

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AUTUMN 1978

A NATIONAL REVIEW
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

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VOL. II NO. 4

Business and the rational mind, Part III

The national guilt complex • Achievement or original sin • Production vs. atonement

Judging by some of what we read and hear, self-flagellation seems about to become the order of the day. Much of whatever Americans do or achieve or enjoy is termed immoral or otherwise indefensible, and what people in other countries do is hailed as the shape of the future, morally speaking.

Well, now.

A lot of this national guilt complex depends on how things are put.

Suppose, for example, we ask you, "Do you think it's right for the United States, with only 5% of the world's population, to consume 28% of its energy?" That might be your cue to beat your breast and cry, "Heavens to Betsy, no! How could we do such a thing? And how can we atone?"

Suppose, however, we rephrase that question and ask you, "Isn't it remarkable that the United States, with only a twentieth of the world's population, can produce a fourth of the entire world's goods and services? And that we have become the industrial and agricultural breadbasket of the world... a prime purveyor to the hungry and the needy abroad?"

"Gee," you might say. "Just shows you what the old Yankee ingenuity, along with hard work and clean living, can do."

We can stomach breast-beating or a hair-shirt demonstration, if that's what gives the other fellow his kicks. But the point we want to make is that nobody in this country has to beat himself over the head just because he's adequately fed and clothed. Mankind has always striven for a land flowing with milk and honey, not a land short of necessities and barren of luxuries, long on deprivation and longer on austerity.

This is not a plea for devil-may-care hedonism. On the contrary, we are trying to make two points:

(1) Gratuitous martyrdom is an exercise in futility.

(2) When someone tries to make you feel guilty because our country has achieved to a considerable degree what all countries strive for, don't leap to the bait. Remember, it's possible to state even the most positive accomplishments in a way that makes them sound like original sin.

We get the distinct impression that most of the people who berate this country for its productivity are themselves quite well fed, well clothed, well housed, and, possibly as a result, feeling guilty. We cannot believe that Americans can solve, or even alleviate, the problems of this country and the rest of the world through starvation diets or by sleeping on a bed of nails. A refrigerator or a loaf of bread or a pair of shoes not bought and used in the United States is not automatically going to end up in some less-developed country.

The point is that our country is so productive, despite all the roadblocks thrown up by government and others, that it can turn out an almost unbelievable volume of goods—enough to supply the domestic market and still have a lot left over to export. If you want more U.S. money and food and other goods sent to needy peoples abroad, fine; tell your Senators and your Congressman so. But don't feel guilty about living well if you already do, or about wanting to if you don't.

We are not trying to promote gluttony or even conspicuous consumption. We are trying to deflate what strikes us as nonsense. Life is short, and people who work hard and productively shouldn't reproach themselves over their rewards, especially since producing for plenty makes society a lot more comfortable than sharing unnecessary shortage. To some people pleasure may be a little sinful, but if there were no sin in the world, what would be the benchmark for virtue?

Mark Twain once commented that on the basis of the information reaching him, his choice would be heaven for climate and hell for good conversation. Maybe he had something there.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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GUIDE TO FAR EASTERN NAVIES

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Foreword by

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

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

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

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AUTUMN
1978

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VOLUME II NUMBER 4

Editor's Comment

This issue of the *Quarterly,* to a great extent, deals with changes. As David Riesman makes clear in his overview of "The Changing American Campus," the nation's colleges and universities now make up a many-splendored array. Our contributors analyze the most important changes in higher education—in the federal role, the development of community colleges, the "elite" schools. However, it would take an entire 192-page issue of the *Quarterly* to explore the ramifications of every trend summarized here, notably, the increases in minority enrollment, the post-1960 slump in the quality of public high-school education evident in lower student test scores, and the declining "market value" of the B.A. degree and many postgraduate diplomas. We hope to examine some of these matters at greater length in the future. We were struck by one overriding change: For the first time, the United States has in place a system of *mass* higher education, which has major implications for employers, federal policymakers, and the students themselves.

Our three essayists on India, 30 years after its Independence and 18 months after the ouster of Indira Gandhi, attempt to put that country's recent history in perspective, to explain its successes and failures, and, not least, to go beyond the odd condescension that many American specialists seem to exhibit toward the subcontinent.

Bernice Madison's analysis of new data on Soviet women—and their transformation into "production workers"—may shed some light on everyday life in Russia's half-modern, half-backward society.

Our essays on Gauguin and on the 21st President, Chester Arthur, deal with transformations of another sort—Paris stockbroker into great artist, notorious party hack into a surprisingly respectable occupant of the White House. Each man left us a special legacy and ample food for thought.

Peter Braestrup

P.S. *Some readers may receive this issue of the* Quarterly *a bit late. We are changing our subscriber service system to improve responses to subscriber queries; the transition may cause some temporary delays, for which we apologize.*

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Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Bringing Back the "Single Tax"

"The Tax To End All Taxes: Where Is Henry George Now That We Need Him?" by David Hapgood, in *American Heritage* (April-May 1978), 383 West Center St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

Henry George (1839–97), perhaps America's most innovative economic theorist, may have been right in his notion of taxing land rather than the improvements on land. So writes Hapgood, author and former journalist.

Living in California just 10 years after the Gold Rush (1849), George observed that land, once cheap, was quickly concentrated in a few hands and then held off the market so that its price would rise. New settlers, unable to buy land cheaply, were forced to work for low wages and to suffer poverty in a land of plenty.

George rejected the standard radical proposals for land redistribution or nationalization. His remedy, set forth in his classic book *Progress and Poverty* (1880), was to allow private ownership of land but to let society collect the "unearned rent" on that land through taxation. The rent to be confiscated was the amount the owner could collect by renting out unimproved land, or if he had built on it, the portion of the rent attributable to the land alone.

George's "single tax" would pay for all the expenses of government, eliminating the need for any tax on the earnings of either labor or capital. By letting society recapture the land values that society itself had created through sheer demand, the owner would be forced to put his land to its most productive use or give it up. Hoarding land would no longer pay.

Hapgood argues that George's "single tax" today would benefit both the decaying cities and the vanishing countryside by reducing sprawl and encouraging more intensive use of the best-located land, especially

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT



With enthusiastic support from organized labor, Henry George ran for mayor of New York in 1886. Despite a lack of poll watchers—crucial in those days of stolen elections—George garnered a respectable 68,110 votes. Democrat Abram S. Hewitt won with 90,552, and the Republican candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, was third with 60,435.

Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York City

acreage along new highways or subway lines. Moreover, George would probably have taxed polluters heavily to halt environmental degradation, and taxed away part of the profits from mining and extraction to recover the benefits owed to society. "Henry George," says Hapgood, "speaks to the present quite as eloquently as he did to the past."

The Disenchanted Black Voter

"Leaders Sans Troupes: Diregeants Noirs et Masses Noirs" by Laura Armand-Maslow, in *Revue Francaise de Science Politique* (Feb. 1978), 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75341, Paris.

Politics for black Americans is currently marked by a curious dichotomy: There is a new unanimity and consensus on ideology and tactics among black political leaders, and, at the same time, a growing disinterest in politics among the black masses.

The consensus has been achieved, writes Armand-Maslow, a University of Paris political scientist, through a shift to the left by groups such as the NAACP and the National Urban League and a shift to the right by black revolutionary organizations that previously had failed to win mass support. The movement of black leaders into the political mainstream has resulted in a 400-percent increase in the number of black officeholders since 1958 (including the mayors of Los Angeles, Detroit, Atlanta, and Newark) and a virtual end to violent tactics since 1972.

But blacks have tended to concentrate their political activity at the

municipal level, says Armand-Maslow. Black city dwellers have quickly become disillusioned by the failure of local black office-holders to improve urban conditions. Furthermore, black voters showed their indifference to national politics in 1976 when only 33 percent of eligible blacks voted in the presidential primaries and only 38 percent in the general election—a sharp drop from the late 1960s.

The real power available to black politicians is at the state and federal levels, where blacks have gained seniority and powerful committee positions in Congress and state legislatures. But black politicians must demonstrate an ability to solve problems of education, housing, and unemployment. Otherwise, Armand-Maslow concludes, they will evolve as a group apart from their power base and will ultimately be absorbed by the dominant white community.

Murky Ways

"Buggings, Break-Ins & the FBI" by James Q. Wilson, in *Commentary* (June 1978), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

The recent prosecution of former FBI officials for having ordered illegal surreptitious entries and warrantless searches (commonly known as "black bag jobs") raises difficult questions about the relationship between constitutional guarantees of privacy and the police problems of investigating well-organized conspiracies.

Current laws governing police wiretaps, surreptitious entries, and surveillance are murky, writes Wilson, a Harvard professor of government. As a result of a 1972 Supreme Court decision that distinguished between "foreign" and "domestic" security cases, the U.S. Justice Department directs its "warrantless electronic surveillance" only against agents of foreign powers. But as Wilson points out, "There is no existing legal standard by which one can easily judge whether an American citizen has ties sufficiently close to a foreign power to make him an agent of that power."

Officials responsible for national security will be seriously handicapped if all searches or intercepts must meet the same standards for obtaining a judicial warrant as apply to criminal cases (i.e., showing probable cause that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime, or has in his possession the fruits of a crime).

Granted that there are reasonable grounds for warrantless surveillance in some cases, says Wilson, the authority to decide on the use of such techniques should not be left entirely in the hands of the President of the United States or his Attorney General. "What is needed," he concludes, "is an independent review mechanism that can prevent unjustified or political uses of the national-security authority without having to follow the same standards now governing the issuance of warrants in ordinary criminal cases where prosecution, not intelligence, is the goal."

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Euthanasia Made Easy

"How to Terminate a Public Policy: A Dozen Hints for the Would-be Terminator" by Robert D. Behn, in *Policy Analysis* (Summer 1978), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Terminating a government program is never easy. It requires a strategy at least as elaborate as that used to launch the program in the first place. Certain rules should be followed, says Behn, an associate professor at Duke University. Among them:

Don't give advance notice—it only gives the beneficiaries and ideological supporters of the program time to mobilize political opposition. In January 1975, for example, President Ford decided to tell Congress in his February budget message that he was eliminating the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy. His decision was reported in the *New York Times* on January 16, and the President was forced to reverse himself in the face of stiff congressional opposition.

Focus attention on the harm caused by the policy. For example, when Jerome G. Miller, commissioner of Massachusett's Department of Youth Services, wanted to close that state's reform schools in 1975, he focused public attention on the evils of those institutions rather than on the issue of how to handle delinquent children.

Avoid legislative votes. Why? Because a move to kill off a program is likely to be dealt with by the legislators who first helped to develop the program, and because legislative bodies facilitate compromise.

Recruit an outside terminator as program boss. (The Nixon administration named Howard J. Phillips as acting director of OEO—the Office of Economic Opportunity—in January 1973 for the sole purpose of dismantling the agency; to a large extent he succeeded.)

Do not encroach on legislative prerogatives. (Nixon failed to follow this rule and found himself confronting Congress over his failure to submit Phillips' name for Senate confirmation, rather than on the substantive issue of OEO's usefulness.)

Finally, Behn notes, there are ethical considerations: "If the termination of a public policy involves the abrogation of a government commitment . . . the terminators have an obligation to provide the policy's constituency a smooth transition to a benefitless future."

Our Hydra-Headed Attorney General

"Reorganizing Politics out of the Department of Justice" by Mitchell Rogovin, in *American Bar Association Journal* (June 1978), 77 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.

Since 1900 many a U.S. president-elect has appointed his political campaign manager to the post of U.S. Attorney General. This made the appointee the nation's chief law enforcer and counsel to the President, as well as political adviser, patronage dispenser, and re-election campaign manager designate. (Among such appointees: Herbert Brownell,

Robert F. Kennedy, and John Mitchell. Presidents Johnson and Carter broke with the tradition.)

This practice, says Rogovin, a former U.S. assistant attorney general, "places tremendous strain on the Justice Department's capacity to administer justice evenly and on the public's perception of the quality of justice administered."

There are more than 300 presidential appointees within the Justice Department, and the patronage system also is commonly used to fill some 1,700 attorney jobs in the 94 United States attorneys' offices around the country.

Rogovin urges that the Department be depoliticized. He would bar the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the solicitor general, and all assistant attorneys general from any political activity. Further, all U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S. attorneys should be made part of the career legal service. Finally, the Attorney General, as chief prosecutor, should not have the responsibility to "recommend, screen, and then defend the administration's appointments to the federal judiciary," as is now the case.

Only 8.3 percent of the Justice Department's $2.3 billion budget for fiscal year 1978 is spent on general legal activities, while about 30 percent is devoted to grants given by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and 10 percent to the Bureau of Prisons. Arguing that "public confidence in the impartial administration of justice is waning," Rogovin would also separate the Department from all correctional functions and from the politics of grant-making.

Keeping the Books

"Are We Starving Our Libraries?" by Clint Page, in *Nation's Cities* (July 1978), 1620 Eye St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Across the United States, urban libraries are cutting staffs, reducing hours and services, and buying fewer books and other materials because of inflation and reduced budgets, writes Page, associate editor of *Nation's Cities*.

Since 1967, the average price of a book has gone from $8.43 to $18.03, while magazine subscriptions have risen from an average of $8.03 to $24.59. Tax support is shrinking at a time when library administrators must remodel their buildings (many of them architectural landmarks) to make them more energy efficient and more accessible to the handicapped.

Large, urban libraries, says Page, serve whole states and entire regions (4 percent of the country's libraries meet 25 percent of the rural libraries' needs for interlibrary loans). Yet, state support of local public libraries is lagging. Despite the fact that libraries are educational institutions, state governments across the nation provide 43.6 percent of the financial support for public schools but only 12.9 percent of the support for public libraries.

Page urges immediate federal help in the form of adequate funding

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for the 1965 Library Services and Construction Act, designed to help states extend and improve library services, aid construction and interlibrary cooperation, and provide special help to big-city libraries. (Congress *authorized* $110 million for fiscal year 1978 and $140 million for 1979, but only *appropriated* $60.2 million each year.)

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Country They Love to Hate

"Reflections on Anti-Americanism in Our Times" by Paul Hollander, in *Worldview* (June 1978), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

The United States has been the subject of more denunciation, hostility, and abuse by foreign ideologues and intellectuals than any other nation in the world.

Hollander, a University of Massachusetts sociologist, attributes this worldwide animosity to America's affluence, its pervasive cultural presence (which, thanks to American movies, magazines, and television, extends through much of the world), and the recent notion that the United States is a superpower without the will or capacity to achieve its foreign policy goals (e.g., in Indochina). Helping to tarnish the nation's image is the fact that so much is known about the United States. Also contributing is the strident anti-Americanism of American intellectuals (such as Herbert Marcuse, Noam Chomsky, and Susan Sontag) who seem ridden by guilt over the alleged injustice and corruption of their own social and political system.



American cartoonist Cobb expresses a common vision of America in this drawing of a rapacious Uncle Sam devouring an unending stream of the world's dwindling resources.

From Cobb Again *(Glebe, N.S.W. Australia: Wild and Woolley Printing, Ltd., 1976).*

But what provokes the greatest hostility, or at least ambivalence, everywhere, Hollander argues, is America's "moral-ethical (and aesthetic) confusion." It is the "American spectacle of a moral and aesthetic free-for-all, of the astonishing ups and downs of moral (and philosophical-ideological) fashions" that most shocks outside observers because they fear its spread.

The export of these "confusions, of high and easily frustrated expectations, ethical relativism, nonmaterial insecurity, forms of spiritual malaise" alarms intellectual critics abroad because such "Americanization" seems to promise the decline of their own traditional values and institutions.

America's Failure of Imagination

"U.S. Policy and the Two Southeast Asias" by Donald E. Weatherbee, in *Asian Survey* (April 1978), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Since the end of the Indochina war, the members of the anticommunist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore—have sought to develop a "regional resilience" to the threat of communist subversion. It is an effort that depends on Western and—as yet, uncertain—American economic, political, and military involvement.

The 1975 defeat in Vietnam created a "new international reality in Southeast Asia," says Weatherbee, a professor at the University of South Carolina's Institute of International Studies. The perceived U.S. retreat from its regional commitments, the revived Sino-Soviet competition, and the swift consolidation of Communist power in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam led the ASEAN nations to conclude that the balance of power in the region had tipped sharply in favor of the communists.

In their initial reaction, the ASEAN states tried to demonstrate their independence from the United States (e.g., the demands to close all U.S. installations in Thailand, the dismantlement of SEATO, and Philippine assertiveness in negotiations over U.S. base rights) and sought "normalization" of their relations with communist neighbors.

Now, says Weatherbee, the ASEAN states realize that their attempts to have the communists recognize Southeast Asia as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" has been viewed as a sign of weakness. Rather than accept communist Vietnam's demand for the elimination of all U.S. influence in Southeast Asia as a precondition for "neutrality," the ASEAN group seeks a more tangible American role in the region, including continued military and economic assistance.

However, they find Washington hamstrung by a Vietnam "backlash," preoccupied with human rights as an overriding issue, uncertain of America's real interests, and holding to a wait-and-see attitude. Instead of broadening its association with ASEAN, Weatherbee concludes, the United States—either by intention or default—is slipping toward a position equidistant from the two Southeast Asias. It is not so much a failure of nerve; it is a "failure of imagination."

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Israeli Victory Without Gain

"What the Next Arab-Israeli War Might Look Like" by Steven J. Rosen, in *International Security* (Spring 1978), 9 Divinity St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

As the euphoria surrounding the 1977 autumn peace initiative by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat began to subside, there was speculation in Washington about the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli war. Such a struggle, says Rosen, Senior Research Fellow at Australia's National University, would result in a decisive Israeli battlefield victory, but no political or diplomatic gains for either side.

An Arab attack, intended to convince the Israelis that they cannot achieve security by military power alone, would seek a few, highly symbolic successes (e.g., capture of the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai, or some portion of pre-1967 Israeli territory) rather than total victory. Sophisticated detection devices installed by Israel since the 1973 war would make an Arab surprise attack difficult and might compel an Israeli pre-emptive attack. Regardless of who strikes first, Israel would face Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt, with Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia joining in.

Israel would seek, and achieve, a quick and decisive victory, Rosen speculates, because of a vastly superior air force, experienced military personnel, a sophisticated early-warning radar system, and reliance on long-range, precision-guided bombs, rockets, and missiles.

The struggle would be brief (three to six days)—preventing superpower intervention—and would be a disaster for the Arabs, leading to a renewal of self-doubts and mutual recriminations. Saudi Arabia would be radicalized by the war experience and the United States would retreat further from its total support of Israel in order to appease the Arab oil-producing countries. Postwar Israel's diplomatic isolation would be worsened, her standard of living would decline further, and the basis for a political settlement would be more remote than ever. The most that might be hoped for in the aftermath, Rosen concludes, is that 1) all the Arabs would quietly abandon the military option; 2) there would be a lengthy stalemate; and 3) an eventual compromise territorial agreement would be reached.

