.

The commission proposes a national health-insurance financing program. Washington would provide all Americans with a flat premium subsidy. Recipients would then purchase policies from private insurance agents. The resulting expansion of private sector competition would serve consumer interests. And the system would end the paradox under which 12.6 percent of the population lacks any health insurance at all, even though federal and state governments foot the bill for 40 percent of Americans' health-care expenses.

"The Washington Reporters."

The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 168 pp. \$6.95

Author: Stephen Hess

The 1,250 men and women who report from the nation's capital for U.S. newspapers, wire services, newsmagazines, trade journals, and broadcast media are, essentially, an "elite covering an elite," who worry, from time to

time, about being out of touch with the rest of America.

Using questionnaires and interviews, Brookings political scientist Hess sketches a 1978 profile of the various segments of the Washington press

corps, their pecking order, their output, and the specialization that has come with the growth of Washington journalism.

Although faced with deadline pressures and erratic schedules, journalists in Washington average only 42-hour work weeks (45 for TV correspondents). They are well paid (the "top minimum" *Washington Post* reporter's salary was \$596 a week in 1979); tend to be in their 30s; are predominantly white and male; and, in the more prestigious media, are graduates of prestigious colleges. Fifty-three percent of black reporters are women, versus 20 percent of white reporters. Politically, 42 percent consider themselves "liberals," 39 percent "middle-of-the-road," and 19 percent "conservative." But 47 percent claim to be more conservative than their colleagues.

Their friends tend to be other journalists. They write for their peers, and if they work for out-of-town newspapers, they seldom get much direction (or reaction) from the home office. As always, they tend to write and think about "events" yesterday or today or last week; for data, they rely on

interviews, government publicists, and news clippings, not documents. Because they find politicians are lively, kindred souls, they tend to cover the "political government," not the plodding "permanent government" of the bureaucracy. Most old-time newsmen think the coverage, however uneven, is far less partisan than it was 50 years ago.

Who decides what is news? News-magazines and TV allow the reporter the least autonomy; but, by and large, the reporters decide. Reporters favor some subjects, e.g., diplomacy, and skimp on others, notably economics, that are of direct interest to the average American. Journalists' boredom, says Hess, has been neglected by scholars as a determinant of news coverage.

Overall, Washington now dominates the media's attention, eclipsing state and local affairs. In one sampling of 22 newspapers, Hess found, Washington news got 45 percent of the stories, state capitals 19 percent, and local 18 percent—even though state and local government activity has grown far faster than federal activity since 1960.

"The Decline of Service in the Regulated Industries."

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 73 pp. \$4.25

Authors: Andrew S. Carron and Paul W. McAvoy

Americans who think that their railroads are slower, their airlines are running fewer flights, and their electric power is "browning out" more often than it used to are right. Since 1965, service in many regulated industries has steadily declined. Carron and McAvoy, economists at the Brookings Institution and Yale, respectively, blame federal and state regulatory policies that have not adjusted to a deteriorating national economy.

Regulated businesses thrived during the high-growth, low-inflation years of the late 1950s and early '60s. In fact, regulatory policy helped utilities and transportation lines achieve higher growth and greater productivity than the rest of the economy. By requiring the reinvestment of profits to meet spreading markets, federal and state agencies forced these companies to capitalize on the then low prices of energy and raw materials. Expansion

RATES OF OUTPUT GROWTH
IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES, 1965-1977
(average annual rate of change, in percent)

Industry	1965-1969	1969-1973	1973-1977
Electric	7.1	6.3	-0.3
Natural gas	6.5	0.7	-1.6
Telephone	9.2	7.7	7.3
Airline	14.0	3.4	3.9
Railroad	2.4	2.8	-3.4
Unregulated services	4.0	3.9	2.4
Total U.S. economy	3.9	3.4	1.9

NOTE: Output growth is measured in terms of real gross national product.

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished data (1978); *Economic Report of the President* (January 1979).

permitted economies of scale, yielding higher profits.

While private companies boosted their overall productivity growth by a yearly average of 4 percent between 1961 and 1965, the regulated industries achieved 7.3 percent. These companies were even able to hold prices constant and accede to occasional state and federal requests for rate reductions. From 1961 to 1965, when prices in the economy as a whole edged up 1.8 percent annually, prices fell slightly in the electric, natural gas, railroad, and airlines industries.

From 1965 to 1969, however, annual real GNP growth averaged less than 4 percent, and inflation jumped to 3.9 percent. The regulatory system could not adjust. Slow economic growth prevented new equipment from being used to capacity and forced up unit costs.

The administrative procedures established by Congress and the states to control prices and profits relied mainly on pre-existing price and cost patterns. They were incapable of timely responses to continuously rising costs. New laws guaranteeing consumer

groups and industrial customers a voice at regulatory hearings put the utilities at a further disadvantage. Even when officials "split the difference" between consumers' unrealistically low capital-cost estimates and the utilities' more accurate projections, inadequate returns and prices resulted.

From 1973 to 1976, the regulated industries' average yearly output grew only 1.1 percent, compared with a 2.4 percent growth rate recorded by unregulated services. Output in electric and natural gas companies and railroads actually fell. And except in the telephone industry, productivity growth rates failed to match the sickly 0.8 percent average for the total U.S. economy.

These figures translated into a three-fold increase in power blackouts nationwide from 1969 to 1978, a 35 percent shortfall in interstate natural gas deliveries by the late 1970s, and curtailed rail and air service. According to Carron and McAvoy, further economic decline could produce serious disruptions and shortages unless the pace of deregulation quickens.

“Men and Family Planning.”

Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
48 pp. \$2.00 (Worldwatch Paper 41)
Author: Bruce Stokes

Birth control used to be viewed as a man's responsibility—until millions of women around the world went on the Pill or began using intrauterine devices (IUDs) in the 1960s. Now, with concern growing over the safety of female contraceptives, vasectomies, condoms, and even withdrawal are again gaining popularity.

In 1980, Stokes, a researcher at Worldwatch Institute, surveyed birth control practices from Newark, N.J., to rural China. He found that, worldwide, 65 million women had been sterilized, 58 million were taking oral contraceptives, and 52 million used IUDs. But male birth control was far from obsolete. Thirty-five million men had undergone vasectomies, and 37 million relied on condoms.

Stokes also noted intriguing national differences. Men were most likely to take responsibility for birth control in Japan, Italy, and Poland, where 85.5, 45, and 40 percent of males surveyed, respectively, used contraceptive methods. By contrast, only 22.7 percent of Frenchmen, 28 percent of Englishmen, and 19.7 percent of American men practiced contraception.

When men used birth control, the methods they preferred varied widely.

Seventeen percent of Frenchmen, 29 percent of Italians, and 30 percent of Polish men relied on withdrawal to limit family size. This method was favored by only 6 percent of Englishmen and 2 percent of American males.

The most popular forms of male contraception in England and America were condoms (used by 16 percent of Britons) and vasectomies (undergone by 10.5 percent of American men). Sterilization proved least acceptable in France and Japan, where only 0.1 and 6 percent of all men chose this option. Condoms, sold by door-to-door saleswomen, are used by nearly four out of five Japanese men.

Male birth control methods have yet to make much headway in the Third World. In many patriarchal Latin American, African, and Asian societies, large families still boost the male ego. Nonetheless, government attempts to increase male contraception—especially advertising campaigns for prophylactics—have worked in regions of India, Sri Lanka, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Men can no longer be treated as the “forgotten sexual partner,” Stokes maintains. The drive to stabilize Third World populations may well hinge on the spread of male contraceptives.

“Are Old People Conservative? How Much?”

Unpublished research paper presented to the 33rd annual meeting of the Gerontological Society, San Diego, Calif., November 21–25, 1980. 33 pp.
Authors: John Creighton Campbell and John Strate

The stereotype of America's elderly as rock-ribbed political conservatives is as common as the view that most college students are liberals and radicals. Today, it may be just as outmoded,

suggest Campbell, a University of Michigan political scientist and Wilson Center Fellow, and Strate, a Brandeis University economist.

The authors surveyed University of

Michigan national polling data from 1952 to 1978 and compared the responses of Americans aged 65 and over with those of persons aged 30 to 64. They found that, between 1972 and 1978, both groups described themselves as moderate conservatives when asked to characterize their political leanings on a scale of 1 (extremely liberal) to 4 (middle of the road) to 7 (extremely conservative). Senior citizens placed themselves only slightly to the right of the middle-aged—their scores ranged from roughly 4.4 to 4.7, while the 30-to-64 age group's responses hovered at between 4.3 and 4.4.


The elderly have voted more heavily Republican than the middle-aged in nearly every presidential election from 1952 to 1976 (the exception is the 1956 race, when middle-aged support for Republican President Eisenhower against the Democrat, Adlai Stevenson, exceeded elderly endorsement by a 60.4 to 56.1 margin). However, in 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace did better among middle-aged Americans (11.5 percent) than among senior citizens (7.8 percent). Extreme conservatives do not attract the elderly, the authors speculate.

In fact, when it comes to bread-and-butter issues, the elderly are often

more liberal than the middle-aged. Their support for government-guaranteed health care averaged nearly 18 percent higher than middle-aged support did in 1956–78. And in 1978, senior citizens were 25 percent more apt to prefer maintaining “government services” over tax cuts.

However, the elderly are well to the right of the middle-aged on “law and order” issues—a stance that probably reflects their greater vulnerability to crime. They also seem more strongly opposed to social programs that do not benefit them directly, e.g., greater aid to education. And while both the elderly and the middle-aged have held increasingly liberal views on racial equality since 1956, the elderly tend to be more conservative on open housing and the integration of hotels and restaurants—issues likely to touch their daily lives.

The greatest generation gaps involve “lifestyle” issues, although few over age 65 view them as priority problems. Both the middle-aged and elderly took a dim view of abortion, the changing role of women, and drug abuse, for instance; but disapproval among the elderly was much sharper—by 28, 16, and 13 percentage points respectively.



From Great Moments in Architecture, published by Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. © 1978 by David Macaulay.

"Does not the American partly live in oil? Certainly he cannot move without it," wrote two Englishmen in 1923. "The oil tin litters his waste places. His wayside is dotted with the petrol pump, and at night illuminated oil 'filling stations' make his streets beautiful." And the future? Above, a detail from artist David Macaulay's apocalyptic Gas Station.

Energy: 1945–1980

Most Americans now date the nation's current, unsolved energy problems back to 1973—the time of the Arab oil embargo, OPEC price increases, and gas lines. Yet both the long-term question of U.S. energy supplies and the much-debated remedies of the 1970s surfaced repeatedly in Washington after World War II. The failure of successive Presidents and Congresses—from the Truman days through the Carter era—to devise a coherent national energy policy is a complex political story. Duke economist Craufurd D. Goodwin and four colleagues have produced the first comprehensive account of this failure: *Energy Policy in Perspective*. We present here a three-part summary of their 728-page work, ending with Professor Goodwin's analysis of why things went so wrong for so long.

SETTING THE STAGE

With the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman became President of the United States on April 12, 1945. He faced a host of challenges. First, he had to see World War II through to victory. Later, he had to oversee the economy's conversion to peacetime, promote a stable new world order, and contain Joseph Stalin's ambitions in Europe and the Mideast.

As it happened, these preoccupations coincided with a little-publicized development: The United States was suddenly no longer self-sufficient in energy. In 1947, the United States, an exporter of oil since 1870, became a net importer. It was clear, moreover, to noted specialists such as geologist Everette De Golyer that the "center of gravity" of world oil production was shifting rapidly from the Western Hemisphere to the Middle East.

Harry Truman thus became the nation's first chief executive to face energy matters in a "modern" context. He did not consciously set out to forge an "energy policy" as recent Ameri-

Adapted from Craufurd Goodwin, *Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981). Copyright © 1981 by the Brookings Institution.

can Presidents have done, and he had not the luck to do so accidentally. Rather, he confronted (or avoided) energy issues as they arose, one at a time, fuel by fuel. In Washington, as in the press and in the country at large, there was no overriding sense that “energy,” as such, was destined to become a Big Problem.

Yet, as Truman and the Congress dealt with the “fuel” issues before them, they did not operate in a vacuum. Three distinct ways of thinking about energy supplies, prices, and producers shaped the recurring postwar debates—and flavor American energy debates today.

The first approach was a legacy of the Depression and the New Deal. Its advocates in the Interior Department and the White House believed that if the free market threatened to produce economic distress for workers or consumers, then the free market system should be modified. Often this meant that key industries, such as oil, gas, and public power, needed the leash of regulation to keep prices down. Sometimes it meant that Washington was prepared to set itself up in the energy business, as it did in creating the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration during the 1930s. Harold Ickes, FDR’s (and briefly Truman’s) Interior Secretary, and the first U.S. official to acquire the sobriquet “energy czar,” once proposed that oil companies be regulated like electric utilities.

A second perspective, that of officials in the Pentagon and at the State Department, may be summed up by the word *expediency*. After December 1941, America had a war to win. Legitimate concerns about the price of electricity, resource conservation, or antitrust laws had to give way to the needs of mobilization. With some modifications, this view applied to the Cold War and to the task of ensuring adequate supplies of foreign oil for reasons of “national security.” Thus, despite the lingering memory of Teapot Dome, cooperative relationships developed between the federal government, especially the Interior Department, and the producers of oil, gas, and coal.* “God help Government,” wrote C. Pratt Rather, a gas industry execu-

*In 1922, Interior Secretary Albert Fall persuaded President Warren G. Harding to transfer control over the U.S. Naval Petroleum Reserves to his department. Fall then leased, in return for a bribe, the 9,481-acre Teapot Dome reserve in Wyoming to oilman Harry Sinclair; he subsequently leased the 38,969-acre Elk Hills reserve in California to another oilman, Edward Doheny. A congressional investigation later uncovered the scheme. Fall, Sinclair, and Doheny were indicted, convicted, and briefly imprisoned.

This essay has been adapted by the editors from chapters 1–3 of Energy in Perspective, which were written by Craufurd D. Goodwin (the Truman years) and William J. Barber, an economist at Wesleyan University (the Eisenhower years).

tive assigned to Interior in 1951, "and industry too, if this sensible alliance is not maintained."

A third viewpoint was that of the free-market economists and their allies, represented primarily by the Federal Trade Commission and the antitrust division of the Justice Department. Only vigorous competition among many small producers of oil, coal, and gas—not planning, not federal price-fixing, not a peacetime War Production Board—would guarantee minimum energy costs and maximum efficiency. This notion was embodied in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. "Big Oil" was a favorite target.

Competition vs. Regulation

Each of these views had its sincere adherents in such places as the Bureau of Mines and the Petroleum Administration for War, and its advocates on Capitol Hill. When he assumed the Presidency, Harry Truman acquired not one energy policy but several:


Oil. Here the free-marketers had won the first round with the breakup in 1911 of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil, "mother of trusts," into 34 separate companies. But *laissez faire* in the oil industry led, in the 1920s, to overproduction, price wars, and waste. (Drilling too many wells in close proximity often resulted in loss of pressure and hence of recoverable reserves.) After Columbus M. ("Dad") Joiner's 1930 strike in the Sabine Basin in East Texas, opening up what was then the largest oil field in the world, the price of U.S. petroleum plummeted to 65¢ a barrel.*

As a result, Congress stepped in with the Connally Hot Oil Act in 1935 to enforce a complicated system of quotas (or "allowables") governing the amount of petroleum each producing state could sell. ("Hot oil" was oil sold in excess of the allowable.) The federal government collected nationwide data on oil consumption so that just enough petroleum would be produced to satisfy demand at an arbitrary price. Local allowables were set by intrastate bodies, such as the Texas Railroad Commission. The whole scheme was overseen by an Interstate Oil Compact Commission. The controlled price of U.S. oil was higher than that of crude available from Venezuela or Mexico, but an oil tariff was already in place (1932) to discourage imports.

In effect, Congress sanctioned a petroleum oligopoly blessed

*A barrel of oil is equivalent to 42 gallons. Normally a barrel contains 55 gallons, but petroleum was first transported to market in wooden casks by horse-drawn wagons; there was so much slopping around that refiners were willing to pay only for 42 gallons per barrel.


U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE, 1900-79
(as % of total consumption)



Source: U.S. Department of the Interior; U.S. Department of Energy; *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 1975.

Relative consumption of various fuels has changed dramatically over time (above). Increases in oil prices and depletion of gas reserves have led to a modest revival of coal. Firewood has overtaken nuclear power as a source of energy. In constant dollars (below), the price of all fuels steadily declined until the early 1970s, contributing to record demand.

PRICES OF U.S.-PRODUCED FOSSIL FUELS, 1950-79
(in constant 1972 dollars)



Source: Energy Information Administration, *Annual Report to Congress*, 1979.

with a legal price-fixing regime. Through this and other interventions, such as the oil-depletion allowance, the federal government ensured that the free market did not determine the price of oil, or the rate of production, or the pace of exploration.*

Foreign oil soon added a new twist. America's demand for petroleum had grown rapidly during World War II, and demand continued to expand following V-J Day, after a brief postwar downturn. To most specialists, it had long been obvious that the nation's petroleum future did not lie in Texas or Oklahoma. This prospect posed several dilemmas. German U-boats had decimated Allied shipping during World War II: Would heavy reliance on imports leave the United States exposed in the event of future hostilities? Or was it actually better to buy cheap foreign oil during peacetime, saving domestic reserves for an emergency? There was no easy answer. To exploit such reserves, a strong domestic oil industry had to be preserved; yet foreign imports could undercut U.S. producers.

Many of the large, vertically integrated American oil companies (the "majors") had invested heavily overseas.† Their economic interests did not always coincide with those of their smaller, stay-at-home cousins—or with Washington's foreign policy goals for that matter. (From the beginning, Arab oil and support for Israel did not mix well.) The bottom line, however, was that the United States was going to need foreign oil. With such needs in mind, President Roosevelt, returning from Yalta in February 1945, arranged a friendly cruise through the Red Sea with Ibn Saud, King of oil-rich Saudi Arabia.

Natural gas. Gas emerged as a potential major fuel only during World War II. Like oil, natural gas was cheap, could move by pipeline, and was a "clean" fuel increasingly preferred to coal by industry and utilities. By war's end, greater and greater proportions of gas to oil were being found.

Should gas be further regulated? Under the 1938 Natural

*The oil depletion allowance was established in 1926 to encourage producers to search for new oil. An oil company could deduct from its tax base 27.5 percent (changed to 22 percent in 1969) of gross income from a given oil property; the deduction could not exceed one-half the net income from that property. (Similar but lesser tax incentives nourished many industries. For example, there was a 3 percent depletion allowance for clam shells.) There was, of course, a certain contradiction between Washington's twin goals of encouraging oil exploration and limiting production.

†Great Britain dominated Mideast oil production before World War II, but American companies pulled abreast after the war and then moved far ahead. The situation during the early Truman years was as follows: Exxon and Mobil owned interests in the Trucial States, Qatar, and Iraq, but shared the fields with Great Britain; Gulf was established, alongside the British, in Kuwait; Exxon was the main foreign presence in Venezuela. The 440,000-square-mile Aramco concession in Saudi Arabia—once regarded as a "white elephant"—was owned jointly by Socal, Texaco, Mobil, and Exxon. Iran remained largely a British preserve, although Exxon and Mobil had a quarter interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Gas Act, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) plainly had the authority to regulate the prices that the few existing interstate pipeline companies could charge local utilities and industry. But what about the "wellhead" price that gas producers charged the pipeline? Here, there was room for interpretation.

Southwestern Congressmen like Senator Robert S. Kerr (D.-Okla.) believed that federal intervention was unnecessary: With 2,300 producers, the gas industry, Kerr claimed, was quite competitive. Regulators like Leland Olds, veteran New Dealer and FPC commissioner, countered that 75 of those producers (mostly oil companies) controlled 70 percent of the market.

The neglected long-range issue was whether the United States should encourage conservation of finite gas reserves through relatively high prices or stimulate widespread use of gas via politically popular low prices.

A Free-Marketer's Nightmare

Coal. Dirty, bulky coal was America's most abundant natural resource, but the coal industry was the most financially troubled of all the energy producers. Its share of U.S. energy consumption had been declining for years. N. H. Collisson, chief of the U.S. Coal Mines Administration, warned soon after World War II that the coal problem "far exceeds the ability of the industry to effect a solution."

Demand for oil and gas—coal's attractive rivals—had grown steadily after World War I. The coal industry ran in the red every year from 1924 until 1939, when a temporary system of minimum coal prices, established under the Bituminous Coal Act, began to have an effect. But price supports ended in 1943 and the industry as a whole, plagued by high fixed costs and too many small, marginal producers (there were then about 5,000 coal-mining companies) slipped back into unprofitability.

Unlike oil, coal benefited from neither market regulation nor subsidy. Its depletion allowance was a mere 5 percent. The industry was a free-marketer's nightmare: It was the one truly laissez-faire industry left in the energy sector, and it was thus placed at a severe competitive disadvantage. Ironically, geologists and bureaucrats alike knew that the nation's return to coal was inevitable when oil and gas ran out. Coal's long-term future was secure. Looking ahead, Evelyn Cooper, a member of the Interior Department's secretariat, predicted in 1946 that coal would eventually regain "all markets lost to these competing fuels and, in addition, . . . will itself be an important raw material for the manufacture of [synthetic] gasoline." The question

was whether the coal industry could survive till then.

This, then, was the energy picture that greeted Harry Truman at war's end. The United States was consuming about 30 quadrillion Btu's of energy a year (two-fifths of the 1980 level).^{*} Almost half the U.S. energy came from coal, followed by oil, then gas. In 1946, America was a net exporter of all of these fuels. In that year, a barrel of U.S. oil cost \$1.41. Natural gas was priced at 5¢ per thousand cubic feet.

When Truman sought to act on energy matters, it was generally as an interventionist. Truman was suspicious of big corporations, fearful of monopoly, and loyal to the New Deal that he supported as a Senator from Missouri in 1935-45. He himself promised Americans a "Fair Deal," favoring the "little guy," and pushed ahead with plans for "more TVAs" in Colorado, California, and elsewhere. He didn't want the West, he said, to be "an economic colony of Wall Street."

The ailing coal industry got no succor from Truman. Any good will he may have had ebbed quickly during a wave of coal strikes beginning in 1946. Amid brownouts, Truman symbolically doused the floodlights on Capitol Hill and ordered a federal takeover of the coal mines for a year. The President possibly had better relations with Stalin than he did with John L. Lewis, imperious president of the United Mine Workers.

The reality was that coal operators could not afford to pay appreciably higher wages to 400,000 coal miners unless they also raised the price of coal; yet higher coal prices would merely encourage coal's remaining customers to switch to oil.

Keeping Gas Cheap

Harry Truman's one concession to the coal industry was a nod in the direction of developing synthetic oil and gas derived from coal. There was no mystery about synthetics. Very early in World War II, the Germans were producing 30 million barrels of synthetic oil a year in Silesian and West Prussian coal-oil plants. U.S. technicians, examining Nazi scientific records after the Allied victory, learned the details. Congress authorized \$85 million for "synfuel" research during the Truman years.

Yet, without slave labor (which the Germans employed), and with plenty of cheap oil and gas still available, producing synthetic oil and gas was too costly a proposition. For 30 years, synfuels were to remain perpetually "a decade away."

In 1946, looking at another fuel, President Truman decided

^{*}A British thermal unit (Btu) is the quantity of heat required to raise one pound of water 1° Fahrenheit.

to turn over the government's two large-diameter steel pipelines—the Big Inch and Little Big Inch, built during the war to bring oil from Texas to the Atlantic seaboard—to the “gas people.” This decision, to the dismay of the coal industry, promoted gas from the status of a petroleum by-product (which was, for the most part, used locally) to that of an important fuel with a new national market. Truman's instincts urged him toward stricter regulation of the gas industry. To him, this meant that the Federal Power Commission should regulate the price of gas at the wellhead, not simply the pipeline price.

The pricing issue quickly found its way into the federal courts. The city of Detroit filed a motion in 1946 requesting the FPC to assert its jurisdiction over Phillips Petroleum, the local supplier of gas; the suit wound a tortuous path to the Supreme Court, and no ruling was forthcoming until the Eisenhower administration. Meanwhile, gas-state Congressmen—Senator Kerr of Oklahoma, and Senator Lyndon Johnson and House Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas—pushed through a bill in 1950 to exempt natural gas from wellhead regulation. Advised by aide Charles Murphy that the legislation had “no merit” and would “take some of the shine off of the Fair Deal,” Truman vetoed the bill. There the matter rested, for a while.

Truman's veto climaxed a bitter fight in Congress, pitting consumer states (which favored low prices) against producer states (which favored high prices). Even racial prejudice was brought in: “The colored people,” wrote Charles LaFollette, director of Americans for Democratic Action, “are particularly incensed because they regard this measure [the Kerr bill] as a reward to the chief foes of civil rights legislation.” For all the passion aroused by the debate, few voices warned that excessive demand and excessive dependence might result from selling gas at prices far lower than what the market would bear. The realities became clearer three decades later.

Trouble in Iran

The major *oil* policy question Truman faced was what to do about petroleum imports. As a percentage of total U.S. oil consumption, imports swelled during the Truman era from zero to 13 percent—or to almost 1 million barrels a day.

Imports meant different things to different people. Domestic producers feared a tidal wave of inexpensive foreign oil. Consumers looked forward to a “softening” in the price of gasoline. The State Department, believing that more imports were inevitable, hoped by “active, energetic, and consistent support” to



Public suspicion of the oil industry ran deep during the Truman years. Yet, despite their presumed power, oil companies gained only one of the three initiatives Herblock criticized in this 1950 cartoon—tax benefits.

From The Herblock Book, Beacon Press, 1952.

ensure that American companies got the lion's share of the Middle East's oil concessions. The Pentagon was worried about defending distant oil supplies and a vulnerable tanker lifeline in the event of war but also conceded that "draining America first" would only make matters worse. The Defense Department pressed hard—and in vain—for a massive stockpile of crude.

For his part, Harry Truman saw growing imports as part of "a concerted effort by the big companies to put the little [domestic] companies out of business." He was apparently on the verge of curbing imports drastically when the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. The import question was left in limbo.

A year later, with the United States deeply involved in war, events in Iran underscored the risk in heavy reliance on oil from the Mideast. In April 1951, Iran's frail but frenetic premier, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Anglo-Iranian was largely a British firm (it became British Petroleum in 1954), and the production cutbacks did not affect the United States. But Western Europe and Japan were threatened with shortages.

Washington responded by looking the other way as the "Seven Sisters" joined to create a "disaster plan" cartel, boycotting all Iranian oil and arranging for the supply of oil, from other sources, to Europe and the Far East.* Despite Truman's

*The "Seven Sisters," the oil companies controlling almost all Mideast petroleum production at the time, were Exxon, Shell, British Petroleum, Gulf, Texaco, Mobil, and Socal.

suspicious, the majors could be useful; then as later, they brought order out of chaos when governments failed to do so.

But, unlike its European allies, the United States never established ground rules for its own day-to-day relations with the big oil companies operating abroad; instead, the executive branch acted erratically. In 1952, for example, the Federal Trade Commission filed a criminal suit against Gulf, Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, and Socal for “cartel practices” overseas, even as Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned that weakening of the oil companies would lead to a “decrease of political stability” in the Mideast.

The Paley Commission

Thus, Harry Truman bequeathed to his successor a set of energy policies with many unresolved contradictions and no guiding rationale. Why did no comprehensive policy emerge?

Ignorance was not the culprit. In the yeasty period of discussion following World War II, energy policy had been given considerable attention by Harold Ickes and others in Washington. Conferences were held, studies commissioned, proposals advanced. The general dimensions of America’s long-term energy supply problem were clear. There was no want of expert advice, even if firm quantitative data on fuels, which the government did not then collect, were scarce.

The main barrier to concerted action on energy—as on other matters—was Washington’s chronic peacetime preoccupation with short-term political costs and benefits. Stephen Raushenbush, an influential Interior Department official, asked himself in 1944: “Can a sensible fuels policy be devised?” He decided that the answer was no. Neither Congress nor the White House, he concluded, was equipped to address the matter on a broad national level. “Every measure comes up as a special commodity interest measure, is handled by a special agency, and goes before special interest committees of Congress.”


The energy sector was fragmented, and individual energy industries themselves were riven by conflicts. No one federal agency had responsibility for energy matters, but many of them—from the Bureau of Mines to the Bureau of Reclamation—had something at stake. The policymaking structure had so evolved that even minor projects, like synfuel development, touched many nerves, soothing some (in the coal industry), irritating others (in the oil and gas industries). Sudden crises such as the Korean War heightened awareness of long-range energy needs but at the same time deadened sensation to all but the cri-

Some issues were extraordinarily divisive. "Big Oil" had been a target of savage criticism since the 1880s; by the early 1950s, suspicion of the multinational oil companies was virtually embedded in American political rhetoric. "Oil continues to ally embedded in American political rhetoric," culminated in Harold Ickes as the 1947-52 "tidelands" controversy raged in Washington. At issue was whether mineral rights to submerged coastal lands should rest with the states or with the federal government. The oil companies favored state control (they believed royalties would be lower and access easier), but President Truman felt otherwise; and he prevailed against those whom he regarded as "special privileged promoters."

It is unfortunate that the one broad White House energy initiative—creation of the Paley Commission—came at the end of the Truman era instead of at the beginning. Formally known as the President's Materials Policy Commission, and headed by CBS chairman William S. Paley, this blue-ribbon study group was set up by President Truman in 1951 to take stock of America's future needs for all types of nonrenewable natural resources. With a staff of 50, Paley brought the study to completion in 1952.

The final report, *Resources for Freedom*, was widely publicized. The authors insisted that "the hydra heads of energy policy must be reined together." They recommended a wide

U.S. CRUDE OIL DEMAND VS. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, 1925-79



Source: *Resources for Freedom* (Paley Report), 1952; Energy Information Administration, Annual Report to Congress, 1979.

Projections of U.S. oil supply and demand made by the Paley Commission in 1952 proved remarkably accurate. The commissioners warned that Americans had "skinned the cream" off domestic energy resources.

range of federal programs, including research into solar and atomic energy and creation of an underground petroleum reserve. They challenged Detroit to come up with a fuel-efficient car and challenged Americans generally to start preparing for the energy demands of the 1970s. "As a nation," the authors observed, "we have always been more interested in sawmills than seedlings."

The timing of the Paley report was inauspicious. Four months after its publication, Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States; the warnings of *Resources for Freedom* were largely forgotten in the transition to the first Republican administration since 1933.

Whether or not Eisenhower read the Paley report, he would certainly have been comfortable with its assertion that a consistent energy policy "implies no increase in government activity; it might well mean less." The new administration's basic stance on economic matters might be summed up by the words "hands off." Eisenhower believed in free markets, in private enterprise, and in regulation by states and localities, not by the federal government. Energy policy per se did not rank high on the Eisenhower agenda. But in its various applications, the broader official free-market doctrine affected the energy sector in many ways.

Conception without Sex?

As early as the summer of 1953, the Interior Department announced a "no new starts" policy: Henceforward, responsibility for developing public power lay with "the people locally." Federally subsidized synfuel research was cut back—that was a job for private industry, Eisenhower believed. Jurisdiction over seabed resources, including offshore oil, in coastal areas of the 875,000-square-mile continental shelf was transferred to the several states. The Federal Power Commission effectively drew back from regulating the wellhead price of natural gas.

Soon, Washington began shedding its monopoly of the nuclear power field. In his dramatic "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations in 1953, Eisenhower pledged that the "miraculous inventiveness of man" would be put to work in harnessing atomic energy. With White House backing, the Republican-controlled Congress rejected Democratic Senator Albert Gore's proposal to make generating electricity from nuclear power a federal monopoly. Instead, Congress authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to make uranium fuel and reactor blueprints available to the private sector. The first com-

mercial nuclear power plant went into operation in 1957 in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, using a reactor modeled on that of the Navy submarine, *Nautilus*. When questioned by reporters about the high cost (\$110 million) of the new plant, Admiral Hyman Rickover, who helped supervise its construction, replied: "You people are asking for conception without sex."

When the Iran crisis came to an end in 1954 following the overthrow of Mossadegh and the return of the Shah—"a diplomatic victory for the West," as the *New York Times* put it—Eisenhower again paid homage to free competition by inviting U.S. independent oil producers, most of them with little or no foreign experience, to join with six "majors" in dividing up the 60 percent of Iranian oil production reserved to U.S. firms under the terms of the new settlement.