The "Ultimate" Political Act

"Assassination as Political Efficacy: Two Case Studies from World War I" by Douglas D. Alder, in *East European Quarterly* (Spring 1978), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80302.

When Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was slain at Sarajevo by Bosnian nationalist Gavrilo Princip on June 28, 1914, Hapsburg officials in Vienna used the assassination as an excuse to attack Serbia and thereby precipitated World War I. On Oct. 21, 1916, Friedrich Adler, the son of Austria's Social Democratic Party leader, murdered Prime Minister

Graf Karl Stürgkh as a protest against the war and failed to arouse public support.

Both political assassinations were the work of naive, romantic idealists seeking a martyrdom that they never achieved. (Princip died, forgotten, in prison; Adler was pardoned.) In each case, says Alder, a Utah State University historian, the slayings removed key leaders but both were quickly replaced and their policies continued. Yet, the goals of the assassins were ultimately secured. A year after Princip's death, South Slav unification became a reality with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1919. A war-weary Austria surrendered, the Hapsburg Empire collapsed, and Adler was released from prison in time to help the Social Democrats create the First Austrian Republic.

Princip and Adler both sought to influence public opinion rather than government policy. "Their aim was not to cause change by removing a crucial personality but to draw attention to an issue by killing a renowned figure," says Alder. The common element in both cases was "systemic frustration"—an inability to arouse public feeling in support of an ideology (one nationalist, the other pacifist). Desperation led them to employ assassination—the act of "ultimate political pressure"—which had significant long-range results that they never anticipated.

Reviewing JFK's Legacy

"Bearing The Burden: A Critical Look at JFK's Foreign Policy" by Thomas G. Patterson, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 1978), One West Range, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

Before his death in 1963, President John F. Kennedy reportedly expressed doubts about the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and called for a re-examination of American Cold War attitudes. Apart from the nuclear test ban treaty, however, the real legacy of his foreign policy, argues Patterson, a University of Connecticut historian, must include a massive arms race, neglect of traditional diplomacy, global over-commitment, and "conspicuous reliance upon military force to solve diplomatic tussles."

Like many contemporaries, Kennedy and his advisers were members of the "containment generation," nurtured on such Cold War triumphs as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and Point Four. They were convinced that the nation must negotiate from strength; that communism was monolithic—a cancer feeding on poverty which had to be contained by countermeasures on a global scale.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis offered the Kennedy administration a welcome opportunity to demonstrate toughness. But, in suspending private diplomacy in favor of a televised challenge to the Russians, Patterson argues, Kennedy "significantly increased the chances of war." Moscow was publicly humiliated and later reacted by launching a massive arms buildup.

Kennedy's belief that evolutionary economic development would insure noncommunist political stability in the Third World led to the

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Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, as well as to the counterinsurgency philosophy embodied in the Army's Green Berets. But Kennedy's concept of "nation-building" gave inadequate attention to the world's diversity and complexity, the variety of political forces and cultural traditions, and the compelling appeal of revolutionary dogmas. Finally, says Patterson, Kennedy "did not estimate the strain that would be placed on American resources and patience in this long-term, global role as policeman and teacher."

Would JFK have changed had he lived? Probably not, Patterson suggests. The President would have had to drop his hard-line advisers and their Cold War notions, admit error, and abandon his natural predilection for bold action.

Two Views on Human Rights

"The Carter Administration and Human Rights—Part 1: A Crusade Quickly Cancelled" by Tracy Early; "Part II: A Commitment Sustained" by Patricia Derian, in *Worldview* (July-Aug. 1978), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

President Carter's human rights crusade has been abandoned, says Early, a New York writer, because "it endangered too many American interests without visibly weakening tyrannies abroad." Reduced to absurdity, "the crusade now amounts to looking at 105 countries receiving American aid or buying American weapons and finally deciding it is safe to penalize Nicaragua."

The policy was applied inconsistently, Early contends. It was pursued in the Soviet Union, where the United States has little leverage, but less so in South Korea, where U.S. influence is substantial. At the same time, Carter's crusade encouraged both those Americans who favor a return to the Cold War and those who welcome any excuse to withhold foreign aid anywhere. The President, says Early, should have recognized "the dangers of moralistic posturing."

Mrs. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, denies that the human rights effort has been abandoned. "Enhancing respect for human rights and human dignity remains a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy," she says.

Carter's human rights policy has been implemented on the basis of three principles: (*a*) that the policy is global and not aimed at any particular country; (*b*) that it should be implemented pragmatically, taking account of each country's situation; and (*c*) that it does not replace other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as our national security, but will be pursued along with other significant national goals.

The United States has deferred bilateral economic assistance or opposed loans by the World Bank to countries that seriously violate human rights (e.g., Argentina). Human rights concerns have resulted in the reduction or denial of military aid to some countries (e.g., Ethiopia). The human rights policy of the United States will continue, says Derian, "because it is right and because it is in our national interest."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Advocacy, Inc.

"How Good Are Advocacy Ads?" by Lynn Adkins, in *Dun's Review* (June 1978), 666 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, along with other U.S. institutions, Big Business was subjected to severe press criticism, public skepticism, and increased federal regulation. A few corporation managers turned to advocacy advertising in response—either to upgrade their "image" or to speak out on major business-related issues.

Mobil Corp., with $4 million budgeted for such advertising in 1978, took the most hard-hitting ideological stance, urging both energy deregulation and curbs on Big Government. The American Forest Institute adopted a softer line in its ads ("Trees, the Renewable Resource") against too-strict curbs on timber-harvesting.

How effective were the Mobil and A.F.I. ads? Adkins, a *Dun's Review* editor, cites a recent Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. poll of both the public and "leaders" in government, labor, Wall Street, etc. Mobil obtained higher readership (e.g., 90 percent of government leaders polled) but lower agreement (33 percent) than did A.F.I. (56 percent). Mobil's ads, said Yankelovich, were too "antagonistic" and "abrasive" for many of those polled; A.F.I.'s ads were better received.

A Mobil spokesman, Adkins reports, doubted that one could ever measure the effectiveness of the company's ads in quantitative terms.

On public-issue ads generally, the pollsters said, only 6 percent of the public found them "very credible," and as many as 53 percent said they were "not credible." Most companies, says Adkins, have chosen to run less obtrusive "soft-sell" ads to enhance their corporate images (Shell, Weyerhauser), and have opted for less expensive ways to influence policy, such as old-fashioned lobbying.

Help Wanted

"Second Thoughts About Illegal Immigrants" by Michael L. Wachter, in *Fortune* (May 22, 1978), 541 N. Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

The influx of illegal immigrants from Mexico, Latin America, and Asia has continued despite the crowding of the unskilled labor market by both the 1950s "baby boom" generation and unprecedented numbers of young women.

This is partly explained, says Wachter, a University of Pennsylvania economist, by the fact that while unemployment averaged 6.25 percent between 1970 and 1977, generous welfare payments were reducing the total pool of job-seekers by lowering the cost of not working.

Despite Congress's extensions of minimum-wage coverage, there are

nearly as many low-wage jobs in the United States today as in 1967. Jobs paying less than the current $2.65-per-hour minimum wage are readily available in exempt industries, such as food service, and in other categories like domestic service, where enforcement is lax. Spurned by many Americans, these jobs are attractive to the illegal aliens moving in at the bottom of the wage structure.

Nevertheless, Wachter argues, available statistics suggest that about 50 percent of all illegal aliens earn wages at or above the legal minimum. Assuming that illegal aliens constitute 30 percent of the nation's lowest-skilled labor, if all of them were forced to leave the country, wages at the bottom of the job ladder would be driven up. Of the estimated 6 million jobs now held by illegal aliens, Wachter estimates, as many as 3.5 million jobs might simply disappear. Some 2.5 million would be taken by low-skilled U.S. citizens at higher wages, and the U.S. unemployment rate (5.7 percent as of June 1978) would drop by approximately 1.2 percent.

Illegal immigration, however, is likely to continue, Wachter predicts. The United States badly needs the low-wage labor to supplement the shortage of teen-agers entering the labor pool. The only real question is whether the immigrant labor will be legal or illegal. Wachter concludes that Washington must decide soon whether to open or shut U.S. borders, or to introduce a system of temporary "guest" workers like that which exists in Western Europe.

Reassessing the Distress Factor

"Unemployment: It's Not What It Used to Be" by Harrison H. Donnelly, in *Congressional Affairs* (July 15, 1978), 1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Unemployment in the United States fell sharply in June—down from 6.1 percent in May to 5.7 percent—but economists disagree on the validity of these figures and how to interpret them. Increases in welfare and unemployment benefits for example, which permit people to remain out of work for longer periods, and the larger numbers of women and young people in the work force have combined to lessen the value of simple unemployment figures as an indicator of America's overall economic distress or well-being.

"The unemployment rate," says Donnelly, a reporter for *Congressional Quarterly*, "conceals vast differences among subgroups of the population." For example, the unemployment rate for blacks and other minorities was 11.9 percent in June 1978, more than double the moderate 4.9 percent level for all whites; the adult female unemployment rate was 6.1 percent, compared with 2.9 percent for men; the unemployment rate for black women was 11.3 percent, versus 7.8 percent for black males; and the unemployment rate for minority teen-agers was 37.1 percent.

But the "discomfort" of being unemployed is far less today than in the past. Almost three-fifths of all American families have more than

SELECTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, seasonally adjusted



one breadwinner. And unemployment insurance provides succor for the short-term or seasonal jobless. (The June figures show that almost half of the unemployed had been out of work for less than five weeks.)

A National Commission on Unemployment Statistics is now studying new definitions of employment and unemployment that could make a substantial difference in the way local and national jobless rates are computed. Current methods, Donnelly notes, exclude from the ranks of the unemployed the estimated 842,000 "discouraged" workers who have given up trying to find a job. Moreover, persons seeking part-time work are counted as unemployed, while members of the armed forces are not considered part of the nation's labor force, thereby skewing unemployment rates, especially in areas near large military bases.

SOCIETY

The (Un)Happy Homemaker

"Are Working Women *Really* More Satisfied?" by James D. Wright, in *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (May 1978), National Council on Family Relations, 1219 University Ave. S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55414.

The number of working women in the United States has jumped sharply in recent years (the labor-force participation rate for women over 16 increased from 31.8 percent in 1947 to 46.1 percent in 1974), but social scientists still disagree as to who leads the more satisfying life—the full-time mother and housewife or the woman with a job outside the home.

Some studies have tended to support the "bored housewife" theme;

SOCIETY

they suggest that the working woman is generally happier and more satisfied with her life than the woman who does not work. But some of these findings, says Wright, of the Social and Demographic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, have been based on only a small sampling of predominantly working-class women.

Analyzing data from broader surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, Wright finds that working women "typically carry the double burden of work and household commitments." They may enjoy their outside earned income and increased independence, but "pay for these benefits in reduced free time for themselves, a more hectic pace, and a more complicated life."

Surprisingly, neither working women nor housewives express much "outright dislike" for housework; and Wright's analysis of overall happiness, satisfaction with work in and out of the home, marital satisfaction, and attitudes toward family and careers shows "no consistent, substantial, or statistically significant differences."

In the aggregate, Wright concludes, "homemakers" are just as happy or unhappy as women who work. The impression of "confusion, isolation, loneliness, and alienation among American housewives" is just as mythical as the image of the totally "satisfied" working woman.

Junkyard Playgrounds

"Loose On the Playground" by Richard Louv, in *Human Behavior* (May 1978), 12031 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90025.

"Adventure playgrounds"—where children are encouraged to entertain themselves by building forts, shacks, and treehouses out of donated scrap lumber, or to construct mud slides, tunnels, lakes, and dams—are slowly gaining popularity in America.

The concept, writes Louv, *Human Behavior* contributing editor, began in Copenhagen in 1943. Landscape architect C. T. Sorensen observed that children ignored the standard playgrounds he had designed and were instead playing on construction sites and in junkyards. He designed a popular junkyard playground, and the idea spread. There are now more than 200 adventure playgrounds in Britain, where bombed-out city blocks were fenced off after World War II and given over to children, who created their own world from the rubble.

Recreation officials in this country complain that children quickly tire of traditional playground equipment—the slides, swings, and cement turtles. Proponents of junkyard playgrounds, Louv writes, see them as an antidote to television, which, it is said, blunts childrens' creativity and self-reliance.

Minneapolis built the nation's first adventure playground in 1950. Now there are 18, including one in Huntington Beach, Calif., with a 30-foot mud slide, lakes for fishing and swimming, rope bridges spanning the water, shacks, and forts—an enticing combination that often draws more than 500 children a day. Structures are periodically torn down or demolished by the children so they can create new ones from a

random supply of scrap materials, such as old packing crates.

The accident rate is no higher than in traditional parks and there have been no serious injuries, says Louv. Liability insurance remains the greatest problem, though all but one of the existing adventure playgrounds have insurance protection provided by the cities' regular carriers with no additional premiums. More difficult to overcome is the popular resistance in low-income areas, where residents say they already have enough shacks and junk (they want asphalt playgrounds and concrete turtles). And disputes persist among recreation officials over what properly constitutes "play" in a technological, urban society.

Fear and Loathing in the Classroom

"Analysis and Critique of HEW's *Safe School Study Report to the Congress*" by Robert J. Rubel, in *Crime and Delinquency* (July 1978), 411 Hackensack Ave., Hackensack, N.J. 07601.

New federal data on "violent" schools in America reveal such odd patterns as these: A teacher who is robbed once by students in one two-month period is 60 times as likely to be raped by pupils during the next two-month period as one who has not been robbed; 41 percent of school bombings occur on Tuesdays; a student runs the greatest risk of being assaulted on Wednesdays.

Yet, classroom violence in America is not as pervasive as many believe, writes Rubel, director of research at the Institute for Reduction of Crime in College Park, Md., analyzing a 1978 report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Only 8 percent of all school principals complain of more than 7 incidents of violence per month (a level considered "serious"), and many report that violence has leveled off since 1973.

More serious than the financial or physical damage is the climate of apprehension and disruption that violence creates. Some 33 percent of junior high school students in large cities report they avoid certain dangerous areas of their schools (most frequently a restroom), and 7 percent reported living in constant fear. Such fear tends to cause student absenteeism, which in turn affects federal or state per-pupil cost reimbursements to schools.

Yet, Rubel says, the HEW study disproves two pervasive beliefs: first, that schools cannot do much to reduce crime and violence because these are broad social ills; and, second, that outsiders are responsible for most school violence (except in cases of trespassing and breaking and entering, between 74 and 98 percent of all offenses are commited by youngsters enrolled in the school).

It is clear, Rubel concludes, that the factors *not* under the educators' control are far less important than such school-controlled variables as number of students per teacher, class size, and the principal's own qualities of fairness, firmness, and consistency in helping individual teachers to maintain discipline.

SOCIETY

Short Is Beautiful

"Short Beautiful" by Thomas Samaras, in *The Futurist* (August 1978), World Future Society, P.O. Box 30369, Bethesda Branch, Washington, D.C. 20014.

The ever-increasing stature and size of North American and North European people has long been regarded as a good thing—a result of prosperity, better diet, and superior medical care. However, in ecological terms, human bigness is unquestionably bad.

So writes Samaras, a California systems analyst. Short people require less food, oxygen, water, clothing, and other vital resources. A 5-percent increase in stature, for example, generally results in a 16-percent increase in body weight, requiring roughly 16 percent more food. An increase in stature of 5 percent also results in a 10-percent increase in surface area, meaning 10 percent more cloth and leather to cover the body and feet. American men of all ages now average 5'9"; and 18-year-old males average about 5'10". Adult males in Revolutionary times averaged 5'6".

FAMOUS SHORT PEOPLE

Science	Military	Haile Selassie	Athletics
Albert Einstein	Napoleon	George Wallace	Nadia Comaneci
Marie Curie	T. E. Lawrence		Bobby Riggs
Buckminster Fuller		Business	Mario Andretti
Margaret Mead	Politics	Andrew Carnegie	Juan Rodriguez
	John Adams	Aristotle Onassis	Sammy Lee
Arts	James Madison	Henry Ross Perot	Pelé
Pablo Picasso	Benjamin Harrison	Armand Hammer	Joe Walcott
Toulouse Lautrec	David Ben Gurion	Harold Geneen	Phil Rizzuto

The economic impact of increasing stature and weight is staggering, says Samaras. For example, if one compares two future American populations of 500 million people with a one-foot average difference in height, the estimated costs of clothing, food, shelter, furnishings, personal items, and transportation would be more than $500 billion per year greater for the taller and heavier population.

From a study of height, weight, and age data, Samaras concludes that shorter people live from 6 to 20 percent longer than tall people, depending on their profession; are disproportionately stronger; have greater endurance; and are equally intelligent and creative. Many shorter-than-average people have excelled in sports (Olympic gymnast Olga Korbut), business (Aristotle Onassis), the arts (Picasso), and politics (James Madison).

Nevertheless, Americans tend to admire tallness (starting salaries of college graduates over 6'2" are 12 percent higher than those of shorter job applicants); and the average height of Americans has been increasing by about one inch every 30 years. Samaras argues that it is time to discourage the adulation of bigness and to determine, through research, both the best average human size and the factors that are causing Americans to grow taller.

SOCIETY

Redefining "Life"

"Consensus and Controversy in Medical Practice: The Dilemma of the Critically Ill Patient" by Diana Crane, in *Annals of the American Academy* (May 1978), 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

American physicians are moving toward a *social* definition of "life"—defining an individual as being alive in terms of his ability to interact with others, rather than by purely physical criteria.

Questioning more than 3,000 neurosurgeons, pediatric heart surgeons, internists, and pediatricians, University of Pennsylvania sociologist Crane found that most physicians (75 percent) agreed that salvageable patients (capable of resuming social roles even minimally and temporarily) with purely physical damage should be treated. Unsalvageable patients with mental damage, they agreed, should not be treated. But the doctors could not agree on the appropriateness of treating salvageable patients with mental damage and unsalvageable patients with purely physical damage.

For example, 89 percent of the neurosurgeons said they would operate on a salvageable patient with a blood clot on the brain if the damage was entirely physical, but only 55 percent would operate if the damage was mental. In the hypothetical case of a patient with a malignant brain tumor that was spreading to other parts of the body, only 22 percent said they would operate on this unsalvageable patient if the tumor affected the patient's mental faculties, but 50 percent would operate if the tumor affected only the patient's physical capabilities.

Organized medicine in the United States has not yet set guidelines for physicians in these matters, Crane observes, although the American Hospital Association has endorsed a "bill of rights" for patients, which includes the right to refuse treatment "to the extent permitted by law." Unlike the Swiss Academy of Medicine, which permits doctors to cut off life-prolonging treatment for dying or comatose patients, the American Medical Association has applauded court decisions that forbid such withdrawal of treatment.

PRESS & TELEVISION

The Not-So-Great Panama Debate

"Covering the Canal, Or, How the Press Missed the Boat" by Walter LaFeber, in *MORE* (June 1978), P.O. Box 30056, Washington, D.C. 20014.

President Carter predicted in February on national television that the debate over the Panama Canal treaties would symbolize our maturity as a great power.

Instead, says Cornell historian LaFeber, due to a dismal performance

by the news media, the American public was treated to little more than misleading stories that "misinterpreted public opinion polls, focused on the personal contest . . . between the President and Senate leaders, and culminated in pious warnings that the treaties were not all that significant after all. . . ." Moreover, the media failed to tell the public much of anything about Panama and why the Panamanians had struggled for years to obtain the treaties giving them *de jure* independence from U.S. colonial control.

The reporting on poll results failed to convey the fact that they showed most Americans cared little about who operated the canal so long as the United States had the right, in emergencies, to move its ships to the head of the line and to intervene militarily to keep the waterway open. Once these conditions were guaranteed by the amendments sponsored by the Senate leaders—Democrat Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Republican Howard J. Baker of Tennessee—no amount of anti-treaty propagandizing through the media made much difference.

LaFeber found "pathetic" most of the coverage of Panama's economic and political complexities, its military government, its views on the canal debate (which was being broadcast by National Public Radio to Panama, complete with insults to the country and its "maximum leader") or why Panamanians rioted even after the Senate ratified the first treaty (which guarantees the canal's permanent neutrality). Panamanian President Omar Torrijos' alleged involvement in narcotics traffic received more attention in the U.S. media than any other internal Panamanian issue, even though the charges had little to do with the treaties.

Thanks in part to TV and the press, what was to have been a great debate "turned out to be neither great nor much of a public debate over the substance of foreign policy."

A Plea for Press Restraint

"Our Right of Privacy Needs Protection from the Press" by Arthur R. Miller, in *Human Rights* (Spring 1978), 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

A free press is crucial to maintaining democracy and exposing government abuses—a truth the designers of our constitutional protections found sufficiently self-evident to enshrine in the Bill of Rights. But is the press too free? Sometimes, says Miller, a Harvard law professor, restraints on the press are appropriate, notably when press freedom conflicts with another fundamental freedom—an individual's right to privacy.

Americans are beginning to recognize that their right to privacy has been jeopardized by growing numbers of government, commercial, and institutional files and data banks containing information about their private lives. Watergate's exposure of overzealous surveillance activities by the FBI and CIA underscored this concern for privacy. Now,

says Miller, "The constant pressure by the press for the expansion of its liberties and its right of inquisition surely contributes to the erosion of privacy and emphasizes the need for protection."

Miller applauds those statutes—opposed by newsmen—that protect individuals from unwarranted public attention (i.e., laws prohibiting the naming of rape victims and restricting the release of certain criminal records). He particularly objects to the zeal of gossip columnists and the revelation of private details of a person's life without cause (e.g., reporters' interest in the sexual preferences of Oliver Sipple, who thwarted an assassination attempt against President Ford on Sept. 22, 1975).

Miller sees a "disturbing situation" at present: Newspapers and magazines have become almost immune to libel suits, justify intrusive and even illegal *means* by touting "beneficial" *ends,* and assert the right to publish any "truth" no matter how private. What is needed is more press self-restraint, says Miller, and, failing that, court action to establish a better balance between press freedom and privacy.

Taxing TV Promos

"A Modest Proposal to Pay for Excellence" by Martin Mayer, in *American Film* (June 1978), P.O. Box 966, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Since it began in 1969, national public television programming in the United States has been funded by a mix of congressional appropriations, corporate and foundation contributions, and individual donations—an inadequate and uncertain financial base. (Approximately 45 percent of the current $70-million annual budget comes from federal tax dollars.)

Congress rejected a variety of other financial support arrangements, including the annual license fee on each television set with which Britain funds the programs of the BBC. Mayer, an author and critic, suggests charging broadcasters in this country a fee for the air time they now use to promote themselves and their upcoming programs.

"If the stations and networks were made to pay one-tenth of what they would charge advertisers for this time," says Mayer, "the resulting fund would total $175 million a year." If broadcasters decided to reduce their self-promotion rather than pay for it, there would be less money in the production fund for public television, but also less advertising "clutter" to annoy television viewers.

The proceeds from the charge on promotional air time, Mayer argues, should be allocated to programs that might otherwise be rejected by public television because of their high cost or limited audience appeal. Completed programs could be offered for sale to the networks or independent stations but provided without charge to public, noncommercial stations. Finances aside, the sooner that public television programming decisions can be insulated from the pressures that accompany congressional funding, says Mayer, the better.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

The Moon Message

"Korean Moon: Waxing or Waning?" by Leo Sandon, Jr., in *Theology Today* (July 1978), P.O. Box 29, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

The theology of the Unification Church of Rev. Sun Myung Moon is clearly heretical from the standpoint of classical Christian theology, but it is a Christian heresy—the product of almost 200 years of Christian missionary teaching interacting with the Korean culture.

As a Christian mutation, writes Sandon, professor of religion at Florida State University, it is in the interest of the main-line Christian churches to engage in open dialogue with it.

Sandon believes that the Moonist movement in America has peaked but is not about to disappear. Whatever its prospects, the movement raises crucial questions about "the nature of conversion and commitment among young adults . . . about the need for thoughtful morality and spirituality; and about the hunger in America for community. . . ."

Some 3,000 to 5,000 young Americans, many of them graduates of the better universities, have joined the Moonies, apparently drawn by its comprehensive belief system and the absence of meaningful alternatives. "To argue that the Moonist solution is inane, preposterous, or unrealistic is hardly a substitute for our not having any specific vision of the future," says Sandon.

The Moonies have rejected contemporary permissiveness for a rigorous morality, a spirituality characterized by a "robust prayer life and a liturgical orderliness seldom found in conventional American religious life," and a communal lifestyle that is fulfilling. Sandon argues that the

The emblem of the Unification Church symbolizes the unification of Christianity. The center circle represents God, while the 12 rays emanating outward represent the 12 gates to the new Jerusalem mentioned in Revelation 21:10-14 ("On the gates the names of the twelve tribes of the sons of Israel were inscribed").



essential strength of the movement is not to be found in the logic of its doctrine but rather "in the experience of warm, chaste, unselfish, morally principled, and ordered fraternity"—none of which is incompatible with Christian theology.

Conjugal Confusion

"Christianity, Marriage, and Sex" by Francis X. Murphy, C.S.S.R., in *Commonweal* (June 16, 1978), 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Roman Catholic moralists and theologians are re-evaluating the Church's attitude toward love and sex. Despite the "ecclesial arrogance" displayed by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani and his conservative associates in the papal curia during Vatican Council II (1964) in opposing any change in the Church's moral and doctrinal teachings, the Council provoked a deeper examination of human sexuality and a closer look at the Church's views on the subject. So writes Father Murphy, rector of Holy Redeemer College in Washington, D.C.

Much of the confusion now surrounding Catholic teachings on conjugal love springs from the mistaken notion that the basic guidelines have been "uniform and constant from the beginning." Not so, says Murphy, citing differing views of love and marriage expressed by Jesus, St. Paul, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and others.

By the time of Vatican II, the early pre-Augustine view of marriage as "a sacramental covenant with God as a third party and the joys of carnal and spiritual love its primary component" had long since been replaced in Church doctrine by a legalistic vision of marriage as a contract between two parties, sealed by coitus. This view, Murphy says, "narrowed the function of sex to the process of procreation" and relegated "the energy, joy, pleasure, and love involved in erotic experience to the realm of the sinful—in thought, word, and deed—if indulged outside of marriage."

Vatican II legitimized a pluralism of opinion among diverse schools of moral and doctrinal theology. The Church now relies on a welter of "approved authors" (e.g., Andrew Greeley in *Sexual Intimacy*) who explore Christian approaches to sexuality. This has brought a remarkable liberalization of the Church's views on what constitutes the state of matrimony and the role of sexual love. For example, the Rota, the Vatican's principal marriage tribunal, has recognized that a lack of love necessarily negates the marriage bond—a finding, Murphy notes, that must logically apply as well "to the situation in which love that once existed in a marriage has been totally eradicated and replaced by hatred."

Confusion persists, Murphy concludes, when the Vatican reiterates the absolutist positions of previous ages, as in the 1974 and 1975 documents dealing with masturbation and homosexuality. But among the achievements of the post-Council debate is the fact that in its 1975 Declaration Regarding Sexual Ethics, the Holy See accepted the absolute nature of sexuality as the foundation of the human person.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Religious Restlessness

"Alienation and Apostasy" by Wade Clark Roof, in *Society* (May-June 1978), Box A, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

The rising popularity of many new religious and quasi-religious groups in America reflects a larger disarray. Many Americans are abandoning their earlier religious identities, writes Roof, a University of Massachusetts sociologist.

Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center show that religious defection is occurring primarily among the young (the proportions for liberal Protestants, Jews, and Catholics average about 15 percent among the 18–25 age group), but that Americans of all ages are less inclined to identify themselves as members of a religious community than was the case 20 years ago. (Some 6.7 percent of Americans now describe themselves as having no religious affiliation, compared with 2.7 percent in 1957.)

Religious defection is most prevalent among college-educated males living in the West and Northeast. But income level, employment, and marital status appear to make little difference in defection rates. Rather than being marginal people, says Roof, "young defectors are prone to come from affluent, middle-class families and are likely to be married and hold jobs."

Disenchantment with established churches occurs far more frequently among those who embrace the so-called "new morality" and a permissive attitude toward marijuana, abortion, homosexuality, sexual behavior, and protest activity.

Roof doubts that the new morality will replace the old or that religious defection will increase sharply in the near future. In fact, defection may have "bottomed out" among the very young even as it spreads through society as a whole. To a considerable extent, the long-term future of the main-line religious institutions depends on how well they can adjust to changing values and lifestyles.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Positive Impacts of Negative Ions

"Ions in the Air" by Albert P. Krueger and Sheelah Sigel, in *Human Nature* (July 1978), Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 10702, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Scientists have long recognized that certain natural phenomena—radioactive elements in the soil, cosmic ray activity, the shearing of water molecules in waterfalls, and persistent winds like the *foehn* in Germany and the *mistral* of France—can influence the formation of air

ions—molecules of common atmospheric gases that have taken on a positive or negative electrical charge.

The effects of air ions on living matter (including bacteria, plants, and human beings) are readily apparent but not thoroughly understood, write Krueger, a biometeorologist, and Sigel, a psychologist, both of the University of California at Berkeley. It is known, for example, that depletion of ions in the air may increase susceptibility to respiratory infection. Conversely, enhancing the negatively-ionized atmosphere of a Swiss bank for a 30-week test period produced a 94 percent reduction in the incidence of respiratory illness among bank employees.

Furthermore, recent experiments have shown that a net increase in negative ions reduces the concentration in the blood stream of serotonin, a potent neurohormone. Krueger and Sigel assert that, like the serotonin-reducing drug Reserpin, this change in blood chemistry has a calming effect on humans; negative-ion therapy has also been found to relieve pain in severe burn victims.

Ion concentrations in the air fluctuate naturally, but there is a trend toward continuous depletion because pollutants combine with ions and render them biologically inert. Modern ventilating equipment also tends to reduce ion levels. Chronic ion deprivation, the authors warn, may cause "discomfort, lassitude, and loss of mental and physical efficiency." However, future research may make it possible to establish optimum air-ion standards, to replenish ion-depleted air, and to find increasing uses for ions in the treatment of pain and respiratory illness.

Problem-Solving for Mutual Profit

"The Dynamics of International Technology Flow" by Denis Goulet, in *Technology Review* (May 1978), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

Modern technology flows to Third World countries through many channels. By far the most significant channels today are the Western companies that export products or manufacture them overseas and the Western consultant firms that specialize in solving problems for a fee.

Developing countries, writes Goulet, Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., are beginning to realize that there is a vast difference between technology "transfer" in the traditional sense (e.g., through exports of machinery or licensing contracts) and the "genuine assimilation of technology," which gives the recipient both a measure of control and the promise of future technological independence.

While the international companies see technology transfers as "strategies for successful marketing," the poorer countries view the acquisition of technology as an end in itself. The companies will give up only as much technology as they must to achieve access to new Third World markets. Western consultants, meanwhile, act as "technical gatekeep-

ers" who advise clients about new technologies that might be useful to them.

Yet, the technologies in which Western consulting firms specialize (e.g., design and problem-solving services) are not easily transferred, Goulet observes. It is easier to train engineers to build dams than to train feasibility experts of consultant-firm caliber who can evaluate dam siting, cost, and design problems. It is the absence of these skills that makes developing countries technologically dependent on outsiders. The difficulty with consulting firm contracts for technology transfer is that a lot of problem-solving takes place but not much transfer of technology.

"The 'transfer' of technology is no neutral, value-free technical activity," Goulet concludes. It occurs in a competitive arena. It is up to the developing countries to devise more sophisticated policies to make this process serve their long-term social goals and national objectives.

Exploiting the Gulf Stream

"Benjamin Franklin and the Gulph Stream" by Frederick P. Schmitt, in *Oceans* (May–June 1978), Oceanic Society, Fort Mason, San Francisco, Calif. 94123.

Ben Franklin, America's Renaissance man, was the first person to map the waters of the Gulf Stream, gleaning data on the great "ocean river" from his own scientific observations and the whaling experience of a Nantucket sea captain.

Franklin's interest in the "Gulph Stream," writes Schmitt, curator of the Whaling Museum at Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y., was stirred in 1769 by complaints that the supposedly fast mail packets plying the Atlantic between Falmouth, England, and New York were taking two weeks longer than ordinary merchant ships bound from London to Rhode Island.

Although Franklin had noticed the great stream, with its carpet of floating gulfweed, as early as 1726 during a sea voyage to London, he did not appreciate its significance until his cousin, Captain Timothy Folger, explained that the fast westbound merchant ships were skippered by Rhode Island men who understood that it was wiser to cross the Gulf Stream quickly than try to buck its northerly three-mile-per-hour current. Franklin persuaded his Nantucket cousin to prepare a sketch of the "ocean river" with instructions on how to benefit from or avoid its brisk flow.

As Deputy Postmaster General of the British Colonies in North America, Franklin had copies of Folger's sketch sent to Falmouth where, Schmitt writes, "the packet skippers paid no attention."

Franklin, the scientist, continued his studies of the Gulf Stream, measuring its temperature during subsequent transatlantic voyages with a thermometer suspended from a line. He knew the waters were warmer in the current, and he hoped to devise a method for navigators

Nantucket whaling captains gave Ben Franklin the data to prepare this 1769 chart of the "Gulph Stream."



Courtesy of the American Philosophical Society

to determine exactly when they entered or passed through the stream.

Franklin found 18th-century mariners reluctant to take advice from a landsman. Modern day scientists, Schmitt observes, recently employed satellite photographs—not Franklin's charts—in a study aimed at persuading captains of ocean-going vessels to take advantage of the Gulf Stream's swift currents to save fuel.

"Greenhouse" for Truffles

"French Science Robs the Truffle of its Gallic Romance and its Rarity, with the First Crop from a Greenhouse" by Rudolph Chelminski, in *Horticulture* (May 1978), 125 Garden St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

The black truffle *(Tuber melanosporum),* so highly prized for the mysterious subtlety of its flavor in *pâté feuilletée, foie gras* and *poularde de Bresse,* has become prohibitively expensive ($160 per pound at retail) for all but the wealthiest, most obsessed gourmands. But now a research team for the French Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) has, for the first time, succeeded in seeding, cultivating, and bringing to fruition the highly prized delicacy.

All past attempts at truffle seeding have failed, says Chelminski, a former *Life* staffer now living in France. Moving truffle-producing soil from one locale to another did not work; and all too often, productive truffle grounds have mysteriously turned barren. Truffle production in France, which amounted to 2,000 tons in 1892, now average 25 to 50 tons per year.

The successful "greenhouse" cultivation of truffles was the work of agronomic engineer Jean Grente, director of INRA's plant pathology station at Clermont-Ferrand. Grente began his efforts on the assumption that the truffle is not a parasite, as commonly believed, but rather mycorrhizal in nature—living in mutually beneficial symbiosis with

the root system of its host tree.

Grente synthesized the mycorrhizal association between truffle (really a mushroom) and tree, obtaining pure cultures from fresh truffles and cooking them in a controlled environment until they germinated and produced mycelia, the plant's vegetative part. The truffle mycelia were then married to oak and hazel tree seedlings in a calcareous (chalky) soil free of other competing microorganisms. A transplanted hazel seedling produced its first truffle in December 1977.

Some 150,000 mycorrhized seedlings have been sold, at prices ranging from $3.50 to $6.50 per plant, and distributed (exclusively within France and Italy) through Agri-Truffe, a private society. They are expected to produce high quality truffles within 3 to 5 years, and Grente predicts production of 250 tons a year in 10 to 15 years.

The Artful Origins of Knowledge

"Art Opens Way For Science" by Jon B. Eklund, in *Chemical and Engineering News* (June 5, 1978), American Chemical Society, 1155 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

As a general rule, "pure" science discoveries are later elaborated by engineers and other technicians as "applied" science. However, says Eklund, curator of chemistry at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of History and Technology, the reverse is often the case; a broad body of empirical knowledge is developed first from which scientific principles and basic research follow later.

This is particularly true of the artists and artisans who throughout history have discovered and exploited particular properties of matter long before scientists noted these properties or attempted to explain them.

For example, early Chinese bronze castings (1200 B.C.) reflect the design limitations imposed by the use of sectional clay molds and the properties of bronze at the temperatures that the metal worker could achieve. The same was true of the red and black vases of classical Greece (500 B.C.), which could only be produced by artists with an empirical knowledge of the subtle properties of the clays and glazes used.

Eklund argues that the so-called "scientific revolution" of the 17th century produced a science of chemistry stemming from a knowledge of acids and corrosive alkalies associated with art, particularly etching. And the 18th-century European search for true "hard-paste" porcelains to match the hardness and luster of those from China and Japan produced a vast amount of experimentation with the behavior of different materials at high temperatures and led to the invention of crude devices to measure temperatures by the amount of shrinkage observed in a small cylinder of clay. The geologist subsequently borrowed the instruments and techniques of the ceramist to prove the vital role of heat in the development of the earth's mineral formations.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Taking Vengeance on the Beaver

"The War Between Indians and Animals" by Calvin Martin, in *Natural History* (June–July 1978), Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

The pre-modern American Indian is widely viewed as a noble savage who lived in harmonious balance with nature, taking from it only what necessity demanded and respecting animals and plants as fellow spiritual beings. A new look at the historical record by Martin, a Rutgers historian, shows that at certain periods the Indian perceived his relationship with nature to have gone awry and engaged in a fearful slaughter of game that amounted almost to a declaration of war.