Erecting a "Quota Dike"

For a full year, the Eisenhower administration adhered to its free-market principles. Then, in 1954, came a recession. Despite his professed distaste for the "new economics," the first Republican President since Herbert Hoover was not about to preside over a depression. The notion of government intervention in the economy regained some of its appeal.

Eisenhower was opposed to "slam-bang" stimulants to increase demand, but some kind of stimulus was clearly in order. New public power projects, favored by the Democrats, were a possibility. But the public works project that the President backed and Congress approved was the construction of a new 41,000-mile interstate highway system. The highway program helped to open up the hinterland to industry and tourism and encouraged suburbanization. In effect, it also subsidized growing U.S. dependence on cars and buses, further weakening the ailing passenger railways. In the end, the highway program helped to create a sizable new demand for imported oil.

The year 1954 also brought a Supreme Court decision in the long-simmering Phillips Petroleum case. The Court ruled that the Federal Power Commission, as Truman had believed, *must* regulate the wellhead price of natural gas. Eisenhower promptly sought to annul the ruling by legislation, and a bill to exempt natural gas from FPC jurisdiction cleared Congress after a reprise of the bitter debate of 1950. But evidence came to light of an attempt by an oil company lawyer to bribe Senator Francis Case (R.-S.D.), and Eisenhower reluctantly vetoed the legislation, saying that "any good bill ought to be passed without having a terrible stench connected with it." Later attempts to

In 1957, President Eisenhower waved a "neutron wand" in the White House, activating the nation's first atomic power plant at Shippingport, Pa.



Courtesy Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

revive the legislation were stalled in Congress.

So, for almost three decades, the FPC was to set prices for natural gas. Responsive to consumer pressure, it kept them low, overlooking the long-term effects of its actions on future U.S. energy supply and demand.

Like its predecessor, the Eisenhower administration worried most about oil, notably, the rising volume of imports. As a proportion of total U.S. oil consumption, imports rose from 13 to almost 19 percent during the Eisenhower years. Growing Mideast production by American companies spurred this trend. After 1950, U.S. tax laws made foreign crude, already cheap to produce, especially attractive: At the urging of the State Department, the Treasury Department had ruled that royalty payments to foreign governments by American companies could be subtracted from their U.S. taxes. Domestic U.S. oil producers demanded protection.

In 1955, Eisenhower established a system of voluntary import controls, whereby U.S. oil companies would limit future imports to the share of the domestic market that foreign oil held in 1954. (Canadian and Venezuelan oil was, in effect, exempted.)

The voluntary system did not work, in part because some of the "newcomers"—American independents who had ventured late into the Arab world—defied such discipline.

On March 10, 1959, Eisenhower issued Presidential Proclamation 3279 replacing the voluntary quota system with mandatory oil import controls—a "quota dike." Henceforth, foreign oil could not legally be brought into the United States without a license issued by the Secretary of the Interior; the Interior Secretary would allocate these imports among domestic refiners. The "hemispheric preference" for Canadian and Venezuelan oil was ended. The President did not like what he had done. He privately complained about the "tendencies of special interests in the United States to press almost irresistibly for [protective] programs like this."

Mandatory quotas did not change the underlying reality—a condition of surplus at home and abroad. A lid had long been kept on domestic production to keep oil prices stable; now a lid was clamped on imports largely for the same reason. But foreign oil was still cheaper to produce than domestic oil, and the major oil companies still stood to make greater profits by bringing it in. Controls moderated the glut but did not eliminate it. By 1960, *Time* magazine was urging motorists to drive four minutes more each day to help reduce surplus gasoline stocks.

Designed to protect domestic interests, the Eisenhower controls program was to have long-term international repercussions. The State Department had viewed quotas with foreboding, warning of hostility from oil-producing countries anxious to find markets for what, in some cases, was their only source of export revenue. The Venezuelans, dependent on U.S. imports and about to embark on a massive economic development effort, were especially upset.

In 1960, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the brainchild of Venezuelan oil minister Perez Alfonso. Many things would have to fall into place before OPEC could challenge its customers. But a new actor, as yet hardly noticed in the West, was now on the world stage.

FROM JOHN F. KENNEDY TO JIMMY CARTER

On October 6, 1973—the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur—Syria and Egypt invaded Israel. This brief war, the fourth Arab-Israeli conflict since 1947, coincided with a series of events that most Americans now commonly identify as the origins of the “energy crisis.”

Ten days after Egyptian armies bridged the Suez Canal and pushed into the Sinai, representatives of the 13-nation Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, meeting in Kuwait, raised the posted price of “marker” crude—Saudi Arabian “light”—from \$3.01 to \$5.12 per barrel.

Four days later, on October 20, enraged by President Richard M. Nixon’s request to Congress for \$2.2 billion in arms for Israel, the seven-member Organization of *Arab* Petroleum Producing Countries brandished the “oil weapon” and ordered an oil embargo against the United States.

In early November, the Arab oil ministers, whose governments together controlled 60 percent of the noncommunist world’s proven reserves of petroleum, agreed to cut production to 75 percent of the September 1973 level.

On Christmas Eve 1973, OPEC raised the price of marker crude once again, to \$11.65.

In eight weeks, the price of OPEC crude had nearly quadrupled. The cost of foreign oil soared above the artificially supported price of U.S. crude.

Initially, however, the prospect of a long embargo seemed to Americans more ominous than the impact of higher prices. Owing in part to unwieldy federal efforts to allocate supplies, shortages appeared here and there almost immediately, as the Northern Hemisphere braced for winter. School systems were shut down to conserve heating fuel, and janitors removed 750,000 light bulbs from federal buildings in Washington. There were long lines at the gasoline pumps, especially in urban areas.

The Arab embargo and the OPEC price hikes coincided; therefore, in the eyes of many Americans and their Congressmen, there was a direct link between the two. Even as the major oil companies, in the absence of effective cooperation among Western governments, adroitly eased the winter crisis by re-routing tankers and allocating supplies around the globe, there

was a widespread suspicion in America that the shortages were "artificial," to use consumer advocate Ralph Nader's word.

Skepticism in Congress and the press grew when the Arab embargo faded in the spring of 1974; yet oil prices still remained on a high plateau. Oil industry profits for 1973 rose by an average of 48 percent.

In fact, sharp foreign increases in the price of crude had long been inevitable—and openly predicted by officials of producing countries and Western oil companies alike. OPEC had matured since its founding in 1960, when news reports generally prefixed its name with the tag "little-known." Its membership had grown from 5 to 13, and each of the member nations now boasted a cadre of native-born, Western-trained technocrats who well understood the international oil economy. They knew how to turn the spigot on and off to get a better deal from their customers. Increasingly, there was no one strong enough to prevent them from doing so.

If the Seven Sisters had once mounted an effective cartel, by the early 1970s they no longer could. The number of oil companies with investments in the Middle East and Africa had grown into the hundreds as "independents" such as Sohio and Getty Oil and scores of wildcatters had gained access to the established fields and opened up new ones west of Suez, in Libya and

After the 1973-74 oil embargo, the menacing Arab became a stock character in editorial cartoons.



By Warren King, Copyright 1974 New York News Inc. Reprinted by permission.

Algeria. By the early 1960s, the oil majors' dominance of all aspects of the international market, from exploration to production to transport to marketing, had eroded.

Needed: A Blackout

The new order was fragile. Independent producers and refiners, often dependent on a single Mideast or African nation's crude, were vulnerable to the demands of their hosts; in price negotiations, the oil companies were no stronger than their weakest link. Thus, in 1970, Libya's mercurial Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, successor to the pro-Western King Idris, won an increase in both the posted price of Libyan crude and the oil company taxes paid into his treasury by briefly squeezing supplies to Occidental Petroleum, which depended on Libyan oil for its European refineries. Occidental's capitulation soon led to others. Moreover, by 1973, the Arab oil-producing nations had taken steps toward full control of the oil production facilities on their soil.

The final necessary factor in the crisis of 1973-74 was the West's increasing dependence on foreign oil. This was an unfamiliar phenomenon in the United States, whose domestic oil production peaked in 1970 even as demand kept growing. America's surplus production capacity had averted shortages at home and abroad during the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Mideast War in 1967, but there was no longer any such capacity. The United States was now an importer not by choice but by necessity, depending on the Arabs alone for 1 million barrels of oil a day in 1973, and on OPEC as a whole for 65 percent of total imports.

In vain, for two decades, oil industry geologists and Washington specialists had warned that a day of reckoning would come. Early in 1973, Representative Chet Holifield (D.-Calif.), chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, wondered whether anything short of a "good, 24-hour blackout" could focus the attention of the public and official Washington on the need for a coherent energy policy. The Arab oil embargo and OPEC price increases sounded the necessary alarm, at a time when the United States still had many energy options to explore.

The events of 1973-74 provided an opportunity to act. The

This essay has been adapted by the editors from chapters 4-9 of Energy in Perspective, which were written by economists William J. Barber (Kennedy), James L. Cochrane of the University of South Carolina (Johnson and Carter), Neil de Marchi of Duke University (Nixon and Ford), and Joseph A. Yager of the Brookings Institution (Carter).

question was whether the United States would seize it.

It had been many years since energy, even briefly, had held the spotlight. When John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency on a cold day in January 1961, millions of Americans viewed the festivities on TV in their living rooms, thermostats turned up high. If there was an energy problem, it was a problem of surfeit.

Yet specific energy issues had cropped up in JFK's 1960 campaign to "get the country moving again." The Senator from Massachusetts found himself, for example, stumping for public power projects (in depressed Maine) and for a revival of coal (in West Virginia). In language reminiscent of the Paley Commission report, he had championed a "national fuels policy."

Business As Usual

By the time of his assassination in November 1963, no such policy had emerged. Comforted by the scientific optimism that pervaded his administration and feeling hemmed in politically by his narrow election victory over Vice President Richard Nixon, President Kennedy, like his predecessors, ignored the long-term in favor of coping with the short-term. His calls to action during the campaign became calls for "more study" when he reached the Oval Office.

Unwilling to face opposition from the oil and gas industries, Kennedy backed away from the campaign pledges that played so well in the mining towns during the 1960 West Virginia primary. He settled instead for symbolic gestures—an order that U.S. forces in West Germany use American coal, for example.

On other issues, Kennedy was content to tinker with the status quo. The protective oil import quota program inherited from Eisenhower was riddled with loopholes. The President engineered some adjustments but generally left the system intact. Natural gas, meanwhile, had become the fifth-largest industry in the nation, and Kennedy favored continued federal regulation to keep prices low. Neither he nor his advisers were struck by the decline in domestic gas reserves that low prices, popular with consumers, only abetted. A few federal moves were made in behalf of atomic energy, notably a reduced price to private utilities for government-owned uranium oxide, or "yellowcake." In 1962, Westinghouse took its first orders for "turnkey" atomic generating plants in Connecticut and California.

In sum, President Kennedy made few changes in the mixed bag of federal energy policy. Thanks to exemptions and loopholes, foreign oil imports kept on growing—to 20 percent of U.S. oil consumption in 1963. Natural gas continued to outdistance



Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Library. Photographer unknown.

Candidate John F. Kennedy assured West Virginia coal miners during the 1960 campaign that “the future of coal and the future of West Virginia can both be bright.” But in office, Kennedy pledged more studies but no action, and the ailing coal industry continued its long decline.

coal as the preferred fuel nationwide.

Energy was the least of Lyndon Johnson’s concerns when he took the oath of office on Air Force One. Sensitive to conflict of interest charges (he had been a Senator from Texas), he later told reporters that Interior Secretary Stewart Udall would have “full control over oil matters.” Johnson then turned his attention to getting JFK’s New Frontier legislative program through Congress, and to the 1964 election.

To some in Lyndon Johnson’s entourage, notably Donald Hornig, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology, it seemed obvious that the cumulative effect of Washington’s energy policies was contradictory. Hornig, a Manhattan Project alumnus and later president of Brown University, worried that “energy pluralism”—setting policies for individual fuels without reference to the energy picture as a whole—had led increasingly to bizarre and worrisome consequences.

Much of the nation, for instance, was now “hooked” on artificially cheap natural gas, to the detriment of coal, even as the

ratio of gas reserves to production dwindled to half the 1947 level. Curbing oil imports, meanwhile, had had the ironic effect of worsening the U.S. trade balance; American petrochemical manufacturers, compelled to rely largely on relatively expensive U.S. petroleum "feedstocks," claimed that they could no longer compete with foreign rivals in the export market.

Yet a high-level interagency staff report concluded in 1966 that there was really nothing to worry about. "The nation's total energy resources," its authors wrote, "seem adequate to satisfy expected requirements through the remainder of the century, at costs near present levels."* President Johnson, immersed in the politics of his Great Society and in the torments of the Vietnam War, was not inclined to argue.

To LBJ, technology promised salvation. In 1964, the President hailed an "economic breakthrough" in nuclear power. Utilities had suddenly discovered that atomic energy could be commercially successful. Twenty-one reactor contracts were awarded in 1966, 30 in 1967. Plans for a federally funded liquid-metal fast "breeder" reactor, which would create more fissionable material than it consumed, went forward. The breeder, like atomic power generally, would not become an "issue" for another decade.

As for oil policy, Lyndon Johnson did not keep his word to Interior Secretary Udall. It was a promise no President could sustain. Thus, early in 1966, with the future course of the Vietnam War uncertain, and the consumer price index edging upward, LBJ intervened to keep down crude oil prices by increasing the production "allowables" on domestic oil. Domestic crude prices remained constant during the Johnson years, at about \$3 per barrel. In constant, uninflated dollars, crude oil prices actually declined; not surprisingly, so did drilling for new wells.

Because consumers are highly sensitive to changes in the price of gasoline—far more than its 3 percent weight in the Consumer Price Index would justify—LBJ privately jawboned oil company executives to keep gasoline prices down. The oilmen, fearing a flood of imported gasoline, did as they were bid.

Johnson virtually lifted what remained of the restrictions on imported residual fuel oil, continually raising the quota ceilings so that, in effect, supply always conformed to demand.†

**Energy R&D and National Progress*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966.

† Residual fuel oil is what is left over when lighter products, such as gasoline, have been distilled from crude. Refiners generally sold the "bottom of the barrel" to utilities and industrial users, primarily on the East Coast, at prices below cost. As demand for gasoline and other refined products rose after World War II, the fraction of each barrel of U.S. crude left as resid declined; imports—not coal—filled the gap.

LBJ's "resid" policy illustrated the gradual unraveling of Eisenhower's protective oil import program generally. More important, because coal might have been substituted for residual fuel in almost all its uses, allowing unhampered imports guaranteed that a significant proportion of U.S. energy supplies was needlessly exposed to the OPEC price hikes in 1973.

The Johnson administration, in the main, was notable for its senior officials' blindness to the problems of impending scarcities, price rises, and growing OPEC strength. LBJ unabashedly subordinated energy issues to transient political and economic pressures. By passing on to his successor a war in Southeast Asia and the first stirrings of rampant inflation, he ensured that underlying energy issues would gain little White House attention for several years to come.

The Environmentalists Arrive


Vietnam, inflation, détente, China, and Vietnam again: These were Richard M. Nixon's overriding concerns during his beleaguered first term in office, facing a hostile Democratic Congress. Energy problems were treated by the White House in piecemeal fashion and received only intermittent attention at the highest levels.

Perhaps President Nixon's most important contribution to the U.S. energy problem during his early years in office did not involve energy per se. Eight days after his inauguration in 1969, an oil rig "blowout" in the Santa Barbara Channel coated southern California beaches with black muck. Press photographs of seals and seabirds mired in slime gave new impetus to an environmental movement that had quietly been growing in power and cohesion. Thousands descended on Washington in April 1970 to celebrate the first "Earth Day."

Protecting the environment was widely viewed in the press and on Capitol Hill as a necessary effort that a wealthy nation could afford. From the White House, the environment appeared as a field for bold—and politically popular—action. President Nixon backed the Clean Air Act of 1970 and creation of the Environmental Protection Agency that same year.

It was not long before the consequences for energy use became clear. Power plant executives began converting even faster from "dirty" coal to "clean" oil and gas. Refinery construction slumped. Licensing of new nuclear power plants, though favored by Mr. Nixon, became a nightmare of red tape. Offshore drilling for oil and gas was placed under a federal moratorium. Strip mining encountered new roadblocks.



WHERE AMERICA GOT ITS OIL, 1955 AND 1979



U.S. oil consumption more than doubled between 1955 and 1979, but imports tripled as a percentage of total use. The price of U.S. crude (below) was artificially held above, and then below, world levels. Gasoline prices paced inflation in the 1970s, but total energy costs account for less than 25 percent of current U.S. double-digit inflation.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines.

OIL IMPORT PRICES AND THE PRICE OF GASOLINE



Source: The British Petroleum Company Ltd.; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Labor.

Even before Earth Day, the first signs of a chronic energy imbalance had begun to appear. Natural gas and heating oil ran short in the winter of 1969–70.* A few months later, Libya cut back oil production. Summer brownouts plagued the Atlantic coast. Fuel shortages persisted into the next winter, and four Eastern utilities had to reduce power output to prevent total blackouts.

In June 1971, President Nixon took the unusual step of sending a comprehensive energy message to Capitol Hill.† The Congress ignored it, and Nixon did not press the issue. More demanding matters were at hand: the overtures to China; Henry Kissinger's negotiations with Hanoi; and continuing inflation.

Inflation—by July 1971, it was running at what was then a shocking annual rate of 4.4 percent—was Nixon's prime domestic concern. In August, breaking with Republican orthodoxy, the President announced Phase I of what would be a four-phase program of wage and price controls—the first ever applied in the United States in peacetime. The controls would continue in various forms until April 1974, but those on petroleum products remained in place much longer. Price controls would play an important role in undermining Nixon's later energy policies, as foreign oil prices began to rise. "It would be hard to think of a more effective way of creating a fuel crisis," Paul McCracken, chairman of the energy subcommittee of Nixon's Domestic Council, pointed out, "than to decree U.S. price ceilings . . . below those prevailing in the world market."

It was not until after his 1972 election victory over Senator George McGovern that Richard Nixon again turned his attention to energy. By then, the cycle of winter "spot" fuel shortages and localized summer brownouts was in its fourth year, an extended dress rehearsal for the crisis to come. Demand was rapidly outstripping supply.

As 1973 began, the situation, in outline, was this: Domestic crude production had peaked in 1970 at 9.6 million barrels a day and by 1973 had declined to 9.4. Under the exemption-riddled oil import system, imports of crude had grown from 22.7 per-

*There were several reasons for the natural gas shortage, including increased demand. Another was the "double market" for gas. While the Federal Power Commission regulated the wellhead price of gas sold *interstate*, state commissions regulated the wellhead price of gas sold *intrastate*. These two prices gradually diverged, with the intrastate price rising faster. As a result, producers of gas had an incentive to sell their product in their own states, rather than in, say, New England.

†Nixon's proposals included: creation of a Department of Natural Resources; expansion of the civilian nuclear power program; stepped-up research into synthetic fuels; accelerated leasing of the outer continental shelf for oil exploration; and leasing of federal lands for shale oil development. The emphasis was on *long-term* energy needs.

cent of U.S. needs in 1970 to 35.9 percent. Consumption of regulated, low-priced natural gas (it cost 22¢ per 1,000 cubic feet, compared to 72¢ for an energy-equivalent amount of oil) was running at twice the rate of new discoveries, and winter curtailments of usage were expected to equal 10 percent of demand in 1973-74. Oil from Alaska's promising North Slope, meanwhile, had not yet begun to flow; Congress, citing environmental hazards, had not approved construction of the Prudhoe Bay-Valdez pipeline. And there were tremors overseas: For the first time, the cost of foreign oil on the international "spot" market exceeded the price of domestic crude.

Spreading Scarcity Around


Long neglect of the coal industry had shrunk its share of U.S. energy consumption to 18 percent (versus 23 percent in 1960), while court challenges by environmentalists had halted all leasing of federal lands for strip mining in 1971. The surge to nuclear power had stalled—it accounted for only 5 percent of electricity generation in 1973—and the federally sponsored Clinch River Fast Breeder demonstration project had encountered technical difficulties and cost overruns on the order of 250 percent. The production cost of synthetic fuels from coal, oil shale, and tar sands still remained too high—in relation to that of other fuels—to warrant heavy investment.

In all, annual energy consumption per capita in the United States had grown by 50 percent since 1955, as cheap oil and gas fueled an economic boom that lasted into the early 1970s. But by 1973, future energy supplies were uncertain. As Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson put it, "Popeye is running out of cheap spinach."

Though they came late to the subject, Nixon and his key advisers—these included, at various times, Treasury Secretary George Shultz, his deputy (and later head of the Federal Energy Office) William E. Simon, special energy assistant Charles Di Bona, and former Colorado Governor John Love, director of the Energy Policy Office—arrived at a sound diagnosis of what was wrong with U.S. energy policy.

As they saw it, Washington's regulatory policies, especially those affecting oil and gas prices, were contradictory and had helped to cause the transient shortages of 1969-73. Further, the administration had gone too far in the right direction on the environment, leading to unreasonable curbs on coal burning and mining and to bottlenecks in the construction of refineries, power plants, and other facilities.

ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, 1970
(by U.S. Petroleum Administration regions)



Source: *International Petroleum Encyclopedia*; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior.

Rival regional interests have helped fashion many U.S. energy policies; federal policies, in turn, have affected regional energy development. Exploitation of vast Western coal reserves was impeded by curbs on the leasing of federal lands for mining and by environmental regulations. (The latter, by requiring all coal-fired plants to install expensive "scrubbers" to remove pollutants from high-sulfur coal, reduced utilities' incentives to buy the West's naturally low-sulfur coal.) Politicians from energy-short Regions I and II pressured Washington to ease oil import controls and regulate gas prices to keep domestic fuel costs down; their counterparts in energy-rich Region III shared a different perception of the national interest.

Effective control over energy policy, the White House also realized, had long been impeded by the dispersion of responsibility throughout both Congress and the executive branch.

The Departments of State and Defense, for example, had an important say on security issues, notably oil import and naval reserves policy. The Office of Emergency Planning watched over the oil import quota program, which was actually administered by the Interior Department. Coal was the bailiwick of Interior's Bureau of Mines and its Office of Coal Research; oil and gas policy was set by Interior's Office of Oil and Gas. Nuclear energy was the province of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Federal Power Commission regulated interstate sales of gas and electricity. Surveillance of the "competitive climate" of the energy industries was the responsibility of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. Nothing seemed beyond the purview of the Environmental Protection Agency.

Whether President Nixon, given time, might have brought a coherent energy policy to life (and the various energy bureaucracies to heel) is idle speculation. For the events of 1973 acquired a momentum of their own; and Nixon, preoccupied with surviving the Watergate investigation, did little more than take each crisis as it came. There was no time for grand strategies.

In April 1973, in response to a worsening gasoline shortage, Nixon issued a makeshift energy message, his second. It lacked all the elements of the bold "big play" that had so appealed to him earlier.

The 14-year-old protective quota system had become a poignant relic of an era of surplus. By 1973, as world oil prices neared the level of domestic U.S. prices, the quota system, combined with Nixon's price controls, had the effect of choking off desperately needed imports, since oil companies could not pass on all foreign price increases to consumers. In his April message, President Nixon replaced the quota program with a system of license fees whereby importers could bring in as much oil as they wished; the fees were modest, but those on refined products were stiffer than those on crude, to encourage refinery construction at home. Inadequate refinery capacity was a major cause of gasoline shortages.*

By May, local gasoline shortages had become acute, and the administration slipped more deeply into regulation. In response to charges by independent refiners and dealers that the big oil

*In his April message, President Nixon also called for the deregulation of "new" natural gas; easing of Clean Air Act standards for coal-burning; accelerated leasing of the outer continental shelf for oil and gas exploration; and, once again, creation of a Department of Energy and Natural Resources.

companies were using shortages to deprive them of oil and thereby drive them out of business, Nixon announced a voluntary "allocation" plan. Major oil companies were asked to supply all refineries and dealers with the same percentage of the total supply of crude and petroleum products as they received between September 1971 and August 1972. Allocations did nothing to ease the basic energy problem; at best, they merely spread the scarcity around.

By June, 1,500 independent gasoline dealers had closed temporarily; 400 more had shut down for good. Gasoline prices crept upwards, as far as controls allowed. Nixon responded with another quick energy message, calling for voluntary conservation and urging a five-year, \$10 billion investment in energy R&D. In July, Phase IV of the price stabilization effort went into effect, introducing a two-tier crude pricing system, with "old" oil subject to a price ceiling but "new" oil (anything produced from a given property above the 1972 level) exempt. Variations of this system remained in effect until January 1981.

Fighting inflation through price controls was no more compatible with curing energy ills in mid-1973 than it had been six months earlier. Ceilings remained on retail prices of many oil products. As foreign crude prices rose through the summer, responding to increased world demand, importers, still unable to pass on many cost increases to consumers, cut back on foreign oil purchases. The shortages grew worse.

In September 1973, as Arab governments stepped up their calls for a "correction" in U.S. policy toward Israel, President Nixon worried openly at a press conference that the nation might soon be "at the mercy of the producers of oil in the Mideast." He pleaded with Congress to approve the 789-mile Alaska pipeline. (Congress didn't act until November.) In early October, with the winter fuel situation looking bleak, the President ordered mandatory federal allocation of propane, heating oil, and jet and diesel fuels. Mandatory allocations were eventually extended to all crude oil and refined products.*

*A further "refinement" in the allocations program came in late 1974 with the appearance of "entitlements." Entitlements were devised to aid small and independent refiners, which had popped up when foreign oil was inexpensive and were threatened now that it was dear (the world price was about \$11). Unlike the large refiners, the independents often had little access to "old" domestic crude, the price of which was then controlled at \$5.25. Under the scheme, all refiners were issued entitlements authorizing them to use a proportion of old crude in their runs equal to the national average. A large refiner with *more* than the national average of old crude available thus had to buy entitlements (initially, at \$5 per barrel) from small refiners with *less* than the national average. This gave small and independent refiners a vested interest in keeping price controls on old oil, where no such interest had existed before. President Reagan lifted the remaining controls on oil in January 1981; the negative impact on small refiners is expected to be substantial.

On October 20, the Arab oil ministers placed the United States under an oil embargo. By the end of the month, the posted price of OPEC crude had nearly doubled.

By now, federal involvement in the U.S. energy markets was as tangled and complex as the White House's involvement in the Watergate cover-up, but the economy seemed to have built up a certain immunity to intervention. It took more to do less.

As his authority and prestige steadily deteriorated, Nixon delivered a major televised address in November to the nation to promote "Project Independence." With the Mideast crisis as a backdrop, he asked Congress to establish a nationwide 50-mile-per-hour speed limit for cars (55 for trucks), to permit year-round establishment of Daylight Savings Time, to relax environmental standards and ease licensing of nuclear power plants, and to act on his proposed Energy Research and Development Agency. A detailed blueprint for energy self-sufficiency would be drawn up soon, he promised. "Let us set as our national goal," Nixon concluded, "in the spirit of Apollo, with the determination of the Manhattan Project, that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own energy needs."

A Cat-and-Mouse Game

Project Independence never really got off the ground, although Congress did approve the speed limit and Daylight Savings proposals, and White House officials spent much of the next year drawing up a "Project Independence Blueprint." The winter of 1973-74 was unusually warm; shortages were less severe than anticipated. By summer, the lines of automobiles at gas stations had disappeared. Congress, it seemed, was less interested in pursuing solutions than in finding scapegoats; and the attentions of Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.) and others were fixed on the big oil and gas companies, whose long-cherished and once sacrosanct depletion allowance was promptly eliminated.

"The American people want to know," Senator Jackson demanded during a series of hearings, "whether major oil companies are sitting on shut-in wells and hoarding production in hidden tanks and at abandoned service stations." Three times, Congress came within a handful of votes of requiring oil companies to divest themselves of all but one phase—exploration, production, refining, marketing—of their business. To what extent the oil companies may have created (or exploited) shortages during the 1970s is difficult to say. Much was beyond their control. Justified or not, the backlash against the oil industry de-

flected attention once again from the business of formulating a national energy policy.

In the throes of Watergate, President Nixon was in no position to follow through on his energy proposals.

He did not leave Washington in disgrace until August 9, 1974. But Watergate's repercussions had been felt outside the Oval Office for many months, measured by executive indecision, tangled lines of agency authority, and paralysis in Congress. For the new President, Gerald R. Ford, devising a politically salable package of energy initiatives in late 1974 was further complicated by prickly short-run concerns (e.g., record postwar unemployment, persistent inflation) and the hazards of getting any energy bill past a gauntlet of special interests.


President Ford nevertheless acted bravely to get energy planning under his control. By December 1974, he had a comprehensive energy package, striking in its consistency, ready for Congress. It was put together largely by Interior Secretary Rogers Morton and Frank Zarb, administrator of the Federal Energy Agency, which Nixon had created after the embargo in an attempt to get energy planning "under one roof."

The main objectives of the Ford program were to reduce oil imports, spur energy research and production, and create a free market in energy. Among its key proposals: decontrol of oil and deregulation of natural gas (coupled with an excise tax on gas to equalize the price of oil and gas on a per-Btu basis); a rise in utility rates; weakening of the Clean Air Act; authority to order major power plants to switch from oil and gas to coal; creation of a 300-million-barrel strategic petroleum reserve as a hedge against supply interruptions; and a tariff on imported crude of (eventually) \$3 per barrel.

President Ford believed, correctly, that his energy plan was the most coherent yet devised by an American President; he believed, incorrectly, that a Democratic Congress, the press, and the public would respond with gratitude. He encountered instead the larger problem that occurs when laws must be made by legislators subject to frequent re-election: the temptation in Congress to sacrifice the electorate's real long-term interests to its perceived short-term interests.

"If this energy problem is as bad as they tell us," observed Representative James A. Burke (D.-Mass.) early in 1975, "we're going to have to take steps in every direction." Congress did just that, coming up with a grab bag of Democratic alternatives to the program submitted by the President, all of them backed by powerful coalitions on Capitol Hill.

As domestic oil and gas production sagged and imports



The Gerald R. Ford Library.

In a May 1975 TV address, President Ford ripped pages from a calendar to illustrate how long Congress had been sitting on his energy proposals.

reached pre-embargo levels, a peculiar cat-and-mouse game developed. While the undisciplined Democrats could not agree on their own plan, they had enough votes to block any Ford initiative; while Ford couldn't get his own legislation passed, he had enough votes to sustain a veto of any Democratic bill. The basic conflict was between the President's free-market philosophy and a Congress that was disposed, in Interior Secretary Rogers Morton's words, "to [regulating] our way out of something we've regulated our way into." Ford also faced the traditional Democratic reluctance to impose higher prices on consumers.

In the end, Ford had to give way, watering down his proposals until Congress finally passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act in December 1975. Ford got his strategic petroleum reserve, authority to ration petroleum in an emergency, and his coal conversion measures. As for oil decontrol, the composite price of "old" and "new" domestic crude—then around \$8.75—was actually rolled back by more than \$1; price controls and the complex allocation program would remain in effect for more

than three years. The President was given limited authority to increase the price of oil to keep up with inflation.*

Despite pressure from oil companies and conservative Republicans to veto the legislation—Senator John Tower (R.-Tex.) had called it the “OPEC Relief Act of 1975”—Ford reluctantly signed the bill into law. It was, he said, a “first step.”

Energy issues played almost no role in the 1976 Ford-Carter presidential campaign. Memories of 1973 had faded. Among the Big Three auto makers, only General Motors had begun in earnest to “downsize” its fleet. Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter’s proposal to create a Cabinet-level Department of Energy (it was established in August 1977) aroused far less interest than his attacks on Gerald Ford’s economic record. The media seemed interested mostly in the candidates’ slips of the tongue.

The Moral Equivalent of War?

But if energy was not a campaign issue, Jimmy Carter knew it would be an issue in his Presidency. He took steps even before the election to put together a comprehensive energy package. As it happened, Carter failed as Ford had failed, even though Congress was controlled by his own party.