A striking example of this behavior, Martin writes, occurred in eastern Canada in the late 15th century just before there was major direct Indian contact with whites. Diseases such as smallpox and influenza, brought by European fishermen and voyagers to the Canadian shore, preceded the newcomers inland and decimated aboriginal populations totally lacking in immunological resistance.

The Indian, believing that game animals possessed the power to inflict disease, and as yet unaware of the white menace, felt that the game had broken the traditional "compact of mutual courtesy" between animals and men. For some obscure reason, the wildlife had become angered and had unleashed their most potent weapon against man. In response, the Indians of the Northeast counterattacked with a vengeance. As some Micmac Indians termed it, they were "making war upon the beaver."

When the French and British fur traders arrived on the scene with manufactured goods to exchange for furs, the psychological basis for near-extinction by Indian hunters of many varieties of Canadian wildlife had already been established.

The Battle of the Fibers

"Cotton Versus Polyester" by T. Leo van Winkle, John Edeleanu, Elizabeth Ann Prosser, and Charles A. Walker, in *American Scientist* (May–June 1978), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Ct. 06511.

Environmentalists in recent years have extolled the benefits of "natural" processes and products over "synthetic" ones—especially those man-made items derived from such nonrenewable resources as petroleum. But in terms of energy consumption, it is not at all clear that cotton, a "natural" fiber, is less costly to society than "synthetic" polyester fibers made from oil and gas.

An analysis by van Winkle, a Catholic University engineering professor, and three colleagues, compares the energy consumption involved

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

in the full lifetime cycle of a cotton shirt and a shirt containing polyester fibers. While it takes considerably less energy to produce cotton lint than polyester fiber (613 kWh per 100 lbs. versus 2,158 kWh for the synthetic), and 25 percent less energy to make a cotton shirt than one containing synthetics, the advantage is lost in the wearing and maintenance (washing/drying/ironing) cycles. The total energy requirements for the manufacture and energy-intensive maintenance of a cotton shirt is 115.5 kWh, and for the more durable 65/35 polyester/cotton blend shirt it is 72.4 kWh.

When land-use factors are considered, the advantages of synthetics become even more pronounced. Van Winkle and his research associates estimate that if cotton were to replace man-made fibers in U.S. textile production, it would require a 35.6 percent increase in total cotton acreage. "With the increasing world population requiring increased food supplies," the authors contend, "it would be well-nigh impossible to divert this much prime cropland from food to cotton production."

Debunking the Starfish Myth

"The Crown-of-thorns Crisis in Australia: A Retrospective Analysis" by Richard A. Kenchington, in *Environmental Conservation* (Spring 1978), Elsevier Sequoia, S.A., P.O. Box 851, 1001 Lausanne 1, Switzerland.

Inadequate research, poor sampling techniques, and the eagerness of the news media for a sensational story combined to create the great crown-of-thorns starfish "menace" of the late 1960s and early '70s.

So says Australian marine biologist Kenchington, who suggests that the advent of scuba-diving technology led to greatly increased exploration of Australia's 2000-kilometer-long Great Barrier Reef and the dis-

Acanthaster planci, *measuring up to two and a half feet across, envelops living coral by extruding its stomach through its mouth.*



Photograph by C. H. Edmondson

covery in 1962 that large areas of the reef were infested with coral-eating crown-of-thorns starfish *(Acanthaster planci)*.

Although little was known about either reef ecology or the starfish, some scientific authorities hypothesized that the starfish infestation was something new, abnormal, and probably caused by human tampering with the environment. Subsequent surveys, which were inadequately financed and hampered by the extent and remoteness of the rich coral cover, did little to discourage speculation by the news media and environmentalists that the Great Barrier Reef would eventually collapse, exposing the entire Queensland coast to the erosive force of the Pacific Ocean.

In the absence of effective means of dealing with the menace (hand collecting and chemical treatment proved either impractical or dangerous to other marine life), the Australian government opted for further study and delay. By 1970 it was apparent that predictions of impending doom were unwarranted; even where the starfish's ravages had been great, the coral soon regenerated itself.

Further studies showed that the *A. planci* population explosion was a relatively short-lived phenomenom resulting from temporary changes in ocean salinity and temperature that had nothing to do with the hand of man. Analysis of reef sediments more than 3,000 years old demonstrated the recurring nature of starfish infestations, Kenchington writes, and showed that they were "natural but infrequent episodes in the long-term ecological balance of the Great Barrier Reef."

The Porpoise Success Story

"The Tuna/Porpoise Problem: Behavioral Aspects" by Karen Pryor and Kenneth S. Norris, in *Oceanus* (Spring 1978), 1172 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02134.

For many years, fishermen have capitalized on the tendency of yellowfin tuna to swim beneath schools of "spotted" and "spinner" porpoises (genus *Stenella*) in the tropical eastern Pacific. The *Stenella* schools usually travel and feed within 20 meters of the ocean surface and are easily spotted by fishing boats.

By using speedboats to herd the porpoises into a milling group, the tag-along tuna school may be efficiently encircled by huge nets. In the process, however, the air-breathing porpoises may easily become entangled in the nets and suffocate. All this has provoked widespread public concern.

However, since the early 1960s, according to Pryor, a marine biologist, and Norris, professor of natural history at the University of California, Santa Cruz, fishermen have used a variety of new equipment and techniques to release the encircled porpoises. To reduce entanglement, today's nets are required by federal law to have fine, 1¼-inch mesh at points where the *Stenella* are allowed to escape. Other gear improvements have minimized "canopies" or bulges in the net in

which porpoises may become trapped.

Such refinements have reduced porpoise mortality from an average 3.8 deaths per ton of tuna caught in 1971 by the U.S. fleet to 0.26 per ton in 1977. This death toll is low enough to permit porpoise populations to increase, and, while the matter may continue to be debated in emotional terms, the authors cautiously conclude that porpoise deaths are "perhaps no longer a major ecological problem."

A Plea for Conservation

"The Real Meaning of the Energy Crunch" by Daniel Yergin, in *The New York Times Magazine* (June 4, 1978), 229 W. 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

A serious real energy crisis—avoidable only if Americans drastically cut their consumption of oil—will arrive in the middle or late 1980s. It will be marked by astronomical prices for OPEC oil caused by an increase in world demand from the current 28–31 million barrels per day to an estimated 45 million barrels per day, the uppermost limit of OPEC production.

A dramatic rise in oil prices (double or triple present levels), continues Yergin, a member of the Harvard Business School's Energy Research Project, will bring about a resurgence of hyperinflation, reduced investment and purchasing power in the industrial nations, severe balance-of-payments problems, widespread unemployment, and, perhaps, "a major recession, even a world depression." The political effects, he adds, will be just as severe; nations will fight each other for oil, and the Soviets may feel compelled to "take bold risks" to extend their influence over the Persian Gulf oil-producing states.

Global dependence on Saudi Arabia, which controls one-fourth of the world's oil and therefore controls OPEC, will make the Saudis the linchpin of the world economy. A natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or a coup d'état in Saudi Arabia could have a shattering impact on world events.

Yergin discounts the importance of new oil from Alaska and the North Sea (Alaska will only make up for declining oil production in the lower 48 states, and North Sea production will peak at 5 or 6 million barrels per day in 1985). He says the development of nuclear power is stalemated by "cost, technical problems, environmental risks, doubts about safety, and, most recently, the dispute over nuclear proliferation." Coal and solar energy are inadequate alternatives.

Americans, Yergin concludes, must stop assuming that "big technology" and alternative energy sources will fill the gap and must begin to recognize the importance of reducing world demand for oil through conservation. The United States, he contends, can cut its energy use by at least 30 percent without significant changes in the American standard of living by "an adroit mixture" of incentives, regulation, public education, and energy-pricing policies. Reduced energy consumption may be difficult to achieve politically, but it is essential.

ARTS & LETTERS

The Newest Wave

"Here Comes The Fringe" by Steve Lawson, in *Horizon* (June 1978), 381 West Center Court, Marion, Ohio 43302.

A "Third Wave" of audacious and innovative British playwrights is beginning to make its mark on the English theater. These writers—Stephen Poliakoff, Barrie Keefe, Snoo Wilson, Steve Gooch—were spawned in small, makeshift theaters that have sprung up in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Sheffield, and Liverpool as well as in London.

"Young, committed, and astonishingly prolific," the Third Wave dramatists, says Lawson, literary manager of the Williamstown (Mass.) Theater Festival, "reject conventional drawing-room comedy and psychological drama in favor of using the stage as a forum for political and cultural issues" (e.g., the struggle for human dignity and fulfillment in an urban society still ruled by outmoded convention and notions of class). Their inspiration comes from the movies, rock music, and sick humor of today's pop culture.

Third Wave plays deal heavily in violence, alienation, and the distortion of man by his environment. Lawson says it is unlikely that the new playwrights would have flourished without the proliferation of English theaters dedicated to experimental works and without the new freedom bestowed by Parliament in 1968 when it abolished the Lord Chamberlain's powers of censorship.

Typical of the new works is Poliakoff's *Strawberry Fields*, which takes place almost entirely on a British highway and depicts two young right-wingers determined to restore Britain to a previous condition of purity. Whether such plays will win wide and lasting audience acceptance remains to be seen. But they have already made an impact, says Lawson, "by extending their drama beyond the fringe, beyond naturalism, beyond conventional plot lines and into new historical, political, and colloquial areas."

From Agitation to Auto-Destruction

"Art and Anarchism" by John A. Walker, in *Art and Artists* (May 1978), Hansom Books, P.O. Box 294, 2 & 4 Old Pye St., off Strutton Ground, Victoria St., London SW1P 2LR.

The anarchist of the popular imagination is a bomb-throwing madman bent on destroying authority through mindless terror. In fact, anarchism as a political philosophy (buttressed by a substantial literature) influenced late-19th-century European thought far more strongly than its main ideological rival, Marxism. The principal anarchist philosophers—William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Max Stirner, and Prince Pëtr Kropotkin—believed in a self-governing society made

up of small communes where power was decentralized and people would spurn the accumulation of private property.

Many important artists and art critics of the day—Gustave Courbet, Camille and Lucien Pissarro, Proudhon, Paul Signac—endorsed the social objectives of anarchism, says art historian Walker. Bourgeois hostility and the declining status of the artist, after the demise of aristocratic patronage and the invention of photography, combined to convince many artists that the anarchist vision promised greater financial security while satisfying their own deep commitment to "individual autonomy, independence, and freedom."

In anarchist theory, art played a number of roles, including agitation, propaganda, social criticism, and fund-raising. But despite their saturation with anarchist thought, neither the 19th-century impressionists and post-impressionists nor the 20th-century Dadaists truly married art and anarchist ideology.

Not until German artist Gustav Metzger invented "auto-destructive" art in the 1950s did anarchism come close to producing an authentic artistic statement. By spraying acid on stretched nylon, Metzger created art that destroyed itself in the very act of creation. In using violence creatively without producing a commodity for the marketplace, Walker argues, Metzger attained the elusive unity of art and politics that earlier anarchists had sought.

Feeding Culture May Imperil Art

"Centrality Without Philosophy: The Crisis In The Arts" by Joseph Wesley Zeigler, in *New York Affairs* (vol. 4, no. 4, 1978), New York University, Graduate School of Public Administration, 4 Washington Square North, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Soaring attendance figures for dance and symphony concerts and theater, opera, and museum events, combined with increased public funding, have produced a major change in the arts in America. Since 1966 the number of U.S. professional resident dance companies has grown from 10 to 70; the number of professional (nonprofit) theater ensembles has quadrupled (to 450). Appropriations by the states for the arts have risen from $4 to $70 million, and for fiscal year 1979 President Carter has budgeted $150 million for the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts.

Despite, and because of, this massive growth, writes Zeigler, a consultant to arts institutions, the arts revolution has reached a turning point. While subsidized "expansion" and "decentralization" have spawned cultural hubs in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Houston, Toledo, and many other cities, thinly dispersed federal funding has forced some arts groups like the Joffrey Ballet to curtail their programs. The New York City Ballet and Opera companies have come close to extinction, and at least one major cultural arena, New York's City Center, has all but shut down—"a victim of its own expansion," Ziegler writes.

Public funding may "breed culture," but it may also "imperil art." New York City, for example, recently launched a program to pay 300 artists $10,000 each, plus other benefits, for one year's work. To many people, this sounds utopian; to others, like *New York Times* critic Hilton Kramer, it is an undiscriminating "welfare program for artists" that encourages mediocrity.

Will future government-assisted growth emphasize quantity or quality? Will public funding reward popularity or original talent? Better management alone will not solve the crisis in the arts, Zeigler warns, for the problem is above all one of leadership and philosophy. What are needed are visionary men and women—artists and managers—who want to inspire the best the arts have to offer.

OTHER NATIONS

That Noisy Isle

"Will There Always Be An England?" by William Haley, in *The American Scholar* (Summer 1978), 1811 Q St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

England has fallen from its imperial heights as rapidly as any nation in history. Prime Minister James Callaghan's Labor Party government currently faces grave labor agitation and economic woes, friction with its European Common Market partners, and pressure to give autonomy to Scotland and Wales.

But, although Britain seems to be teetering on the brink of ruin, it will survive, says Haley, former director-general of the BBC and editor of *The Times* of London.

The English are still making important adjustments. They are renegotiating the social contract against a background of rapid social reform that "proved false to its promises and damaging in its effects," Haley writes. Nationalization of major industries and health services at the end of World War II resulted in bureaucratic waste and inefficiency.

Today, Britain experiences iconoclasm and dissent, exacerbated by the nation's rapid decline in world power. Authority is no longer trusted; the masses of people feel that the "professionals" have let them down. Big labor, "the most powerful organized force in the land," is frequently disruptive; the unions lack internal cohesion and cannot always control their own members.

But the questioning of established values is not new; Britain's adversary system of law and politics reflects a "national passion for argument," says Haley. What has changed is the scale of debate, thanks to the expanded role of press, radio, and television. Britain "is an isle full of noises." What is really happening, he suggests, is that "a healthy skeptical English democracy is seeking to establish new foundations."

OTHER NATIONS

Was It Luck or Genius?

"The Napoleonic Myth" by Correlli Barnett, in *The Illustrated London News* (May 1978), British Publications Inc., 11-03 46th Ave., Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, was a master of modern public relations who brilliantly portrayed himself as a national hero and military genius. In reality, argues Barnett, author of the new biography *Bonaparte,* Napoleon "was not a heroic genius or a master of war at all, but an overconfident gambler pursuing a fundamentally unsound system of war and statecraft."

Many of Bonaparte's costly campaigns were launched to further his personal political interests—to consolidate his shaky regime (France was bankrupt in 1795 after six years of war and revolutionary turmoil)—rather than to enhance the security or well-being of France. He is credited with instituting a new era of warfare—abandoning complex supply systems in favor of fast maneuvers and quick, decisive battles. But his method of providing money and food for his army by stripping the enemy countryside led to popular uprisings, notably in Italy, that forced him to disperse his troops to protect his own lines of communication.

The battlefield victories—from Montenotte in 1796 to Ligny in 1815—that gave Bonaparte his military fame, says Barnett, were "the product of quick-witted opportunism and fast, hard punching, of sheer energy and ruthless will to win, together with an army to match. They were victories of sheer pugilistic skill over ponderous, slow-reacting, conventionally minded opponents."

Bonaparte's technique of advancing without adequate supplies or transport worked well as long as his opponents failed to recognize his precarious position and his critical need for rapid victory. By avoiding decisive battle and conducting a protracted war (a strategy the Russians developed by accident in 1812), Bonaparte's enemies could have destroyed him long before Waterloo.

Decelerating Eurocommunism

"Eurocommunism: Who's in Charge?" by Don Cook, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1978), Box 1857, Greenwich, Ct. 06830.

There is strong evidence to suggest that (on instructions from Moscow) the French Communist Party under Georges Marchais intentionally shattered its alliance with the Socialists in order to destroy any chance of a leftist victory in the French parliamentary elections late last year. The behavior of the French Communists has exposed the myth of

Eurocommunism, writes Cook, Paris correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*.

The Russians had reason to fear that if the French Communists came to power with the Socialists, a Communist victory in Italy would inevitably have followed, thereby producing an end to détente and a return to the Cold War. Détente, contends Cook, permits the Russians to pursue other world ventures without risk and encourages the Western trade and credits essential to the economic well-being of Eastern Europe.

Since the election defeat, Cook writes, "Marchais has dropped all the cosmetics and returned to his true Stalinist colors—to the irritation and bitterness of comrades who really believed in Eurocommunism. . . ." The French Communist Party remains the most Moscow-oriented of all the parties in Western Europe.

The Italian Communists now seem to be as close to power as party leader Enrico Berlinguer and the Kremlin want them to be. And in Spain, Communist leader Santiago Carrillo continues to keep his distance from Moscow while building a party structure that can assure central control while gathering electoral support "among the wary, newly democratized Spaniards."

The "self-inflicted defeat" of the Left in the French election, says Cook, "has abruptly checked the concept of cooperative Eurocommunism cresting in some European wave of the future." The French political situation is frozen at least until the 1981 presidential election and perhaps until the National Assembly elections in 1983. Disillusionment with communism among leftist intellectuals, especially in France, is "complete," says Cook. In neither France nor Italy "does the Left seem to be going anywhere at all."

Loosening Ties

"COMECON Blues" by Nora Beloff, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

While members of the European Common Market move fitfully toward greater economic and political integration, the East European counterpart that calls itself COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), with headquarters in Moscow, remains a group of six East European states (plus Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam) whose economic ties are so loose that the bloc cannot collectively negotiate on equal terms with the West.

COMECON countries, writes Beloff, former political correspondent for *The Observer* of London, remain so weakly integrated after almost 30 years (Joseph Stalin set up COMECON in 1949) that they will sell each other products for which there is an international market "only if payment is in convertible exchange." (As much as 10 percent of internal COMECON trade is settled in U.S. dollars.)

Today, recession in the West is promoting COMECON integration by

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making it difficult for the East European nations to diversify their trade or reduce their dependence on Moscow. Beloff argues that the West has ample reasons, both political and economic, to expand trade with Eastern Europe. The Soviet and U.S. economies are somewhat complementary, and Western Europe has surplus goods, including machinery and consumer items, that the East bloc countries want and need.

Obstacles to expanded trade are very real; most East European products are not competitive in world markets in terms of price or quality. Nevertheless, Beloff contends, the West can encourage trade by abandoning "sudden and brutal acts of protectionism" and preventing political or ideological disputes from disrupting economic cooperation.

The Options for Zimbabwe

"What Economic Road?" by Roger Riddell, in *Africa Reports* (May–June 1978), Transaction, Inc., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

What is the economic future for an independent Zimbabwe? Supporters of Prime Minister Ian Smith's plan for an internal settlement of Rhodesia's racial conflict would continue the present export-oriented economic system while removing the more overt forms of racial discrimination. This strategy, says Riddell, a staff member of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, promises little to the black majority of 5.2 million. (More than 80 percent of urban black workers earn incomes below the urban poverty level of $1,652 per year.)

The Rhodesian economy, during its recent boom (1969–75), failed to provide jobs for some 250,000 blacks entering the labor force in that prosperous period. Any plan to raise the incomes of rural blacks, Riddell argues, would require a tenfold increase in investment in traditional agriculture to upgrade the Tribal Trust Lands and to resettle blacks (some 500,000 families) on underutilized white-owned land.

Leaders of the Patriotic Front (Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) seek "a radical change away from settler-colonialism towards a more



Two-thirds of Rhodesia's 5.2 million blacks live in rural areas, most of them on 39.9 million acres of Tribal Trust Lands (shown in red). The 249,000 Europeans own 45 million acres—almost half the country's total area.

socialist, self-reliant, economic structure," says Riddell. This is likely to mean nationalization of all land, the resettlement of large numbers of rural blacks, and a system of communal farming units; reorganization of industry to produce goods for mass consumption; control of foreign investment; and a narrowing of income differentials at the expense of managerial, industrial, and bureaucratic job holders.

Such a strategy would be bitterly opposed by the small but powerful group of people (blacks as well as whites) who do well under the existing system. Riddell concludes that the Ian Smith option entails little structural change, and thus offers little chance of solving basic economic inequities. The Popular Front option presents huge short-term problems but does address the needs of the poor majority, and "holds out the greatest hope for the war-weary Zimbabweans."

A Post-Terror Prognosis

"Between Repression and Reform: A Stranger's Impressions of Argentina and Brazil" by Fritz Stern, in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1978), 428 East Baltimore St., Baltimore, Md. 21202

Democracy in Latin America has all but disappeared over the last decade. Even in countries where democratic institutions survive, social and economic conditions are inhospitable to healthy liberal democracy. But, despite authoritarian trends, Stern, a Columbia University historian, finds "a presumption for change" in Argentina and Brazil.

This presumption is rooted partly in Latin America's traditional ties with Europe, strengthened now by Common Market investments and trade. The recent transition to democracy managed by Spain and Portugal may prove a handy model for reform. And the success of Latin America's military-technocratic regimes in restoring order and promoting economic growth also argues, paradoxically, for change; with terrorism and inflation under control, how can repression be justified?

Unfortunately, a state of latent repression remains in Argentina under the military junta of President Jorge Rafael Videla, even though most foreign observers (and Argentinians) believe the "war" against left-wing Montonero terrorism has been won. The government, which came to power in 1976 determined to crush the guerrillas, seems afraid to admit victory for fear of being called to account for past excesses once repression is relaxed.

In Brazil, the benefits of a long economic boom (1968–74) have been slow to filter down to the masses, and unions are denied the right to strike. Lately, there have been some changes. The regime of President Ernesto Geisel has lifted censorship for most newspapers, and police torture seems to have been halted (as of April 1977).

Both countries, still suffer from their leaders' indifference to the ideals of democracy, including such preconditions of reform as the rule of law and broader participation in political and economic life by all strata of society.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"A Sea of Troubles? Sources of Dispute in the New Ocean Regime"

(Adelphi Papers No. 143)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London WC2N 6AL. 50 pp. $1.50.
Author: Barry Buzan

Law-of-the-sea disputes are going to stir international disorder for the foreseeable future. However, few of them seem likely to result in serious military conflict, says Buzan, lecturer at the University of Warwick.

Buzan predicts that low-level conflicts will occur quite frequently and settlement of many disputes will be accompanied by confrontations ranging from seizure of fishing boats to small-scale military clashes. Still, law-of-the-sea controversies can often be pursued without seriously damaging the relations of the parties on other matters because the resources at stake are not crucial, the disputes are often physically remote, and because maritime boundaries do not carry the same emotional weight as land frontiers.

Buzan points out that law-of-the-sea disputes can be used by states to pursue other political goals in a forceful, but relatively safe, way (e.g., Egypt's closing of the Straits of Tiran in 1967; North Korea's seizure of the *U.S.S. Pueblo* in January 1968; and Soviet seizure of Japanese fishing boats in November 1976 when a Soviet defector flew a MIG-25 to Japan). Some struggles are prolonged for domestic consumption (e.g., Argentina's dispute with Britain over the Falklands).

A few disagreements have the potential for more serious and large-scale conflict, either because relations between the disputants are already strained or because the issue involves territory or economic interests considered vital. Among these are contests between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean; between Japan and the Soviet Union over islands in the Kurile group; between Japan and South Korea over islands in the East China Sea; and between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. In addition, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru quarrel over Bolivia's access to the sea; the general problem of Israeli access to the Red Sea continues; and the right of passage for all ships at Bab-el Mandeb near the horn of Africa remains unsettled.

What is unfolding is the final stage in a process by which maritime affairs are no longer dominated by the maritime states but rather by maritime and coastal states together. This process, says Buzan, has been taking place through both unilateral and global actions, but because of the high visibility of the three Law of the Sea Conferences since 1958 there is a tendency to assume that if the Conference produces an international convention, then the law-of-the-sea problem is solved. This is hardly the case. A convention will mitigate some kinds of disputes (e.g., the legitimacy of coastal-state jurisdiction over offshore fisheries) but do little to help settle quarrels over offshore islands and boundary lines. Indeed, says Buzan, the Conference may have intensified "a world-wide scramble for islands and boundary positions."

"The Resilience of Ecosystems"

Colorado Associated University Press, University of Colorado, 1424 15th St., Boulder, Colo. 80302. 29 pp. $1.95
Author: Rene Dubos

It is not true that human beings cause damage to the Earth whenever they disturb the natural order of things. Nor is it true that natural processes always produce the most viable ecosystems.

The restorative processes of nature, says ecologist Dubos, are exceedingly effective, especially in the temperate zone. Just 200 years ago, 70 percent of the land area of Rhode Island had been cleared of forest cover for use as farm land. With the abandonment of less productive farms in the late 19th century, trees returned so rapidly that less than 30 percent of the state remains cleared today.

There are countless examples of ecological recovery that follows human intervention of a benevolent kind (e.g., as in Jamaica Bay, N.Y., and rivers like the Thames in Britain and the Willamette in Oregon, where pollution was halted and natural forces allowed to work). "What is needed," says Dubos, "is not esoteric knowledge and technologies but simply good management and social will."

Sound and fruitful ecosystems of great diversity and stability have been deliberately and artificially created by man. Hawaii, for example, once had few terrestrial vertebrates, no pine trees, oaks, maples, willows, fig trees, or mangroves, only one species of palm and a few orchids. The harmonious profusion that exists there now occurred through the deliberate introduction of foreign species.

By creating their hedgerows in England and France, farmers established a varied ecosystem which serves as a reservoir for animal and plant species that probably could not survive in either the primeval forest or a completely cleared landscape.

Ecosystems, says Dubos, have continuously evolved in the course of time, first through the influence of natural events and now, increasingly, because of human intervention. While conceding that human activities are causing environmental damage, Dubos argues that humans nevertheless, "can use natural resources to create new ecosystems which are ecologically sound, economically productive, and esthetically rewarding."

"New Approaches to Conflict Resolution"

The Ford Foundation, 320 East 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10017. 73 pp.
Author: Sanford M. Jaffe

America today is beset with disputes of all sorts—among interest groups, between interest groups and government, between different levels of government, and between individuals.

The courts and other decision-making bodies have struggled to meet the unprecedented demands placed upon them, says Jaffe, head of the Ford Foundation's Government and Law Program, but their ability to resolve conflicts efficiently and fairly has become seriously strained. (Between 1960 and 1975, the number of cases filed in federal courts rose by 80 percent.)

The Ford Foundation is funding research in the United States and Europe to find alternative procedures that will improve society's capacity to deal with conflicts while ensuring continued access "to the system of justice

that the poor, minorities, and other disadvantaged have so recently won."

Experimentation has shown that mediation, arbitration, and "investigative adjudication" can be cheaper and more effective than the courts, writes Jaffe. For example, arbitration has been used successfully by Boston's Community Dispute Services (in the Hyde Park High School racial disturbance), New York's Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution (in a complex ethnic-racial dispute between Columbia University and the Harlem community), and by Philadelphia's compulsory arbitration program (for small claims), which has proved considerably less costly than formal court procedures.

Other countries have developed potentially helpful programs: Germany's "Stuttgart Model," a procedure that reduces delay in civil cases; the National Swedish Board for Consumer Policies, which combines conciliation and fact-finding; and Britain's Payment-Into-Court System, to promote settlement of civil claims by penalizing claimants who refuse an early out-of-court offer from the defendant.

Extensive reforms in the United States are probably a long way off, Jaffe concludes, but new research could lead to reducing the overload on the present system.

"Renewable Ocean Energy Resources, Part 1: Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion"

Report by the Office of Technology Assessment to the U.S. Senate Ocean Policy Study, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 44 pp. $2.20 (Stock no.: 052-003-00536-1).

The concept of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)—using the temperature difference between warm ocean surface water and cold water in the ocean depths to power a turbine—offers the promise of inexhaustible electricity.

However, a recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress concludes that federal funding of OTEC research, while "neither clearly foolish nor clearly desirable," is at best a costly and high-risk proposition.

Stored solar energy in surface waters can be extracted by using the heat to evaporate a fluid (ammonia or freon), passing the resultant vapor through a turbine, and then returning the vapor to fluid state by chilling it with cold water from the deep ocean. The turbine can be used to power equipment or to generate electricity.

Funding for government research on OTEC has totaled about $27 million since 1972 and is budgeted at $35 million for fiscal year 1978, most of which will be spent on the design, manufacture, and testing of component parts for a prototype OTEC plant.

Because of low operating efficiency, a 100-megawatt OTEC plant would be enormous in size and require a cold and warm water flow of 30,000 cubic feet per second—two and a half times the flow of the Potomac River past Washington, D.C. The technical problems involved (e.g., the cold-water intake pipe for a 100 megawatt plant, hanging vertically in the sea, would have to be 40 meters in diameter and 800 meters long) make it impossible to estimate the real costs and benefits of an OTEC facility.

The OTA study concludes that continued modest funding in the tens of millions of dollars range for the next 5 to 10 years could lead to the solution



An OTEC plant requires great quantities of cold water to chill a vaporized gas that has been heated by warm surface water to drive a generator.

of important technical problems without the construction of a costly large-scale prototype. It is unlikely, in any case, that an OTEC system could "become a viable part of the U.S. energy supply system in this century."

"Mandatory Retirement and the Law"

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 29 pp. $2.25.
Author: Robert M. Macdonald

On January 1, 1979, legislation will go into effect (the amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) that bans mandatory retirement in private firms before age 70 and eliminates any upper age limit for federal workers.

Macdonald, a professor of business economics at Dartmouth, argues that the legislation was rushed through Congress with too little research or debate over its possible effects. Opponents argue that the legislation disrupts orderly procedures for retiring older workers with dignity at a pre-set time, in favor of a system that arouses contention and forces workers to retire under pressure when their capacities are recognized to be in decline.

Mandatory retirement, says Macdonald, offers increased efficiency and greater opportunities for young and minority workers. Through long experience, firms have established retirement policies that generally serve their best interests and those of their employees as well. Government intervention in this area disrupts policies that vary from firm to firm.

Macdonald concludes that too little is known about retirement behavior to predict what the full effects of the new legislation will be. Currently, among the more than 8 million men and women aged 65 to 70, one in five is in the work force, compared with one in three just 15 years ago. Peter Drucker, of the Claremont Graduate School, be-

lieves that the ban on mandatory retirement will substantially increase the number of older people at work. James Schulz, another expert on the aged, predicts a modest increase in the male labor supply of less than 0.1 percent in the first year of the new retirement law and up to 0.3 percent after five years. Retirement patterns for women are less well known.

"Drug Use Among American High-School Students, 1975–1977"

National Institute on Drug Abuse, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, Md. 20857, 238 pp.
Authors: Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, Patrick M. O'Malley

Marijuana use among American teenagers has been rising steadily over the past three years, while use of other illicit drugs (e.g., stimulants, tranquilizers, hallucinogens, cocaine, etc.) has remained constant.

These are among the findings of a survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan for the National Institute on Drug Abuse.

Researchers studied drug use among high-school seniors at some 125 public and private high schools throughout the country for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977. (An average of almost 17,000 students were questioned each year.)

The data show that by 1977, 56 percent of the high-school seniors had at least tried marijuana—an increase of about 9 percent since the class of 1975—and that the number of daily users had risen substantially from about 1 in 17 to 1 in every 11.

About 36 percent of the students had used a drug other than marijuana. Of these, amphetamines, used by 1 in 4, were most popular; followed by tranquilizers (tried by 1 in 5), sedatives (1 in 6), hallucinogens (1 in 7), inhalants and cocaine (both tried by 1 in 10), and heroin (1 in 50).

The majority of high-school seniors, according to the study, say that their personal use, or nonuse, of marijuana would not be affected by decriminalization. In 1977, only 22 percent of high-school seniors believed that marijuana use should be treated as a crime, and only one-third believed that regular use involved much health risk.

Students reported that marijuana and psychotherapeutic drugs (tranquilizers and amphetamines) are relatively easy to obtain, and from 28 to 35 percent reported easy access to less frequently used drugs, such as cocaine.

Over the three-year period, alcohol use has remained fairly constant, with about 6 percent of seniors reporting daily use (8.6 percent of males and 3.6 percent of females). Almost 20 percent of all seniors smoke half a pack of cigarettes or more daily. (The proportion of males who smoke heavily has remained constant, while the proportion of females has risen from 16 percent to about 19 percent since 1975.) This is true despite the fact that almost 60 percent of all seniors believe that regular cigarette use carries great risk of harm, and 42 percent believe that cigarette smoking in public places should be prohibited.

Illicit drug use, drinking, and smoking cigarettes are more prevalent among seniors who do not plan to attend a four-year college (e.g., less than half the college-bound—47 percent—reported any illicit drug use in the previous year, while more than half—53 percent—of the noncollege-bound did).

Overall, illicit drug use is highest in the largest metropolitan areas and

lowest in nonmetropolitan areas, but the gap is closing. Furthermore, over the past three years the use of marijuana has risen slightly less in the largest metropolitan areas than in other, less densely populated, regions. This suggests that the country may be nearing a saturation level in drug use, at least for the senior-high-school age group.

"Disappearing Species: The Social Challenge"

Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 38 pp. $2.00
Author: Erik Eckholm

All species ultimately become extinct and are replaced by new ones, but the destruction of natural habitats, the spread of toxic chemicals, and exploitation have accelerated the pace of species disappearance to an alarming extent.

Endangered animals receive the greatest attention (some 1,000 birds and mammals are now believed to be in jeopardy), says Eckholm, Senior Researcher with Worldwatch Institute, but plant extinctions are often more important ecologically because a disappearing plant can take with it 10 to 30 dependent species of insects, animals, and even other plants.

The most immediate threat posed by the decline in the diversity of life forms is the shrinkage of the gene pool. Eckholm argues that it is vital to maintain this diversity if science is to continue finding varieties of plant and animal life beneficial to man. (For example, in 1973, scientists trying to develop high-protein sorghum examined more than 9,000 varieties before they discovered the qualities they sought in two obscure strains in Ethiopia.)

The gravest danger to species is habitat destruction, especially in certain tropical areas where humid conditions have produced unparalleled genetic diversity.

Tropical ecosystems contain most of the world's medicinally valuable plants, producing compounds used to fight everything from heart disease to cancer (e.g., a tropical periwinkle plant provides chemicals used to combat leukemia).

Eckholm urges support for a program to identify and preserve valuable areas and species. Under the auspices of UNESCO, 144 areas in 35 countries have already been recognized as "Biosphere Reserves," but humid tropical forests are badly underrepresented. Wealthy countries likely to reap future benefits should help share the costs of saving these reserves. However, the ultimate solution is economic progress and population control to ease the pressure on all life-preserving habitats.



Times have changed. From the Morrill (land-grant college) Act of 1862 to the vast federal aid programs of the 1970s, American colleges and universities have experienced a century of rapid growth. In 1875, the University of Missouri at Columbia (above) *counted 32 professors and 400 students. Today, the 24,000-student Columbia campus is one of the four state university campuses; its faculty numbers close to 3,000.*

The Changing American Campus

For the first time in its history, the United States has in place a system of *mass* higher education, with 11 million people of all races and incomes attending some sort of college or university. This campus revolution has occurred during the 1970s while most attention has focused on declining overall enrollment, financial strains, and controversies, such as the *Bakke* case, over "affirmative action." Here sociologist David Riesman provides an overview; Martin Kaplan examines the old "elite schools"; journalist Larry Van Dyne analyzes community colleges, the newest wave; and economist Chester E. Finn, Jr. looks at the financial state of higher education.

BEYOND THE '60s

by David Riesman

In common parlance, "the 1960s" generally denotes the tumultuous period between the Kennedy assassination in 1963 and the beginning of Watergate in 1972. Like other stereotypical decades, the '60s are now seen retrospectively through a distorted lens. We forget, for example, that civil-rights activism, civil disobedience, and the antinuclear movement in the United States all began in the 1950s. By the same token, although American campuses achieved their greatest visibility in the press during the '60s, the 1970s are proving to be a more significant decade of change in higher education.

Consider these developments:

In 1972, in a move heralded by no banner headlines, Congress created the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants to pro-

vide tuition subsidies for needy students. Spiritual heir to the G.I. Bill, it was the most important piece of federal education legislation since Lincoln's day, when the Morrill Act established the land-grant college system. Basic grants (along with money from related programs) now provide some $5 billion annually to 3 million American students.

These students are not admitted to college on the basis of national competitive examinations, as in Japan and many other industrial societies. Instead, the recent American pursuit of equal opportunity has led us to extend some sort of college education to virtually any taker, regardless of ability, willingness to pay, or quality of previous academic work.