Jimmy Carter announced at his inauguration that an energy package would be on Congress’s doorstep within three months. The Carter program quickly took shape in a second floor suite of the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House, under the leadership of James Schlesinger. Schlesinger, a Harvard-trained economist who had held the top posts at the AEC, the CIA, and the Defense Department under Richard Nixon, was interested in efficiency, not consultation with Congress or the rest of the executive branch. He worked in virtual secrecy. All of his associates favored increased federal intervention in the energy sector. They asked for no advice, except in the odd form of a questionnaire sent out to 450,000 Americans, most of them picked at random from the census rolls. (Among the 28,000 replies: “Darken Las Vegas”; “Reduce the birthrate.”)


On April 20, 1977, in a speech before a joint session of Congress, President Carter unveiled his National Energy Plan and called for the “moral equivalent of war” in the struggle to get the United States on a sound energy footing.

The basic objectives of the Carter plan were to reduce reliance on imports, turn consumers away from oil and gas, and be-

*Congress took no action on deregulation of natural gas prices, but the Federal Power Commission periodically acted on its own, in 1975-76, to raise the price of “new” natural gas sold interstate to as much as \$1.42 per thousand cubic feet.


gin using more coal, despite the environmental hazards, until the sun and other clean and renewable resources could be tapped. (Carter considered nuclear power a "last resort" and tried, with some success, to scuttle the Clinch River breeder project, even as breeder development proceeded in France, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.) He estimated that his program would reduce projected 1985 oil imports from 16 to 6 million barrels a day, lower annual growth in energy consumption to 2 percent, and cut gasoline usage by 10 percent.

Carter's major proposals included: a crude oil equalization tax that would lift the price of domestic crude up to the world market price, with receipts from the tax rebated to the public in the form of tax credits; new pricing policies for gas that would gradually bring its price into line with that of oil, on a per-Btu basis; and tax incentives to promote fuel-efficient cars, cut gaso-



Auth—Philadelphia Inquirer.

The crusade for a National Energy Plan dominated President Carter's first year in office, but Carter was unable to work effectively with Congress. Pollster George Gallup reported that one-half of all Americans surveyed were "relatively unconcerned" about energy problems.



Cross section of the Superphénix "breeder" power station, under construction in France. (Dark red represents the active core, black the steam circuit leading to the generator.) Development of a U.S. breeder was slowed by the Carter administration.

From Superphénix: A Full-Scale Breeder Reactor by Georges A. Vendryes. Copyright © 1977 by Scientific American, Inc. All rights reserved.

line consumption, encourage the use of solar energy, and stimulate the conversion of utilities from oil to gas to coal.

The whole plan was presented in terms of how much energy each measure would "save" in millions of barrels of oil. The emphasis was almost entirely on reducing energy demand and increasing energy efficiency. According to some estimates, the United States wasted half of its energy. Unlike the earlier Ford plan, there were few incentives for increasing supply. (Higher oil prices were meant to promote conservation; the crude oil equalization tax meant that oil producers could not "plow back" profits into exploration.) The President sent his program, encompassing 113 separate proposals, to Congress and told reporters it would be passed by October 1, 1977.

October 1 found the House and Senate deadlocked. The President's congressional liaison had been poor, and many Congressmen were irked by Carter's initially high-handed approach to energy planning. A more basic problem was that the Carter plan had been devised to be "fair"—i.e., to offend everybody. Unlike the Ford proposals, which at least had the solid backing of oil and gas companies, there was no constituency for the Carter plan. Congress went into recess, overcome by what Robert Samuelson, a columnist for *National Journal*, called "the moral equivalent of chaos."

When Congress reconvened in 1978, it had other fish to fry: the Panama Canal treaties, the Korean influence-peddling scandal, a financial bail-out of New York City. There were no gas lines, and oil had started to flow from Alaska's North Slope, causing an embarrassing local glut on the West Coast that seemed, in the eyes of the press, to undermine administration claims that a crisis was at hand.

In November 1978, Jimmy Carter finally got an energy bill, in tatters. Half of his proposals were gone, including the crude oil equalization tax, the centerpiece of the program. Decontrol of natural gas prices was accepted but would be phased in gradually through 1985; until then, gas would be subject to a bewildering array of regulations. Many of the tax credits survived.

Few expected the resulting energy "program" to do much of anything, and the U.S. monthly oil import bill continued to run at more than \$3 billion. But Jimmy Carter could assert that he now had an energy program, however modest. The President hoped he would not have to tackle the subject again. His State of the Union message in January 1979 was almost devoid of references to energy. It was time to turn attention to other matters: SALT; revived inflation; the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

It would not be possible. Even before the State of the Union address, the Shah of Iran had left his country for an extended "vacation" from which he would never return. An Islamic revolution was underway. Iran's oil production had been cut back sharply, even as OPEC stepped in with another series of price increases, the largest since 1973, boosting the price of a barrel of crude by midyear to between \$18 and \$23.50. (By the end of the year, the price hovered around \$30.) On March 28, an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, reawakened fears over the safety of atomic energy. By April, gas lines appeared, first in California, soon spreading east, largely the result of the lapse in Iranian crude production.

On April 5, President Carter, in a nationwide television address, reacted to the uproar. He revealed his intention to decontrol the price of domestic oil ("a painful step") in order to ration consumption. Decontrol would be subject to passage by Congress of a 50 percent "windfall profits" tax on oil company earnings, with proceeds going to an "energy security fund" that would help poor families pay for fuel, and provide more subsidies for mass transit.

By July, Congress had yet to act, and Jimmy Carter's approval rating in the polls had sunk below 30 percent, where it seemed to stick. Inflation was running at 11.3 percent. OPEC

threatened further price increases. Domestic affairs adviser Stuart Eizenstat warned the President that, more than anything else, it was the nation's energy woes that had "added so much water to our ship."

An energy speech had been scheduled for July 5, but Carter mysteriously postponed it and instead convened a "domestic summit" at Camp David, the presidential retreat in the Catoctin Mountains. After meeting there with more than 100 business and civic leaders, President Carter flew back to Washington and, on July 15, delivered yet another nationwide address.

In the first part of his speech, he lectured his audience about a "crisis of confidence," asserting that America was beset by a pervasive "malaise," the first French word Americans had learned from the White House since "détente." Later in the address, the President announced a ceiling on imports of foreign crude oil and called for crash development of synthetic fuels (using funds raised by the proposed windfall profits tax) overseen by a federally sponsored Energy Security Corporation. It was the first time Carter had addressed the problems of energy's "supply side." Congress eventually passed a stiff windfall profits tax and phased in decontrol of oil. But it sharply reduced the proportion of new oil tax receipts to be applied to a synthetic fuels program, whose costs and benefits were disputed.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 65 Americans hostage. Obscured by the hostage crisis and other issues, energy got little attention during the 1980 presidential election campaign. As Ronald Reagan was sworn into office in January 1981, both economic recession and conservation measures had curbed U.S. demand for foreign oil. But America was still importing 37 percent of its oil and 5 percent of its natural gas. A gallon of gasoline cost \$1.28, and the price of a barrel of OPEC oil had climbed to \$34.83, ten times what it cost in 1970. Construction of new nuclear plants had slowed. Seven years after the crisis of 1973–74, a Roper Poll found that more than half of all Americans surveyed believed that there had never been a real oil shortage and that the Arab embargo had been contrived by the oil companies.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

by Craufurd D. Goodwin

The United States emerged from World War II with a new appreciation of the importance of energy to the nation's survival. It had participated in the first fully mechanized war in history. In the view of the State Department's Charles B. Rayner, testifying before the Senate in 1945, the Allies won because the United States had oil in abundance; Germany and Japan fought for it in Baku and Kirkuk, in Burma and Indonesia, and they lost because they were unable to capture it, or to capture it in time. Rayner's version of history was highly simplistic, but his implicit warning was sound.

America's reserves of oil and gas were limited, as Rayner noted. Future generations would perceive the nation's heavy dependence on these fuels to have been transient, like its earlier dependence on whale oil or wax candles. New energy sources would be needed: synthetic liquid fuels; gas made from coal; atomic and solar power. This much was clear from the start of the Truman administration.

During the next 30 years, what to do about future energy supplies remained the nation's most important piece of unfinished business, variously languishing from neglect or overwhelmed by a brief rush of attention. Successive Presidents worried about fuel prices and shortages, about imports, about competition among coal, oil, and natural gas. But a truly broad, painful White House attack on the problem, it seemed, was always deferrable as wars, recessions, or political conflicts intervened.

The inventory of energy policies adopted by Washington before and after the Arab embargo in 1973-74 is long and intricate. Stripped of embellishments, however, two themes stand out: the unwillingness, despite all their rhetoric, of energy producers, consumers, and the federal government to allow a genuinely free market in energy to develop; and the inability to create a system of central planning—the obvious alternative—to take the place of the marketplace.

The hybrid and piecemeal approach to energy policy that evolved instead puzzled everyone who bothered to study it. Events may prove that it was a tragedy for the nation.

The oil industry's chaotic early history, of course, did not

constitute overwhelming evidence in favor of a laissez-faire approach. During the 1930s, Congress took steps to supplant the free market in petroleum. Oil was treated like some other commodities—wheat, for example—and its price was stabilized, as wheat's was stabilized, by taking fields out of production.

The Failure of Planning

Under the slogan "Democracy on the March," Washington also intervened during the New Deal with vast public power programs and construction subsidies to keep electricity prices low. After World War II, when natural gas became important, it too was regulated, and its price held down. During the 1950s, the White House added restrictions on imported oil. After that, federal regulation, like Topsy, just "grow'd." Only the coal industry was left unfettered. Mine owners and workers did not fail to note the correspondence between the freedom of the market for their product and the coal industry's economic decline.

Washington's tinkering with the marketplace may have been justified, temporarily, at particular times. The result, all the same, was gradual erosion of public confidence in the market as an allocator of energy resources. When the energy crisis struck during the 1970s, most of the proposals to deal with it, including the comprehensive schemes of Presidents Ford and Carter, ultimately counted on "market solutions"—i.e., allowing prices to rise to curb demand or stimulate production. But, by then, the notion of free markets in the energy field had been abandoned by almost everyone involved. The market could not be put back to work anew at the stroke of a pen.

Ironically, as postwar history demonstrated, only market forces, when unleashed, seemed to have any impact on energy shortages.* Every President since Truman "jawboned" producers and consumers or presided over some awkward, short-term

*It is interesting to note how quickly oil-well drilling responded to the gradual decontrol of domestic oil prices beginning in 1979. The "rig count" grew by 34 percent in 1980.

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"It's a myth to raise prices," asserted consumer advocate Ralph Nader in this 1974 cartoon. "Who do you believe, that lousy stick or me?" Yet only higher prices seemed to have any effect on energy demand.



*Courtesy of Charles Brooks,
the Birmingham (Ala.) News.*

administrative strategy in order to ease the nation painlessly out of a fuel crunch. Invariably, price adjustments, had they been politically palatable, would have done the job more quickly, more easily, and, in many cases, more fairly.

If, after World War II, the energy markets were no longer free, and so no longer efficient, what could be put in their place? Some kind of national planning was clearly an alternative. Yet, except during wartime or deep economic trouble, Americans have had a strong ideological aversion to planning.

Even during emergencies, Americans were less interested in serious long-range planning than in "stopgap" solutions. Crises were the bane of effective energy policy, drawing attention to a problem while diverting the means to deal with it. Never was the urgency of "synfuel" development perceived as clearly as at the outset of the Korean War; never was it less likely that Congress and the White House would embark on a multibillion dollar scheme that wouldn't pay off for at least a decade.

Crises also prompted Presidents to assign energy matters to various short-lived emergency bureaus, such as Truman's National Security Resources Board and Eisenhower's Office of Emergency Preparedness. What little official thinking on energy issues occurred was thus repeatedly interrupted as the bureaucratic structures devoted to it were dismantled or reshaped.

HOW OTHER COUNTRIES COPE

In September 1979, the Gallup Poll reported that 45 percent of Americans surveyed did not know the United States imported *any* oil. The citizens of other industrialized nations, however, have long been aware of their dependence on foreign petroleum. (West Germany, France, and Japan, for example, import almost 100 percent of their oil.) In the wake of the 1973 OPEC price increases, Western governments began to reassess their various energy strategies.

Most Europeans have tried to couple substantial conservation with conversion to new sources of energy. Banking on the success of their Superphénix breeder reactor, the French hope to satisfy 20 percent of their energy needs through nuclear power by 1985. The Germans are stepping up coal production and also pushing forward with nuclear power, despite domestic opposition. The Netherlands, by contrast, has opted to *increase* its reliance on OPEC oil in the short run, conserving its own vast Groningen gas field. Norway and Great Britain began pumping North Sea oil during the 1970s; both countries are self-sufficient in petroleum. Over all, the "energy crisis" has not yet been a calamity for the industrialized West.


The rise in crude oil prices has crippled the economies of many Third World nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To pay for OPEC oil, most of them have gone heavily into debt (outstanding Third World loans now total \$385 billion). OPEC officials claim that, through higher oil prices, they rob the rich West to give to the world's poor. But so far, OPEC's aid to its less fortunate brethren has not come close to compensating for their higher oil costs.

President Nixon had three successive energy "czars" heading up two successive energy offices in 1973 alone.

If there was to be planning, whose job would it be? The great virtue of competitive markets is that they permit prices and the allocation of resources to be determined by the interplay of impersonal forces—Adam Smith's "invisible hand." When free markets in energy were supplanted, the hand became visible. Individuals had to be designated to make decisions. The questions then became who and on what criteria.

For some federal policies, the first question was relatively easy to answer. For antitrust work, for example, there was a cadre of lawyers and economists in the mold of Thurman Arnold and Louis Brandeis, who saw themselves as guardians of competitive free enterprise. But energy policy lacked a comparable group. The Interior Department came closest during the early Truman years, but its controversial ties to the oil and gas industries, and the jealousy of bureaucratic rivals, soon stunted its

In the view of some governments, the United States (which consumes 20 percent of OPEC exports) poses as much a problem as OPEC. The "sheer weight" of U.S. demand for oil, as German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has noted, helps to keep crude prices high everywhere. European nations have far outpaced America in conservation, even as U.S. imports have leveled off.



Americans continue to pay less for gasoline than do citizens of other Western nations, where high gas taxes promote conservation and energy R&D. (Foreign data for 1949-55 and 1962-70 are not available.) In constant dollars, U.S. gasoline cost less in 1979 than it did in 1922.

leadership potential.

Besides, many of the department's own officials in the various bureaus and fuel offices were skeptical of comprehensive planning. Rather, they believed, through "consensus and accommodation," real people—not eggheads "schooled in the academic disciplines" but people who knew their own small piece of the energy business down to the last Hughes drilling bit and Louisiana salt dome—should continue to set policies for individual fuels according to their best lights.

It is obvious in retrospect that an elite corps of energy advisers, and long-term federal energy planning, could have thrived in Washington only with the support of a strong national constituency. Before energy problems were perceived by Americans as vital and permanent, this constituency did not exist in the White House or Congress, or, for that matter, in industry, or in the universities, foundations, and "public-interest" groups. (It is questionable whether it exists even now.) Broad energy propos-

als, in consequence, shared the fate of Jean-Paul Sartre, who once complained that he had many readers “but no public.”

By default, the Washington representatives of special interests evolved into the dominant intellectual forces in energy policy: the suppliers of oil, coal, natural gas, and electrical power; the advocates of atomic energy; the environmentalists; and the “consumers,” who comprised an awkward mix of regional, ideological, and business spokesmen, including refiners who were as sensitive to the price of “feedstocks” as any family to its monthly heating bill.

In time, most of these groups, inevitably, developed their own protective belt of regulations and agencies and Congressmen. Resolving policy disputes became as complex as three-dimensional chess.

Any move toward centralized planning was further handicapped by the limits of human intuition. For planning to be effective, experts had to make the right guesses about, say, what was going to happen with reactor safety, rates of petroleum recovery and natural gas discovery, and R&D expenditures on synthetic fuels. “Safe” assumptions could be made, but the future was obdurately capricious. As the authors of the Paley Commission report observed, trying to *plan* energy was like trying to plan “the fingerprints of one’s great-grandchildren.”

It is sobering to recall that, in 1970, a Nixon task force assumed in its projections that imported crude would continue to be less expensive than domestic crude, that the risk of an Arab embargo was slight, and that oil from Alaska’s new North Slope fields would reach the Lower 48 by 1973. By the end of 1973, all of these suppositions were shown to have been in error.

Repairing the Damage

Thus, it is not at all clear, even with the benefit of hindsight, exactly what the nation ought to have done at a given moment to prepare for the energy transitions that all the data indicated lay down the road. It was never possible to say precisely *what* the future would bring, exactly *when* synthetic fuels would be needed or *where* new oil would be found or *who* would throw down the gauntlet to oppose one proposal or another. Such uncertainties would have plagued any concerted effort by a President and Congress to deal with the problem. But no concerted effort was ever made.

What is striking is that those involved in the various debates over energy policy seldom had any but parochial concerns in mind. An issue such as increased imports of residual fuel oil

galvanized Northeastern Congressmen (whose constituents depended on imported heating oil), the leaders of the United Mine Workers (who feared that competition with "resid" would cost jobs in the mines), and officials in the State Department (who worried that curbing imports would antagonize Venezuela, the main supplier). There was no one to represent the long-term *national* interest, except possibly a President who was preoccupied with difficulties elsewhere.

When it came to "doing something" about energy, the cards were therefore stacked heavily in favor of the status quo. The public (and media) memory was short, the tyranny of the immediate decisive. Energy was so broad a subject that politicians, buffeted by lobbyists, inevitably broke it down into "manageable" components—imports, production, pricing, research, conservation, environmental issues—and found that, even so, the sheer pain of reaching agreement on any single item dampened desires to address the subject ever again. A costly by-product of this was an official reluctance to dismantle emergency measures, such as President Nixon's jerrybuilt allocations program, once the emergency had passed.

And energy questions were continually submerged by other disputes. Exploitation of offshore oil and gas reserves was ensnared in court battles over states' rights. Increased use of coal conflicted with environmental statutes. Energy plans also had to be weighed against other objectives: promoting economic growth; controlling inflation; maintaining national security. Historically, even totalitarian regimes have found it difficult to reconcile such major goals.

The United States was no totalitarian regime. Indeed, since the early 19th century, even foreign visitors had held up the "American model" of decentralized democracy and competitive free enterprise as uniquely efficient, politically and economically. Yet, over a period of 50 years, as the nation's energy problems grew in magnitude and complexity, the system failed to respond in timely fashion. Energy policy was continually torn between two extremes of economic theory: free markets and central planning. Repairing the damage is a challenge awaiting us in the 1980s.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

ENERGY: 1945-1980

There are many under-investigated subjects in academe. Economic history—as opposed to economic theory or policymaking—is one of them. The gap is apparent to anyone looking for comprehensive accounts of U.S. and foreign development of oil, gas, coal, and nuclear energy. Historical treatment of these topics tends to be superficial, heavily biased, or unreadable. We offer a few exceptions here.

Study in Power (Scribner's, 1953), historian Allan Nevins's sympathetic, two-volume biography of John D. Rockefeller, treats energy issues *per se* only intermittently, but the 19th-century expansion of the petroleum industry is explored thoroughly. "John D.," founder of Standard Oil (1873) and prime target of federal trustbusters, loved what he called "the big game." Nevins supplies vivid details on Rockefeller's organizing skills, his financial ups and downs, and the evolution of Big Oil.

Rockefeller was caricatured and vilified as a monopolist (which he was), but Standard Oil brought order out of the chaotic early conditions described in **The American Petroleum Industry** by Harold F. Williamson et al. (Northwestern, 1959, vol. 1; 1963, vol. 2). The authors of this dry but useful chronicle trace the erratic path of the oil business from the sinking of Drake's well in Pennsylvania in 1859 to President Eisenhower's imposition of controls on imports 100 years later. No comparable survey covers the industry since 1959.

British journalist Anthony Sampson focuses on the rise and decline of **The Seven Sisters** (Viking, 1975,

cloth; Bantam, 1976, paper), the five American, one British, and one Dutch/British multinational oil giants. Beset by dissension and by official suspicions in Washington, they confronted, then succumbed to, OPEC on higher oil prices in 1970-74. The Seven Sisters, Sampson believes, are now simply "middlemen" between OPEC and Western consumers.

Even so, during the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, as Western governments failed to coordinate their responses, the multinationals quietly re-allocated available world supplies and averted a more serious economic shock. This becomes clear in a detailed country-by-country postmortem, **The Oil Crisis** (Norton, 1976, paper only), edited by Harvard's Raymond Vernon.

David E. Lilienthal considers the past and future of nuclear power in his brightly written **Atomic Energy: A New Start** (Harper, 1980). Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority under Franklin Roosevelt and first head of the Atomic Energy Commission under Harry Truman, was an early proponent of America's nuclear power program. He concedes that the "technical method chosen for producing electricity from fission [the "light water" reactor] has proven to be far from an unmixed blessing," with its plutonium by-products and safety problems. But nothing can take the place of nuclear energy: "We need to turn our backs on the past—but not to quit."

Journalist James A. Wechsler looks at the troubled, pre-World War II coal industry and the United Mine Workers' powerful president John L.

Lewis in **Labor Baron** (Morrow, 1944; Greenwood, 1972). Denounced by 70 percent of respondents in a wartime survey as one of the nation's most "harmful individuals" and lauded by *Time* as "the greatest labor tactician in U.S. history," Lewis assumed the presidency of the UMW in 1920 and did not relinquish the post for 41 years. Four times, he shut down the mines during World War II.

Coal's future may be brighter than its past, believe the authors of **Coal—Bridge to the Future** (Ballinger, 1980), the report of the World Coal Study headed by MIT professor Carroll L. Wilson. The team of 80 specialists from 16 countries calls for "a tripling of coal use" and a massive shift from oil and gas to coal.

A medium-sized utility could probably operate for several years by using as fuel the special task force studies published since 1973 on America's overall energy future. Of varying quality, they range from Denis Hayes's utopian **Rays of Hope** (Norton, 1977, cloth & paper), which makes the case for an "efficient, solar-powered" world, to the Ford Foundation's somber **A Time to Choose** (Ballinger, 1974, cloth & paper), recommending a "conservation strategy" similar in many respects to President Carter's ill-fated 1977 National Energy Plan.

The best of these "future" volumes—and by far the most readable—is **Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School** (Random, 1979, cloth; Ballantine, rev. ed., 1981, paper), edited

by Harvard professors Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin. The authors make a persuasive case for price deregulation (now accepted) of oil and natural gas and for further tax breaks to promote conservation and solar energy.

An engaging and philosophical summary of America's energy dilemmas may be found in Jeremy Bernstein's **Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy** (Basic, 1980), a profile that originally appeared in *The New Yorker*. Bethe, the émigré physicist who became one of the principal architects of the atomic bomb, draws on a half century of thinking about energy—and on memories of his boyhood in coal-short Germany after World War I.

"First of all," says Bethe, "the country has to realize that the energy problem is terribly serious and is likely to be permanent. Next, it must recognize that there are really two problems: One is to provide enough total energy, and the other is to provide fluid fuels of all types—mainly oil and gas. But for the next 20 years, at least, I believe the mainstays will have to be coal and nuclear power—that we will need more of them. Much more. . . . We need a vigorous program to make synthetic fuels. . . . Research and development of solar energy should be encouraged, although I do not believe it will make a substantial impact in the next twenty years or so. No one of these programs by itself will solve our energy problems, but all of them together have a good chance of succeeding."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Many of the titles mentioned in this essay were suggested by former Wilson Center Fellow Chester Cooper of the Institute for Energy Analysis.*

Philosophy:

MORALITY AND THE LAW

Should legal restraints on gambling, prostitution, pornography, and other traditional vices be eased? American voters and legislators seem increasingly disposed to answer "yes." Since the early 1960s, "You can't legislate morality" has become a cliché in public discussion of such matters. Political scientist Hadley Arkes takes issue with this notion, arguing that one may justifiably legislate *nothing but* morality. Arkes reaffirms Aristotle's conception of the polity as a "moral association." Above all, he says, the law must be principled. Otherwise, we risk the "corruption of the people."

by Hadley Arkes

All about us today urban life is celebrated, but largely for the wrong reasons. When the city is valued, it is valued as a theater of diversity, the center of a cosmopolitan culture, the breeding ground of freedom and tolerance. It is a place of specialty, movement, and color, of services tailored to the rarest tastes.

But these virtues are the virtues of the marketplace, or of the city as "hotel." What is lost in this vision of the city is the sense of a people joined together in a perception of common ends; who base their common life on procedures they regard, by and large, as just; and who cultivate an understanding of justice and morals in one another through the things they hold up to the community with the force of law. What is lost, in a word, is the Aristotelian sense of the city as *polity*.


It may be rather unsettling, even to members of an older generation, to regard the city as a source of moral instruction.

This essay is drawn from *The Philosopher in the City: The Moral Dimensions of Urban Politics* by Hadley Arkes. Copyright © 1981 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

But the discomfort with that notion in our own day is a measure of how far we have drifted from the original understanding of the connection between morals and law. There is a tendency in our public discourse to equate moral judgments with matters of religious belief, or to reduce them to questions of the most subjective personal taste.

This confusion has been reflected in many of the college students I have known during the past decade. It was important to them to insist, for example, that the war in Vietnam not be regarded merely as an enterprise plagued by poor management and bad luck but as a thoroughly *immoral* venture. Yet as these students came to consider many of the problems that arose in the city—problems of drugs, abortion, the censorship of literature and the arts—they became liberals in a rather old sense that they usually disdained. Their tendency then was to argue that the state of anyone's morals was not the business of the government—that morals were essentially matters of the most personal taste or the most subjective, private belief.

The curious thing about this understanding of morals was that it reduced the indictment of the Vietnam war to the level of the utterly trivial. To say that the Vietnam War was "immoral"



Courtesy of Stephen Longstreet.

San Francisco during the Gold Rush. Gambling, Arkes writes, is a "traditional vice" but not a "categorical wrong." It cannot be distinguished from such legitimate ventures as investing in the stock market.

was to say, in effect, that it was simply not to one's taste, much as one might profess an aversion to cabbage or squid.

But moral propositions are distinguished sharply from statements of merely personal taste or private belief. They claim to speak, rather, about the things that are *universally* right or wrong, just or unjust, for others as well as oneself. When we say that it is "wrong" to "kill without justification," we do in fact imply that it is wrong, even if the assailant happens to enjoy what he is doing. In that sense, there was a recognition in the past that it was the logic of morals which made necessary the existence of law: When we recognize that any act stands in the class of a wrong, we can no longer leave it, with indifference, to the domain of personal taste or private choice. We are compelled to forbid that act generally; to forbid it, in other words, with the force of law.

This connection between morals and law has rarely been made with more clarity than by Abraham Lincoln in his celebrated debates in 1858 with Stephen Douglas. Douglas professed that he regarded slavery as wrong, but he preferred to leave it to popular majorities in the separate territories of the United States to decide whether slavery should be voted up or down. As Lincoln pointed out,

When Judge Douglas says that whoever, or whatever community, wants slaves, they have a right to have them, he is perfectly logical if there is nothing wrong in the institution; but if you admit that it is wrong, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do a wrong.

Philosophers of law may have succeeded over the years in rendering this point obscure, but most people of ordinary intellect seem to recognize that it is the awareness of a "wrong" that usually precedes the insistence that "there ought to be a law." When we consider our laws on murder, theft, and assault, it is plain even to the most committed libertarians that the laws embody perspectives that are authentically moral. But moral judgments of one kind or another—large or small, valid or arguable—underlie almost every kind of law on the books, from

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copyrights and embezzlement to the regulation of insurance. If the law has a claim to bind everyone, it is only because it claims to rest on something more than the personal tastes or opinions of those who rule.

Libertarians will concede that the law may coincide, at different points, with moral understandings, but they will insist, nevertheless, that the law ought to be limited in its reach to the relief of *material* harms or injuries. This perspective has become, of course, part of the orthodoxy of modern liberal jurisprudence, but it can be preserved only by forgetting the strict meaning of "moral principles" and the connection between morals and law. For that reason, this perspective fails to account for the most significant parts of our current laws.

Race and Social Science

A notable case in point would be the law that forbids discrimination on the basis of race in restaurants, inns, and other places of "public accommodation." When American lawyers and jurists are asked to explain the ground on which that law is justified, their disposition has been to say that the end of the law is to protect blacks against the deprivation of material goods and services: in this case, the deprivation of food or lodging.

And yet it would be hard to demonstrate that black people would be deprived of food simply because they were turned away from a particular restaurant. We would never assume that the same injury was being threatened in the case of a man who was turned away from a restaurant because he was not wearing a necktie. We recognize that he might well have access to food in establishments nearby, and the same possibilities may also be present for blacks. In fact, in the case in which this issue was argued before the Supreme Court in 1965, Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama, had a take-out counter serving blacks, even though blacks were not permitted in the main dining room. We accept the exclusion of the man who is improperly dressed, but we do not accept the exclusion of blacks; and our reasons have nothing to do with the denial of food.

We are brought back here to the recognition that the root of "injury" is in the Latin *in jus*: literally, not according to right or justice. Many hurts may be inflicted by dentists and lovers and Offices of Admission, but unless they are animated by unjust ends, we would not say that an "injury" had been done. Before we can define an injury, then, we must understand the nature of the principle that marks an act as "wrong."

But lawyers and judges have deflected themselves from the

task of articulating those principles that form the proper ground of law. They have sought instead to divine the material injury that defines the wrong of each case, even if that injury must remain rather speculative or tenuous. Instead of basing their decisions on real principles—on propositions that hold true categorically, as a matter of necessity—they take, as the foundation of their judgments, calculations or predictions about the likelihood of material harms. In this tendency, the courts have sought reinforcement in the findings of modern social science, as though these findings could supply the moral axioms or principles that are missing from their judgments.

But it is in the nature of social science that it can never be more than statistical and contingent. What social science “knows,” at best, are averages and aggregates within “confidence intervals,” bounded by circumstances that may be highly mutable. Even when correlations and probabilities run very high, there is a serious question as to whether they may ever supply a proper foundation in the law for ordering the conduct (or restricting the freedom) of any person in particular.

It could be shown, for example, on the basis of aggregate data, that single males in America are threatened with serious injuries by remaining single. They are 22 times more likely than married men to be committed to hospitals for mental disease; they have nearly double the mortality rate of married men. And yet no one would think of using these findings as the foundation of a law that would save single men from these injuries by assigning any one of them, in particular, to a bride. In instances of this kind, the law would have drifted far from those principles or categorical propositions that alone can supply its proper foundation.

What Are Vices?

Altogether, then, these requirements of law would be quite demanding. If they had been applied in a strict way over the years, many statutes that have been on our books would have been swept away, and among these would have been many of the laws that have regulated certain traditional “vices.”

It is one of the ironies of our time that the domain of morals has been reduced, in our public discourse, to cover matters such as gambling, drinking, and prostitution. But these occupations represent only a truncated part of those moral concerns that are addressed through the law, and oddly enough they do not represent, in all cases, the kinds of problems that represent categorical wrongs. It is doubtful, for example, that gambling could be

*Women in a Parisian
brothel (1894), by
Toulouse-Lautrec.
Experiments with
licensed prostitution in
19th-century Europe
were short lived.*



Reprinted by permission of
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distinguished from many other legitimate ventures in risk-taking, whether in business or politics, and there is no ground on which it could be said that the taking of alcoholic drinks would be injurious or wrong in all cases, regardless of whether it was done in excess or moderation.

When it comes to matters like prostitution and pornography, I think the traditional perspective turns out to be justified: These occupations or entertainments cannot be regarded on the same plane of legitimacy as occupations like nursing, carpentry, or tailoring. But the nature of the argument that will be required here may be easier to understand once we have become clear on the point that the law does not require evidence of *material injuries before it becomes justified in acting*.

Once that point has been established, the question of “vices” is no longer framed in the terms defined by liberal jurisprudence. As with discrimination based on race, the question turns not on proof of material injuries but on our understanding of the grounds on which prostitution and pornography can be regarded, in principle, as wrong.*

*I would refer the reader to Chapter 14 of *The Philosopher in the City*, where this question is taken up in detail.

With a proper consistency, our jurists have confronted such issues in the same way they have faced other serious moral questions in the law. Instead of defining the principled grounds of the offense, their inclination has been to define the crime through its ancillary effects or its outward manifestations. But unless the authorities are willing to face directly the grounds on which they regard prostitution as a wrong, the result tends to be a series of vacuous regulations.