Aided in part by federal aid (and legal pressure), in part by active recruiting by colleges and universities (with the elite public and private schools leading the way), both the proportion and the absolute numbers of minority students have risen dramatically in the 1970s. Black women for a long time had attended college (usually predominantly black colleges) in higher proportions than black men—often 100 percent higher. But during the 1970s, black males caught up with their female counterparts. There are currently more than 1 million black students in college, comprising 11 percent of total U.S. enrollment. The college-going rates for youths from middle- and lower-income black families are now actually higher than for comparable white families.* Race aside, women, for the first time in our history, now outnumber men in the freshman classes of U.S. postsecondary institutions.

Many of the new college students attend the growing urban universities. If we leave aside the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, King's College (which became Columbia) in New York, and a few others, colleges in the United States until the late 19th century were in small cities and towns, away from the

*Enrollments of students from Spanish-speaking families have risen less dramatically, however, in part because fewer of them are making it through high school. Although "Hispanic Americans" will be the largest officially designated U.S. minority group by the mid-1980s, in 1976 they made up only 4.4 percent of college students.

David Riesman, 69, is Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University. Born in Philadelphia, he received his A.B. (1931) and LL.B. (1934) from Harvard and later clerked for Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1935–36). He joined the Harvard faculty in 1958, after many years of practicing law and teaching law and the social sciences. His many books include The Lonely Crowd *(1950, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denny),* The Academic Revolution *(1968, with Christopher Jencks), and* The Perpetual Dream *(1977, with Gerald Grant).*

alleged corruption of the metropolis.* Even after the land-grant colleges were established in 1862, most of the attention continued to go to rural areas.

Administrators Under Siege

During the last few years, the momentum has been in the other direction. The University of Massachusetts has opened a new Boston campus. The University of Missouri has taken over the once private University of Kansas City (and has also built a new branch in St. Louis); and the state system in Ohio has established Cleveland State University, taking over for this purpose the small kernel of Fenn College. One could go on. These new institutions may be seen as a second land-grant wave, belatedly reflecting a shift of the U.S. population to metropolitan areas.

Junior colleges—there were once 300 of them, mostly private, often for women only, frequently regarded as finishing schools—have been steadily supplanted by (mostly public) community colleges, many of them also urban, which now enroll one-third of all American college students. A thousand strong, the community colleges represent the kind of quick and enviable adaptation to consumer demand usually not associated with so entrenched an enterprise as higher education.

Finally, in the face of competing campus interests and government regulations, the task of being a university president is harder than ever before. The very nature of the office has changed; indeed, it may no longer be a job for an educator. In an earlier era, to be sure, those long-lived presidents who set their stamp on institutions, or created them *de novo*, were not universally popular. Woodrow Wilson had at least as many difficulties at Princeton as he did in the White House, and a look at the correspondence of Charles William Eliot during his 40-year tenure at Harvard reveals the many difficulties he encountered with faculty, governing boards, and influential Bostonians.

Yet university presidents today are required to spend more time managing than leading. They must contend with competing interests inside the university—among graduate schools and autarchic faculty members, unionized staff, and periodically mobilized students—that are as threatening as any pressures coming from the outside. Indeed, the external pressures sometimes seem relatively benign.

In my own view, for example, the fact that government

*Two Big Ten universities, Minnesota and Ohio State, are located in metropolitan centers; perhaps in Minnesota it was believed that, if heavily populated by Scandinavians, even a metropolis could be healthy.

bounty, on which virtually all schools depend, comes from more than 400 separate programs scattered through almost every federal agency (and overseen by over 100 congressional committees and subcommittees) is fortunate because no single jugular vein can be cut at the behest of an angry legislator. Yet the need to manage and keep track of funds from so many different sources, subject to different patterns of auditing and review, creates almost unmanageable problems for recipient institutions.

The sheer diversity of American higher education, so baffling to foreigners, baffles Americans as well. There were, at last official count, 3,075 accredited colleges and universities in the United States. Many of them have their own separate lobbies in Washington: the community colleges, the land-grant schools and other state universities, the former teachers colleges and regional state universities, the predominantly black schools, the private colleges. Not to mention women's schools and Catholic schools, and schools affiliated with dozens of other denominations. Higher education in this country has not evolved according to a master plan. Nor is there any kind of centralized federal ministry of education,* as there is in most of the rest of the world. (There are, however, central boards in many states to limit senseless competition by curbing, for example, the plans of a regional state college or university to establish a medical school or inaugurate new Ph.D. programs rivaling offerings at already established state and land-grant universities.)

A Hobbesian War?

Prior to the current economic crunch, the helter-skelter development, governance, and multiple financing of American colleges and universities was regarded as a great strength, an example of healthy pluralism. But in a time of "retrenchment," questions are being raised about the compatibility of pluralism and other values—for indeed, contrary to the American credo, good things are not always compatible. In a number of states, robust public institutions are continuing to expand even as academically distinguished private ones, with empty classrooms,

*In 1977, to honor a campaign pledge to the organized schoolteachers of the National Education Association (which has also been active in college organizing), the Carter administration proposed creation of a cabinet-level Department of Education. The hope was to give education greater dignity and visibility by separating it out from the mammoth Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. But many representatives of private higher education opposed the change, fearing especially that if specialized agencies such as the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation were to be included in the new Department, dominated as it is likely to be by concerns for public schools, the tendency toward a "leveling" in quality, already evident in much federal and administrative practice, would be enhanced.

"BASICS" VERSUS "SOFTNESS"

Newspapers—and the Bakke case—have made us aware of the increasing numbers of minority students in college. But we are less aware of the growing numbers of white college students who once would not have thought of themselves as "college material." Faculty members are only now beginning to seek ways to cope with a student body—both in community colleges and in four-year schools—that is academically less well prepared and less motivated than in the past.

Professors in many colleges and universities respond to the new generation by pressing for greater stress on basic skills and a "core" body of knowledge that every student is expected to master. At the same time, individual university departments—acting much like the community colleges—feel compelled to compete for these students in a campus "free market." The end result is "softness": larger rewards (grade inflation) or lesser demands (fewer homework assignments), with the professor often being judged as an entertainer.

teeter towards bankruptcy. Many of the private schools could accept students now attending public institutions if they were given the per-student subsidy (or even much less) that the state provides. In such a situation, between the private and the public schools, as well as among the public schools themselves, the stage has been set for a Hobbesian war of all against all.

In some ways, that war has already begun, and the side that has given up the most ground is the private sector. This is a mischievous development. Worse, in terms of those subtle counterweights that help us to maintain a broad and balanced sense of what educational "quality" really is, the mischief promises to be quite substantial.

At the end of World War II, approximately half of the 1.5 million college and university students in the United States were educated in private institutions, the other half in state or locally supported schools. Today, private colleges educate barely one-fifth of American undergraduates.*

Only in the northeast quadrant of the United States, where private education had a head start, does the appeal of such schools still outshine that of the state universities. By contrast, in Michigan, few private colleges even come close to the major state schools in quality. When one goes further west and to the South, the state institutions have near-total hegemony. One senses this in Willie Morris's description, in *North Toward*

*This is just the reverse of the case in Japan, where a growing number of private colleges and universities now enroll about 80 percent of the students; however, with exceptions such as Waseda and Keio, the most distinguished universities are public.

Home, of the allure of the University of Texas to a graduate of Yazoo City High School.

There is a handful of exceptions all around the country, including not just major private research universities like Stanford, but outstanding smaller private colleges and universities as well: Reed, Whitman, Carleton, Oberlin, Emory, Rice—schools that, if they did not already exist, no one in these tough times would now be likely to invent. Here, the academic standards are rigorous and purposeful. But the number of students these and other private institutions draw are insignificant compared with enrollments at the great state institutions such as the branches of the University of California, which take students from the state's entire socioeconomic spectrum and to which a well-to-do family is as likely to send its children as to Stanford.

Thus, it is not simply tuition that has taken private schools out of the market, for inflation spreads its penalties—and windfalls—all too unevenly. There are still millions of Americans who have enough, could save enough, or could safely borrow enough to send their children even to the most expensive private college. Indeed, some recent evidence (which few parents or politicians are predisposed to accept) suggests that middle-class families' gross incomes are actually *outpacing* the rate of inflation.*

At the heart of the problem is the fact that, as our culture becomes "democratized," the idea of attending a private school has come to seem unnatural and anachronistic to many people. To be sure, in a country the size of the United States there remain a good many affluent and ambitious children and parents who are determined to seek "the best" in higher education—Jewish families particularly, and, increasingly, families of Irish, Oriental, and other backgrounds, lacking regional or strong religious loyalties. But such traffic feeds only the big or small "brand-name" institutions.

Among one group of victims of this egalitarianism—the exclusively private single-sex colleges—panic has been spreading since the late 1950s. Future anthropologists will be amused to discover that Americans threw young people at each other in an unchaperoned way and regarded this as if it were the order of nature. Yet sex segregation, which has existed in some form for adolescents in all societies, was denounced as "unnatural," not just as discriminatory. It has become an increasingly idiosyn-

*According to the Congressional Budget Office, even when all taxes are subtracted, the median income of families with college-age students rose by about 75 percent between 1967 and 1976—just enough to cover the tuition climb of the same decade. The Congressional Research Service, however, has published rival findings suggesting that median income in fact lagged behind tuition by about 5 percent over the same period.

HIGHER EDUCATION: KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

INSTITUTIONS[1]

	1950	1960	1966	1970	1976
Public	638	721	806	1,101	1,467
Private	1,221	1,319	1,446	1,472	1,608
For women	258	259	283	193	125
For men	222	232	232	154	109
Co-ed	1,379	1,549	1,737	2,226	2,828
Religious	717	807	910	817	785
2-year	527	593	685	897	1,147
4-year	1,332	1,447	1,567	1,676	1,928
Total	1,859	2,040	2,252	2,573	3,075

The number of colleges and universities (above) *continues to climb, but the number of religious and single-sex colleges has fallen from its 1966 peak. Big gains were made by community colleges, which now enroll one-third of the nation's 11 million college students* (below). *Of those attending community colleges, less than one-fourth go on to four-year schools, with figures ranging from 9 percent (Hispanics) to 26 percent (whites).*

STUDENTS[1]



Average pre-college Scholastic Aptitude Test scores for all students have declined, with the biggest drop in "verbal" scores (below), *even as college enrollment has doubled since 1965. Of every 100 American youngsters in the fifth grade in 1948, 58 later graduated from high school, 15 from college; for 1968 fifth-graders, the figures were 75 and 24 (projected).*

S.A.T. SCORES[2]



Sustained enrollment gains have raised the proportion of college graduates from 17.3 percent of the 22-year-old population in 1962 to 23.4 percent in 1976. In 1976, colleges and universities awarded nearly 1 million bachelor's degrees, more than 300,000 master's degrees, and about 35,000 Ph.D.'s. In both numbers and percentages, blacks and other minorities (below) *now share increasingly in these rewards, although gains for Hispanics have not been dramatic.*

MINORITY ENROLLMENTS[3]

(Thousands of students and percentages of total undergraduate enrollment)

	1970		1974		1976	
Blacks	345	6.9%	508	9.0%	605	10.2%
American Indians	27	0.5	33	0.6	38	0.6
Hispanics	103	2.1	158	2.8	264	4.4
Asian-Americans	52	1.0	64	1.1	103	1.7
Total	526		763		1,011	

RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION[4]

	UNIVERSITIES		COLLEGES	
	High ranking	Low ranking	High ranking	Low ranking
FACULTY				
Protestant	59.9%	69.3%	64.7%	67.1%
Catholic	13.2	16.7	13.4	23.8
Jewish	17.2	7.2	13.2	3.3
Other	9.7	6.8	8.7	5.8
UNDERGRADUATE				
Protestant	43.2	57.0	65.2	57.2
Catholic	26.7	29.8	17.6	33.7
Jewish	20.1	7.9	10.1	3.7
Other	10.0	5.3	7.1	5.4

Diverse religious groups are represented as percentages of total faculty and undergraduates in U.S. institutions (above, *with "ranking" of institutions derived from the 1967 Gourman Report). Catholics, 25 percent of the U.S. population, are still "under-represented" in high-ranking schools, but future increases seem likely. Freed from pre-war discrimination, Jews (2.8 percent of the U.S. population) now make an outsized contribution to "elite" schools. The changing percentage of bachelor's degrees awarded in each field* (below) *partly reflects shifting job opportunities.*

B.A./B.S. DEGREES[1]



Sources: [1]National Center for Education Statistics, *Department of Health, Education and Welfare*
[2]College Entrance Examination Board
[3]U.S. Office for Civil Rights
[4]Adapted from *The Academic Melting Pot* by Stephen Steinberg. © 1974 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

cratic choice to attend the few single-sex schools that remain. One element of American diversity is thus being lost—as is an opportunity for some young people who would benefit, for a time, from not having to compete *with* or *for* the opposite sex. Yet opportunity to choose is supposed to be one of the very essentials of democratization.

Another precariously perched group of private schools are the Fundamentalist Christian colleges, which combine Biblical literalism with the kind of high-powered education that is geared to "this-worldly" success. Many of the Fundamentalist institutions are in the South, such as Bob Jones University in South Carolina (which regards even the neighboring Southern Baptists at Furman University as heretics), or Harding College in Arkansas, which seeks to foster "a strong commitment to Christ and his kingdom" and forbids "drinking, gambling, dancing, hazing, obscene literature and pictures," and smoking by women.*

Smallness vs. "Giantism"

Many of these schools—including Billy Graham's alma mater, Wheaton College, in Illinois—have tough academic standards along with a driving sense of purpose. In times of trouble, they take comfort from their very belief that they are fighting a rearguard action against modernity (which, in many very sound ways, they are). But this sometimes leads them into costly confrontations with the insufficiently differentiated regulations of state and federal governments, and the prejudices of "enlightened secularists" who believe themselves to be apostles of tolerance.

Advocates of public higher education claim that there is virtually no innovation to be found in the private sector that cannot also be duplicated in the public sector. And indeed, the public schools are less monolithic than is often thought. The University of California, with its eight campuses, offers students everything from small-college clusters in rural settings of great natural beauty (Santa Cruz) to large urban universities (Los Angeles). And Evergreen State College, begun 10 years ago in Olympia, Washington, is more avowedly experimental than most private colleges.

Yet an important difference remains: Private colleges, and (with such exceptions as Northeastern and New York Univer-

*Fundamentalist religion does not necessarily mean political conservatism, however. At Michigan's Calvin College, run by the Dutch Reformed Church, and far more traditional than anything found in the Netherlands, many of the faculty campaigned for George McGovern in 1972.

THE (UNCERTAIN) LEGACY OF BAKKE

The question of "reverse discrimination" in the case of Allan Bakke was resolved by the Supreme Court on June 28, 1978, but it remains very much a question in many other cases. The 38-year-old white engineer contended that he had been denied a place at the University of California-Davis medical school because of racial quotas that reserved 16 out of 100 openings for minority applicants. (Bakke entered the school last September.)

So finely balanced was the high court decision—Justice Lewis Powell voted with one bloc of four justices to award Bakke a place, then sided with the other four justices to uphold the consideration of race (but not explicit quotas) in the admissions process—that most lawyers regard it as an ambiguous precedent, not the last word on the legal complications of affirmative action in education.

Reverse discrimination suits, which have been cropping up in lower federal courts for some time, will no doubt continue. During the past year, judgments in lawsuits charging reverse discrimination or racial quotas have gone against Virginia Commonwealth University, the Georgetown University Law Center, the University of North Carolina, and Alabama State University, with the judge in the Virginia case expressing concern lest the rights of individual students or teachers be "flattened by the civil-rights steamroller."

Nor is the confusion limited to education. Similar suits have involved unions in New Orleans, police in Detroit, and city employees in Berkeley. How *Bakke* will shape future Supreme Court decisions is far from clear. Shortly after its decision in the case, the Supreme Court found in favor of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. and its federally-approved system of "numerical goals" for hiring and promoting women and members of minority groups.

sity) most private universities as well, are on average far smaller than public ones. And while small size is not necessarily a virtue, it often is, particularly insofar as it continually reminds the sprawling public campuses that "giantism" may itself be a deformity. I am inclined to believe that, in the absence of the private model, state colleges and universities would never have sought to create enclaves of smallness. Clark Kerr (a graduate of tiny Swarthmore) has said that it was the model of the small, private Claremont Colleges that made Santa Cruz possible.

As noted above, private schools were the first actively to seek recruitment of minority students. Private colleges have also in fact (though by no means universally) possessed a somewhat greater degree of academic freedom and autonomy than public ones. Sheltered from the whims of angry governors and legislators, they set a standard for academic freedom and non-

interference that the public institutions can—and do—use in defending themselves.

State university officials recognize the importance of maintaining a private sector. State pride is a factor here. The state universities of Michigan and Texas, of Illinois and Indiana, Virginia and North Carolina, Washington and California all want to be world-class institutions on a level with Stanford, Chicago, and Yale, and they use these private models as spurs to their legislative supporters and beneficent graduates. They have even been able to maintain some selectivity, shunting those students with less demonstrable ability to the growing regional state colleges and universities.

These latter institutions, Avis-like in their resolve, hope to rival the state "flagship" campus. They have their own levers in our Hobbesian war. Most of the students beached by the 1960s demographic bulge swelled the enrollments of these colleges—not primarily those of the central university. The regional state colleges and universities are now large and well established. Given the sudden decline in funds and enrollments, and the general egalitarian temper of the times, these schools have no qualms about going to the mat for state money with the older, more prestigious parent campuses. The ineluctable, if not immediately perceptible consequence is that of "leveling."

Spoiled Heirs

We have already seen how, in an effort to cut costs and avoid duplication, many states have established governing coordinating bodies whose task it is to allocate expenditures at each of the once relatively autonomous public universities. How does one now defend the superb library of the University of Illinois at Urbana—a world resource—when Southern Illinois University is forced to dismiss tenured faculty? How does one defend the eminence of the University of Wisconsin at Madison against the claims of the branch university in Milwaukee, the state's largest urban center?

With leveling comes an erosion of student choice: If one institution is nearby, then why apply to any other since it is likely to be no different? In fact, most students today make no choice. Some two-thirds of "first time in college" freshmen apply to only one school, and they get in.

Even so, the decision is never irrevocable: American higher education offers students of all ages a second—indeed, a third and fourth—chance. Unlike the British (and Soviet) system, where a student is "tracked" by the age of 11 or 14, the American

system allows students to change their minds, drop out, transfer, take jobs, and come back without overmuch anguish.

Colleges, too, have second chances. They can adapt or react to the times; they can make an about-face in curriculum or in the type of student they hope to attract. There has always been room for innovation and fresh starts in American higher education, even if this freedom, which rested partly on expanding enrollments and funds, is more circumscribed now than it has been in many years.

What is really lacking is strong and visionary academic leadership. The democratization of search committees, the prospect of endless bureaucratic struggle, and the requirements of broad "sunshine laws" often make able candidates unwilling to offer themselves to universities. Many institutions wind up with conciliatory, faceless presidents, incapable either of vision or of the imaginative kind of planning required for what economist Kenneth Boulding has called "the management of decline."

But "decline," after all, is relative. Most of the rest of the world's universities are understaffed and overcrowded. The grumbling and querulousness common in American universities—serious plaints notwithstanding—resemble nothing so much as the moans of a spoiled heir still on a plateau of affluence.

THE ELITE SCHOOLS

by Martin Kaplan

There are perhaps 50 "elite" colleges and universities among the 3,000 institutions of higher education in the United States. They are, as their brochures plainly admit, highly selective; 3 out of 4 applicants for admission regularly fail to pass through the needle's eye. They are also expensive: $8,000 or more for a year in collegiate heaven. A few of them (such as the University of California at Berkeley) are public schools, the flagship campuses of state institutions. But most are private in governance and finance—"independent" is the word their Washington lobbyists prefer to use—although many now receive more than half of their support from tax dollars.

These elite schools are not homogeneous. Some of them (like Swarthmore) are almost exclusively for undergraduates, but more often (as at the University of Chicago) the college belongs to a complex that also includes graduate and professional schools, laboratories, research institutes, and libraries. Some, like Emory and Vanderbilt, have traditionally strong regional ties; others, like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have built exceptionally high reputations in particular fields. Still others have strong religious ties, such as Brandeis (Jewish) or Georgetown (Catholic). Often their faculties are internationally known and get regular invitations to government powwows and intellectual spas—Aspen, Bellagio, Woods Hole, L'Arcouest. And there are self-conscious sub-clubs within the 50—the Ivy League, the Little Three, the Seven Sisters, the Council of Twelve medical schools—to promote further recognition of their special relationship with excellence.

Such are the elite colleges and universities—"this incredible Disneyland," as one Harvard student aptly put it. The family resemblance that unites them springs partly from common resources (bright students, residential campuses, Nobel laureates), partly from common values.* Their ideology, articulated by college presidents with staggering frequency, is consistent with the enlightened liberalism of the larger society's

*One man's elite university or college may be another man's borderline case, but there is little argument among academics over the elite status of schools named in this essay.—ED.

elite culture. Academic freedom, the marketplace of ideas, a pluralism of approaches, the glorious lack of utility of the liberal arts, the intrinsic worth of knowledge—no anthropologist of the elite university would fail to collect these proud slogans.

But patient field work would also uncover another cluster of attitudes, notably a deep condescension toward the less privileged universities, whose tragic dependence on attracting students ("clientele") enforces a putative dilution of standards and pollution of the curriculum. As Joseph Epstein, editor of the *American Scholar*, put it recently, "Nearly everyone who teaches in a contemporary [non-elite] university has seen transcripts of students whose course lists read like the table of contents of *Harper's* or the *Atlantic*; or, worse, *Psychology Today*. Undergraduate education is fast coming to resemble nothing so much as a four-year magazine—and, like a magazine, once one has completed it, one might as well throw it away."

A New Diversity

But elite universities tacitly extend a long-term promissory note to their students: an elite *outcome* that lasts a lifetime. This is perhaps their most marketable distinction. The famous Grant Study of the "normal boy," begun jointly at Harvard in 1940 by philanthropist William T. Grant and the university's hygiene department, has doggedly followed with interviews and questionnaires the lives of several hundred Harvard men. In 1977 the director of the Grant Study published the check list he uses to sort alumni into "best outcomes" and "worst outcomes." The average *worst* outcome, one learns, involved a chap who "graduated from college, often with honors, had won a commission and good officer-fitness reports from the Army, had married and raised children who also completed college, was steadily employed as a professional or upper-echelon business executive, enjoyed an average income of more than $25,000 in 1967, surpassed his father's occupational success, and at 45 was still in good physical health."

Not a bad prospect, then, for the elite university student. Graduates of such institutions take in, on the average, about 20 percent more income during their lifetimes than their counterparts (of comparable Scholastic Aptitude Test scores) holding less hallowed sheepskins. Bigger bucks are not the only satisfaction; the young elite graduate is encouraged to measure his—and increasingly, her—career success in intangible terms as well: "influence," "creativity," "prestige," "job satisfaction." Not to mention the warm, inner sensation that one is somehow

better, more sophisticated, more *worthy.*

Managing alumni affairs—and raising money—requires full-time, year-round staff at many elite institutions. Old Boys—tailored and tweedy, as well as the post-1960s design-research-and-good-dope variety—are notoriously keen to exercise university oversight and to carouse with their peers every fifth spring. The alumni magazines detail the good life to be had after graduation; their advertisements for Cunard cruises, "asset management," and Oriental rugs confer consumer solidity on the Cardinal Newman boilerplate of the undergraduate years. As for editorial content, the "Stress and How to Cope With It" article seems to be the thriving genre in alumni publications. Better stressed and from Stanford, one infers, than "laid back" and from Contra Costa Community College.

Of the 11 million American undergraduates paying tuition at some sort of college today, perhaps 3 percent enjoy the special dividends of elite institutions. As always, their campus activities—newspapers, theaters, radio stations—are likely to be semiprofessional in quality. Their professors have probably contributed their surnames to "seminal" papers in their fields; the graduate students who actually do most of the teaching have survived innumerable byzantine screenings by the professoriat; and the undergraduates are not only bright but, for the first time in history, reflect the social diversity of the world outside.

Before World War II, elite institutions were largely WASP bastions with tacit quotas for Jews, Catholics, commuters, and urban public-school whiz kids. Women (except in colleges of their own) and blacks were largely absent. Nearly all that has changed. At Princeton, for example, both co-education and minority recruitment have arrived. Between 1972 and 1976, the proportion of "Hispanic-surname" undergraduates there increased sevenfold, and the proportion of total minority enrollment in the college rose by nearly 60 percent. Over the last decade, Stanford has more than doubled the number of blacks in the university while its Chicano enrollment rose by a factor of 10. Minorities (not including "Asian-Americans") today account

Martin Kaplan, 28, was most recently executive assistant to the United States commissioner of education. Born in Newark, N.J., he graduated from Harvard College (1971) and received his M.A. from Cambridge University (1973) and his Ph.D. from Stanford (1975). He was the editor of The Harvard Lampoon Centennial Celebration, 1876–1973 *(1973), and* The Monday Morning Imagination *(1977), and the author of* Educating for Survival *(1977, with Ernest L. Boyer). His views do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of Education.*

for 10 percent of its student body, four times what the figure was a decade ago.

As for women, although affirmative action policies at the graduate school and faculty level are as yet far from effective, undergraduate co-education has been widely applauded as another forward step, even if some Old Boys grumble. Yet, as a way to maintain a unique institutional identity, some elite women's colleges—such as Smith, the largest, with 2,500 students—have resisted co-education. Some academic advantages may in fact follow from sex segregation: While few women at co-educational institutions major in the hard sciences and mathematics, at all-female Smith, 30 percent choose to spend their college years with graph paper and Bunsen burners.

Farewell to Activism

A decade ago, one fine spring morning, a Boston newspaper ran a headline screaming, "Rebels Maul Harvard Dean." Student strikes, campus bombings, and classroom disruptions were part of the elite university landscape from Berkeley to Columbia; so, too, were administrative trysts with local police squads, a persistent faculty willingness to seek federal contracts, and student loathing for the "best and brightest." But by nearly all accounts, today's elite undergraduates are busily reverting to more traditional outlets for their energies. Old-style fun has returned to the campus, albeit without the patrician gloss of yesteryear. A few years back, Dartmouth's Winter Carnival was languishing; this year, a snow sculpture graced nearly every dormitory and fraternity house. Fraternity pledging at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville is booming, and Yale's senior societies, though shorn of much mystique, are thriving; the formal dinner dance has returned unself-consciously to Princeton.

Careers and salary prospects are addressed by students with the kind of calculating sobriety one expects from a Morgan Guaranty Bank officer. Forty percent of Harvard's Class of '77 intended to continue their education in some sort of graduate school, the lowest percentage in the last 20 years; the other 60 percent said they were dubious about the rewards to be gained from graduate study. A recent list of the most popular courses at Harvard was led by the introductory "Principles of Economics," with nearly 1,000 students. The rest of the top 10, in order: "Oral and Early Literature" and "Cosmic Evolution" ("outrageous guts," or nondemanding courses, as one undergraduate describes them); then "Automatic Computing," "Organic



"CONFUSED—of course, I'm confused! I have a son at Vassar and a daughter at Yale!"

Chemistry," "Introduction to the History of Art" (to allay cocktail-party paranoia), "Organismic and Evolutionary Biology," "Introduction to the Calculus," "Introduction to Chemistry," and "Financial Accounting."

Pre-business and pre-medicine, with a bit of alleged academic excelsior: Faculty reverence for liberal arts and excellence notwithstanding, the elite curriculum's recent convergence with the community college's more candid identification with students' career goals is too dramatic to go unnoticed. Among many elite undergraduates such material aspirations take their toll. University psychiatric counseling centers are more popular on campus than even the Merrill Lynch recruiter. The mental health center at Princeton is heavily booked, with quick appointments for all but emergencies nearly impossible to obtain. The director of Harvard's health services describes his establishment's strategy this way: "We try to guide students into seeking self-esteem in their relations with others rather than through their achievements." He adds, "You shouldn't have to get accepted to law school or medical school to get self-esteem."

While careerism has flourished, political activism has been largely dormant since the September after Kent State. The uni-

versities' indirect investments in faraway South Africa have stirred the only notable campus political action. At Stanford, 294 students were arrested at an investment policy sit-in, and 58 were hauled in at Berkeley. Amherst and Harvard each decided to dump $600,000 worth of their South Africa-related portfolios, and Citibank—sniffing a trend—has decided against future loans to Johannesburg.

But these episodic eruptions are the exception. Conservative intellectuals may argue that elite education's Disneyland now serves as an incubator for a facile, fashionable, and ultimately pernicious radicalism; but early returns suggest the opposite. "We are veterans of the Battle of Harvard," declared one senior speaker at Harvard's Class Day last year. "All too often the wounds inflicted here do not inform us, but rather frustrate or deaden us. We abandon social and personal ideals once held. We lose the confidence to take the road less traveled." What has been lost, in my view, is more than the youthful radicalism of the 1960s; the critical spirit itself seems to have been anesthetized by the narcissism of "let it be."

At best, as a University of Chicago graduate student put it, one sees "a longing for a moral issue"—that is, a galvanizing moral issue. Sociologist Martin Duberman's assessment of political life on campus is probably the most sanguine analysis coming from the academic Left:

> The challenge to patriarchy and the challenge to capitalism are the only two radical games in town (the challenge to racism having long since receded). Currently [the players] view each other (with individual exceptions) with deep suspicion. Both have made significant gains in the past few years, with the feminist momentum more pronounced. But neither feminists nor socialists have captured the allegiance of the campus majority. Nor, unlike previous minorities (SDS, say, or the hippies), have they succeeded in setting a generation's agenda or style.

The only issue to galvanize Harvard students recently has been President Derek Bok's cost-cutting plan for the dining halls. A spring protest march through the Yard—"We like it hot," read one placard opposing the introduction of cold, Continental breakfasts—was staged as self-conscious parody of 1960s-style activism. (A "Stop Bombing Hanoi" sign was also spotted in the crowd.) Today John Connally and William Colby lecture on campuses without incident. Instead of issues (or villains), students focus on procedures: "We have a lot more Joe College

types serving on advisory boards," says one Stanford faculty member. Stagnant, smug, grade-grubbing, bored, quietist, tired: Relevant exceptions acknowledged, these are nevertheless the most common words one hears to describe student life on elite campuses today. Few would suggest, of course, that radicalism per se is a measure of worth; nor would everyone agree that the '60s activists were the best and brightest students of any recent generation. Yet the current lack of spark and spirit on campus suggests the absence of other qualities as well. Imagination? "Commitment"? A sense of the absurd?

While a melancholy fringe of young faculty and graduate students looks back at the '60s with nostalgia, elite university administrators also think longingly of those times—not for their almost seasonal confrontations, of course, but for the financial cushion the pre-OPEC, pre-inflation, Wall Street go-go years provided. Enrollments were still growing; portfolios were expanding; alumni felt good about giving. Administrative success could be measured by new buildings erected, juicy foundation and federal grants snagged, eminent scholars seduced away from rival institutions, and radical groups neutralized.

With Special Gravity

Leaner times have sired leaner styles. In 1967 the Ford Foundation gave $71.8 million to higher education, including $33 million in challenge grants alone. A decade later, Ford's university total had fallen to $17.3 million. Between 1974 and 1978, the Danforth Foundation's higher-education grants were cut by 90 percent, and the number of prized graduate fellowships it awarded annually was reduced from 180 to 100. Government is now probably the most important single contributor to elite higher education's income through student aid and research grants; it has nevertheless become their public enemy No. 1. Today's annual reports by elite university presidents—complete with dark warnings of Washington intervention and the murderous costs of compliance with affirmative action and other regulations—could *mutatis mutandis* have come from any General Motors chairman fed up with bureaucratic meddling. While university administrators gird for battle with HEW, a vocal alliance of minorities, feminists, and their sympathizers among graduate students and professors is making common cause with Washington, seeing aggressive enforcement of civil-rights and sex-discrimination laws as the best hope for social progress in university policies.

Few episodes better illustrate more garishly the plight of

today's elite university administrators than last year's somewhat Romish search for a new president of Yale, whose money managers apparently thought the go-go years would go on forever.

First, Yale's financial problems were discussed with the special gravity once associated with deathbed reports on popes and prime ministers. During the 1977–78 Yale search, the provost of a distinguished West Coast university—a man otherwise known for his sobriety and judgment—was asked about Yale's multimillion-dollar deficit at a dinner party. "God," he exclaimed, "I hope that place doesn't go down."

A New Mission?

Second, with money tight, the ascendant model of the perfect elite administrator is the fiscal-expert-*cum*-hatchetman. One Yale candidate—with long experience as top administrator of a prestigious public university—was asked during an interview how Yale might have to change in the 1980s. After he had replied, speaking mainly of the need for vision and for adapting to new social challenges, a member of the search committee commented, "You know, you're the first candidate not to talk to us about installing a new computer management system."

Third, running an elite university is no longer the obvious top job for American academics aspiring to greatness. After five people had withdrawn from consideration for the Yale post or had turned down the job outright, Clark Kerr, former University of California president, told the *New York Times,* "It's the thinnest market I've ever seen for college presidents," and William P. Bundy, the Yale search committee chairman, admitted, "It's not a glamorous period for higher education. It's hard to be a great Olympian."

Fourth, the professors are restless. When A. Bartlett Giamatti, a respected Yale Renaissance scholar, was finally named Eli's 18th president,* his academic well-wishers leapt to the *New York Times* op-ed page to warn him that (*a*) he would have to achieve distance from his former faculty colleagues, thrive on bureaucratic pressure, and do time at the Washington front; and (*b*) that he would inherit a Yale faculty "near the end of its patience," chomping "to reclaim the authority and power it has lost, and regain its deserved share in the university budget."

Elite universities help to shape their times and are shaped

*Harvard's Dean Henry Rosovsky had turned down the job because, he said in effect, he wanted to continue to be involved in education.

by them. If they wish to contribute intelligence and leadership to America's third century as they did, at their best, to its first and second, their success will depend in large measure on their power to address the ways this brave new world differs from the more comfortable one just left behind. The greatest challenge facing elite universities today is not providing the nation's luckiest, brightest, most ambitious teen-agers with even more advantages; it is not pushing already breathtaking research even further into the ionosphere, or shaping public policy and taste even more effectively. It is not even sheer survival (so far). The greatest challenge is to help all of higher education reinvent its mission in the face of the largest, most diverse, and academically least-prepared college-going population in American history.

For a few public elite institutions, this new heterogeneous student body may require a radical transformation of purpose. A recent survey of "America's intellectual elite" found that more than one-third of them had (a generation or two ago) attended four colleges: Harvard, City College of New York, Yale, and Columbia, in that order. Not long ago the City University of New York disclosed that its single biggest remedial (reading and writing) program in 1976 was conducted at City College. As the *Times* reported, 37 percent of 14,500 undergraduates were "taking remedial classes at what used to be called the 'proletarian Harvard.' " Where CCNY requires money and vision to adapt to its new tasks, enlightened liberals instead extend their sympathy, and privately scratch City College off the approved list.

But most elite institutions will not have to endure the agony of losing their Michelin stars. For them, the challenge is to help all of higher education learn to serve the other 97 percent of American students without snobbism, condescension, or despair. One victory the elite institutions have largely achieved in our status-conscious society, alas, is convincing many of the students, faculty, and administrators of some 3,000 colleges and universities that their work is at best second-rate, faddish, essentially remedial, and often hopeless. With the lecture rooms and student aid for mass American higher education now in place, a new mission for that challenging enterprise needs to be born—though whether it will come out of Stanford, Chicago, and Cambridge, Mass., is far from clear.

THE LATEST WAVE: COMMUNITY COLLEGES

by Larry Van Dyne

Community colleges, which now enroll about one-third of the country's 11 million undergraduates, crowd the very bottom of higher education's pecking order. Ranking below even the least prestigious of the four-year colleges and universities, these two-year schools struggle along without the assets that make for high intellectual status.

First of all, they are completely nonexclusive, admitting virtually anyone who walks through their doors. Their students usually have average academic preparation—or less. Their instructors, few of whom have Ph.D.'s, exist on the margins of the prestige-conscious professoriat. And they offer remedial and vocational courses that prepare graduates for modest jobs in business, industry, and paraprofessional occupations.

In short, community colleges are places where many upwardly mobile parents hope their children will not have to go.

Yet this plebian status also gives these same community colleges a certain cachet, at least in some liberal circles. They are often portrayed as the true vehicles of "equal opportunity." They are the "open-door" colleges, offering poor whites, blacks, Hispanics, and others a first chance to move up, to share in the American dream. About 1,000 of these publicly financed commuter colleges have been sprinkled throughout our inner cities, suburbs, and county seats over the last 20 years—more or less in the name of open access. Now, as they begin to reach maturity, it is time to ask how closely their performance matches their rhetoric.

The origins of the contemporary community college can be traced to the turn of the century. William Rainey Harper, first president of the University of Chicago, was one of the earliest to promote the idea of separate "junior colleges" that would offer two years of college education and allow the big universities to concentrate on more advanced work. More important, however, was the movement toward free public high schools, a national development beginning in the late 19th century that some

communities pushed to its logical extension by creating local junior colleges to offer a 13th and 14th year. California's first junior college, for instance, was an outgrowth of the Fresno high school in 1911. From such beginnings, the community-college movement expanded—but only a little, remaining a minor part of the country's educational system until the early 1960s.