The "Prime Minister of Sin"

In New York City, for example, the authorities have sought to deal with the bogus "massage parlors" that are brothels in disguise by requiring massage parlors to add swimming pools and squash courts (as though the presence of these facilities insured the legitimacy of the enterprise). Beyond that, they have required massage parlors to be 1,000 feet apart and no closer than 500 feet to churches and schools. But if the businesses in question had been law firms, no one would have thought it necessary to keep them distant from churches and schools. The measure becomes plausible only when it is assumed that there is something illegitimate about the enterprises themselves. But if one could explain the grounds of principle on which these establishments could be regarded as offensive, there would be no need for such legal charades in the first place.

As I have suggested, those grounds of principle would be very exacting. There are many projects inspired by the tenderest regard for the public good that are not founded on any categorical propositions, and that should not be invested with the force of law. A political community that takes itself seriously as a moral association need not be driven then to extend its reach until it governs almost everything. A government that understands the moral grounds on which its own authority rests may actually end up, in many cases, doing less rather than more.

As Aristotle understood it, the possibility for government and law arose from the capacity of human beings to reason over matters of right and wrong. For animals, government would have been useless, since they were cut off from the possibilities for moral teaching that were implicit in the law. But if men were higher than animals, they also stood lower than gods in the order of nature, and for that reason they required the restraint of the law. The same understanding that established the responsibility of the government to teach through the laws also counseled a certain moderation in the burdens that might be placed on creatures that were notably less than angels.


It was never assumed, in the traditional understanding, that the aim of the law was to eradicate all vice. What the law sought to do, with a proper modesty, was to contain vices within tolerable limits. This view of the matter was reflected, for example, in the statutes established in Florence in 1415:

Desiring to eliminate a worse evil by means of a lesser one, the lord priors . . . [and their colleges] have decreed that . . . the priors . . . [and their colleges] may authorize the establishment of two public brothels in the city of Florence, in addition to the one which already exists: one in the quarter of S. Spirito and the other in the quarter of S. Croce. [They are to be located] in suitable places or in places where the exercise of such scandalous activity can best be concealed, for the honor of the city and of those who live in the neighborhood in which these prostitutes must stay to hire their bodies for lucre. . . .

The understanding that lay behind statutes of this kind may be set forth rather simply. It was thought, with considerable reason, that if certain vices were made fully legal, if all legal inhibitions were removed, those vices would expand far beyond their present dimensions. At the same time, it was anticipated that activities of a correlative nature would develop, as one form of vice feeds upon another. This growth of the illegal network is the most ironic feature in the experience of "legalization." It is the feature that rarely fails to surprise nowadays, for it cuts against the assumption that legalized vices breed their own form of ennui.

And yet there is a very straightforward explanation as to why, enduringly, things seem to turn out in this way. The case of gambling provides a clear example. As I have suggested, gambling would not meet the strict requirements of a categorical wrong, but the experience with gambling nevertheless illustrates the tendencies that come into play when the legal restraints are removed from activities that were previously constrained as "vices."

In the early 1970s, the State of New York legalized a system of offtrack betting (OTB) with the hope of gathering some revenue for itself while at the same time undercutting the illegal network in gambling. Soon after the system was underway, however, it was estimated that \$6 continued to flow within the illegal network for every \$1 that moved through the legal betting parlors. By January 1974, it was estimated that illegal gambling had increased by 62 percent in dollar volume since OTB went into effect, while the state's racetracks were down sharply.



Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

The Drunkard's Progress, 1826. *Should temperance mean abstinence?*

The reasons were not hard to fathom. When the state itself declared gambling to be legitimate—indeed, when it urged the public, through advertising, to go out and bet—the state swept aside the moral reservations that still made many people reluctant to gamble. If there was nothing wrong with gambling in principle, then it was only a matter of betting where the returns were highest. They were highest, of course, with the illegal book-makers.

The logic that has been played out in the legalization of gambling has been present perennially in the efforts to legalize prostitution as well. In the gatherings of the urbane today, it is quite common to hear it said that the problem of prostitution ought to be solved by having brothels licensed by the state. As the price of legal acceptance, prostitution would be confined to its own zone within a city, and there would be a regular system of medical examination for the sake of protecting “consumers” from venereal disease. In some cases, the argument is made that prostitution ought to be “decriminalized” altogether.

One would hardly know from the current conversation that virtually all of these proposals had been tried at one time, by rather sophisticated people of an earlier generation, and that

they were all eventually abandoned.

A century ago, Sheldon Amos wrote his classic survey on the *Prohibition, Regulation, and Licensing of Vice in England and Europe* (1877), and what he recorded was a general repeal throughout Europe of the laws that licensed and legitimized prostitution. Characteristic of the movement was the action of the municipal government of Zurich, Switzerland, which abolished its system of regulation in 1874 as an arrangement that was finally "irreconcilable with the idea of the State as a moral power." The officers of the municipal government spoke out of an understanding, informed by tradition, of what was truly meant by a "city." As they put it:

Toleration [of prostitution] gives rise to a fatal confusion of ideas; men become accustomed to regard all that passes in houses thus protected as a permitted thing. . . . A moral confusion no less fatal is produced among the employees and agents employed in the "morals-police"; the fact of being in constant relations with the tenants of bad houses necessarily leads to a species of intimacy. Moreover, it is not possible that they should display much energy against unlicensed prostitution while they are occupied in favouring licensed prostitution. . . . To admit any sort of compromise with a trade fundamentally evil, to tolerate one description of houses of debauchery and make war upon others, is to enter upon the path of half-measures, compromises, and the equivocal partiality, fruitless of every good result. . . .

As Sheldon Amos observed, the state becomes corrupted when it makes itself the sponsor of vice; it would stand before its subjects as "the supreme monopolist and prime minister of sin." Or, as the saying has it in New York, the state would become "the biggest pimp of them all."

Those in our own time who rail against the "intrusion" of the law into questions of morality are adamant in other cases that the law must also render "justice." They are no more willing than anyone else to repeal laws that embody what even they would concede to be moral perspectives. They are unwilling to remove the statutes on the battering of wives and the selling of children. Many of them, as I have noted, would argue that most of these cases involve material harms; and yet without quite admitting it to themselves, they are willing enough to impose restraints through the law even when material harms are not present. They may insist on stopping men from "exposing themselves" to children. They may act in the name of "the environ-

ment" to pull down billboards or garish neon lights.

What, then, is the source of the conviction, so prevalent and clichéd in our own day, that one may not "legislate morality?" There is, of course, a rich tradition of moral relativism that may be drawn upon in a variety of forms, along with the admonition, ancient and trite, that a law that runs counter to popular habits may be difficult to enforce. But when people insist today that it is both wrong and futile to legislate morality, the example they cite most often is that of Prohibition, the movement that succeeded (for a while) in banning the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages.

Prohibition, it might be said, gave morals a bad name. It encouraged the tendency, even among the educated, to confuse *morals*—and the discipline of principled discourse—with a strident *moralism*. As I have already suggested, Prohibition represented a counterfeit morality: It condemned the drinking of liquor in any quantity, under any circumstances—it condemned drinking, in short, with the force of categorical judgment, even though it was plain that drinking could not meet the strict requirements of a categorical wrong.

Corruption of the People

Abraham Lincoln, who clearly sought moral ends in politics, preserved his own detachment from the so-called "temperance" movement of his time. The problem for Lincoln was that these crusaders did not seek temperance at all, in the classic sense of "moderation"; what they sought, rather, was abstinence. As Lincoln characterized the movement, it looked forward to the day when all appetites would be controlled, all passions subdued, all matters subjected, and "*mind*, all conquering *mind*, shall live and move the monarch of the world."

One danger with visions of this kind is that the mandates of perfection require a concentration of power that might be incompatible with the conditions of free government. The law has a responsibility to teach, but statesmen have an obligation to be prudent and reasonable. As Thomas Aquinas argued, the aim of the law is to lead people to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. "Otherwise," he wrote, "these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus, it is written (Prov. 33): *He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood.*"

But if we lean, in our teaching, toward prudence, if we leaven our laws with a sense of what can reasonably be expected, we do not imply in any way that morals are impractica-

ble, or that the dominant concern of the law can be anything other than moral instruction. We are led to remind ourselves that the case for constitutional government has the same origins in principle as the case for republican government or government by consent: They both begin with the recognition that beings which are capable of reasoning over moral things do not deserve to be ruled in the way that one rules beings that are not capable of giving and understanding reasons. And if the case for lawful government begins with the capacity of human beings for moral judgement, the rulers must be invested with an obligation to do far more than seek their own interests and preserve the security of the citizens.

It has often been observed that, for Jefferson, the greatest threat to republican government came from the usurpations that the government itself might commit if the people lost their vigilance or their capacity for revolution. That understanding had, as far as it went, a certain truth, but it took Lincoln and the experience of another generation to make it more complete. As Professor Harry Jaffa has pointed out, Lincoln understood that "once the government was established upon a popular basis, the great danger was the corruption of the people" themselves. A corrupted people, who were willing to injure some of their members to serve the interests or the passions of the majority, would soon bring forward talented and ambitious men, who were more than content to ride to power by catering to those passions.

A government that drew its leaders from the people themselves could not afford to be indifferent to the moral condition of its citizens. It was the most serious corruption of understanding to say that this government—a republican government—should have less concern than any other with the moral improvement of its citizens. That is a persuasion that would be inconsistent at its root with the premises on which a free government rests, and it would render us incapable of addressing those questions of justice which must form, enduringly, our most urgent business.



Courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.

A Buddha head from the Borobodur shrine. Along with Hinduism and animism, Buddhist beliefs color the Muslim faith of many Indonesians.

Indonesia

As many specialists see it, Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation, has become a major test of the capitalist West's approach to economic development. Others disagree. Resource-rich Indonesia is the only Asian member of OPEC. Despite 7 years of high oil revenues and 15 years of Western aid and advice, its economy lags far behind those of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Here, Benedict Anderson traces the country's past, focusing on the tumult that led to the sudden 1965 swing from theatrical "anti-imperialism" to strong ties with Washington. Donald Emmerson discusses Indonesia's "top-heavy" economic progress since 1965, assessing the importance of both oil and ideology. Finally, James Peacock examines Indonesia's culture and its peculiar brand of Islam.

LOOKING BACK

by Benedict R. O'G. Anderson

Jakarta, capital of Indonesia, is a huge, humid sprawl of shanties and skyscrapers, so unlike the nation it commands that traditionalists regard it with suspicion, yet so alluring that every year hundreds of thousands of peasants flock to it from the extremely poor, densely populated, Javanese countryside. Today, it is so overcrowded—the population is now about 6 million—that the government has created a system of internal passports to control the city's growth.

Jakarta is where Western and Japanese corporate executives often pay Indonesian generals 20 percent as "signature bonuses" on multimillion dollar contracts, and it is home to more than a million desperately poor squatters. Here Muslim

politicians come to rail against gambling, prostitution, and Christian missionaries, and here the metropolitan governor annually crowns a "Queen of Wadam" (a combination of *wanita*—woman—and Adam) as the prettiest male transvestite in the city.

At the intersection of the capital's busiest boulevards is *Medan Merdeka* (Freedom Square), crowded with hawkers and hustlers and featuring the Sukarno-built National Monument, an intentionally phallic 137-meter-tall marble shaft tipped by a golden flame and decorated with 35 kilograms of gold leaf. Not far away stands another of Sukarno's constructions, a Soviet-style statue of a man atop two concrete steles, his musclebound arms flung skyward, his feet amid broken chains. Intended to commemorate the 1962 liberation of Western New Guinea from Dutch control, it today stands as a conspicuous relic of the Sukarno era.

Three hundred miles to the east, near the old royal city of Jogjakarta, is another monument, the largest in the Southern Hemisphere. Built from 2 million cubic feet of stone and containing a mile of friezed galleries, the gigantic 9th-century Buddhist shrine called the Borobodur was, according to one version of the story, buried by volcanic lava in 1006. It had been all but forgotten by local folk when a curious European visitor found it 800 years later. It is now being restored under UNESCO auspices.

The disparity between the magnificence of the Borobodur and the garishness of modern Jakarta is one measure of the span of Indonesian history. But the story is much older than Borobodur; the earliest surviving records are the Sanskrit-enscribed stone tablets set up by Javanese rulers in about 400 A.D.

As Asia's maritime trade developed, Java and Sumatra, two narrow islands strung tip to tip along the chief route between India and China, became centers of political and economic power. The island's early commercial ties with China were important, but it was the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism from India that stimulated the flowering of the archipelago's great civilizations. On Sumatra, from the 7th through the 14th centuries, the empire of Srivijaya dominated the region's trade and culture, drawing merchants, priests, and pilgrims from all over the Buddhist world. On Java, a series of Hindu-Buddhist king-

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Coll. Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam.

The Ricefield, a 19th-century Dutch lithograph. The great majority of Indonesians are country folk and spend their lives among fields such as these.

doms culminated in the empire of Majapahit, which flourished from 1292 until about 1450. Even today, the ruined temples, shrines, and palaces of the empire dot the Javanese landscape. Old Java also gave birth to a brilliant literature, much of which has survived. From those lyric poems, epics, and legends, modern Indonesians from peasant to President evoke a glorious pre-colonial past.

Marco Polo, the archipelago's first recorded European visitor, reached Sumatra in 1292 on his sea voyage homeward from China to Venice. "This kingdom is so frequented by Muhammadan traders," he noted, "that they have converted the local people." Thus began the process of Islamization that has made modern Indonesia the world's largest Muslim nation. In time, with their busy trade, fertile land, and mature culture, the islands might have generated a great Islamic civilization of their own, but in 1511 the Portuguese explorer Affonso de Albuquerque seized Malacca, a port just east of Sumatra.

There ensued four and a half centuries of European conquest and exploitation. Lured by the high profits of the spice trade—until the 18th century the East Indies produced most of the world's cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, and pepper—Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutchmen, and Britons fought for commer-

cial dominance. The Portuguese faded quickly; by the middle of the 17th century, their holdings had been reduced to an arid enclave on the island of Timor. The Spanish retreated northward to the Philippines, leaving the British and Dutch to carve up the region, with the British eventually taking the Malayan peninsula, Singapore, and northern Borneo.

Relying on their firearms and superior ships, Dutch traders organized as the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (the V.O.C., or United Dutch East Indian Company), controlled the waters of the archipelago, and monopolized its export trade. The company sought profits, not converts, and so was interested in the natives primarily as growers of indigo and coffee. But to secure monopolies in those commodities and in Moluccan spices, V.O.C. officials needed the cooperation of local princes and sultans. Wars, bribes, and the manipulation of dynastic successions ensured that cooperation—and in 200 years reduced a proud ruling class to an obedient salariat. Large-scale, armed resistance to the Dutch was only sporadic, and after the doomed guerrilla war led by Prince Diponegoro between 1825 and 1830, it ceased altogether in Java. The 19th-century court poet Ronggawarsita later lamented the passing of Javanese power in a work composed shortly before his death, “Poem of a Time of Darkness”:

The lustre of the realm
Is now vanished to the eye.
In ruins the teaching of good ways
For there is no example left.

During the early 1800s, the Dutch crown took over the East Indies from the V.O.C. Deeply in debt from a vain attempt to suppress the Belgian independence movement, it turned Java into a giant royal plantation under the “Cultivation System.” This system forced peasants to set aside one-fifth or more of their land for the cultivation of export crops—indigo, coffee, and sugar—and deliver them to the state at very low controlled prices. From the Dutch point of view, it worked. Between 1831 and 1877, the East Indies paid 823 million guilders into the Dutch treasury, annually subsidizing nearly one-third of the state budget.

The Cultivation System began to end during the 1870s. Dutch businessmen joined humanitarians inspired by *Max Havelaar*, a vitriolic exposé of Dutch greed in the East Indies written by a former colonial official, to break the state monop-

oly in the Indies in favor of a free-market "Liberal System." Determined to keep up with the British, and aided by the easier access to Europe that resulted from the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), the colonial regime extended its sway across Borneo, Sulawesi (Celebes), the Sumatran interior, and the smaller islands, thus creating Indonesia's modern 3,000-island domain. This enormous territorial expansion coincided with the invention and proliferation of the automobile. In 1930, rubber shipments alone were worth \$69 million, far more than the total value of *all* exports in 1870. The new oil industry, dominated by Royal Dutch Shell, was even more profitable, as the Dutch East Indies climbed to fourth place in world oil production.

Using the Whip and the Club

By the 1920s, the Dutch Indies had become the most prosperous colony in Southeast Asia, so rich that it attracted a large population of Dutch settlers, as well as American, British, and Belgian planters. Yet, paradoxically, in 1939, on the eve of World War II, the colony was politically underdeveloped. Other Asian colonies were moving toward self-determination—Washington had promised the Philippines independence by 1946, and British Burma had lived under a Burmese Prime Minister for four years. But the Dutch had no intention of handing over power; they had granted the native population of the Indies only a bare majority in the 60-man *Volksraad*, the virtually powerless colonial legislature.

Europeans dominated the economy, and left the fringes—retail trade and local moneylending—to the Chinese, most of them descendants of refugees from the dying Ch'ing Empire. The Indonesians were all but absent from commerce. In 1940, near the end of Dutch rule, the colony's population was made up of 250,000 Europeans, 2 million Chinese, and 70 million Indonesians. Yet while more than 20,000 Europeans enjoyed incomes of over \$2,000 in 1939,* only 1,244 Indonesians had risen to that level. (The Chinese were in the middle, with just over 3,000 people in the top tax bracket.) Moreover, as in the Belgian Congo, education of the natives was deliberately neglected: In 1940, only 37 Indonesians were graduated from college. That year, Indonesians held only 221 of the 3,039 civil service jobs classified as "higher rank."

During the first decades of the 20th century, a small group of Indonesian intellectuals became the core of an emerging anti-

* In that year, 3 percent of the U.S. population earned incomes of \$2,000 or more.

colonial movement. Foremost among the new organizations was the Muslim *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic League), which by 1919, only seven years after its founding, boasted a membership of almost 2½ million. In 1920, Dutch Marxists and Indonesian labor leaders founded Asia's first Communist party, the PKI. They joined with the Sarekat Islam, pulling its leadership leftward and exploiting its grass-roots organization to spread the Marxist message.

Disaster soon followed. In November 1926, facing a government crackdown, the PKI launched a badly organized insurrection. The Dutch rapidly crushed it. They executed 16 leaders, arrested 13,000 suspects, and shipped 823 rebels to the Tanah Merah concentration camp in the malarial swamps of south-western New Guinea.


After the PKI's debacle, a charismatic young Javanese engi-



neer, Sukarno, founded the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI). He was, of course, to dominate Indonesian politics for the next four decades. Appealing to intellectual and peasant, to Muslim and Christian, Sukarno told Indonesians that political salvation would not be delivered by "an airplane from Moscow or a caliph from Istanbul." The colonial government swiftly recognized the young man's potential and kept him in detention for all but two years between 1929 and the advent of World War II.

During the 1930s, the hardliners then in control of the colonial government believed they had suppressed the nationalists. "We have ruled here for 300 years with the whip and the club," Governor-General B. C. De Jonge is reported to have said, "and we shall still be doing it in another 300 years."

Then came Pearl Harbor and Japan's swift advance to the south. The oil-rich Indies fell to the Japanese on March 9, 1942,



only eight days after the first Japanese soldier set foot on Java. The 8,000-man Dutch garrison went into the prison camps. Welcomed as fellow Asians, the Japanese soon began turning potential allies into enemies. Determined to employ the entire Indonesian population in the war effort, Japanese military commanders exploited the country with a ruthlessness that made Dutch rule seem mild by contrast. On Java, massive requisitions of rice caused sporadic famine. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were taken away for forced labor on construction projects as far away as Burma.

Yet the harsh years of occupation were also a time of political gestation. As the Allies closed in, the Japanese began to seek native support. In 1944, they promised Indonesian independence "in the future." On Java, they gave Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and other leading nationalists access to the radio and set up PETA (an acronym for "Fatherland Defense Force"), which soon grew into a volunteer army of 66 battalions, the core of future nationalist military strength. Thus, during the closing years of World War II, Sukarno was delivering anti-Allied speeches on Radio Jakarta—a favorite jingle of the time was *Amerika Kita Seterika, Inggris Kita Linggis* ("We'll Flatten America with an Iron, We'll Take a Crowbar to the English"). Meanwhile, the man destined to be his successor in 1967 as President of Indonesia, Suharto, was serving as a 20-year-old PETA company commander.

Mountbatten's Unpleasant Surprise

Independence came amid confusion. Just after Tokyo surrendered to the Allies, a band of youthful militants kidnaped an indecisive Sukarno. The Japanese secured his release, and on August 17, 1945, he read aloud to a small Jakarta crowd an uncharacteristically unadorned statement: "We, the people of Indonesia, hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time."

The Dutch contested independence at every step of the way. But after five years of German occupation, The Hague initially was in no position to reimpose its old colonial rule—and for the first time, large numbers of Indonesian nationalists had modern weapons and training. Six long weeks passed before British troops landed on the islands to disarm the Japanese and re-establish Dutch authority. During those six weeks, Indonesian nationalists, led by Sukarno, established a cabinet, a constitution, and the beginnings of an army. Lord Louis Mountbatten,

the Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia, was unpleasantly surprised by the fierce resistance that greeted his troops. Desperate for manpower, he pressed into service released Dutch prisoners-of-war and Japanese troops awaiting repatriation. But increasingly heavy losses, as in Surabaya, where Indonesian forces fought a 10-day battle against a British infantry backed by planes and warships, soon made Mountbatten unwilling to press Dutch claims.

Embarrassing the CIA

For many Dutch businessmen, soldiers, and politicians, however, a Holland stripped of the East Indies was inconceivable. By August 1947, the Dutch had put 150,000 troops into the archipelago. They gained control of the major cities and rice-growing regions, intending to starve out their adversaries.

But other factors intervened. Anticommunists won the struggle for power among the Indonesian nationalists in September 1948, and so American support for a free Indonesia became stronger. When the Dutch lost patience and launched a major offensive in December 1948, a group of powerful Republicans in the U.S. Senate threatened to cut off Marshall Plan aid to Holland. Worldwide pressure grew. Denounced by everyone from Jawaharlal Nehru to a *Chicago Tribune* editorial writer (who urged that Holland's Queen Juliana be hanged), and facing condemnation by the UN General Assembly, the Dutch made their way to the negotiating table, and at the end of 1949, conceded Indonesia's independence.

The newborn regime of the Republic of Indonesia, led by Sukarno, inherited a country drained by 20 years of war and economic depression. Even so, the years 1950–57 were a time of liberty and democracy. Under the Constitution of 1950, which established a multiparty parliamentary system, a series of coalition governments struggled with the problems of educational backwardness, population pressure, and ethnic conflict. They also faced continuing Dutch domination of shipping, banking, manufacturing, export agriculture, and the oil industry.

Worse yet, the Army, commanded by Major General A. H. Nasution, had grown accustomed to political influence during the armed anticolonial struggle. Its commanders regretted yielding up their power to civilians. Nasution found similar thinking at the top: President Sukarno, never comfortable with the compromises that are the essence of parliamentary politics, felt an urge to throw off the constitutional limits on his own power. "The democracy I would like to have for Indonesia," he

BUNG KARNO

In April 1955, Indonesia's President Sukarno addressed China's Zhou Enlai, India's Nehru, Egypt's Nasser, and the representatives of 26 other Asian and African regimes attending the meeting known as the "Bandung Conference," after the West Java town in which it was held. It was Sukarno's supreme moment, his bid to be ranked with Tito and Nehru as a leader of the Third World. "Sisters and Brothers," he said, "Indonesia is Asia-Africa in small . . . a country with many religions and many faiths."

Sukarno, the son of a Javanese schoolteacher, was born in 1901 in Surabaya, East Java. Tjokroaminoto, chairman of the anticolonial *Sarekat Islam*, made young Sukarno his protégé and sent him to the Technical College at Bandung. There, in 1927, Sukarno achieved sudden prominence with a series of fiery nationalist speeches that prompted the Dutch to jail him. When Indonesia declared independence in 1945, Sukarno became its President.

"Bung Karno" (*bung* means "brother" or "comrade") proved to be a charismatic head of state, an incompetent administrator, a flamboyant globe-trotting *bon vivant* with a sense of humor. He managed to marry a total of seven women—and dallied with countless others. Indeed, Sukarno's breezy autobiography opens with the statement that "the simplest way to describe Sukarno is to say that he is a great lover."

In the years after Bandung, Sukarno, seeking to imitate Mao, imposed "Guided Democracy," threw offending newsmen into jail, and tilted toward the local Communists. But according to anthropologist Clifford Geertz, this system was less Maoist than it was a revival of the old imperial Javanese "theatre state," in which "power served pomp, not pomp power." Thus, Sukarno gave himself a series of inflated titles ("The Extension of the People's Tongue," for example), mounted a largely rhetorical "*konfrontasi*" campaign against Malaysia, and filled Jakarta with grandiose monuments. Money for all this came from the Soviet Union. Moscow gave Indonesia an estimated \$1 billion in aid between 1960 and 1965. Much of that aid went to the military—but much of the military was turning against Sukarno. In 1965, General Suharto shut down Sukarno's theatre state for good.

Isolated and ailing, the "Great Leader of the Revolution" died on June 21, 1970. On Suharto's orders, he was buried not near Jakarta, as he had requested, but hundreds of miles away, next to his mother's grave in the eastern Javanese town of Blitar.

announced in 1956, "is a guided democracy . . . especially if we want to construct it in the way I saw in the Chinese People's Republic."

In Washington, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, were alarmed by Sukarno's rhetoric. The Communist PKI had made considerable gains in the 1957 local Javanese elections. And that year Sukarno had nationalized all Dutch properties in Indonesia. In his memoirs, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith recalls the reaction of the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans: "It's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire." The CIA, which had spent a million dollars supporting conservative Indonesian parties in the 1955 national election, soon got its chance to step up its anti-Sukarno efforts. On Sulawesi and Sumatra, in February 1958, non-Javanese Army commanders, with the backing of a few prominent Muslim politicians, announced the formation of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

Sukarno responded swiftly. Loyal Java-based Army battalions landed on Sumatra and Sulawesi and quickly crushed the rebellion. In *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, a biography of former CIA chief Richard Helms, journalist Thomas Powers assesses the entire effort as an "abrupt, embarrassing failure," especially because direct American involvement became known: Flying a B-26 for the rebel air force, CIA pilot Allen Lawrence Pope was shot down after bombing and strafing the town of Ambon in eastern Indonesia.

A Split Society

What advantages a CIA victory would have given Washington remains a matter of conjecture. Some observers believe the Dulles brothers hoped to install a new regime; Powers claims that they hoped a chastened Sukarno would "suppress the PKI, send the Russians packing, and get on the American team." Instead, Sukarno scrapped the 1950 constitution in favor of his "Guided Democracy," which was little more than a euphemism for dictatorship.

Above all, the rebellion led to further polarization and tension. With 350,000 men, the Army and its commanders grew steadily more hungry for power. Martial law, already declared in 1957, gave Army leaders vast political influence, strengthened by their new control of formerly Dutch enterprises. In fear of his generals, Sukarno turned for support to the PKI, which had grown to be the world's third largest Communist party,

after those of China and Russia.

The split in Indonesian society was exacerbated by an economic tailspin. Military corruption and mismanagement and Sukarno's increasingly erratic leadership (characterized by the costly but futile 1963-66 "Crush Malaysia" campaign) brought on an annual inflation rate that hit 600 percent in 1965.

Death to the GESTAPU

Toward the end, Sukarno seemed almost desperate: In February 1964, he admitted that famine had struck parts of Java, but five weeks later shouted in public at U.S. Ambassador Howard Jones "To hell with your aid!" He went on to withdraw Indonesia from the United Nations and the World Bank, and then declared his nation part of an "anti-imperialist axis" including China, North Vietnam, and Sihanouk's Cambodia.

What happened in late 1965 and why remains obscure. Early on the morning of October 1, a small band led by Lt.-Col. Untung of the Presidential Guard shot to death six senior Army generals, seized the Jakarta radio station, and announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council. Untung declared that he was protecting Sukarno from a CIA-sponsored *coup d'etat*—a claim that Indonesians in 1965 did not dismiss out of hand. Within hours, General Suharto, leading some of the best troops in Indonesia, the Strategic Reserve's "Red Berets," launched a counterattack. Like Untung, Suharto claimed to be defending Sukarno. His strategy was to seize the capital and keep the President away from his supporters. Unlike Untung, who was soon executed, Suharto was successful.

Whatever the truth of the matter, the Army high command took the opportunity to blame the PKI for the Untung coup. Suharto and his associates whipped the nation into a panic by spreading stories about Communist youth groups torturing their victims; the Army intelligence corps sharpened the fear by coining the acronym GESTAPU for Lt.-Col. Untung's self-styled "September 30th Movement" (*Gerakan September Tiga Puluh*). For half a year, following Suharto's order to wipe out the PKI, the Army (and the bands of Muslim youths they supplied with trucks and weapons) hunted down and shot, strangled, or hacked to death an estimated 500,000 suspected Indonesian leftists. Loyalty to the new regime was demonstrated by joining in the pogrom; those who objected to the killings were accused of being Communist sympathizers.

Suharto and his fellow generals pressed on against Sukarno, stripping him of his powers but allowing him to retain

his title. Then, in March 1966, Sukarno tried to exercise his presidential prerogative to form a new Cabinet. Army paratroopers surrounded his palace and forced him to flee the capital. Thereafter, his orders were ignored.

In March 1967, just 46 months after Sukarno had assumed the title of "President for Life," Suharto appointed himself Acting President, and put Sukarno under strict house arrest. Finally, one year later, Suharto took on the full title of President. The new military regime now looked to Japan and the West for political support and for economic aid. Indonesia, dazed and shaken, was firmly in the Army's grip.

NO MIRACLE, NO MIRAGE

by Donald K. Emmerson

Is Indonesia winning its war on poverty?

A Chemical Bank report is optimistic: A bumper rice crop, buoyant oil prices, a construction boom, natural gas sales, and increased manufacturing combined to lift GNP by 9.5 percent in 1980—the country's highest growth rate in seven years. The bank predicts another strong performance in 1981.

A World Bank report is somber: "Life expectancy at birth—48 years—remains very low by international standards. About 600,000 infants less than one year old die annually. Almost 30 million people aged 15 and over remain illiterate. Daily wages in many parts of Indonesia are less than \$1."

Indonesia Handbook, an Australian travel guide, is unflattering: "Oil-king generals earn \$100 a month, then blow \$50,000 on a daughter's wedding. You can buy the captaincy of a ship (\$1,200) or [pay] to send off a letter extra-fast at the post office (25¢). You must even pay the teacher in order that your child graduate from the 4th to the 5th grade."

Diverse views reflect diverse realities. Indonesia must be

credited with impressive gains in overall economic growth since 1965. Yet poverty remains widespread, and corruption seems to have grown along with the economy. This contradiction is rooted in the history of Indonesia's "New Order."

In 1966 and 1967, Indonesia's new military rulers rejected Sukarno's romantic nationalism in favor of development through trade with and aid from the major capitalist nations. Sukarno's successor, General Suharto, made "development" the goal of his New Order of "political and economic stability." The Army undertook to ensure political order, while a newly influential group of Indonesian technocrats was charged with reversing Indonesia's economic decline.

Led by Berkeley-educated Widodojo Nitisastro, who told the *New York Times* that he wanted to make Indonesia a "test case" of the free enterprise system, the 7 Western-trained economists and 5 generals in Suharto's 18-man "Development Cabinet" set out to balance the budget, stabilize the currency, reschedule Indonesia's foreign debts, and attract foreign investment. As one of those technocrats later recalled, "In 1967, everything and everyone was welcome. The first major company [Freeport Sulphur] virtually wrote its own ticket."

Suharto's anti-communist triumph in Southeast Asia's most populous nation and his inclination to follow the Western path pleased Washington, then waging an inconclusive anti-communist war in nearby Indochina. In 1966 and 1967, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. In response, a consortium of industrial democracies called the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia* granted Indonesia \$200 million in emergency aid.

During 1968, on his first overseas trip as president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara visited Indonesia and announced that his organization would set up a permanent mission in Jakarta, a move unprecedented in the bank's operations. Enjoying special powers (such as direct access to McNamara) that, according to one bank officer, "exceeded those of

*Current members: Indonesia, the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, West Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Denmark and Norway are observers.

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KRAKATAU AND CORRUPTION

Named after the Krakatau volcano, whose sky-darkening 1883 eruption was one of the most powerful on record, the Krakatau steel mill and its checkered history illustrate many of the pitfalls of economic uplift in Indonesia—and the rest of the Third World.

In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union, then courting Sukarno, agreed to build a prestigious steel mill for Indonesia, just as it had done for Algeria, India, and China. Construction got underway in 1963 but was halted three years later, after Sukarno was ousted and the Russian technicians were invited to leave the country. The half-completed structure rusted until 1970, when the Indonesian government formed the Krakatau Steel Co. and married it to Pertamina, the prospering state-owned oil company. Pertamina soon signed contracts with a number of West German firms: Ferrostaal agreed to build the smelter; Siemens the power station; and Kloeckner the other sections.

But in January 1975, it came to light that Pertamina had borrowed over \$10 billion from Western banks—a debt eight times the total of Indonesia's foreign reserves. Investigators later found that the director of Krakatau had built himself a \$1 million home and that the contracts with the German firms were unusually expensive: The fee to Siemens, for example, was said to be triple the normal cost per kilowatt of capacity.

The scandal lives on today in the courts of Singapore, where Pertamina's attorneys are sparring with the widow of Haji Achmad Thahir, once a senior Pertamina official, over \$35 million of the dead man's fortune, acquired on an annual salary of \$9,000. Mrs. Thahir does not deny that much of the \$35 million (which now sits in a Singapore bank) came from enormous kickbacks on Krakatau contracts. But she testifies that her husband did nothing unusual. Even President Suharto, she claims, has received commissions on arms deals with West Germany and Israel.

The story of the still-unfinished Krakatau steel mill indicates the scale of corruption in Indonesia, supposedly one of the most graft-ridden countries in the world. According to a recurring but unverifiable estimate, 30 percent of the national income goes to "leakage." Bribery and abuse of office go back to the early days of Dutch colonialism, when unsalaried Dutch East India Company officials paid the company an "office charge" for the privilege of squeezing the locals.

Today, say some of Suharto's critics, political corruption has enabled generals, top bureaucrats, and their associates to monopolize entire sectors of the economy. Suharto's wife, for example, is rumored to control the importation of cloves, which are rolled into the tobacco of Indonesian cigarettes. "You either get somebody in power associated with your company," one foreign businessman told the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, "or they wipe you out."

any other of the Bank's resident missions before or since," and sharing officers with BAPPENAS, Suharto's development planning agency, the World Bank mission could directly influence Indonesia's development policies. The bank's first loan to Indonesia: \$5 million in 1968 to dredge and rebuild silted irrigation canals.

Confounding the "Berkeley Mafia"

While the World Bank was dispensing loans, Pertamina, the state-owned oil company, was issuing exploration contracts to Western oil companies. In 1970, one of those firms discovered Indonesia's first offshore oil field. In May 1971, more oil was located in Sumatra; in September, the Java Sea offshore field began producing; in October, the Union Oil Company struck even more oil off the east coast of Kalimantan.

One year later, the IMF reported that Indonesia, thanks to oil exports, had run up a trade surplus of \$500 million.

In aggregate economic terms, Suharto had scored an impressive success. Between 1965 and 1968, the government's budget deficit had been cut from the equivalent of 64 percent of expenditures to zero, and the inflation rate brought down from 600 percent to 10 percent. The nation's politics had been stabilized and its ability to export natural resources revived.* For achieving political stability and economic growth so soon after replacing a regime that had accomplished neither, the New Order was credited with what Rand Corporation analyst Guy Pauker, writing in 1973, called an "economic and political miracle."


But economic growth was narrowly based on the export of raw materials—mostly oil and timber. And the results of the First Five Year Plan, which came to an end in 1973–74, were respectable but not miraculous. The increase in rice production was less than half the planned 47 percent, although most other targets were attained. With this success under their belts, the technocrats—by this point dubbed the "Berkeley Mafia" because of their American degrees—produced the Second Five Year Plan.

Certain actions taken by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries soon made the new plan irrelevant. In July 1973, Indonesia sold a barrel of its crude oil for \$4.72. By November of that year, the price was \$6, and eight months later,


*Political stabilization came at a price. In 1965 and 1966, hundreds of thousands of suspected leftists were killed or imprisoned without trial; many were held until 1979. Even today, criticizing Suharto means risking arrest. Democratic rights, he once said, are like spices: "Used excessively, they spoil everything."

INDONESIA COMPARED: GNP PER PERSON, 1950-77

Per capita GNP (in 1976 dollars)



HOW INDONESIA SPENT THEIR MONEY, 1976



Note: In 1976, U.S. \$1 = 415 rupiah.

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1980 (top) and 1976 (bottom).

THE OBSCURE TRAGEDY OF TIMOR

In April 1974, a group of young Army officers toppled the right-wing government that had ruled Portugal since 1926. The new regime in Lisbon soon told the people of Portugal's colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor (as something of an afterthought) to prepare for independence.

Lost in the backwaters of the Indonesian archipelago, Portuguese Timor was populated by subsistence farmers, 90 percent of them illiterate. Poor in natural resources, it had remained a colony of Lisbon from the 16th century until the 1970s for one reason: No one else wanted the place. And when Portugal no longer wanted it, the trouble began.

In August 1975, a group of Timorese seeking continued links to Portugal attempted a coup. They seized the small airport, the radio station, and police headquarters in Dili, the capital. But many of the Timorese in the local Portuguese Army garrison went over to *Fretilin*, a leftist pro-independence party then led by Francisco Xavier do Amaral, a former customs official. *Fretilin* soon launched a counterattack, and by mid-September it controlled most of the colony. Alarmed by the prospect of "a Cuba on the doorstep," the Indonesian government sent arms to *Fretilin*'s foes, now organized as the *Movimento Anti-Communist*a—a coalition group that, unsurprisingly, favored incorporation of Timor into Indonesia. On November 28, 1975, *Fretilin* declared Timor independent.

Indonesia's rulers responded with a naval bombardment of Dili, followed by a 10,000-man invasion. Indonesian troops shot suspected *Fretilin* sympathizers and herded the rest of the population into resettlement camps. There, thousands suffered from tuberculosis, malaria, and malnutrition. In mid-1976, Indonesia officially annexed Portuguese Timor but kept out all foreigners.

By September 1979, when foreign relief agencies were finally allowed to enter Timor, between one-tenth and one-half of its estimated 1975 population of 650,000 had died. The situation of the 240,000 people still in the camps was "as bad as Biafra," according to an International Red Cross official.

Fretilin, now consisting of a few hundred insurgents, showed unexpected tenacity; its guerrillas harassed Indonesian installations as late as mid-1980. And for five years, the United Nations has annually voted to condemn Indonesian actions in Timor. Yet it is unlikely that the Suharto regime will be pressured into pulling out. In 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the American Ambassador in Jakarta to downplay the Timor issue. The United States, he said, had "enough problems of greater importance" elsewhere. That comment was, and is, true of almost every government in the world—and it may serve as a kind of epitaph for East Timor.

\$12.60. (As of early 1981, the price ranged from \$33 to \$38.) In 1966, when Suharto's economists began to draw up their frugal plans for stabilization, oil accounted for 5 percent of Indonesian government revenues. During 1974, when the Second Five Year Plan was introduced, the percentage shot up to 55 percent. Yet Indonesia's petroleum proved to be a mixed blessing. Although the rising value of oil enlarged Indonesia's foreign exchange holdings, it also pushed up the prices of imports, including petroleum-based fertilizer. The government was hard put to spend its earnings on development without enlarging the domestic money supply and so spurring inflation.

Soldiers Sell Volkswagens

The oil bonanza also encouraged some Indonesians to question the technocrats' careful planning. One such doubter was the man in charge of Indonesia's oil, General Ibnu Sutowo, the director of Pertamina and, not coincidentally, owner of the only Rolls Royce in the Indonesian archipelago. Sutowo thought the technocrats' idea of incremental development was far too cautious. He operated beyond their reach, signing contracts with foreign firms and taking out unreported loans from foreign banks. As the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance later charged, Suharto's regime tended to agree "in principle" to focus on rural development and the creation of jobs; but then its leaders would quietly commit themselves to "costly, capital-intensive projects"—schemes such as the Krakatau steel plant in Cilegon, Java, now scheduled for completion in 1983.

General Sutowo, who liked to think big and spend bigger, was a prime mover behind such projects. Using his company's funds—he once told *Time* magazine that "Pertamina and Sutowo are very difficult to separate from each other"—he invested in motels, monuments, mosques, hospitals, Southeast Asia's largest helicopter fleet, and giant oil tankers at top-of-the-market prices.

Late in 1974, when Pertamina ranked 118 on the *Fortune* list of top corporations outside the United States, a worldwide recession and a fast climb in foreign banks' interest rates caught Sutowo by surprise. As newspapermen Seth Lipsky and Raphael Pura later explained in *Foreign Affairs*, "Pertamina was a bubble. Much of its debt was to fund projects that would take far longer to build than the loans would run." (There is reason to believe that the Japanese, European, and American bankers who made those loans were betting that Tokyo and Washington

Market (1954) by
Balinese artist
I.B.M. Nadera.
Much of Indonesia's
commerce still
centers around such
open-air markets,
featuring everything
from patent
medicines to single
cigarettes.



Photo by Frank Bodmer.

would not allow a nation as strategically located and resource-rich as Indonesia to go bankrupt.) It was a \$10.5 billion bubble—four times the foreign debt run up by Sukarno—and its creation infuriated the technocrats. They were happy to see Pertamina stripped of its nonoil holdings and then to see Sutowo separated from Pertamina.

But Sutowo was replaced by another general, not an economist. Even today, citing their theory of *dwi fungsi* ("dual function"), which holds that the armed forces have a duty to develop as well as defend the nation, the military combines public duties with private profit. Thus, General Sofjar was already chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce when he became head of the Army Strategic Command, which reportedly holds partial ownership of the Volkswagen distributorship in Indonesia, as well as interests in a bank, logging, and Mandala Airlines. This last enterprise puts the Strategic Command in competition with the Air Force, whose C-130 cargo planes sometimes carry civilian passengers for a fee. The Navy, for its part, is said to be involved in commercial shipping, and the police supposedly en-

gage in logging. (Timber is second only to petroleum as an export commodity.) Some of the profits from these ventures go to running the military. To foot the bill for its 1975 invasion of Timor, the Army took over a number of East Timorese coffee plantations, from which it reportedly raised about \$20 million. More generally, the Indonesian government's 1981 defense budget of \$2.1 billion is widely reckoned to cover only 30 to 50 percent of the real needs of the 240,000-man armed forces. Profits from the military's corporations make up the shortfall.

Neither China nor Nigeria

Partly because of the economic power of Indonesia's military elite, partly because of high-level corruption, and partly because of the technocrat's own development strategy, the distribution of wealth is becoming increasingly imbalanced. The cities are getting more of it than the rural areas. Within the cities, the disparity between rich and poor has increased. In the countryside, where the great majority of the Indonesian population lives, the real income of the poorest people may even have declined over the last 10 years. Indonesia is not subject to the desperate poverty found in Haiti, India, and sub-Saharan Africa, but on a typical day in Java in 1976, 17.2 million people could earn about enough to buy only a pound of rice—with nothing left over for shelter, clothing, or additional food.*

The more Indonesia's population grows, of course, the scarcer farm land becomes, especially in Java. One-third to one-half of peasants on that island are without land. (Most of those who do possess land don't have much. The problem of rural reform on Java is not to break up large holdings but to provide the landless with nonagricultural employment.) Underemployment is chronic, and "shared poverty" the rule: In one fishing village in East Java, for example, one worker wakes the fishermen, while others only guard or clean the boat, thus gaining shares in the catch without even going to sea. In 1974, the Federation of Indonesian Labor claimed that out of the 44 million-strong labor force, only 12 million workers were fully employed. These are the realities concealed in the statistics showing a growth in

*The production of rice has increased faster than the population it must feed, but economic growth has increased demand even faster. A poor family that earns a little extra income is likely to spend it making home improvements or eating less cassava and more rice. The government is unwilling to risk riots by allowing scarcity to reduce demand. So, in the 1970s, despite real achievements in output using the high-yielding varieties collectively known as "miracle rice," Indonesia became the world's largest importer of rice, buying some 2 million metric tons per year. The rice revolution also played favorites: Only the wealthier farmers could afford pesticides to keep insects from stripping the crop.

INDONESIA'S POPULATION: IMBALANCE AND OVERCROWDING




Indonesia's total population in 1976 was 130 million.
 All figures are approximate. Information on East Timor not available.
 Numbers in parentheses indicate the populations of principal islands only.

per capita income from \$160 in 1966 to \$360 in 1978.*

Maldistribution of jobs and income did not "just happen." It was the direct result of the New Order's philosophy. During the late 1960s, Suharto's technocrats conceived of development as the fruit of "top-down growth." They gambled on the strong (who by the end of the Sukarno era were relatively weak), and the bet paid off. Stabilization and rehabilitation spurred production, and the economy was revived. But as the economy stabilized, the strong grew stronger—as did their interest in stabilizing inequality. Accustomed to promoting growth in general, the technocrats were ill-equipped to redirect its benefits downward to landless laborers in the villages.

* Even this 1978 figure may be over-optimistic, for it appears to be based on an underestimation of Indonesia's population.



Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, from 1976 population survey.

Even so, one might ask, does not Indonesia's successful effort to generate growth affirm the superiority of the market mechanism?

No. Suharto's New Order is no more a showcase of free-enterprise capitalism than Sukarno's Guided Democracy was a test of socialism. Indonesia remains Indonesia. For all the technocrats' willingness to deregulate, the state now penetrates the economy more than ever before. At the top, interlocking directorates, formal and informal, link generals and bureaucrats to ethnic Chinese financiers and foreign investors in big businesses such as oil, shipping, and construction. At the bottom, many a district chief tries to siphon off what he can. The New Order's success in bringing about overall economic growth results less from its strategy than from oil revenues, and its failure to distribute more equally the ensuing wealth is explained as much



Published in 1980 by dissident Indonesian students, this cartoon shows Suharto using "HPH" (the official forestry licensing system) to carve up Indonesia for ethnic Chinese and foreign businessmen.

by the authoritarian political system as by its decidedly mixed economic model.

Yet Japan and the West remain strongly committed to Suharto's regime. As of 1980, Indonesia was the World Bank's third largest borrower (with \$2.6 billion), behind only Brazil and Mexico. And in fiscal year 1980, only Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan received more American aid than Indonesia, which got \$231 million. Nor was Washington being sentimental: By 1980, Indonesia accounted for 6 percent of all U.S. crude oil imports.

Energy-short Japan has an even greater stake in the New Order. In 1980, when Indonesia was the world's ninth-largest oil exporter, and when oil and gas made up over half of its exports, Japan bought over half the petroleum Indonesia sent abroad. (Indeed, in 1979, more than half of *all* Indonesian foreign trade

was with Japan.)

Indonesians are ambivalent about this dependence on Tokyo and Washington. In a nationwide poll conducted last year by the Jakarta newsweekly *Tempo*, nearly three-fourths of the people asked said they were better off financially in 1980 than they had been when Suharto came to power. But many seemed to think they were better off despite, not because of, the government's pursuit of foreign investment. Forty-six percent of those asked believed foreign businessmen had helped the economy; 35 percent felt they had not.

But a popular uprising is hardly imminent. Indonesia today is not China in 1949. Nor is it Nigeria in 1979, because the New Order seems unlikely to civilianize and democratize itself. So Indonesia will remain a military autocracy: Suharto may be toppled by a coup, but if so, his replacement will probably come from the Army.

The population's acquiescence is not solely a matter of fear. "Trickle-down growth" has reached and co-opted many of the New Order's potential opponents in the middle class. In towns and villages, merchants, civil servants, and the more prosperous farmers have gained enough from development to shy away from any Marxist visions of the future.

In Indonesia since Sukarno, a lot has been done for the few. But a great deal remains to be done for—and by—the many. Aggregate growth and political stability have been achieved, but distributive justice has not. The New Order now seems too corrupt to overcome that particular failure but just strong enough not to have to.

THE IMPACT OF ISLAM

by James Peacock

High, thick, whitewashed walls shade pedestrians and bicyclists from the late afternoon sun as they pass by the palace of the sultan of Surakarta, a city which lies in central Java, at the heart of Indonesian culture. Just beyond the far end of the palace, a noisy market is beginning to quiet down. In the open-air courtyard of the palace mosque, scores of merchants and artisans bathe their hands and feet, then kneel and perform the evening prayer of Islam.

Inside the walls stands the palace itself, in which the now-powerless sultan and his family still reside. The entire palace complex is laced with narrow alleys leading to small courtyards, and beside one, 12 men of all ages sit with eyes closed: They are the *Sumarah*, a meditation group. In the corner of another courtyard is a small table, the shrine of a resident mystic, and on that table are figurines: the Buddha, the Hindu god Siva, the Virgin Mary, and the all-powerful clown-god of Java, Semar. On the other side of the wall, the mystic's automobile, a 1957 Chevrolet, boasts hood ornaments of the same figures. Notably absent are any insignia of Islam: the star and the crescent, the green flag, or a picture of the *Ka'bah* (the holy stone of Mecca).

Together with Jogjakarta, a few miles to the west, Surakarta is one of the two surviving sultanates of Indonesia, remnants of the greatest Islamic empire of Southeast Asia, the second Mataram. This mighty kingdom reached its peak in the 17th century, when it was subdued by the Dutch. It went on, under Dutch protection, to elaborate a refined courtly culture that became the base of modern Javanese civilization, which is only partly Islamic. Thus, in the sultan's palace there coexists a variety of religious traditions, ranging from the rather orthodox Islam of those who pray at the mosque to the mixed—strongly Hindu, Buddhist, and magical—worldview expressed by the resident mystic who claims to cure the sick by reciting Indian mantras that enable him to project a searing light from his belly.

Looking beyond the sultanates, we encounter everywhere a scrambled pattern: In Indonesia, Islam is woven into a rich religious tapestry.

Yet, to change the metaphor, is not the desert-born faith of Muhammad a strange transplant in this lush tropical archipelago? Here we have a monotheistic faith, first shaped by the

harsh nomadic life of warring tribes in the Saudi desert, transferred thousands of miles to a complex nation whose civilization was based on a pantheistic Hindu-based philosophy of social and cosmic harmony. Even so, the desert religion took root. Nine out of 10 Indonesians now identify themselves as Muslims, and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim nation. Yet, as the saying goes, scratch a Javanese Muslim and you'll find a Hindu; scratch him again, and you'll find an animist. Islam in Indonesia is unlike Islam in Iran, or Malaysia, or anywhere else.

Until approximately the time of Christ, the religion of the native tribes scattered across the archipelago was animistic: Swirls of spiritual energy were seen to pervade the atmosphere, appearing here and there in a tree, rock, animal, or demon. Hindu ideas were brought to the islands during the first millennium B.C. by traders following the maritime routes of South Asia. When seagoing Muslim merchants—not warriors—came to Indonesian ports in the 13th century, their kind of Islam could compete because it was not a rigid faith imposed by the sword, as was so often the case with Islam elsewhere, but a speculative religion of the imagination. The mysticism of their creed appealed to the Hindu princes, as did the prospect of luring Muslim traders to their ports to be taxed.

Burying Buffalo Heads

Islam mingled with the existing Javanese-Hindu civilization—physical evidence of the merger can be seen in Java's oldest mosques, which resemble the present-day Hindu temples of Bali—and gave rise to the second empire of Mataram. The Dutch stripped the empire of its military and political power in the 17th century, but its culture lives on even now. As political scientist Benedict Anderson has noted, the Javanese are today so conscious of their refinement that unruly children are described as "*durung Djawa*"—"not yet Javanese"—rather than, as we might put it, "not yet adult."

Without an awareness of all this, one cannot begin to understand Indonesia. Only by looking to the tradition of self-examination through meditation, for example, can we fathom why, in the spring of 1946, General Sudirman, the 31-year-old Commander of the Indonesian Army, responded to a national crisis by asking his soldiers to fast for three days. Similarly, only Indonesia could produce a Sukarno, who wrote under the pseudonym of the shadow-play hero, Bima; named his female paratroopers *Srikandi* after a shadow-play heroine; and compared running his nation to the staging of a *wayang* (the shadow

play) of which he was the priestly puppeteer. Sukarno's successor, Suharto, who is also Javanese, is less theatrical but perhaps no less mystical. It is said that he consults a seer, and that when he went abroad in September 1970, a buffalo head was buried at each far-flung extremity of the archipelago to ensure that the nation would hold together in his absence.

Statistik vs. Fanatik

Java is at the center of this enduring culture. Historically, when the people of the outlying islands have sought a counterweight to Javanese cultural domination, they have turned to Islam. Purist Muslims have always been a threat to the central authorities; Indonesians clearly recognize the purists as a distinct and often dissident subculture. Those who (in anthropologist Clifford Geertz's phrase) hunger for "an Islam of the book rather than of the trance" are known as *santri*. Thus, the 130 million Muslims in Indonesia divide into two broad categories: the *santri*, and the others, the majority who not only ignore the "Five Pillars" of Islam (that is, they neglect the five daily prayers, the Ramadan month of fasting, the religious taxes, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and perhaps even the affirmation of faith in Allah and Muhammad), but also blend their Muslim beliefs with strains of Buddhism, Hinduism, animism, and other religions and ideologies. Overall, perhaps one-third of Indonesia's total population is *santri*; away from Java, however, on the sparsely settled outer islands, *santri* is often the dominant type.

This division is implicitly political: The purists see themselves as members of *Ummat Islam*, the worldwide community of believers, while the others, looking inward, hold themselves to be part of an exclusive Indonesian—or Javanese—civilization. Hence the *santri* deride the majority as "*Islam statistik*"—that is, Muslim in name only—while they in turn are taunted as "*Islam fanatik*," or more simply, "Arabs," pointing up the purists' habit of affecting Arabic styles and larding their talk with a pious Arabic "*Inshallah*"—"if God wills."

The split is also economic. In the countryside, many landlords and landowners are *santri*; in the cities, the purists tend to

James Peacock was born in Montgomery, Ala., in 1937. He took a B.A. in psychology at Duke University (1959) and a Ph.D. in anthropology at Harvard (1965). He is now on a Guggenheim fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford, on leave from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where he is a professor of anthropology. His books include Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective (1973) and Muslim Puritans (1978).

A puppet from the wayang (shadow play). As many as 350 such puppets may be used in a typical all-night performance. To the right: The good king Yudistira, who never fights or raises his voice.



From Wayang Purwa by H. Ulbricht. Reproduced by permission of the author.

be traders, often housed in a special *santri* quarter located near mosque and market. The rich *santri* (and many are rich) tend to attribute their financial success both to faith and to hard effort. One businessman from Surabaya told Clifford Geertz, "All I do is work and pray, work and pray; and it only takes a few minutes to pray." This Asian puritan concluded that "those who are poor are poor mainly because they are lazy, stupid, or sinful."

Throughout the 20th century, the devout minority has tried to make Indonesia less Javanese and so more Islamic. The rivalry between the Javanese and Islamic cultures has most often taken the form of a tug-of-war for political power between the Javanese-dominated central government and the outlying, more *santri*-oriented islands.

At this point, the Jakarta regime appears to be the victor in the struggle. Not only have the Islamic groups been unable to establish an Islamic state, but they have never won a majority in the Indonesian parliament, not even in the relatively free elec-

tion of 1955. And Islam, like all organized religions in the nation, has been brought into the Ministry of Religion, the largest department in the regime's burgeoning bureaucracy. Although it is dominated by *santri* Muslims, the ministry also represents Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Such control exacts a certain aesthetic toll: Indonesia's emerging bureaucratic culture has crept into Islam and is reflected in the new Muslim style, with its uniformed youth groups, training camps, and terminology drawn from management courses.

But then the Muslims' strength lies far from the cosmopolitan capital, in thousands of *santri* communities. Before 1965, the Communists could compete with the Muslims, but today not even the Army can match the cradle-to-grave reach of the 6-million-strong *Muhammadijah*. This *santri* religious-welfare-state-within-the-secular-state extends throughout the archipelago and includes schools, hospitals, and the most vigorous women's movement in all of Islam.

Islam Absorbed

Such a disparity between Islam's power in the communities and its relative weakness in the political center prompts the question: Is Suharto's Indonesia like the Shah's Iran? Yes, as the Ford Foundation's Sidney Jones has observed, in that both nations have had "an authoritarian regime committed to rapid development along capitalist lines, an overwhelmingly Muslim population, and a growing income distribution gap based partly on the influx of oil revenues."

Such parallels are, however, overshadowed by differences. No religious upheaval seems imminent in Indonesia. The country's Muslims are too few, when they are *santri* purists; too well-integrated into the regime and into national life, when they are not. And *santri* concerns are less political than those of the Ayatollah Khomeini. When in 1979 I asked a *Muhammadijah* leader about the parallel between Iran and Indonesia, he replied, "We seek not an Islamic state, but an Islamic society." Candid or not, the statement accurately reflects what is possible for Islam in Indonesia.

Muslims can and do influence the government—as in 1973, when they forced Suharto to water down a proposed "Indonesian" marriage law that discouraged Islamic polygamy and endorsed interfaith unions; and again in 1976, when they had the country closed to the aggressively evangelical missionaries of Jehovah's Witnesses. They have never triumphed in national elections, but the Muslims' capture of one-third of the popular

vote in 1971 and 1977 makes them the government's strongest competitor. Even so, it seems unlikely that the Muslims will become more than what they are: a powerful opposition group dedicated not to taking over the government but to exemplifying the proper life guided by the will of God.

Around the world, there are three types of Islamic societies. In the first type, a single ethnic group, believing in Islam, dominates a nation's culture, laws, politics, and foreign relations. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan come to mind as examples. In the second type, Islam is the faith of an ethnic majority in a racially dualistic society. Malaysia, with its preponderance of Malay Muslims and large, relatively prosperous Chinese minority, exemplifies this mixture. (Indeed, the Malay phrase "*masuk Melayu*," which literally means "to become Malay," means "to become Muslim.")

Indonesia's society embraces a more complicated relationship between religion and ethnicity. The two crisscross. A member of the Indonesian (as opposed to the Chinese, Indian, or European) ethnic group is not necessarily a Muslim. Hindu-Buddhistic culture thrives on Bali and has been revived on Java; myriad religions of the type we once called "pagan" flourish

Balinese legong dancers, as drawn in 1955 by the Balinese artist I Rudin. The traditional dances, theater, and gamelan (Indonesia's distinctive percussive orchestra) live on today throughout Java and Bali.



Courtesy of Rijksmuseum voor
Volkenkunde, Leiden.

throughout the islands; 12 million Christians live on the islands of Flores, Ambon, Timor, and Java, and among the Minahasans of Sulawesi and the Batak people of Sumatra. Yet some Bataks are Muslim, just as some Indonesian Chinese are Buddhist and others Christian.

The Minangkabau people of the Sumatran highlands show the intricate weave of religion and local tradition. Though fervent Muslims since the 19th century, and a major force in modern Islamic reform movements, the Minangkabau have never given up their matrilineal customs. Even today, it is their women who own and supervise their houses, shops, and fields.

All this complexity makes it difficult to generalize about Indonesian history and politics. While the factionalism of its practitioners sometimes threatens to fragment Indonesia, the Muslim faith is one of the archipelago's few persisting inter-island bonds. The peoples of Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and (especially) the less-"Indianized" eastern islands differ enormously in custom and history, but they are united in being committed in some fashion to Islam.

Perhaps the most telling fact about Indonesia is that centuries ago its Hindu people *absorbed* Islam, unlike the people of India, who made the Hindu-Muslim split a source of lasting bitterness. Indonesia's traditional tolerance is expressed in the proverb, "*lain desa, lain adat*"—which loosely translates as "for each village, a different custom." But the goal of the post-independence governments of Indonesia has been rather different—as is expressed in the national motto, "Unity in diversity." It is a unity within which Islam is, again, absorbed, though in this case the absorption is backed by the state. Islam is one element within the Ministry of Religion, one judicial and educational system among several, one political coalition among three, one philosophy mixed into a diverse worldview.

The palace complex of Surakarta is, indeed, a microcosm of Indonesian culture: The minaret of the sultan's mosque rises above the palace, but down below, among the courtyards and verandas, Islam is assigned to one place among many.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

INDONESIA

From 1854 to 1862, the English naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace, friend and rival of Charles Darwin, toured the East Indies in search of evidence for the theory of evolution.

The archipelago, he wrote, seemed to have "a climate, vegetation, and animated life altogether peculiar to itself."

Wallace's work in classifying flora and fauna led him to perceive the island chain as "a connected whole." Yet in his chatty travelogue, **The Malay Archipelago** (Harper, 1869; Dover, 1978, paper), he found variety, too. The Portuguese colony of Timor was "a most miserable place," while Dutch-ruled Java was "probably the very finest and most interesting tropical island in the world."

As Princeton anthropologist Clifford Geertz reports in **The Religion of Java** (Free Press, 1960, cloth; Univ. of Chicago, 1976, paper), the people of that crowded island have developed a mixture of religious beliefs found nowhere else. Geertz describes their peculiar mysticism as a way "not of turning away from life but toward it."

To the west of Java is oil-rich Sumatra. Its inhabitants pride themselves on being more direct than the Javanese, whom they regard as excessively refined. Indeed, some Sumatrans did not give up the practice of eating people until early in this century. As ethnologist Edwin M. Loeb writes in **Sumatra: Its History and People** (Oxford, 1935, cloth; 1973, paper), cannibalism was for the Batak tribe of the Sumatran highlands "a severe form of capital

punishment," reserved for traitors, spies, and imprudent commoners who committed adultery with the wives of noblemen.

In contrast to Loeb's sobering examination of Sumatra is Miguel Covarrubias's lively **The Island of Bali** (Knopf, 1937). Covarrubias first cites a legend: When Java fell to the Mohammedans, the disgusted Hindu gods decided to move to Bali.

"Everybody on Bali seems to be an artist," writes Covarrubias, a Mexican painter. He lived on the tiny island for two years in the 1930s; he thought he was witnessing the last years of a pure culture "doomed" by modern commercialization. Yet Bali's painters, dancers, sculptors, and musicians thrive today, despite the invasion of this "last paradise" by thousands of tourists each year. And Balinese Hinduism flourishes with its "constant demand for music and dance," notes UCLA ethnomusicologist Mantle Hood in **Indonesia**, edited by Ruth T. McVey (Yale, 1963; 2nd ed., 1968).

Beyond Bali lie the islands of eastern Indonesia. Far from Java's temples, Sumatra's oil, and Bali's art, the hundreds of islands in the vast area bounded by Australia, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines are scarcely known in the West.

In **Villages in Indonesia**, edited by Raden Mas Koentjarningrat (Cornell, 1967), anthropologist Peter Goethals describes the life of an eastern Indonesian farmer in Sumbawa: His rice seedlings are threatened by fire-resistant weeds, and when the surviving rice matures, it attracts

marauding monkeys. Ants, mice, birds, and wild pigs are constant dangers, requiring a round-the-clock watch on the fields during the growing season. As food stocks run low in the last months before the April harvest, the farmer and his family subsist on plain rice and boiled greens, and for all but the rich few, life becomes a matter of "inertia, drowsiness, and resignation."

Of all the islands, Java inevitably attracts most scholarly attention; it is home to over half of Indonesia's population, the locus of commerce and political power, and the center of the nation's culture. So writes art historian Claire Holt in **Art in Indonesia: Continuities and Change** (Cornell, 1967). She surveys three aspects of that culture: first, the ancient art of Java's classical Hindu-Buddhist period; then the living traditions of dance and *wayang* (shadow plays that could be called Javanese opera); and finally, modern Indonesian painting, which is heavily influenced by Western art.

As Dutch sociologist and historian W. F. Wertheim comments in **Indonesian Society in Transition** (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1956; 2nd ed., 1959; Hyperion, 1980, reprint of 1st ed.), the tough European merchants who settled in the East Indies "could hardly be said to radiate Western culture." Not until the 20th century did any Westernization—whether in art or education—seep below the aristocratic layer of Indonesian society. When European influence did penetrate, young Indonesian students responded most enthusiastically to the ideas of socialism and nationalist revolution.

Both in Holland and in the East Indies, the Dutch were not interested in dialogue: The Indonesians would rule only when they were "ripe for

selfgovernment." Historian Bernard Vlekke observes in **Nusantara: A History of Indonesia** (Quadrangle, 1943; reprint, 1977), that "it was never said . . . *what* qualifications a people must have to be 'ripe for selfgovernment.'"

As it turned out, what first developed in Indonesia was a ripeness for rebellion. Cornell's George Kahin tells how independence was won in 1949, in **Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia** (Cornell, 1952, cloth; 1970, paper). With victory, a new generation full of "energy and creativeness" set up a parliamentary-style government that, Kahin wrote, "gave promise of taking root."

The title of Herbert Feith's book sums up what happened instead: **The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia** (Cornell, 1962). Feith, an Australian political scientist, attributes the 1957 collapse of democracy to postwar disillusionment and a "decline in revolutionary spirit."

That decline is the subject of Mochtar Lubis's melodramatic novel **Twilight in Djakarta** (translated by Claire Holt; Vanguard, 1963). Lubis, an Indonesian writer and journalist, portrays corruption at the top and desperation at the bottom. One senior official urges a fellow bureaucrat to use his official position to obtain an import permit for a car. Then, buy the foreign automobile at 62,000 rupiahs, he says, and resell it for 125,000: "You can buy yourself a second-hand car for about fifty thousand . . . and you are left with a clear seventy-five thousand profit." Meanwhile, a Javanese laborer explains his plight to a friend: "Read—cannot. Write—cannot. Become skilled—cannot. Most I have—two hands and two feet."

Australian novelist Christopher

Koch's **The Year of Living Dangerously** (St. Martin's, 1979) takes place in 1965, when popular uneasiness in Indonesia escalated to panic. The novel is essentially an expatriate's meditation on Sukarno. Through an odd friendship with a half-Chinese dwarf, an ambitious Australian journalist becomes caught up in the disintegration of Indonesian politics. An outcast in every way, the dwarf finds refuge in his faith in Sukarno. "When a great poet writes about his country, he actually gives it a soul it didn't have before," argues the dwarf. "Well, Sukarno's done the same thing in his speeches. He's *created* this country."

Both Koch's novel and **Sukarno: A Political Biography** (Praeger, 1972), a rather dry account by Australian political scientist J. D. Legge, end with the military takeover that toppled the champion of "Guided Democracy."

Since then, the joke goes, holding general elections in Indonesia means electing Indonesian generals. Today, with the civilian opposition outlawed, frightened, or co-opted, argues Harold Crouch in **The Army**

and **Politics in Indonesia** (Cornell, 1978), "the most important power struggles . . . take place within the military elite." Some of the losers of those struggles have been arrested. More often, they are comforted with diplomatic posts or prestigious and lucrative jobs in the state bureaucracy. One trouble with this closed system, says Crouch, a political scientist at the National University of Malaysia, is that in excluding civilians, it becomes unresponsive to civilian discontents.

The massacre of 1965 haunts Indonesian politics, observes Clifford Geertz in the concluding essay of **Culture and Politics in Indonesia**, edited by Claire Holt, Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, and James Siegel (Cornell, 1972). The Javanese, Geertz writes, have a saying: "The crocodile is quick to sink, but slow to come up"—that is, popular passions in Indonesia build slowly, beneath a calm exterior, and then surface gradually but inexorably with overwhelming force. Today, as in 1972, when Geertz wrote the essay, both Indonesians and Western specialists are watching for the crocodile.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *This essay is based on suggestions from Sidney Jones, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania on leave from the Ford Foundation. Additional titles were suggested by James Peacock and by Audrey Kahin of Cornell University.*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND

by Piotr S. Wandycz
Harvard, 1980
465 pp. \$25

In the early 1770s, American colonists were too preoccupied with their own impending conflagration to notice that, 4,600 miles away, Poland was being carved up by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Wandycz, a Yale historian, surveys U.S.-Polish relations (to the extent that they have existed at all) since then. After World War I, crusading U.S. foreign policy makers first showed an interest in the "Polish Question." With the support of Woodrow Wilson, independence was conferred on the long-suffering Poles at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Yet after World War II, the Western Allies conceded the "borderlands of Europe" to their Soviet "liberators." Why? In Wandycz's view, the fates of small Eastern European states became less important to U.S. Presidents than maintaining a clear East-West balance of power in Europe as a whole. Since 1945, U.S.-Polish diplomacy has been a "barometer" of U.S.-Soviet tensions. When relations between America and Russia are relatively genial, Wandycz contends, the United States seems less worried over Poland's satellite status and domestic politics than when *détente* is foundering.

—Vlad Georgescu ('80)

DEEP SONG AND OTHER PROSE

by Federico García Lorca
New Directions, 1980
143 pp. \$10 cloth,
\$4.95 paper

In intellectual circles these days, an author's popularity usually conspires against his reputation, as if only esotericism guarantees excellence. The writings of Spanish poet and playwright Lorca (1896-1936) circulate widely. Spaniards and Latin Americans who seldom enter a theater have seen *Blood Wedding*. While Francisco Franco, Spain's flamboyant dictator, lived, criticism of Lorca was rare. Assassinated by rightist nationalists be-

cause of his political views, the poet was a bitter symbol of the brutality of Franco's regime for Spanish artists in need of a martyr. Today, the situation has changed. Lorca's knifewielding gypsies, his bullfighters, his virgins are out of favor. Critics reproach him for depicting "Spain of the tambourines" rather than the political turmoil of his time. I do not share their opinion. *Deep Song* contains almost all of Lorca's important nonfiction works, many of them in English for the first time. The essays help unravel the sources of his poetry—exposing the phantoms of love, death, and art behind his picturesque images. But the richest discoveries are in the glimpses of Lorca himself. He had one obsession: Do not bore the audience. He never did.

—Mario Vargas Llosa ('80)

**THE URBAN CRUCIBLE:
Social Change, Political
Consciousness, and the
Origins of the American
Revolution**

By Gary B. Nash
Harvard, 1979
548 pp. \$18.50

To colonial America's wealthy planters and businessmen, "liberty was essentially the condition of being secure in one's property." The American Revolution, however, was not simply a revolt of the affluent. In Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, workers took to the streets in defiance of British authority. What did the rebellion mean to humble shoemakers and tailors? According to social historian Nash, the most radical revolutionary ideas were fomented among working-class folk by religious evangelicals, who spoke of "family, religion, and community rather than capital accumulation." Philadelphia's artisans, for example, considered the concentration of property, power, or commercial privileges in a few hands—British or otherwise—"dangerous to the rights and happiness of mankind." They favored suffrage without property qualifications. (Such "extreme" republicanism, warned John Adams, might prostrate "all ranks to one common level.") The desire for a government that would protect property and guarantee personal freedom drove successful lawyers and merchants to rebellion, argues Nash; colonial tradesmen, by contrast, rose up demanding social equity.

—James Lang ('78)

**ORWELL: THE
TRANSFORMATION**
by Peter Stansky and
William Abrahams
Knopf, 1980
302 pp. \$12.95

Eric Blair, a.k.a. George Orwell (1902–50), proffered readers his passionate humanism and prose as clear as any in English. In *The Unknown Orwell* (1972), critics Stansky and Abrahams recounted Blair's unhappy youth in British public schools and his stint (1922–27) as an assistant district superintendent of police in Burma. This second volume of their trail-blazing biography covers the period from Orwell's first book, the autobiographical *Down and Out in Paris and London* (1933), to his socialist conversion while a Loyalist soldier in the Spanish Civil War. It is fundamentally the story of a young man trying to unite his ambitions as a social critic with his desire to become a "serious" creative writer. The authors painstakingly recount the reconciliation of these callings that produced his first major work of nonfiction—*Homage to Catalonia* (1938), in which he eloquently described the undermining of the anti-Franco cause by the communists—and resulted, during the 1940s, in his best-known fiction, *Animal Farm* and *1984*. Yet, drawing on interviews with his friends, the authors also show Orwell as his contemporaries probably saw him—a man of deliberate eccentricities (e.g., his shabby clothes) and professional self-doubts.

—Frank McConnell ('78)

PARTISAN JUSTICE
by Marvin E. Frankel
Farrar, 1980
134 pp. \$9.95

The U.S. courts today are plagued by inequities. The criminal justice system, as it has evolved, has fostered "unduly elaborate and effective means of blocking the proof of guilt." So contends Frankel, a former federal judge. Among the defects Frankel cites is the old-fashioned ideal of the lawyer as a single-minded champion (the result: advocates too often obfuscate the truth on their client's behalf). Due-process rules have made it impractical to hold criminal trials in all but a small percentage of cases; most charges are now disposed of through plea bargaining, "the dispensation of justice by lawyers [acting] as traders." And today only big corporations, the very rich, and the very poor can retain

good attorneys (the majority cannot afford top legal talent and are ineligible for legal aid). Frankel would require trial lawyers to expose false evidence, even if this implicates a client. This duty has already been imposed on federal government lawyers. Frankel would also ease the severity of sentences for those who persist in seeking a trial—thereby lessening the incentive to plea bargain. Finally, he favors a federally funded legal service available not just to the poor but to all, in both criminal and civil suits. The public might balk at such substantial government investment in lawyers. But it would be the average taxpayer who would gain greater access to the courts, now constricted by the steep costs of litigation.

—John T. Noonan ('80)

**SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
THE LIBERAL STATE**

by Bruce A. Ackerman
Yale, 1980
393 pp. \$17.50

No one is entitled to say that he is better than anyone else. Nor is one person's view of the "good life" superior to another's. Through a series of imaginary dialogues based on these premises, Ackerman, a Yale law professor, attempts to show that liberal ideals—e.g., equal distribution of economic resources and equality of educational opportunity—can be rationally defended against all rival theories. Ackerman's conversations take place among the planners of a hypothetical society; they touch on such topics as population policy, abortion, education, and the limits of parental authority. Some readers (especially meritocrats) may find their views inadequately represented in the refined abstractions of Ackerman's egalitarian "planners." But this work surely joins social philosophy's Big Books list—so recently augmented by John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974).

—Peter Singer ('79)

NEW TITLES

History

**THE VICTORIANS AND
ANCIENT GREECE**
by Richard Jenkyns
Harvard, 1980
386 pp. \$30

In 19th-century Victorian England, the well-to-do were learning to preside over an empire. They embraced the model of ancient Greece. Conversational knowledge of Homer, Aristotle, and Praxiteles became the measure of gentility. Novelists George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, and Oscar Wilde, architects, painters, and sculptors alluded to or imitated the classical style. "There was always some tendency for people to use the Greeks as a means of confirming their own prejudgements," writes Jenkyns, a lecturer in classics at the University of Bristol. And the Victorians made up a fairy-tale antiquity that collapsed under scrutiny. They saw life in ancient Greece as calm and harmonious. The British Empire, they assumed, was the natural heir to that superior legacy. So, for example, the class hierarchy implicit in the writings of Homer reinforced the Victorian belief in aristocracy; and Platonic love became, for some leisured dandies, a philosophical rationalization for conspicuous homosexuality. The Victorians' glorified vision of history and of their role in it left England's leaders ill-prepared for 20th-century events—overseas challenges to *Pax Britannica* and the social disruption brought on by World War I.

**THE THREE EDWARDS:
War and State in England,
1271–1377**
by Michael Prestwich
St. Martin's, 1980
336 pp. \$25

The reigns of England's first three Edwards during the Middle Ages were marked by continuous warfare against Wales, Scotland, and France. Then as later, financing combat was a major problem—especially after 1294 when hostilities with France broke out, a prelude to the Hundred Years' War. The traditional, feudal means of raising an army had been to summon nobles for military service without recompense; these men were expected to



Courtesy of the Trustees
of the British Museum.

bring with them knights and squires, who usually provided their own horses and weapons. The system was neither efficient nor reliable. In 1300, for example, one warrior under Edward I (1239–1307) showed up for duty equipped with a single arrow. The best way to guarantee military service was to pay wages, and this the ambitious Edward II (1284–1327) began to do. But salaries substantially boosted the price of war, especially when Edward III (1312–77), with characteristic extravagance, began doling out double wages to men fighting overseas. In 1280, Edward I first petitioned “Parliament”—then an irregular gathering of regional nobles—to tax the populace. Parliament seized the opportunity to force the monarch, and his successors, into negotiations over local grievances. The independent character of Parliament today, according to Prestwich, a British historian, may owe less to the traditions of Roman law than to the three Edwards’ repeated requests to fill the “royal wardrobe.”

**JONATHAN EDWARDS,
PASTOR: Religion and
Society in Eighteenth-
Century Northampton**
by Patricia J. Tracy
Farrar, 1980
270 pp. \$14.95

The Reverend Jonathan Edwards (1707–58) is best remembered for his stern Puritan creed and his hellfire-and-brimstone sermons. But, says Tracy, a Williams College historian, little attention has been given to his unsuccessful performance as a New England parish pastor. In 1729, Edwards stepped up to the pulpit of the Northampton, Mass., Congregational Church, which his autocratic grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, had headed for nearly 60 years. Sin, in Edward’s view, had generally reared its head in the parish as apathy, lust, and contention; a few years later, it was emerging as insidious pride masquerading as zealous piety. Edwards responded by altering his preaching style. Rational discourses on the “sweet reasonableness” of religion gave way to terrifying threats and denunciations of sinners. The Great Awakening, which swept New England in the early 1740s, brought Edwards fame as a guest preacher; but, ironically, it hastened his downfall at home. Northampton was becoming secular-

ized. Private ownership of land, for example, had replaced the common tillage of village fields. In 1749, in a play for greater control over the lives of his parishioners, Edwards reversed his grandfather's popular practice of open communion and declared that he alone would decide who was worthy of the Lord's Supper. He was fired. Edwards had simply exerted the same strict moral authority wielded by his grandfather, observes Tracy. But the Puritans' descendants had ceased to center their lives around the church.

Contemporary Affairs

WEALTH AND POVERTY

by George Gilder
Basic, 1981
306 pp. \$16.95

George Gilder's book is more than a conservative economics tract; it is a social critic's detailed, contentious overview of the high unintended costs of "affirmative action," welfare, the women's movement, environmentalism, and federal economic policy. Most economists, Right or Left, focus on Big Business and Big Government, Gilder notes. But innovative smaller entrepreneurs are "fighting America's only serious war against poverty"; they provide more than 80 percent of employment for young blacks, for example, and created far more new jobs in 1969-76 than did government. Yet Washington squanders resources on ailing big industries (e.g., Chrysler), harasses successful new ventures, and penalizes savings and fruitful investment. By soaking the rich through inflation and taxes, Gilder argues, Washington simply dries up long-term risk capital and encourages unproductive spending by the wealthy—on real estate, racehorses, and fancy cars. The Welfare State, rashly promising to prevent "all the adversities of life," has fostered public apathy and cynicism. Even so, Vietnamese, Cubans, and other newcomers, he observes, disdain the dole, work hard, and move up. To current economic problems (energy, stagflation), Gilder's ultimate answer is not more controls but a liberating faith in "the ingenuity of free and God-fearing men."

AUTHORITY

by Richard Sennett
Knopf, 1980, 206 pp.
\$10 cloth; Vintage,
1981, 228 pp.
\$4.95 paper

The bloody 1894 Pullman strike began in a community that, at the time, was considered the most successful company town in America—Pullman, Ill. Sennett, a humanities professor at New York University, suggests two reasons why employee dissatisfaction exploded there: Workers were well cared for but were not allowed to buy their homes, a restriction that thwarted the dreams of many immigrants; when things went wrong—e.g., a drop in demand caused temporary layoffs—workers held authority figure George Pullman personally responsible and were loath to recognize that external factors played a role in their fates. This case study is one of several in *Authority*, the first of a projected four books by the author on the “emotional bonds of modern society” (the others are solitude, fraternity, and ritual). Sennett has woven historic precedents, findings from psychoanalysis, sociological thought (including the theories of Locke, Bentham, Weber), and literary examples (Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Proust) into a broad philosophical rumination on the nature of authority.

**THE WINDING PASSAGE:
Essays and Sociological
Journeys, 1960–1980**

by Daniel Bell
Abt, 1980
370 pp. \$25

Recently in these pages, the influential Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell asserted that he had “rarely written ‘unambiguously’ about anything.” This may demonstrate why Bell is claimed by the Right *and* the Left, and why he repeatedly confounds both. It also explains why these 17 essays originally appeared in periodicals with very different outlooks: *Commentary*, *Partisan Review*, *Foreign Policy*, and *The American Scholar*, among others. Pursuing themes developed in *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973) and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976), Bell ruminates on ethnicity, national character, religion, and technology. Rarely does he offer cures for America’s ills. But he defines this country’s dilemma: Its economy, polity, and culture are rooted in separate traditions, each with its own arcane rules. For example, business corporations want employees “to work hard [and] accept delayed gratification.” Yet their products and advertisements promote

"instant joy, relaxing and letting go." Such contradictions make for an unstable society; but, concludes Bell, no *single* social or economic theory offers a quick fix.

EMPLOYING THE UNEMPLOYED

edited by Eli Ginzberg
Basic, 1980
209 pp. \$15

During the 1960s, the federal government's strategy for alleviating joblessness focused on providing the unemployed with competitive skills and experience. But during the '70s, the emphasis shifted to the direct creation of jobs, especially in depressed cities. As a result, the cost to the taxpayers rose from \$81 million in 1963 to \$11 billion in 1979. The authors of this collection of 11 essays—economists, social scientists, and government administrators—calculate some of the benefits and costs of federal jobs programs, which they generally endorse. Judith Gueron of the Manpower Research Corporation finds that work-support programs have helped women recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children find and keep jobs; the government has had less success with young people. MIT economist Lester Thurow maintains that the earnings gap between rich and poor can best be narrowed by (admittedly expensive) wage subsidies rather than by efforts to improve a worker's "employability." In this detailed survey, one key calculation is absent: How many jobs would have been created had the \$64 billion spent in 1962–79 remained in the private sector?

Arts & Letters

PISSARRO: His Life and Work

by Ralph E. Shikes and
Paula Harper
Horizon, 1980
362 pp. \$24.95

While maintaining close ties to his devout middle-class family of Parisian Jewish merchants, Camille Pissarro (1830–1903) lived the hand-to-mouth existence of the struggling artist. Art historians Shikes and Harper's exhaustive biography of the "first impressionist" is based largely on his unpublished letters. Pissarro, the authors emphasize, was a keeper of commitments—to his private artis-



S. P. Avery Collection,
New York Public Library.

tic "sensation," regardless of the tastes of the marketplace; to his devoted family (five of his children became artists); to unpopular anarchist causes; to the nurturing of talent in others. He taught Cézanne and Gauguin, and emboldened his friends Degas, Seurat, Cassatt, and van Gogh. His patience and his ability to reconcile others' feuds kept the impressionists, innovators of diverse temperaments and backgrounds, united against the conservative French Academy, which virtually dictated the market for art. Throughout his life, the gentle impressionist patriarch continued to grow artistically. His landscapes were influenced by Corot and Monet; Degas urged his foray into print-making; and he experimented for a time, with Seurat's pointilism. His last paintings, his most abstract, capture the excitement and agitation of Paris. This volume is illustrated, in color and black-and-white, with 210 of Pissarro's finest paintings, drawings, and etchings, many reproduced for the first time.

**LECTURES ON
LITERATURE**
by Vladimir Nabokov
Harcourt, 1980
385 pp. \$19.95

Cornell University undergraduates who signed up for Literature 311-312, "Masters of European Fiction," during the 1950s were in for a treat. Their professor was Vladimir Nabokov, a Russian émigré novelist. In the notes for his lectures reprinted here, Nabokov illumines Joyce's *Ulysses*, Austen's *Mansfield Park*, Dickens's *Bleak House*, Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, Kafka's *The Metamorphosis*, and Proust's *Swann's Way*. His classroom method is deceptively simple: retell the book's plot, quoting long passages. But throughout, Nabokov drives home the qualities that set his choices apart. He painstakingly traces Leopold Bloom's Dublin wanderings to show Joyce's elaborate organization and felicity with words, and he makes much of Flaubert's punctuation and syntax. Details count: "There is nothing wrong about the moonshine of generalization when it comes *after* the sunny trifles of the book have been lovingly collected." Marx, Freud, indeed all who

attempt historical or biographical interpretations of literature, who ferret out symbols or identify with characters, flunk Nabokov's course. "The wise reader," he explains, reads "not with his heart, not so much with his brain, but with his spine." Nabokov was not just teaching at Cornell, he was also learning. His observations of life in a college town (Ithaca, N.Y.) found their way into the novel he was writing at the time—*Lolita* (1958), the success that freed him from the lecture hall.

DANCE OF THE TIGER:
A Novel of the Ice Age
 by Björn Kurtén
 Pantheon, 1980
 255 pp. \$10.95

Forty thousand years ago, a warm spell settled over northern Europe, causing the ice that had covered the Continent for thousands of years to recede. With an occasional mild tremor, the land rose. Forests grew; flowers blossomed. During this "brief" 15,000-year thaw, one subspecies of intelligent human replaced another. Neanderthal man—squat, beetle-browed, big-jawed, yet accomplished (his brain was bigger than our own)—had inhabited Europe for 100,000 years. Cro-Magnon man, the newcomer, lean, skilled in art and weaponry, migrated from the south; it is his descendants who will read this novel. Did the two subspecies meet? Probably, speculates Kurtén, a world-renowned Finnish paleontologist; and therein lies the tale. Drawing on the suggestive remains of the period—"a cave painting here, a footprint there, perhaps a population of skulls (which shows that the aged were well cared for)"—Kurtén has crafted a story of Ice Age adventure and domesticity. In good scientific fashion, he also challenges some myths. Kurtén's Neanderthals, like most Scandinavians, are blue-eyed blondes—not the swarthy "cavemen" of museum exhibits. They compensate for their fierce, bony gaze with exceeding courtesy ("Mister Baywillow, would you have the kindness to check their trail?" asks one Neanderthal chief when she fears that a foe may be near). Hidden in the tale is Kurtén's hypothesis, elucidated in an afterword, concerning why gentle *Homo sapiens neanderthalensis* vanished while glib *Homo sapiens sapiens* survived.

**ABROAD: British
Literary Traveling Between
the Wars**

by Paul Fussell
Oxford, 1980
246 pp. \$14.95

Flanders' frozen battlefields and wartime England's drab cities instilled a pent-up wanderlust in many of Britain's best writers. After World War I, Graham Greene walked through West Africa; D. H. Lawrence got his look at the Pacific islands, Mexico, and the U.S. Southwest; Norman Douglas sauntered through Naples; Evelyn Waugh journeyed to South America and East Africa; and Robert Byron sampled Persia, Afghanistan, Russia, and Tibet. Critic Fussell examines the travel accounts that resulted from these (and others') adventures with a respect reserved by most critics for poetry and novels. "A travel book," he writes, "is like a poem in giving universal significance to a local texture." Byron's *The Road to Oxiana* (1937)—a collage of news clippings, letters, diary entries, art history, political essays, and comic dialogues—is the *Ulysses* of travel books. It gives the appearance of random jottings, but, in fact, went through three years of revisions before publication. Fussell bitterly laments that in the jet age "travel is now impossible and . . . tourism is all we have." (Anyone who "has hotel reservations and speaks no French is a tourist.") As novelist Waugh remarked, "airplanes have added nothing to our enjoyment of height."

*Science & Technology***THE EVOLUTION OF
CULTURE IN ANIMALS**


by John Tyler Bonner
Princeton, 1980
216 pp. \$14.50

Is man the only animal that's got culture? No, says Princeton biologist Bonner. Culture, defined by Bonner, is the transfer of information by behavioral, as opposed to genetic means. Bonner identifies five types of behavior that also mark nonhuman culture. These include: physical dexterity (sea otters exhibit it when they wield rocks to break mollusk shells); relations with other species (Galápagos penguins show no fear of man on land but become terrified if someone joins them while they are swimming); geographic orientation (geese migrate to the same places each year). All animals have a "genetically determined

behavioral capacity" to share information, and there are fundamental similarities between lower animals' "cultural" traits and man's. But man's bigger, more complex brain allows him to accumulate a staggering amount of data (which writing helps him to recall) and to invent new solutions to problems. Humans' *genetic* capacity for culture far surpasses that of their animal distant cousins.

THE ENGINEERING DRAWINGS OF BENJAMIN HENRY LATROBE

edited by Darwin H. Stapleton
 Yale, 1980
 256 pp. \$62.50



Journal of the Franklin Institute.

Benjamin Latrobe (1764–1820), as an architect, is well-known for his part in designing the U.S. Capitol and for supervising the rebuilding of the White House after the British burned it in the War of 1812. But Latrobe has largely been forgotten as an engineer. Yet his engineering successes include the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, the Washington Canal, the National (Cumberland) Road, the Philadelphia Waterworks, and the Washington Navy Yard dry-dock. This oversized book includes 84 of Latrobe's careful drawings, rarities of comprehensive draftsmanship, with a long introductory essay. Stapleton, an assistant professor at Case Western Reserve University, emphasizes the complexity of Latrobe's undertakings: Latrobe combined science (geology, topography, hydrology); mechanics (pumps, pile drivers, steam engines); and precision surveying and cartography. A master at investment and self-advertisement, Latrobe was a one-man 19th-century construction company.

MATHEMATICS: The Loss of Certainty

by Morris Kline
 Oxford, 1980
 366 pp. \$19.95

With its beginnings among the surveyors and builders of ancient Egypt and Babylon, later transformed into a formal science by the Greeks, mathematics has been a tool used to define our surroundings. Mathematical principles underlie, unify, and reveal the order in the natural world. During the Renaissance, Kepler, Newton, Galileo, and Descartes believed that the universe functioned according to a pattern and that mathematics was the God-given key to understanding it. Pure

mathematics — the study of numbers and their arrangement—relies on deductive reasoning within a set system of rules. But over the centuries, argues Kline, professor emeritus at New York University, mathematicians too often relied on intuition and arguments that produced “correct” results but lacked logical justification. By 1800, mathematics was in trouble. The 19th-century invention of non-Euclidian geometry played havoc with traditional notions about spatial relationships (parallel lines *could* meet). In this century, Bertrand Russell, Kurt Gödel, and others demonstrated the impossibility of proving that math’s methods and rules are consistently correct. Yet, Kline reminds us in this deft history, mathematics, despite its limitations, works. It has taken us into outer space *and* has brought us back.

THE AGE OF BIRDS

by Alan Feduccia
Harvard, 1980
196 pp. \$20

In 1861, a zoological clue of great importance was unearthed in a Bavarian limestone quarry. The 140-million-year-old *Archaeopteryx* fossil linked birds with reptiles. It had been feathered *and* had teeth. Even ardent evolutionists were troubled by *Archaeopteryx*’s teeth. For a long time many suspected that its skull had belonged to another animal. Skepticism subsided with the discovery of more *Archaeopteryx* fossils beginning in 1897. Today, arguments about the evolution of birds center on finer technical points that Feduccia, a zoologist at the University of North Carolina and a research associate at the Smithsonian, lucidly discusses. What was the original purpose of feathers—warmth or flight? Did the first birds lift themselves up from the ground or glide down from high places? Were they at home on the ground or in trees? The answers are all the more elusive, Feduccia notes, because most bird bones are hollow—to enhance flight—and do not preserve well. Moreover, beneath their feathers, birds tend to be very much the same. And, of course, the evolution of *flightlessness* among elephant birds, rheas, emus, and ostriches must still be explained.

PAPERBOUNDS

EUROPE IN CRISIS: 1598–1648. By Geoffrey Parker, 384 pp. \$5.95

EUROPE: Privilege and Protest, 1730–1789. By Olwen Hufton. 398 pp. \$5.95

EUROPE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONS: 1815–1848. By Jacques Droz. 286 pp. \$4.95

EUROPE RESHAPED: 1848–1878. By J. A. S. Grenville. 412 pp. \$5.95

EUROPE OF THE DICTATORS: 1919–1945. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. 286 pp. \$4.95

Cornell reprints, 1980

The intricacies of modern European history seem to defy condensation. Yet these volumes, by British and French scholars, clear that hurdle neatly. Complete with maps and reading lists, Cornell's "History of Europe" series illuminates the political, social, economic, and intellectual shifts during five critical eras. From the so-called Defenestration of Prague in 1618—during which Protestant Bohemian legislators, angry at the dissolution of their parliament, hurled two Catholic regency officials from the royal palace windows—to the 1945 occupation of Berlin by the victorious Allies, war, revolution, and upheaval dominated European experience. Parker opens the saga by quoting a dissatisfied 17th-century Muscovite taxpayer: "The whole world is shaking, and the people are troubled." Wiskemann ends it with the birth of the United Nations as the Cold War dawns.

THE GREAT HUNGER: Ireland, 1845–1849. By Cecil Woodham-Smith. Dutton reprint, 1980. 510 pp. \$8.95

The luck of the Irish, such as it was, ran out in 1845. When the peasants harvested black potatoes that summer, English Prime Minister Robert Peel shipped grain

to them. But there were few harbors in which to unload it, few mills to grind it, and few wives who knew how to use it for bread and porridge. Peel's other relief schemes included fattening Irish income via public works projects. Opposing him were Parliament (made up of "fervent" believers in laissez faire government) and Britain's formidable Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Charles Edward Trevelyan. Ireland's problem, opined Trevelyan, was "not the physical evil of the famine, but the moral evil of a selfish, perverse and turbulent" people. Contemptuously, Parliament did fund various relief efforts. But in 1846, with another blighted crop in Irish fields, "money was useless"; there was no food to buy. Thousands of Irishmen fled, with 37,000 settling in Boston, Mass., in 1847 alone. That summer, England washed its hands of the disaster. All aid ceased. The great famine, concludes British historian Woodham-Smith, hardened the enmity that had "lain like a sword" between England and Ireland for centuries.

THE ITALIAN PAINTERS OF THE RENAISSANCE. By Bernard Berenson. Cornell reprint, 1980. 488 pp. \$14.95

Lithuanian-born, Harvard-educated, Bernard Berenson (1865–1959) devoted his life to attributing Renaissance paintings to the correct artists. His method was unique. He ignored written evidence (signatures, bills of sale) and concentrated on painting style—the way an artist shaped ears or knuckles, for example. Berenson's word on a painting satisfied any art dealer or buyer; his name and "connoisseurship" became synonymous. In these four essays (accompanied by 400 black-and-white plates), written between 1894 and 1907, Berenson delineates the



Madonna and Child by Carlo Crivelli. Samuel H. Kress Collection, National Gallery of Art, Washington.

qualities he valued in Renaissance paintings—youthful optimism, happiness, faith in the individual. He notes that even when depicting religious themes, Renaissance masters drew “handsome, healthy, sane people like themselves.” The technically stunning paintings of Northern European painters like Jan van Eyck, however, demonstrated to Berenson their creators’ concern for their hands rather than their heads. “Greatness,” he declared, is achieved only by the artist who can “seize upon the spirit of life and imprison it.”

SCIENCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. Edited by David C. Lindberg. Univ. of Chicago reprint, 1980, 549 pp. \$9.95

Even during its “golden” age, Rome produced no great scientific theorist and no great technological advance, save for the accidental discovery of cement. The 16 contributors to this readable volume find it ironic that the Middle Ages, by contrast, should be maligned as “dark.” Starting with diffuse scraps of Greek (and later Arab) learning—the barbarian invasions had taken their toll—and without

teachers to define such unfamiliar terms as “square foot,” medieval European scholars refurbished the house of science. They pieced together classical physics, pioneered in optics, and virtually invented chemistry. Physicians introduced trial-and-error experimentation, trying new drugs “first on birds, then on dumb animals, . . . then on the Friars Minor.” Medieval scientists such as Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253) and Roger Bacon (1220–92) were generalists. (Grosseteste studied the tides, the sun, the weather, rainbows, comets, the Bible, free will, and phonetics.) They were also purists—“natural philosophers” who for the most part shunned applied science. Nevertheless, the role of borrowed technologies in advancing knowledge was profound—if sometimes indirect. For example, the Chinese art of papermaking, introduced to Mediterranean lands in 704, made possible the wide circulation of the Ancients’ texts among Western scholars.

THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. By William Julius Wilson. Univ. of Chicago reprint, 1980. 243 pp. \$5.95

When he first published this historical study in 1978, Wilson, a noted black sociologist at the University of Chicago, came under heavy fire from civil rights leaders. But, citing statistics, he stuck to his argument: Racism is no longer the determining factor in the life chances of individual blacks. Young college-educated blacks now do as well financially as their white peers. The real problem is that of the growing black “underclass,” left behind in declining big cities by the U.S. economy’s shift to suburban service industries and Sunbelt high-technology. Hence, Wilson now suggests, black politicians should stop stressing “race” and push for federal policies that produce more jobs for *all* the nation’s poor.

Recent Books by Fellows, Former Fellows, and Wilson Center Staff

THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era. By *Willi Paul Adams*. Univ. of N.C., 1980.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHNIC REVIVAL IN MODERN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY: A Comparative Study of the Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe. By *Erik Allardt*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1979.

THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH. By *Philippe Ariès*. Knopf, 1981.

THE SPONSOR: Notes on a Modern Potentate. By *Erik Barnouw*. Oxford, 1979, paper (cloth, 1978).

GREAT SURVEYS OF THE AMERICAN WEST. By *Richard A. Bartlett*. Univ. of Okla., 1980, paper (cloth, 1962).

WOMEN, WAR, AND REVOLUTION. Edited by *Carol R. Berkin* and *Clara M. Lovett*. Holmes & Meier, 1979, cloth & paper.

HUMANITY IN WARFARE. By *Geoffrey Best*. Columbia, 1980.

CIVILISATION MATÉRIELLE, ÉCONOMIE, ET CAPITALISME. By *Fernand Braudel*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1980.

ON HISTORY. By *Fernand Braudel*. Univ. of Chicago, 1980.

DEMAND REVELATIONS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS. By *Edward H. Clarke*. Ballinger, 1980.

WE AND THEY: Civic and Despotic Cultures. By *Robert Conquest*. London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1980.

BUILDING THE CACTUS CURTAIN: Mexican Migration and U.S. Responses, from Wilson to Carter. By *Wayne A. Cornelius*. Univ. of Calif., 1980.

CHATTEL SLAVERY AND WAGE SLAVERY: The Anglo-American Context, 1830-1860. By *Marcus Cunliffe*. Univ. of Ga., 1979.

DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A Theory of Judicial Review. By *John H. Ely*. Harvard, 1980.

BURNT WATER: Stories. By *Carlos Fuentes*. Farrar, 1980.

AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS: Essays. By *Samuel P. Hays*. Univ. of Tenn., 1980.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY. Edited by *John Higham* and *Paul Conklin*. Johns Hopkins, 1980, paper.

GLOBAL FOOD INTERDEPENDENCE: Challenge to American Foreign Policy. By *Raymond F. Hopkins* and *Donald Puchala*. Columbia, 1980.

COUP THEORIES AND OFFICERS' MOTIVES: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective. By *Donald L. Horowitz*. Princeton, 1981, cloth & paper.

WEAPONS: The International Game of Arms, Money and Diplomacy. By *Russell W. Howe*. Doubleday, 1980.

VOTING IN INDIANA: A Century of Persistence and Change. By *Charles S. Hyeman*. Ind. Univ., 1979.

AFRICAN UPHEAVALS SINCE INDEPENDENCE. By *Grace S. Ibingira*. Westview, 1980.

PORTUGUESE BRAZIL: The King's Plantation. By *James Lang*. Academic, 1979.

WOMEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY: Equality, Development, and Social Change. By *Gail Warshofsky Lapidus*. Univ. of Calif., 1980, cloth & paper.

THE SCIENCE FICTION OF H. G. WELLS. By *Frank McConnell*. Oxford, 1981, cloth & paper.

MEANING OF SOCIAL POLICY: Comparative Dimension in Social Welfare. By *Bernice Madison*. Westview, 1980.

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: Costs and Benefits. By *Selma J. Mushkin*. Ballinger, 1979.

WEALTH OF NATIONS IN CRISIS. By *Ronald C. Nairn*. Bayland Publishing, 1979.

A PRIVATE CHOICE: Abortion in America in the Seventies. By *John T. Noonan, Jr.* Free Press, 1979.

THE ENGLISH CLERGY: The Emergence and Consolidation of a Profession, 1558-1640. By *Rosemary O'Day*. Humanities, 1980.

EL HOMBRE JUNTO AL MAR. By *Heberto Padilla*, Madrid: Seix-Barral, 1980.

DO PARTIES MAKE A DIFFERENCE? By *Richard Rose*. Chatham, 1980, paper.

PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS. Edited by *Richard Rose* and *Ezra N. Suleiman*. American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. By *Bereket Habte Selassie*. Monthly Review, 1980.

MULTINATIONALS IN LATIN AMERICA: Politics of Nationalization. By *Paul E. Sigmund*. Univ. of Wis., 1980.

ANIMAL FACTORIES. By *Peter Singer* and *Jim Mason*. Crown, 1980.

THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: Ethics and Sociobiology. By *Peter Singer*. Farrar, 1981.

INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE: Vietnamese Communism Between Russia and China. By *Richard Smyser*. Ohio Univ., 1980.

RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: Israel's Security Choices, 1967. By *Janice Gross Stein* and *Raymond Tanter*. Ohio State Univ., 1980.

RUSSIAN ART AND AMERICAN MONEY: 1900-1940. By *Robert C. Williams*. Harvard, 1980.

Tolstoy As Believer

Leo Tolstoy's reputation rests primarily on two great novels—*War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*—written during his middle years. But Count Tolstoy was a man of unconventional beliefs. A would-be social reformer in tsarist Russia, ever at war with himself and his family, he died in 1910 trying to escape home, fame, and fortune. Critic Martin Green looks at the evolution of Tolstoy's disruptive ideas, which came to influence, in turn, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King.

by Martin Green

Although most people would rank Leo Tolstoy among the world's giants because he wrote *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, the novelist himself, in the second half of his life, thought of those great epics as works to be ashamed of.

Indeed, when Lev Nikolayevich, Count Tolstoy died, in 1910, his devotees (including novelist William Dean Howells in America) regarded him primarily as a moral reformer, a strong critic of injustice, war, and, among other things, exactly the kind of fiction he had created in his biggest novels.

To ideological Tolstoyans, his spiritual heir would not be the Nobel laureate in literature, Boris Pasternak, but Mahatma Gandhi, who, in turn, influenced Martin Luther King.


Tolstoy's piety and sense of justice were evident early in his life. A hypersensitive child, he was known to the rest of his family as "*Lyova*

Ryova" (Leo the cry-baby) because of his emotional responses to others' sufferings (and joys).

Tolstoy was born in 1828 into what he called the military "caste" in Russia. Even during the 19th century, tsarist Russia had a peculiarly rigid social structure; and the term "caste" was not inappropriate. The aristocrats were soldiers, and their sons became soldiers after them. When they were not in the Army (or serving as civil administrators), they lived on their vast rural estates, with hundreds of serfs to tend the fields.

Tolstoy's family owned a beautiful place, *Yasnaya Polyana*,* 130 miles south of Moscow. Tolstoy described the rolling countryside, and the hunting there, over and over again in his novels. His father (portrayed as the dashing Nicholas Rostov in *War*

*Tolstoy biographer Henri Troyat translates *Yasnaya Polyana* as "Clear Glade," or "Ash Glade."



Tolstoy at age 73. By the time of this 1901 woodcut, Tolstoy had renounced his famous novels and had become a staunch advocate of nonviolence and of a stern Christian faith.

By R. Bryden for Woodcut Portraits of Twelve Men of Letters of the 19th Century. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1899.

and Peace) had been an officer in the Army that fought against Napoleon at the turn of the 19th century. And his grandfather (the sardonic Prince Bolkonsky in *War and Peace*) had been a general under Catherine the Great. Of the four Tolstoy brothers, three, including Leo, became officers in the tsarist Army.

Tolstoy drifted, more or less, into military service. Having left Kazan University in 1847 without taking a degree, the young man was tempted for a time to give up his property and live the simple contemplative life at Yasnaya Polyana.

Yet, ever torn by contradictory desires, Tolstoy also longed to be a dandy, like poet Aleksandr Pushkin,

and to cut a handsome figure in the drawing rooms of St. Petersburg, to gamble and duel, to drink and dance with the gypsies.* "A man who pronounced French badly," he wrote at the time, "aroused in me a feeling of contempt." Later, he said of his youth, "I began to grow depraved. . . . I tried to be elegant."

Alternating between the rustic life and the *dolce vita*, the young Tolstoy faithfully recorded, in a diary, his escapades and gambling losses and then severely chastised himself for his profligacy.

*A remote cousin—called the "American Tolstoy" because of his trip to Alaska, from which he returned tattooed—was a famous duelist and gambler, who married a gypsy.

Bored and unhappy, he went south to the Caucasus in 1851. There he joined his older brother, Nicholas, whose regiment was battling the rebellious Muslim tribesmen of that mountainous territory, which Russia had annexed but not absorbed. (This war lasted more than a half-century, and Russia only won it in 1859 after committing some 200,000 troops.) Tolstoy arrived as an observer, but after going along on a number of expeditions, he signed up as a cadet, or *junker*, in the 4th Battery, 20th Artillery Brigade.

Contradictory Feelings

During the next five years, the future pacifist pamphleteer fought in three wars. In addition to service in the Caucasus, Tolstoy participated in an 1854 campaign in Bessarabia against the failing Turkish empire, and in the Crimean War (1853–56) against the British and French. He was intensely patriotic. In his diary sketches from *Sevastopol* (1855–56), the young artilleryman predicted that the stout defense of the besieged Crimean seaport, “whose hero was the Russian people, will leave mighty traces in Russia for a long time to come.”

Yet, even during the 1850s, Tolstoy expressed contradictory feelings about war and imperialism. He was aware of the horror of the one and fretted occasionally about the injustice of the other. As long as he could take a predominantly aesthetic atti-

tude toward life, in which conflicting feelings fitted together like contrasting colors, the excitement of war subsumed its terror. Even so, in his Crimean War diary, he announced—quite unexpectedly—that he was thinking of devoting the rest of his life to founding a new religion, a demythologized Christianity. The impulse faded, momentarily.

Tolstoy had begun writing autobiographical stories while he was in the Caucasus. His first published work, “Childhood,” appeared in the magazine *Sovremennik* in 1852. It was followed by two sequels (“Boyhood” and “Youth”) and by his first war stories, “The Raid” and “The Woodfelling.”

His ambiguous feelings about war, when given literary expression and resolution, helped to make him a great writer. Together with Stendhal, Tolstoy was the progenitor of all modern imaginative treatments of war, in literature and on film. Equally important, Tolstoy’s combat experience planted the seeds of his later pacifism. He wrestled with his feelings about war all his life. In the 1870s, he renounced all violence. Much later, he condemned the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05); yet he still hoped for a Russian victory.

Yet another ambiguity enriched Tolstoy’s early great novels. As a writer, Tolstoy could successfully depict both romantic love and domesticity—an unusual talent in a novelist of adventure. An author who es-

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pouses one cannot easily celebrate the other. One does not find in Hemingway (or in any other American writer, for that matter) the celebration of family life evident in, for instance, the Kitty and Levin episodes of *Anna Karenina*.

By extolling the virtues of hearth and home, Tolstoy implicitly criticized war and adventure while appealing to the bourgeois sentiments of Russia's novel-reading public during the mid-19th century. Although there is often conflict in Tolstoy's writing, as in his beliefs, traditional domestic values clearly triumphed.

Tolstoy had admired many women and had dallied with prostitutes. But he *believed in* a proper marriage to a young and well-educated girl. He wanted to re-create the happy life of his parents at Yasnaya Polyana. Levin's parents, Tolstoy tells us in *Anna Karenina*, "had lived the sort of life which seemed to Levin the ideal of perfection, and which he had dreamed of restoring with a wife and family of his own."

None of Tolstoy's siblings, who were older, had achieved happiness in the wedded state; thus, his faith in marriage had a certain obstinate quality. He savored the works of English novelists Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and Charlotte Brontë, who all celebrated respectable marriage and domestic happiness.

In 1862, Tolstoy, 34, was five years out of the Army. He hated the new ideas on sex and marriage that were circulating in radical circles in St. Petersburg and Moscow.* Feeling that this was his last chance at hap-

piness, he discarded his peasant mistress and married 18-year-old Sonia Bers. He took her away from Moscow to his home in the country; there, he believed, they would raise a big family and live out an idyll of domesticity.

Sonia believed in traditional marriage with a passion equal to Tolstoy's own. She came from a large, happy clan. Her father, a German Lutheran doctor, raised his daughters (who were older than his sons) to look after their siblings. They were trained as schoolteachers and were also proficient housekeepers—ideal 19th-century wives and mothers. Sonia brought sheets to Yasnaya Polyana as part of her dowry; her new husband and his brothers were used to sleeping under blankets on straw mattresses.

"Do As You Like!"

Sonia also had literary taste. She had fallen in love with Tolstoy when she read, and memorized passages of, "Childhood." The wedding seemed to both of them the beginning of life-long happiness.

Before his marriage, Tolstoy had felt the urge to help the less fortunate. He had been engaged in educational experiments with peasant children, operating a free school in his home at Yasnaya Polyana. He and the student-teachers whom he hired toyed with progressive methods. Their school's motto was "Do as you like!" There was no set curriculum, and lessons took the form of informal chats. By the 1860s, Tolstoy had started 14 such schools in his home district of Krapivna (population: 10,000). Tolstoy also tried working and eating with the peasants in the fields, to their astonishment.

Once married and settled down, Tolstoy entered with new intensity

*The new "theories" were the work of three groups: feminists, who championed equal rights for women; populists, who wanted educated young people not to pursue private happiness but to serve "the people"; and variously flavored socialists, who wanted to liberalize marriage, as well as society.

upon the task of writing *War and Peace*. But this enormous enterprise, he said ruefully, took him away from the People and his efforts at social uplift.

Sonia, unimpressed, encouraged Tolstoy to write. "He disgusts me with his People," she confided to her diary. And she hated the presence of his ex-mistress, Aksinia, who lived in the village of Yasnaya Polyana with her son by Tolstoy. Although Sonia did not lack pity for the poor, she belonged to Moscow, to upper-class social life, and to the world of the arts.

Praising Marriage

During the first 16 years of their marriage, however, Sonia's preference for the sophisticated life was submerged by her preoccupation with her children (she bore 13, of whom 8 grew to maturity). In those years, her family came first, with Leo's writing a close second. She took on a large share of the burden of transcription, later claiming to have copied out most of *War and Peace* seven times, in various drafts.

Although *War and Peace* (1865-69) presents the saga of Napoleon, Tsar Alexander, and the great war between Russia and France, it also reflects the personal relations of various Tolstoys and Leo's in-laws. Because it praised marriage and tranquility in private life, *War and Peace* was widely read in the Russian intellectual world of the 1860s as a salute to conservatism. At the time, young Russian student activists were bent on disrupting the status quo and altering all aspects of society, including marriage and the family.

In 1862, a leader of Russian radicalism, N. G. Chernyshevsky, had begun to publish (from prison) a novel called *What Then Must We Do? or Tales of the New People*. It too was

about marriage, but as practiced among young radicals. Though artistically without merit, it became immensely popular among the young; 30 years later, Lenin was influenced by it. It told of a marriage entered into by both parties solely to help the woman achieve economic and political freedom; of husband and wife working for social reform; and of the husband sacrificing his joyous marriage (by pretending suicide) in order to give her still more freedom.

Chernyshevsky portrayed the ideal marriage as a two-person political cell; Tolstoy portrayed it as the joint creation and enjoyment of children, books, ideas, and feelings. Tolstoy's *War and Peace* obliquely contradicted Chernyshevsky and his admirers. And the obliqueness of Tolstoy's criticism was in itself a further provocation to the radicals. During the 1860s in Russia, as during the late 1960s in America, literary fashion demanded that every artistic creation be "relevant," that it make a radical "statement" of some kind. Thus, the anonymous critic for the *Illustrated Gazette* called *War and Peace* "an apologia for gluttonous aristocrats, sanctimony, hypocrisy and vice."

Loving the Peasants

At this stage, Tolstoy opposed political radicalism; he was interested in domesticity, artistic and intellectual freedom, religion, and the aristocracy. Although he had tried more than once before the Emancipation of 1861 to free his own serfs, without success for one reason or another, he did not want them to cease being peasants. He was as enamored of the peasant life as he was of the countryside itself.

"This summer," he wrote a friend in 1870, "I work, chop, spade, mow



In this turn-of-the-century cartoon, Tolstoy, in rural garb, expresses his dismay to two peasants over Western-style high society fashions in Moscow.

and, luckily for me, do not give one thought to that lit-tra-tyure and those awful lit-try folk." Tolstoy detested towns, factories, and industrialism. He cherished the memory of his parents' aristocratic life.

But even when acting the part of a conservative landowner and famous novelist, Tolstoy was afflicted by contending interests and convictions. He hated the bureaucratic apparatus and autocratic cruelty of the Russian state. He loved the peasants, although they often exasperated him with their suspiciousness and stubbornness, and he admired the primitive tribesmen of the Caucasus and Samara. These feelings soon fired his desire to transform society—in his own fashion. To this end, he sought a religion he could believe in.

Tolstoy was attracted by the ascetic Christianity symbolized by the Sermon on the Mount, but he resisted the dogmatic theology, sacraments, and rituals of the Russian Orthodox Church. He despised the magic and mystery of religion. "To reinforce the teachings of Christ with miracles," he proclaimed, "is like holding a lighted candle in front of the sun in order to see it better."

During the 1870s, while he was writing *Anna Karenina*, he managed, for a time, to assent to the church's teachings. It was the obvious religious option for a wealthy landowner. But he soon found the church's elaborate theology and political subservience to the Tsar unacceptable. According to Tolstoy, church leaders had "cut up the



Drawing by Ilya Repin.

teachings into shreds and tacked their idiotic, vile explanations—hateful to Christ—onto every morsel.”

Meanwhile, the outside world intruded on the private enclave of Yasnaya Polyana. Tolstoy's children began to need tutors, and tutors in late 19th-century Russia were ex-students who were also likely to be ex-revolutionaries.

The first tutor Tolstoy hired for Sergei, his oldest son, had been a member of the revolutionary avant-garde in Russia during the 1860s. This militant socialist, named Alekseev, had even journeyed abroad to live in an agricultural commune in Kansas. When Alekseev came to live at Yasnaya Polyana in 1877, Tolstoy, always interested in what made such men tick, eagerly conversed with him. The two men were to influence each other profoundly on political and religious issues. Sergei later described Alekseev as the first Tolstoyan. But, insofar as the prime elements in the new creed they dis-

cussed were meekness and humility, Alekseev far better exemplified those virtues than did Tolstoy.

Their long discussions occurred against a backdrop of increasing unrest in Russia. During the 1860s, Tsar Alexander II antagonized liberal aristocrats by refusing their plea for a national assembly. Newly freed serfs were bitter about the Emancipation of 1861 because they were now forced to pay for land to which they felt they had a natural right. Inspired by writers like Chernyshevsky, and other radicals, hundreds of university students went to the countryside in 1873–74 to incite the peasants to rebel. The young agitators were sent off to prison or exiled to Siberia. In 1876, the Land and Freedom Party was formed by dissident students and the radical intelligentsia; one anarchist faction urged the assassination of public officials.

In 1881, Russia's political malaise reached a climax. Tsar Alexander II was assassinated in St. Petersburg by a band of students, who were soon arrested and sentenced to be executed. Tolstoy could not accept their fate. Dangerous as it might be, he decided to make a personal protest to the new Tsar, Alexander III. He turned to Alekseev for advice in composing his letter. When Sonia discovered what the two men were planning, she furiously (and unsuccessfully) demanded Alekseev's dismissal. Tolstoy's idyll of marriage was beginning to come apart.

After this incident, Sonia made it clear that she opposed any political activity, however high-minded it might be, that threatened her family's security. Later that year, when Sergei was old enough for college, Sonia insisted that they all move to Moscow, where the children could take part in the social life of their

class. From then on, the Tolstoy family lived at Yasnaya Polyana only in the summers; Tolstoy became, in effect, a lodger in his own house, disapproving of his family's stylish ways in silence.

Moscow's fashionable social life, and the grim existence of the under class, profoundly depressed Tolstoy.* But the more he wanted to leave, the more obligations his wife pressed upon him. She nagged him about his duty to family, friends, and country and threatened to commit suicide if he left her.

During the next 30 years, Tolstoy became a savage critic of the old order and an advocate of nonviolent resistance to it. When workers rioted in 1901, Tolstoy wrote to the Tsar: "The army, that is, the men who are prepared to commit murder, is the cause not only of all the calamities, but also of all the corruption of manners in the world."

He wrote no more novels like *War and Peace*. Instead, he turned out inspirational books and pamphlets, led protests against compulsory military service, took up the causes of political prisoners, denounced Russian foreign policy so harshly that he was threatened with imprisonment, and attacked the church so severely that he was excommunicated.

Tolstoy's religious beliefs were very much intertwined with his efforts to reform Russia. In effect, he created the religion he had been seeking in the Sermon on the Mount (and in Buddhist doctrine). This radical faith taught that evil (both government oppression and revolutionary terrorism) must not be re-

sisted by force. The authoritarian state, like violent revolution, was unacceptable to a man of religion; culture, which reflected the state's will, was also contaminated. Tolstoy read, among others, the American abolitionists, men like William Lloyd Garrison, James Russell Lowell, and Henry David Thoreau—and Christian Socialists like Adin Ballou, a Unitarian-Universalist minister who had long been forgotten by his fellow Americans when Tolstoy discovered him in 1889.

No More Meat

Ballou founded a Christian community in Hopedale, Massachusetts, in the 1840s and published *Christian Non-Resistance*. The community broke up in the 1850s, partly because two of its members found a way to make money there. The son of one of them became a general in the Civil War and later ambassador to Italy, and his daughter married an Italian prince. Thus, by 1889, the ideals of Hopedale had, as so often happens in the history of reform, foundered on personal ambition. But Ballou was still alive to receive Tolstoy's enthusiastic letters. Tolstoy saluted him as one of mankind's greatest blessings, translated his book, and wrote an introduction to it that grew into *The Kingdom of God Is Within You* (1894).

In keeping with his professed beliefs in a simple religion and a spartan life, Tolstoy gave up hunting, meat, wine, and tobacco. Whether in Moscow or at Yasnaya Polyana, he wore peasant smocks, hauled wood, and fetched water for his family.

Under his influence, scores of young Russians refused military service; priests left the ministry; writers became civil resisters; city men went to live on agricultural communes. Many of Tolstoy's disciples were ex-

*Always drawn to the poor, Tolstoy volunteered to help take the 1881 Moscow census. He insisted on canvassing the worst slums and wrote about these visits in his own *What Then Must We Do?* (1902).

iled and quite a few ended their lives in prison or Army penal battalions.

Tolstoy's acolytes came from the aristocracy as well as the peasantry; they wanted revolution, but not violence. It was a doomed, almost quixotic movement. Despite the preachings of Tolstoy and his followers, the tsarist government grew more rigid, and its other opponents, more violent. It was not until some seven years after Tolstoy's death that the Russian Revolution successfully dethroned the Tsar. Then or later, there was little role for pacifists to play.

The Dukhobors

Yet Tolstoy scored some minor victories in his time. Perhaps the most useful was persuading the Russian government to let the Dukhobors emigrate in 1898. The Dukhobors, a Christian communitarian sect in the Caucasus, believed that it was wrong to bear arms; they refused military service. The state confiscated their goods, imprisoned their young men, and sent in the Cossacks.

Tolstoy and his followers, Vladimir Chertkov and Paul Biriukov (who were exiled for their efforts), aroused public opinion on the Dukhobors' behalf inside Russia and out (the English and American Quakers were especially responsive). Money was raised by the sale of a new Tolstoy novel, *Resurrection* (1899), the first in more than 20 years. In the end, the Tsar relented, and thousands of Dukhobors were allowed to leave Russia and settle in Canada.

The scant fiction Tolstoy wrote during the latter part of his life was not like *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*. He wrote short tales—"God Sees the Truth but Waits," "How Much Land Does a Man Need?"

and "Master and Man"—on subjects taken from folklore or religious tradition. Written so they could be understood even by barely literate peasants, these stories championed the uncomplicated life and faith of the poor and rejected the accumulation of property. Artistically, these tales are very simple and very beautiful.


Tolstoy also wrote straight polemics—*A Critique of Dogmatic Theology* (1891), *What Then Must We Do?* (1902), *A Confession* (1882)—against the Orthodox Church, the state, the ruling class.

It was one of these tracts, *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*, that had an overwhelming effect on Gandhi, who was inspired by it to lead his life of political and moral protest. Describing Tolstoy in 1909 as the "Titan of Russia," Gandhi declared himself to be Tolstoy's "humble follower." For his part, Tolstoy, having read Gandhi's manifesto, respected the young reformer, "except for his Hindu patriotism, which spoils everything."

Sonia's Distress

Tolstoy's tracts were mostly banned from publication in Russia. They were printed abroad, however, notably in Geneva, where Biriukov had settled, and in England, where Chertkov had set up the Free World Press. In one of the few books that did come out in Russian, *What Is Art?* (1898), Tolstoy finally repudiated high art and his own work as a novelist.

For the artist, Tolstoy wrote, "it is more important and useful to compose a tale, a touching little song, a *divertissement* or sketch or light interlude, or draw a picture that will delight dozens of generations, that is, millions of children and adults, than



The last photograph of Leo and Sonya together, taken at Yasnaya Polyana in 1910, the year Tolstoy died.

Photo by S. A. Tolstoy.

a novel, symphony or painting that will enchant a few representatives of the wealthy classes and then be forgotten forever."

Tolstoy thought of *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina* as having been written for the few. "Art must not be regarded as a means of procuring pleasure," he argued, "but as an aspect of social life." The mark of quality for a work of art, he felt, was the approval of the masses.

Although his later books were regularly suppressed by church and state censors during the 1880s and '90s, everything Tolstoy said and did aroused excitement. He had, of course, lost his former allies among the conservatives, men like the poet Afanasy Fet and the Slavophiles Yuri Samarin and Ivan Aksokov. And he was not acceptable to Marxist revolutionaries because he repudiated violence. But, between those extremes, there were thousands of Russians to whom Tolstoy was a hero.

When the tsarist authorities banned the distribution of *What I Believe* (1883) after the book was printed, no copies were actually destroyed, and Tolstoy's words found their readers. Many other manuscripts, with titles like "Shame!" and "Is There No Way Out?" were copied by hand or typed and circulated clandestinely—like the present-day *Samizdat* literature of Soviet dissidents.

None of this, of course, pleased Tolstoy's wife. His new argumentative style seemed to Sonia boring and harsh; his new egalitarian ideas impractical when they were not wrong.

In his diary, Tolstoy outlined the ideal existence for his family: "Our life, food and clothes will be of the utmost simplicity. Everything superfluous, piano, furniture, coach horses, will be sold or given away. Concentrate exclusively on the sciences and arts that can be under-

TOLSTOY AND THE 1905 REVOLUTION

On Sunday, January 22, 1905, Russian workers marched on Tsar Nicholas II's Winter Palace in St. Petersburg demanding an eight-hour workday and a national constitution; several hundred were slain by the Tsar's guards. "Bloody Sunday" was followed by scattered uprisings, culminating in a nationwide railroad strike and the short-lived formation, in St. Petersburg, of a Soviet of Workers' Deputies. At Yasnaya Polyana, Tolstoy was upset by the civil unrest. He sided with the workers' push for change. But he detested both the use of violence in trying to achieve it and the rhetoric of the radical activists who invoked Karl Marx and Georgy Gapon. Here, in a letter dated September 20, 1906, he gives his views to an admirer, critic V. V. Stasov, head of the St. Petersburg Public Library:

Unless the people, the real people, the hundred million peasants who work on the land, by their passive non-participation in violence make all this frivolous, noisy, irritable and touchy crowd harmless and unnecessary, we shall certainly arrive at a military dictatorship, and arrive at it by way of the great crimes and corruption which have already begun. In order to replace an obsolete system by another one, it is necessary to set up an ideal which is lofty, universal and accessible to all the people. But the intelligentsia and the proletariat who are goaded on by them have nothing like that—they have only words, and not their own, but other people's. So this is what I think: I rejoice for the revolution, but grieve for those who, imagining that they are making it, are destroying it. The violence of the old regime will only be destroyed by non-participation in violence, and not at all by the new and foolish acts of violence which are now being committed.

stood by all. Equal treatment for all, from governor to beggar."

To Sonia, such notions simply reflected the old socialist ideas of men like Chernyshevsky, who had earlier extolled the glories of the "new" marriage. As she saw it, Tolstoy during the 1880s and '90s was behaving and writing like his radical critics of the 1860s.

Saluted by much of liberal Europe and Russia as the victim of authoritarian repression, Tolstoy was no hero in his own house. Almost his entire family—not just Sonia—was against him. His five sons rejected his schemes for reforming society

and found his preaching foolish. They and Sonia allowed him to have his opinions as long as he merely wrote them down and "did nothing about them." While he lived with his family, Tolstoy remained under their control. By living at home, he also lived in considerable comfort; hence, as critics noted, his public sermons on simplifying one's life seemed tinged with hypocrisy.

To keep peace in the family, Tolstoy transferred to Sonia the copyrights on his early books and gave her control over his property. But he continued to reside at Yasnaya Polyana or at the house in Moscow. He

believed private property was evil; "Property equals theft," he proclaimed. But self-dispossession was as far as he felt he could go toward poverty without incurring the wrath of his demanding clan.

Tolstoy might wear a peasant blouse, cobble his own shoes, eat only oatmeal, but he was served by footmen wearing white gloves. His daughters wore the latest fashions, played tennis, and listened to the gramophone. Celebrities came to dinner. To his family, servants, and guests, he was still Count Tolstoy, the nobleman and novelist who had an odd growing penchant for asceticism.

As we have seen, the government, too, coddled Tolstoy. It let him write his subversive books and publish them abroad or circulate them secretly. It did not punish him; it arrested those who read the books and tried to implement their teachings. To the Russian authorities, Tolstoy was a valuable national property, albeit a man with ill-considered theories that were heretical and potentially dangerous.

This suppression by indulgence was soft torture for Tolstoy. But he submitted himself to it, accepted it as a form of martyrdom that came his way, even though it was psychologically more painful than the outright punishment (prison or the gallows) he expected and half hoped for.

In October 1910, he awoke one night at *Yasnaya Polyana* to find Sonia rifling his desk drawers seeking his diary. Fed up with this control and his self-contradictory life, Tolstoy, at age 82, tried to run away and hide.

This was, of course, impossible. He was recognized everywhere he went; newspapers carried the story. His wife summoned her children and hired a special train to pursue him. At one point, he fell ill and was taken to the stationmaster's house in the village of *Astapovo*, 200 miles southwest of Moscow. When Sonia arrived, she was not allowed to see him. Even the cameramen of *Pathé-News* were there, recording the domestic tragedy—photographing Sonia peering through the windows of the house in which her husband lay stricken with pneumonia. He finally died on November 20, 1910.

An Enduring Power

Thus, Tolstoy's 30-year crusade to transform Russian society started in his middle years, after the two great novels, and ended with a frantic, doomed attempt to escape from his family, his fame, and his wealth. All had conspired to exacerbate the ambiguities of his life.

Although he had inspired scores of young Russians and had helped to bring the inequities of the tsarist regime to the fore, his pacifism and religiousity were inevitably spurned by the anarchists and militant Marxists who turned Russian society upside down in 1917 and gave us the Soviet Union.

In the end, Tolstoy's love of social justice and his credo of nonviolence found no place in his own culture. His ideas could not prosper in Russia. Transformed into action in other settings, first by Mahatma Gandhi in British India, and later by Martin Luther King in the American South, however, these ideas developed a power that endures to this day.

The Lisle Letters

In 1940, poet T. S. Eliot, then a London editor, commissioned historian Muriel St. Clare Byrne to undertake the first annotated edition of England's illuminating 16th-century Lisle Letters—the personal and official correspondence of Arthur Plantagenet (Viscount Lisle), his wife, and his friends. The product of Byrne's scholarship will be published, in six volumes, on May 31, by the University of Chicago Press. The 3,000 Lisle Letters cover the most memorable seven years (1533–40) in the reign of Henry VIII. Through the pens of Lisle and his household, the reader gains extraordinary access to daily life in Tudor England—and gets an inside look, as well, at the “wily world” of court politics and diplomacy. Here we present a summary of the Lisle Letters drawn from Byrne's own lively introduction.

by Muriel St. Clare Byrne

Those who delight in being lured backward through time quickly become aware of two things—the way things change and the way things do not change.

So much detail remains of the past, so many documents, so much information about meals and manners, customs and costumes, that at first it seems comparatively easy to grope one's way back, holding on to the chairs and tables while the intelligence pieces it together; until suddenly there comes a moment of direct contact, and the whole reconstruction shows itself to the historian

for what it is—synthetic, unsatisfying.

Such, at any rate, was my own experience in studying 16th-century England and its people. One can rebuild their houses, furnish their rooms, lay out their very garments for them; but not so will you persuade the past to send back one individual ghost. Not so can you pass the defenses, get beneath the skin, feel the pulse beat to another tune.

Like Henry James's Ralph Pendrel in *The Sense of the Past*, I wanted to “scale the high wall into which the successive years, each a squared

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From J. Anstis, *The Register of the Most Noble Order of the Garter*, 1724; the Newberry Library, Chicago.

Procession of the Garter Knights, so designated by the King. Arthur Lisle, sixth from left, was once forced to pawn his gold Garter Collar to pay a debt.

block, pile themselves in our rear." I wanted to fall to my knees and rise clutching the very earth in my hand, as legend says William the Conqueror did when he landed in England in 1066.

Because my starting point was the Tudor century, it was only a matter of time before I encountered—in 1932—the Lisle Letters. Here was the earth, not the background but the soil itself. In this great collection, I found the lost moment that was Tudor England.

I say "moment" advisedly, because it is by virtue of their intensity that the Lisle Letters are unique. There are some 3,000 of them, but they cover a period of only seven years, from 1533 to 1540.

It is moment-to-moment life, sensation, and thought that are recorded here—all the intimate hopes and fears, the trivial preoccupations, the obstinacies, the generousities, the wire-pulling, the money troubles, the

almost unbelievable "dailyness" of life.

And besides this, the letters have what one has no logical right to expect—a concentrated and sustained narrative interest, with a tragic and dramatic climax: Viscount Lisle's sudden imprisonment by King Henry VIII, the breakup of his household, and his death in the Tower of London, at age 80, as a royal pardon was on its way.

The story told by the Lisle Letters centers on three people: Arthur Plantagenet (Viscount Lisle), whom Henry once called "the gentlest heart living"; his second wife, Honor, a daughter of the Grenvilles of Cornwall*; and their "man of business," John Husee, gentleman of London.

*Honor Grenville and Arthur Plantagenet, Viscount Lisle, were married in late 1528 or early 1529. Both had been previously married. To their union, Honor brought four sons and three daughters, Arthur three daughters. They had no children of their own.

Arthur Lisle was the illegitimate son of Edward IV, the last Plantagenet king. He flourished as one of the personal attendants and boon companions of his nephew Henry VIII—though he was far older, being about 70 to Henry's 40 when the letters begin in 1533.

Until that year, Arthur Lisle and his family had lived the life of the English gentry of their day. A certain amount of time was spent in attendance at court; the rest of the year was generally occupied with the management and the pleasures of their country estates, and with local administrative duties. In 1533, however, Lisle was appointed to the office of Lord Deputy of Calais—a position somewhat resembling that of a colonial Governor General.

Accompanied by his wife, Lisle took up his residence in Calais in June and remained in office until summoned back to England in 1540. The appointment was a popular one in Calais, and local notables did their best to make Lisle welcome.

Sir Christopher Garneys wrote to the new Lord Deputy before his arrival:

I have caused Master Hastings to retain the gardener to keep the gardens and the house sweet until your coming. . . . Also it hath pleased the King to send for all the pheasants that my [previous] lord had. Nevertheless there is kept for you a cock and a hen, and ye shall be sure of three more hens against your coming, whereby I think ye shall have this year 50 or 60 eggs. . . .

Yet the 120-square-mile territory of Calais was and always had been a difficult post and was recognized as England's last remaining bridgehead in Europe. The town itself was populated with Flemings and French and Englishmen, and domestic friction was rife: among members of the Calais Council, between papist and Lutheran.

Calais, moreover, was a pear ripe for the plucking by the Holy Roman Empire to the south and east and France to the west; the network of dykes, canals, and windmills, which successfully kept much of the surrounding terrain above water, was so designed that by closing the sluices the country immediately around Calais could be inundated in the event of an enemy attack.

It was Lisle's task to keep the defenses repaired and the garrison victualled, and otherwise maintain order in the town. He got little help from London. "I have divers and sundry times written unto you," he reminded Thomas Cromwell, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,

for the victualling of this town, in the which, to this day, we have had no answer ne yet redress; for I do ensure you that there is not six bullocks here to be had for money, and much less cheese and tallow and other victuals, as malt and beer. . . .

Lisle fulfilled his responsibilities with diligence. Yet, in the end, it must be admitted that Calais remained in English hands during his

Muriel St. Clare Byrne, 85, is the editor of The Lisle Letters. Born in England, she was graduated from Somerville College, Oxford, and from 1923 until 1955 taught at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art. In 1955 she received the Order of the British Empire. Her books include Elizabethan Life in Town and Country (1925), and The Elizabethan Zoo (1926). She is the editor of The Letters of Henry VIII (1936), and the co-author (with Dorothy L. Sayers) of a play, Busman's Holiday (1936).

THE WORLD OF THE LISLE LETTERS, 1540

During Arthur Lisle's lifetime, Western European diplomacy involved a triangular contest among France, Britain, and the Holy Roman Empire. But the task of running his estates, not foreign policy, absorbed most of Lisle's attention. He owned property in 15 English counties.

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tenure only because neither the King of France nor the Holy Roman Emperor made any attempt to seize it. When the attempt was made by the French in 1558, it succeeded at once.

Had Arthur Lisle ended his days peacefully, he would be little more than a name to us—Knight of the Garter, Vice Admiral of England, Lord Deputy of Calais.

But the unhappy chance that at one blow deprived him of rank, titles, possessions, and liberty—his wrongful implication in the Botolf Conspiracy, which aimed to hand over Calais to the French—meant also that the seven years of family correspondence that had accumulated at Lisle's official residence in Calais were seized by order of the King. The letters have been preserved ever since among the State Papers.

The commissioners responsible for

the confiscation were looking for items of treasonable import. They did not discriminate but seized upon business and personal letters alike; upon begging letters and dunning letters, children's letters, letters from friends, doctors' prescriptions, marriage proposals that came to nothing, bills for shoe leather long since worn through, notes refusing invitations to dinners that had cooled on the tables five years before, and letters expressing an ardor that apparently never cooled. "My nowne swete hart," Lisle wrote to his wife. "I think so much upon you I cannot sleep in the night."

The years covered by the Lisle Letters, moreover, are of great significance in the history of England—the years of Thomas Cromwell's rise to power, and of his sudden fall.

Cromwell, son of a Putney blacksmith, had won King Henry's confi-

dence as a secretary to that great but failing diplomat, Cardinal Wolsey. He had the clearest mind and coolest head in the kingdom, and upon Wolsey's death he prospered—first as Privy Councillor and Chancellor of the Exchequer, ultimately as Keeper of the Privy Seal and Great Chamberlain of England.

The chief basis of Cromwell's power was his control of access to the King's ear—and the information that reached it. It was crucial to Cromwell that everyone depend on *him*, and on one occasion he rebuked Lisle, through John Husee, for attempting to bypass the arrangement. "This day I have spoken with Mr. Secretary," Husee wrote,

who is not a little displeased that your lordship wrote unto Stephen Vaughn touching the money of Mr. Hacket's legacy and bequest, and said that he was as credible as Vaughn and thought your lordship mistrusted him.

The experience of our own times should make us peculiarly aware of the likeness between modern political opportunists and their Tudor equivalents, who were certainly as intelligent as ours, and presumably equally cynical.

It is hard to imagine Cromwell reading Lisle a stern lecture on the selling of offices in Calais (as he did) unless one supposes that he later indulged in a belly laugh after he himself pocketed annuities, bribes, and fees from gentle and simple, rich and poor, even getting £1,000 from Lisle for services rendered.

But Cromwell was also a shrewd power broker. He conceived and set into place the apparatus of a modern authoritarian regime, expressly tailored to the character of Henry VIII, whom the French ambassador once described as "the most dangerous and cruel man in the world."

Its aim was the security of the State, at whatever cost to individuals (such as Sir Thomas More) or to existing institutions (such as the Church). At its core was the calculated use of terrorism—and a new civil service, recruited from the ranks of gentlemen and merchants, rather than the nobility or the clergy, who had other loyalties.

As under any form of dictatorship, it was not advisable to express opinions at variance with those officially held, and the letters make us very conscious of the extent of the danger. "Keep all things secreter than you have been used," Sir Francis Bryan warned his old friend Lisle, "for there is nothing done nor spoken but it is with speed knowen in court."



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Thomas Cromwell, confidant of Henry VIII, in a portrait by Holbein.

Just before he left England for Calais, Lisle officiated at Anne Boleyn's coronation banquet. The years that followed saw the execution of Thomas More and the completion of Henry VIII's breach with Rome—both over the issue of the King's divorce from Catherine of Aragon.

We read in the Letters of Anne Boleyn's execution—"Anne the late Queen suffered with the sword this day in the Tower, upon a new scaffold"—for failing to provide Henry with a male heir; and of the dissolution of the monasteries and the confiscation of their wealth as the conflict with the Pope widened.

And we see Lisle embroiled, through his sensitive position at Calais, in Henry's "judicious meddling" in foreign affairs as he sought to ensure that France and the Holy Roman Empire would not unite, at the Pope's instigation, to invade England. It was, as John Husee was wont to say, a "wily world."

There is no extant portrait of Arthur Plantagenet, not even a conventionally sculpted tombstone effigy to hint at his appearance. Perhaps among the various unidentified Holbein drawings there lurks the true image of the man, though personally I doubt it.

It may be that in the figure representing Viscount Lisle in the procession of the Garter knights we have warrant for the cut of his beard and type of countenance, as neither is wholly conventional. We also have his thumbprint, remarkably clear, preserved in the wax with which he sealed an obligation in 1512. From this, no doubt, enthusiastic speculation might well reconstruct the whole man, even as it has built up a race of Abominable Snowmen from a footprint.

A less extravagant exercise would be to consider his heredity. Lisle was a Plantagenet, from a family whose strongly marked physical characteristics survived in generation after generation: the large frame; the fair, florid countenance; the graceful strength. Edward IV, Lisle's father, was reputed to have been the handsomest monarch who ever sat on the English throne.

Arthur Plantagenet did not share the dissolute style of living which ended his father's life at the age of 40. But it would be a mistake to infer from the complete happiness of his marriage to Honor Grenville that he maintained standards of conduct other than those of his day.

We need not put too liberal or literal an interpretation on the friendly chaffing in which Sir Francis Bryan indulged in some of his letters to Lisle, but his tone was that of mildly sardonic reminiscence over the shared amorous indiscretions of a now devoted husband:

Sir, whereas in your last letter I perceived that in Calais ye have sufficient of courtizans to furnish and accomplish my desires, I do thank you of your good provision, but this shall be to advertize that since my coming hither [to Marseilles] I have called to my remembrance the misliving that ye and such other hath brought me to; for which, being repented, have had absolution of the Pope. And because ye be my friend, I would advertise you in likewise to be sorry of what you have done.

To Lisle's princely disposition all bore witness. Honor's nephew, Sir Richard Grenville, wrote on one occasion, "For God's sake be good to yourself. For a great while ye have been good to all the world that has desired you."

Characteristically enough, Sir Richard promptly proceeded to beg

from Lisle a farm in the West Country for one of the family.

Lisle was essentially a good-natured, social being, more affable than astute, a fine host and a popular guest, ready to enjoy life if it would only let him. He did not ask much more, in those last years, than that it should provide him with his "gentle bedfellow," Honor, his good food, the specially chosen wine "for his own drinking," and enough money.

Enough money—that was always the trouble. It looks as if Arthur Lisle had always been royally careless about money matters, and was incapable by nature of being anything but lavish and open-handed.

In good Tudor fashion, bills went unpaid not only for months but for years, and creditors' letters were left unanswered. It made things very awkward for Husee as Lisle's man of business in London.

To Honor Lisle, less extravagant by nature, there fell in consequence the task of endeavoring to curb her husband's lavish spirit, and many of the letters requesting payment were addressed directly to her. "Desiring your ladyship," Husee wrote, "that I may have money sent to pay the grocer and the chandler, for they never leave crying and calling upon me for it." And again: "The pewterer is but a knave and will not serve you without ready money."

Honor Lisle reflects in a remarkable manner the difference between the theory of women's place in the scheme of things, as set forth in the mass of 16th-century treatises on the subject, and the reality as we encounter it in the actual lives of noblewomen of the time.

It is obvious from the tone of her letters that Honor possessed to a high degree the family characteristics—pride, energy, a domineering

spirit—that were to bring the Grenvilles into prominence during the later Tudor and Stuart reigns. She ran things. Cromwell and others might hint at the danger of feminine interference in matters of state but it was Honor who made the financial proposals when Henry VIII's Treasurer insisted that Lisle's debts to the King be paid. And it was Lisle who wrote, "I bind myself to perform what my wife promised."


She obviously had a considerable store of legal and practical knowledge. It was to Honor that stewards and trustees and tenants wrote about rents and court days, fines and leases; about the picking of the flax, the gathering and threshing of wheat; about damages to property, trespasses, fishing rights, and repairs.

In spite of the "phlegmatic" constitution attributed to her by one doctor, Honor gives the impression of robust energy and health.

"Thank God I was but once sick in all the way," she wrote to Lisle after a particularly long Channel crossing. Reaching her lodging at Dover at 10:00 P.M., she found she was not expected and so entertained the men who had crossed with her with "merry tales" until supper was ready. Then she wrote a letter to her husband before retiring to bed, admitting no weariness save that "I shall think every hour ten till I be with you again."

That Honor Lisle had a sharp tongue is clear. When she took Thomas Raynsford into her service, his friend Sir Thomas Elyot warned that the young man was fond of gambling, but he advised Honor that the vice could be cured by "your sharp admonition and commandment, which I perceive he doth much esteem and dread."

The only known likeness of Honor Grenville, Lady Lisle, taken from the tombstone effigy of her first husband, John Bassett.



*From Transactions of the
Exeter Diocesan
Architectural Society,
vol. 6 (1856), pl. 2.*

Discipline had to be preserved in a Tudor household, and in this one it would not come from the easy-going master.

While Honor Lisle ran the household in Calais, John Husee, the family's faithful London agent, conducted their business on the other side of the Channel. Husee is the author of more than 500 letters—and perhaps the most engaging character in the correspondence.

It is Husee's letters, as a body, which provide the best account of the practical working of "the system"—by which I simply mean the way things worked in the real world of politics and finance. For an affluent Tudor family to maintain its position, especially during the rampant inflation of the 1530s, it had always to be on the move.

Noble gentlemen were continually borrowing money and lending it, buying and selling offices, exchanging gifts and courtesies, asking and giving favors for themselves and their innumerable dependents. They repeatedly made suit to the King for grants of land, or the rents from a certain estate, or an annuity, or the income from some honorary sinecure.*

Even the easy-going Lisle, when at home in England, was sufficiently on the spot (in both senses of the phrase) and sufficiently connected to the center of power to look after his own interests and further them, either by direct appeal to Henry or by a word and a gift to the right person, at the right moment. But after less than a year in Calais, he realized that a first-rate confidential agent at court was a necessity. The man he chose was John Husee.

During the years the Lisles lived at Calais, it was Husee who filed the lawsuits, petitioned the King, and distributed gifts and "tokens" to the powerful men and women whose favors he sought on behalf of his patron. He knew exactly how the system worked and knew the art of "waiting upon" the great ones of the Earth. He knew what tips to give and when letters of thanks or presents

* The competition reached fever pitch after 1536 when Henry, as part of his campaign against the Pope, dissolved some 700 monasteries and convents and sold their lands to his supporters at bargain prices. Arthur Lisle coveted Frithelstock Priory, but his "long suit" for the grant was continually delayed by Sir Richard Riche, Chancellor of the Augmentations, the man who had perjured himself to convict Sir Thomas More. "I trust God will be revenged on him for the troubles he hath Judasly put me unto," Husee complains. Thomas Cromwell made a small fortune off the monasteries, as did his nephew Richard Cromwell, ensuring that Richard's great-grandson Oliver, the Lord Protector, would be a man of property.

were required from his lord and lady.

And Husee took pains always to remind a worried Arthur Lisle that he was esteemed by the powerful Cromwell on whom so much depended. "My Lord Privy Seal," he wrote, "shewed me this day that he remembereth your lordship oftener than he hath fingers or toes." In his perpetual reassurances he was obviously also trying to reassure himself. Thomas Cromwell was the one person who really baffled Husee.

A few years' experience of handling the Lisle family affairs quickly taught Husee more worldly wisdom than many years of court life ever taught Viscount Lisle. When, as frequently happened, Husee offered his "poor advice," it was always sound; never more so, incidentally, than when he counseled Lisle how to deal with Henry VIII.

If he *must* write to the King, then the fewer lines the better, "for I have heard say that His Grace loveth not to read long letters."

Husee was a complete manual of Tudor court politics and etiquette. He knew what was proper to every occasion and did his best to keep Lisle up to the mark:

Your lordship must needs send Mr. Russell two pieces of French wine, for if they were worth £200 he hath deserved them. I have given him already the piece of French wine your lordship sent hither for your own drinking.

His scheme of values was always nicely graded: Donor's rank and services rendered were estimated and appraised. Sir John Russell was awarded his six hogsheads of wine. But Husee had no use for extravagance, or for gifts that would not be appreciated. "As for your dog," he wrote to Honor Lisle, "the same may

be right well spared, for I have been informed her Grace maketh not greatly of them."

Husee did nearly all of Lady Lisle's shopping for her in London. He knew her ladyship's tastes to a nicety, and was always a close bargainer:

And where your ladyship writeth that the riband was dear, I bought it as I would have done for my life; and I am sure there is none better to be had in London of that price.

Nothing was ever too much trouble for Husee.

He would stand over the tailor while Lady Lisle's new gown was being cut out in order to see that not an inch of the material was wasted. He ordered the groceries, bargained with tradesmen, and kept creditors at bay with promises and small sums of ready money, often his own.

He lied for his master; saw to it that Lisle's stepdaughters had the right clothes for Court; and he did his best to keep Lady Lisle supplied with waiting-gentlewomen.

His troubles when dealing with the hiring problem have often a very familiar ring. Good waiting-gentlewomen were not to be had for the mere asking: They had to be carefully inquired for among friends:

I can get no woman for your ladyship that is worth the sending. Howbeit, I have laid await in divers places. She that dwelt with the Lord Dacres is not to my mind.

And then, as now, the good ones could afford to pick and choose:

Further, touching the woman my Lady Rutland 'pointed your ladyship, your ladyship shall understand that she hath now returned her home unto her father, saying plainly that she is not for you.

Husee remained marvelously even-tempered. There were a few

A contemporary drawing of Henry VIII, in the manner of Holbein. Lisle got along well with his young nephew, even sent over his own executioner from Calais to behead Anne Boleyn.



*Staatliche Graphische Sammlung
München.*

people, however, who irritated him past bearing. One of these was the Abbot of Westminster, who gave him a great deal of trouble about a cask of wine, and on whose head he called down the worst imprecation to which he could lay tongue. "I would he had a tun of wine, and the cask, in his belly!"

He could also be neatly ironic, not to say catty, when other people were too busy or too careless to give to the Lises' affairs the same tireless devotion that he himself gave. His remarks on Sir Antony Windsor, for example, Lisle's Receiver General, always have an astringent flavor: "he keepeth his old wont—that is, the Whitsun holidays and the sending of my lord's money are all one."

By 1538, Husee and his pertinacity had apparently become something of a joke in high places. He himself unconsciously revealed the fact, in an


account he sent Lisle of his reception at Court when he presented his master's New Year's gift to the King. "As soon as I was within the chamber of presence," he wrote,

my lord Privy Seal [Cromwell] smiled, and said to the King's Grace, "Here cometh my Lord Lisle's man!"; and the King spake merrily unto him again, but what his Highness said I cannot tell.

One would give a good deal to know what Henry VIII said to Cromwell about Husee.

Arthur Lisle never became, in the full sense, a man of affairs, and both he and his wife were too simple, too direct in their dealings for the world of official rivalry and intrigue at Henry VIII's court.

It never occurred to the Lady Deputy, for example, that because the King was "reforming" the Church and its services, it might be well for



The Tower of London, where Lisle died in 1542.

her to reform her own "papish" custom of prayer and religious observance. "Conform yourself partly to the thing that is used, and to the world as it goeth now," Husee implored her; indeed, "to beguile the time, look like the time."

But that was exactly what neither Arthur nor Honor Lisle could bring themselves to do in a consistent and convincing manner. When it came to the point, they were themselves: personalities, honest individuals, not the mere creatures of power. It was this quality in them that won Husee's devoted service.

The Lisle Letters ended in 1540 as abruptly as they began seven years earlier. Toward the end, we read in-

creasingly of strife in Calais "by reason of variety in opinion in Christ's religion," and we learn that Cromwell's instructions to Lisle on dealing with the situation allowed far more leniency toward "heretics" than King Henry was disposed to grant. When the King sent a commission to Calais in April 1540 to investigate the matter, Cromwell needed to cover his tracks.

For the Lord Chancellor's power was ebbing fast. The marriage he had arranged between Henry and Anne of Cleves had proved disastrous: The King dismissed her as a "Flemish mare" and promptly sought a divorce. The Duke of Norfolk and his allies, meanwhile, sworn

enemies of Cromwell, were rising in royal favor. Arthur Lisle had felt the winds of change. While continuing to correspond courteously with Cromwell, he made overtures to the Norfolk faction. Norfolk saw the royal Calais Commission as the key to Cromwell's downfall.

As a desperate bid to deflect attention, I believe, Cromwell leveled charges of treason against Lisle in connection with a rather farcical scheme by Sir Gregory Botolf to storm Calais and turn it over to Henry's enemies. Lured back to England by intimations of an earldom, Lisle was arrested and imprisoned in the Tower of London. There he remained for two years, although the King, according to the French Ambassador, "cannot believe the said Deputy hath erred of malice [but] rather by ignorance."

There is not much more to our story. Lisle's family was imprisoned at Calais, and his possessions and property were confiscated. It was all done quickly. "And so," wrote the Earl of Sussex from Calais, "we have

broken up and dissolved the household." As for Cromwell, his feint proved useless. He was arrested on June 10, 1540, and executed shortly thereafter for treason.

Two years later, in March 1542, Henry VIII pardoned the Lisle family. Honor and her daughters were given their freedom, and we know that Lady Lisle lived comfortably for another 24 years on her restored estates, though she never remarried.

But Arthur Lisle savored the sweetness of vindication for only a few hours. He died in the Tower on March 3, at the age of 80, shortly after learning that he was soon to be released. We have a record of his last moments:

His Innocency after much search appearing, the King sent [Lisle] his Ring from off his own Finger, with such comfortable Expressions, that he immoderately receiving so great a pressure of Joy, his Heart was overcharged therewith, and the Night following he yielded up his Ghost; which makes it observable that this King's Mercy was as fatal as his Judgements.



COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

How Will the Soviets Cure What Ails Them?

In our concern over American unemployment, inflation, the adequacy of our oil supplies, and what we view as the ever-increasing power and expansion of the Soviet Union, we sometimes forget that the Soviet Union itself has problems. All three articles on "The Soviet Future" [WQ, Winter 1981] help to redress that imbalance.

The main sources of their problems are inadequate food and the events in Poland. To some extent, these factors are interrelated. The shortage of food helped to precipitate the workers' unrest in Poland. And the two bad harvests in the Soviet Union, furthered by the U.S. grain embargo, have raised the specter of a similar happening there. Already there have been reports of work stoppages in scattered cities throughout the Soviet Union. There were even rumors of a general strike in Odessa in October 1980.

Even with a good harvest, however, the Soviets will have a problem digesting the Polish developments. This has been a truly momentous event—perhaps even a turning point in history. In a sense, this was what Marx was calling for—granted that it occurred 63 years after "the Communist Revolution."

The question is can the Soviets limit this cancer to Poland, or will it spread elsewhere to Eastern Europe or, in the extreme, to the Soviet Union itself? In the old days, the Soviets would not have hesitated to suppress such corrosive tendencies immediately. But any Soviet re-

pression is bound to be met with at least temporary distress by the rest of the world.

This is a "no win" situation. If the Soviets should end up with another poor harvest, they may find it impossible to muddle through as they have so often in the past.

*Marshall I. Goldman
Russian Research Center
Harvard University*

The Soviets' Window

Murray Feshbach ["A Different Crisis," WQ, Winter 1981] is probably correct in his forecast that, as the end of the 20th century approaches, already-serious Soviet domestic difficulties will worsen. Clearly, the minority problem, especially as related to the growing Muslim population, will intensify. Our projections [at the University of Kansas] are that by the end of the 1980s, and early in the '90s, food output per capita, particularly of livestock products, will be even less than the present inadequate levels.

Moreover, CIA studies and the work of my colleague Leslie Dienes persuade me that Soviet gas and oil will be increasingly difficult to obtain over the next few decades. Since oil and gas are a crucial source of Soviet hard currency, the Soviets will have to make ever more difficult choices between earning much-needed Western currency from energy sales and supplying their Eastern European clients, who already suffer severe energy shortages.

Our own research has revealed a periodic fluctuation in Soviet grain yields that has been unbroken since the 1920s—i.e., five or six relatively good years followed by five or six relatively bad years. If the pattern continues, the mid-1980s will be relatively good crop years, followed by another period of poorer harvests as the 1990s approach. Moreover, tentative analysis strongly suggests still another alternating pattern. On balance, Soviet behavior in world affairs tends to be more cooperative after unfavorable grain harvests and more aggressive after

better harvests.

Let us assume that by the mid-1980s the Afghan and Polish problems will have been more-or-less resolved in the Soviets' favor; that, at least temporarily, grain will be relatively plentiful; but that the energy and nationality problems will have worsened significantly. Let us also assume that the Reagan administration and Congress will have agreed to strengthen U.S. defenses considerably, a goal that cannot be realized until late in the decade. History is full of instances of beleaguered national leaders turning to aggression by way of externalizing serious domestic problems.

If these assumptions came to pass, surely the men in the Kremlin would take a serious look at a "window" that could offer external answers to major domestic problems and also expand the empire. Soviet control over the Persian Gulf area would serve both ends.

Roy D. Laird
Professor of Political Science
University of Kansas

Television's Invisible Influence on Society

Re "Television in America" [WQ, Winter 1981]:

Marshall McLuhan once wrote that, when a "new technology comes into a social milieu it cannot cease to permeate that milieu until every institution is saturated." Few people, however, are aware of how deeply new communications media can change the processes and values of the institutions in which they work or participate.

In order to comprehend the depth of change that is likely to occur in an institution, one must understand how closely that institution is tied to older forms of communication. Law, one of the most fundamental societal institutions, provides an interesting example. It employs habits of thought, concepts of time and space, and patterns of behavior that have been conditioned by print. Liberal legal values are traceable in part to the

changes that the invention of printing caused in the distribution of information. The essential qualities of television are vitally important to understand. These include the use of images, electronic speed, and communication over vast distances.

The content of television programs, which has dominated communications research on television, is certainly important and influential. What lights up the screen, however, should not blind us to the unseen aspects of television that may have more profound long-term implications and cause fundamental change in many traditional institutions.

Ethan Katsh
Associate Professor of Legal Studies
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Live from the White House

Your splendid cluster of articles on television managed to glide past a ripening problem that should concern deeply all who love republican government. The problem began innocently when the advent of commercial television, coinciding with victory in World War II, seemed a symbol of the better world that had been promised. Because the new medium was launched in such happy circumstances, the unsuspecting political system did not have its guard up. Totally unexpectedly, the tube, within a few years, weakened political leadership profoundly and unprecedentedly.

While the stars of television entertainment rehearse, then are taped and re-taped, the political luminaries are shown *au naturel*, unimproved, and "live." The politicians' quips and jokes (being less taxing to viewers than ideas) are amply reported, thus assimilating the pols to the professional comedians, who, alas, are served by abler writers. The fumbles and stumbles of our leaders, moreover, are frequent fare on the evening news.

The effect on the Presidency has been withering. Television, indeed, must bear important responsibility for the fall of the

last four Chiefs.

The remedy can come only from the White House. It may lie in greater, studied presidential aloofness or in tighter control over the frequency and kind of the Chief's appearances on camera. It may require fostering a more sophisticated view of presidential leadership as not simply an inferior act in an endless variety show.

Henry F. Graff
Professor of History
Columbia University

More Books on Space

While the "Background Books" list accompanying "The Space Effort" [WQ, Autumn 1980] was splendid, a second list is offered, one with additional perspectives:

Two interesting histories of the coming of the space age and its evolution are William Sims Bainbridge's *The Spaceflight Revolution: A Sociological Study* (Wiley, 1976) and Sir Bernard Lovell's *The Origins and International Economics of Space Exploration* (Halsted, 1973). And readers will appreciate the trilogy of NASA official histories of first mission programs by professional historians: On the first U.S. satellite, see the late Constance McL. Green and Milton Lomask's *Vanguard: A History*, with a foreword by Charles A. Lindbergh (Smithsonian, 1971); on the first manned satellite, L. S. Swenson, J. M. Grimwood, and C. C. Alexander's *This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury* (Government Printing Office, 1966); and on the first instrumented lunar probe, R. Cargill Hall's *Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger* (Government Printing Office, 1977).

The memoirs of leading participants in Apollo are contained in *The Apollo Expeditions*, edited by Edgar M. Cortright (Government Printing Office, 1975).

Outstanding policy studies include John M. Logsdon's *The Decision to Go to the Moon* (Univ. of Chicago, 1976, paper),

Jonathan F. Galloway's *The Politics and Technology of Satellite Communications* (Lexington, 1972), and Philip J. Klass's singular *Secret Sentries in Space* (Random, 1971).

Two congressional publications are indispensable: Ken Hechler's *Toward the Endless Frontier: A History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979* (Government Printing Office, 1980), and the legal bible—*Space Law: Selected Basic Documents*, 2nd ed., from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (95th Congress, 2nd Session, December 1978).

Serious students will not overlook Barbara Ward's *Spaceship Earth* (Columbia, 1966, cloth & paper) or the prod to imagination in G. Harry Stine's *The Third Industrial Revolution* (Putnam's, 1975). Reflects Stine: The first industrial revolution replaced the human body with machines; the second substituted computer feedback for mental processes; and the third is expanding man's "new world" beyond planet Earth.

Eugene M. Emme
CLJO Research Associates
Wheaton, Md.

Corrections

On page 176 [WQ, Winter 1981], you list Graham Greene's 1974 publication as *Lord Rochester's Money*. In fact, the title is *Lord Rochester's Monkey*.

E. A. Moura
Raynham, Mass.

Two lines on the Soviet demographic chart on page 121 of the Winter 1981 WQ ["The Soviet Future"] were slightly mislabeled: "RSFSR births (Russian)" should have read "RSFSR births (mostly Russian)," and "Uzbekistan births (Muslim)" should have been "Uzbekistan births (mostly Muslim)." Our apologies go to contributor Murray Feshbach who provided the data.

CURRENT FELLOWS

WILLI PAUL ADAMS, Professor of North American History, Free University of Berlin
DOUGLAS BENNETT, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Temple University
DONALD BERGUS, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan
JOSEPH S. BERLINER, Professor of Economics, Brandeis University
CHARLES W. BERGQUIST, Director, Comparative Area Studies Program, Duke University
CYRIL BIRCH, Professor of Chinese and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley
JOHN CAMPBELL, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J., Assistant Professor of Religion and Society, Jesuit School of Theology and the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Former Director, Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of Energy
JAMES DEAKIN, White House Correspondent, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*
RALPH DELLA CAVA, Professor of History, Queens College, City University of New York
ARIEL DORFMAN, Novelist, Chile
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