In that decade, the community colleges took off. It was a golden era at nearly every level of higher education.* Most trends pointed upward—enrollments, payrolls, state appropriations, federal research money, new construction, salary levels, consulting fees, even professorial prestige. Seven states—California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Texas, and Washington—quickly jumped into the forefront of community-college expansion. By 1968 these states accounted for one-third of all community-college campuses and two-thirds of all two-year-college students.

Other states were not far behind. Their educators saw the community college as an ideal device for meeting the mushrooming demand for higher learning. It was far cheaper, certainly, than the creation *ex nihilo* of new four-year colleges and universities. The existing schools, already overcrowded, often encouraged this movement: The new community colleges would absorb those students the established public universities did not want.

Community colleges thus acquired enormous support in the 1960s, exemplified by the frequent boast of their boosters that a new one was opening somewhere in the country every fortnight. Community-college enrollments grew from 600,000 in 1960 to more than 2 million in 1970. By 1976, the figure had jumped to 4.1 million. California alone now has over 100 of the nation's 1,000 community-college campuses.

It was during the 1960s boom that administrators and teachers at the community colleges began to think of themselves as a special "movement," as keepers of an egalitarian ideology

*Only Catholic women's colleges and private two-year colleges did not experience dramatic increases in enrollment.

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at a time when the civil-rights movement was pushing the politicians and the courts toward a broad redefinition of equal educational opportunity.

The community colleges, it was said, were far better suited than four-year schools to provide such opportunity. As demand grew, traditional colleges were raising their admissions standards. Their tuitions were creeping higher. Many had always been outside the cities and thus were geographically inconvenient. The community colleges, by contrast, had few admissions standards. They kept tuition low or eliminated it altogether. (The national average even now is only $387 per year, compared to $621 per year plus room and board at public four-year colleges, and $2,330 plus room and board at private four-year colleges.) And the community colleges were within reach of their students' homes.

A Second Chance

In addition to their emphasis on equal opportunity, the two-year colleges played up their localism—which is why they began changing their names during the 1960s from "junior" to "community" colleges.* A two-year college, its proponents argued, could contribute to a community's welfare in many important ways—supplying trained labor for new industry, turning out practical nurses for county hospitals, bringing occasional bits of culture to the community, or whatever else seemed appropriate. Chambers of commerce and local legislators were impressed; they came to regard establishment of a community college as a mark of civic progress, as important as an airport or an industrial park. Even the names of these schools have a ring of localism: Henry Ford, Wilbur Wright, and Carl Sandburg all have two-year schools named after them, as do Carl Albert, Richard J. Daley, and George Wallace.

An open-door admissions policy has brought an astonishingly diverse student body, not just the poor, into the community colleges. (They are missing only the most affluent of students.) Some of these are "traditional students"—middle-class youths in their late teens, directly out of high school, with average ability, who are studying full-time and will eventually move on to a job or transfer to a four-year school. To these students, the community college is a convenient way to satisfy parents'

*While four-year colleges get virtually all their tax subsidies from federal and state governments, community colleges get about 23 percent from local taxes. The states put in about 44 percent, 15 percent comes from tuition, and federal contributions are only about 2 percent.

pressure for college. It is near home, and it is an inexpensive way to sample a variety of subjects and possible career choices. Above all, it offers a second chance for those who drifted through high school.

"Cooling Out"

The community colleges also attract large numbers of so-called nontraditional students. Here are the housewives preparing for a return to the job market at middle age; senior citizens learning all those things neglected or postponed during their working lives; blue-collar workers trying to improve their chances for promotion or to move into entirely new careers; recent high-school graduates whose academic skills are too meager for them to get into college anywhere else; highly motivated Vietnam veterans. Since the 1960s, these students have changed the complexion of the community colleges: More than half of all two-year-college students are studying part-time; their average age is now about 30.

The diversity of community college students is mirrored in the endless variety of courses and programs these schools offer. Most of their full-time students are either in "transfer" tracks (which parallel the offerings of the lower divisions of four-year colleges) or in occupational programs (to prepare them for mid- or low-level jobs in health care, engineering, computers, and scores of other fields). Historically, the transfer track has accounted for about two-thirds of the enrollment in a typical community college, but that proportion has been declining in favor of occupational training as the job market tightens in the 1970s. (Ironically, the leveling off and projected decline of enrollments in four-year colleges has prompted some of these traditional institutions to offer occupational training, which they once disdained as fit only for two-year colleges.)

Two other types of specialized courses are also common on the community-college menu. "Community-service" programs—education lingo for such courses as macramé, dieting, and how to quit smoking—attract large numbers of part-time, noncredit students. And many other enrollees, often those hampered by past disadvantages, spend at least some of their time in "developmental" programs—a nice euphemism for remedial training intended to help bring their English, math, and other basic skills up to par.

All this describes the community colleges accurately. Yet it does not go far enough. Almost hidden from view is what may well be their most important social function: sorting people.

REMEDIAL EDUCATION: A GROWTH INDUSTRY

Only five years ago, the need for "remedial" undergraduate education was the elite universities' dirty secret. Rare were the school administrators who admitted that they had students with deficiencies in such basic skills as reading, writing, and math. And those who did usually argued that the problem was nothing a year of "bonehead" math and a copy of *The Elements of Style* wouldn't solve. But as Scholastic Aptitude Test scores continued to decline—and professors continued to complain—such colleges were forced to take action. Remedial courses were no longer confined to community colleges and underprepared minority students.

Today, few universities lack a compensatory reading and writing program, not to mention a "math anxiety" clinic. Swarthmore's English 1A—reading and composition—now enrolls 10 percent of the freshman class. Wellesley and Wesleyan conduct a joint math project for the poorly prepared, and Cornell's six-week writing workshop hones the skills of 100 students every summer—many of them already in graduate school. Some 20 percent of Berkeley's freshmen enroll in no-credit reading and writing tutorials; at Stanford, half the freshman class routinely signs up at the "Learning Assistance Center." The story is the same across the country.

University deans are divided on the causes of the 1970s decline in basic skills (they blame everything from television to lazy high-school teachers). But few are oblivious to the situation's little ironies. The most obvious: Universities such as Brown, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia have looked to the community colleges for guidance in setting up their remedial programs.

Intentionally or not, they are one of the higher education system's main devices for picking early winners and losers in the great American chase after higher income and social status.

One aspect of this sorting function has been dubbed "cooling out." This is an old function that used to be performed at many state universities, where high-school graduates were admitted in droves, huge numbers flunked out quickly, and many more shifted from liberal arts colleges into the less demanding schools of education or agriculture. The community colleges now do the same thing. They convince students with excessively high expectations of education or career to settle for something less. Young people who want to be engineers are convinced they are better off as *aides* to engineers; computer scientists *manqué* absorb instead the routine techniques of programming.

It is revealing that two-thirds of community college students enter the transfer track aimed toward four-year colleges,

but only *half* of them actually stay in this track. The others find easier paths. Some move into occupational programs; a few are simply cooled-out altogether—students for whom the "open" door becomes a "revolving" one that deposits them back where they started.

In the view of such educators as Burton Clark and Jerome Karabel, the community colleges also serve, in effect, as a kind of moat designed to protect the universities higher up the line from underprepared students. The most explicit expression of this idea has occurred in California. In the early 1960s, when popular demand for mass higher education was soaring, California set up a rigid, three-tiered system of public colleges with different admissions standards for each level. Students ranking in the upper one-eighth of their high-school classes are allowed into branches of the University of California, including prestigious Berkeley. Those in the upper one-third to one-eighth go to four-year state colleges—Long Beach State, for instance, or San Diego State. Everyone else has to be content with a community college.

The California system, which is employed to varying degrees in other states, is defended as "meritocratic" because a student's academic ability alone determines his place in the educational structure. The trouble is that the system ends up reflecting—and perpetuating—existing social-class arrangements. The upper-tier campuses tend to get more students from affluent families; the middle tier gets the somewhat less affluent; and the bottom tier gets the least affluent. Across the country, only one-fourth of the freshmen entering major universities in 1977 came from families earning less than $15,000 annually, but almost half of the community-college freshmen came from such circumstances.

Unanswered Questions

The racial makeup of inner-city community colleges provides another illustration of how faithfully these institutions reflect the local patterns. The three-campus, 28,000-student Cuyahoga Community College district in Cleveland, for example, has a downtown campus that is 65 percent black and two suburban campuses that are 80 percent white. (The same arrangement applies in Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis.) This situation has prompted one writer to wonder if these colleges are becoming "the slums of higher education."

Community-college administrators respond by citing their

institutions' mandate to serve the community. Should they be held accountable for local segregated housing patterns? Moreover, the evidence in Cleveland reveals little variation in educational quality between the inner-city and suburban campuses.

Critics note, however, that housing patterns were not a sufficient legal justification to maintain segregated public elementary and secondary school systems. They add that blacks and other minorities are in "disproportionate representation" in community colleges nationally, accounting for 20 percent of enrollments, compared to only 14 percent in four-year schools. And the NAACP, which brought suit three years ago to end de facto segregation in Cleveland's lower schools, is considering bringing suit against the city's community colleges. They have the precedent of a 1972 Memphis ruling to back them up.

Many basic questions about how well community colleges serve their students remain unanswered, partly because they are relatively new institutions and partly because of the primitive state of educational analysis. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, which in 1973 ended a massive five-year, 100-volume study of higher education, raised a number of questions that it could not answer: Amid the welter of different courses, how many community-college students are essentially enrolled in "terminal" occupational programs, and how many are really heading toward four-year schools? What happens to the many students derailed off the transfer track? How do community-college students fare in the job market compared to people who only graduate from high school, or those who complete four-year degrees? How good are the remedial programs?

We still do not know. Even assuming favorable answers, the community colleges ultimately raise a philosophical question: Can a system of higher education that is so hierarchical and that consigns two-year students to the lowest status ever hope to be fair to all? Probably not. But, for all their faults, the community colleges, the latest wave in American education, *do* represent a considerable advance over the prewar days when higher education of any sort reached only the fortunate few.

A MATTER OF MONEY

by Chester E. Finn, Jr.

Everyone is familiar with certain claims made for American higher education: It is the largest and most equitable system in the world; its research and scholarship are unsurpassed; it is the engine driving the American Dream Machine. And indeed, it is all these things. It is one of our national glories.

At the same time, however, it is expensive—and getting more so. Long nurtured through the munificence of state and federal governments, private philanthropy, and grateful alumni, colleges and universities are beginning to find that these resources have limits.

The nation's colleges and universities had combined incomes of almost $40 billion in the 1975–76 academic year, up from about $13 billion a decade earlier. (College and university enrollments almost doubled during the same period, climbing from 5.9 million to 11.1 million students.) When the "foregone income" of college students is added in, according to economist Howard Bowen, the grand total of all "costs of college" was actually around $85 billion—almost as much as we pay for national defense.

Curiously, while Americans muster these vast sums year after year, they pay little heed to a fundamental, underlying question: Who *should* pay for higher education? That is, is it a public or a private good? Should it be financed primarily by the entire populace via the tax system, or by students and their families via tuition?

We are far closer to an answer with respect to elementary and secondary education, where the public schools are universal, wholly supported through tax revenues, and therefore "free." Private schools remain an option; but if they were suddenly to disappear, the American commitment to free public elementary and secondary education would remain. Over the past century it has become an established right.

Not so higher education, where financing is mired in a swamp of unresolved disputes and half-perceived responsibilities. Unlike the situation in France, say, where a centralized Ministry of Education dictates national policy on everything from admissions to curriculum, in America the creation, gov-

ernance, and financing of colleges and universities remains where the Tenth Amendment left it: in state and private hands. Each state operates its own network of public colleges and universities. In some states, admission to many of these institutions is selective, not universal. In most jurisdictions, the student must pay part of his tuition costs, not to mention room and board.

Besides state schools, there are, of course, the private campuses supported primarily by tuition, philanthropy, and miscellaneous federal grants and contracts. Because they receive little, if any, state money, it now costs a student an average of $2,000 more per year to attend a private college ($5,110) than to attend its public counterpart ($3,000).

The federal government has never assumed *any* overall responsibility for education per se, nor for the support of schools and colleges as institutions. Yet today Washington directs billions of dollars into the higher education enterprise through hundreds of program or agency channels, many of them roundabout and some of them fairly well concealed. Though the portion of university budgets supplied directly by Washington has eroded in recent years, in fiscal 1978 the federal government nevertheless pumped about $14.3 billion into activities related to higher education (including scientific research).

The principal means of federal support (more than half the total) for higher education is student aid, which generally flows from Washington to individual recipients. It is snagged by colleges and universities only to the degree that they manage to enroll federally aided students. (This is a far cry from the direct "institutional aid" for which the schools have long been clamoring.) Federal help to students comes in protean forms—grants, loans, subsidized jobs. With rare exceptions, these programs have one of three purposes: assistance for needy or otherwise "disadvantaged" students; aid to those pursuing certain careers (such as nursing) or academic specialties (such as specific foreign languages); and stipends for persons who fall into other categories of government responsibility (ex-GIs, for example).

A second, more direct source of federal support for higher education is actual payments to colleges and universities—about $4.7 billion in 1978, most of it earmarked for particular programs, studies, and research projects that may be ancillary to student instruction. Sixty percent of these direct payments pay for scientific research and development, which is heavily concentrated in relatively few institutions.*

*Of the nation's 3,000 colleges and universities, only one in five received *any* R & D money from Washington in 1975. The top 100 accounted for 85 percent of the total, ranging from $5.4 million at Florida State to $68.7 million at M.I.T.

A third significant (though less visible) source of federal funds consists of "tax expenditures"—money that individuals can keep and use for higher education because the Internal Revenue Service, honoring various exemptions, does not collect it. There are deductions for charitable contributions to higher education, for example. Scholarships and fellowships are not taxable. Most parents may take a tax deduction for children in college.* These and other provisions will account for roughly $2.1 billion in uncollected federal revenues in 1978.

What matters most in bringing federal money into campus coffers is what *kind* of college it happens to be. A school can increase its dollar yield from Washington by deliberately changing certain of its own features and practices. Some changes (such as admitting more federally aided students) are easier to make than others (such as adding a medical school to a small liberal arts college). But all such maneuvers—and most universities have high-powered "development" officers to think them up—carry the risk of allowing the autonomy of the academic community to be compromised by the regulations that seem to be attached to every federal dollar.

It is not surprising—and it may often be socially beneficial—that universities are willing to take such chances. Virtually every one of the programs funneling cash into the colleges was designed by Congress to accomplish a specific national purpose such as equal opportunity, vocational training, or scientific research. The money thus serves as a lure. Former Yale President Kingman Brewster has called this practice the "now that I have bought the button, I have a right to design the coat" approach by Washington to its own largesse. Perhaps more accurate is the Senegalese saying that a man with his hand in your pocket must move with you. So long as higher education remains an instrument rather than an object of federal policy,

*In June 1978 the House of Representatives passed a bill to provide a new tax credit for college (and private school) tuitions. Its fate at this writing is uncertain.

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SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Sources of income vary greatly for public and private schools. Overall, the percentage of revenues obtained from tuition, endowment, and state governments has increased since the early 1970's; the federal share has declined. Costs include pay for 1 million "professional" employees, up from 700,000 in 1967. Teachers' median 1976 salary: $16,313.



Source: National Center for Education Statistics. 1976 data.

Washington will continue to demand a payback of some sort from institutions that seek its money. Often, this payback comes in the form of decreased "sovereignty." It is illuminating to watch erstwhile "statist" academics suddenly discover that Jefferson may have been right after all about the limits of government. "The published *mea culpas* of prominent liberals," Stanford University Vice President Robert Rosenzweig recently observed, "have developed into a tidy cottage industry."

The states have a completely different role in financing higher education. They are more concerned with education per se, and they also make a sharper distinction between public and private institutions, providing very little support for the latter. For their public colleges and universities, however, the states

provide sizable subsidies. Together with local governments (which ordinarily help foot the bills for community colleges), they supply, on average, half the total current revenues of these campuses. In the past decade, higher education's share of total annual state budgets has risen by an average of 85 percent.*

State governments almost always cut up the educational pie on the basis of the number of students the public colleges enroll. But now that the number of college-aged youths is declining—it will drop some 25 percent by 1990 before it picks up again—the system has created unfortunate incentives. It is already impelling rival public campuses to compete fiercely for students; to lure applicants away from more expensive private institutions; to duplicate the academic offerings of other schools; and to downplay—even scuttle—whole programs and departments that lack "student appeal," regardless of their intellectual importance.

The Implications of Decline

The enrollment imperative also forces administrators of public colleges and universities to keep tuitions as low as possible, usually by pushing the state's per-student subsidy as high as possible. It also means being less than enthusiastic about proposals to steer more federal money into private schools. This public-private internecine warfare is one of the most visible imbroglios in academia today.

The implications of declining enrollments for the financing of higher education are profound. There is no reason to suppose that society will agree to consign a mounting percentage of its wealth to an enterprise serving a dwindling percentage of its people. Indeed, economist David W. Breneman predicts that outlays for higher education, which accounted for 3.4 percent of the federal budget in 1976, will slip to 2.4 percent by 1983.

This "retrenchment"—as academics persist in calling it—will have diverse consequences. Some economically shaky institutions are likely to go under. But it would be a mistake to gauge the health of higher education by noting whether every college in existence in 1978 is still a going concern in 1990. As with any dynamic industry, higher education is marked by bold starts and occasional tragic endings. But it is significant that the number of colleges and universities still continues to rise, if at a slower pace than during the giddy 1960s, when a new college or

*The several states differ markedly in their generosity. In 1973–74, state and local outlays per full-time student in public colleges and universities ranged from $871 in Oklahoma to $3,087 in Alaska.

university was opened about once a week. Even the beleagured private sector, after a slight dip in the early 1970s, has resumed its upward climb in numbers.

Some new campuses are unconventional institutions—such as the "proprietary" or profit-making trade schools—that look more like industrial parks than like the stereotypical liberal arts college with ivy-covered Georgian buildings. Yet as the liberal arts baccalaureate brings dwindling economic rewards—the inexorable result of our success in awarding it to so many more people—it will not be surprising if more and more students seek educational experiences of a different order, be it job-oriented training or, as David Riesman observes, the spiritual succor of fundamentalist theology.

Insofar as it turns to government for relief, higher education will probably be disappointed. State legislators show scant inclination to change their historic pattern of support for public but not private campuses. As for Washington, there seems little prospect of unrestricted "institutional aid." Federal research programs and other forms of "categorical" funding will continue and probably grow. But they do little to support the central academic activities of colleges and universities.

These are familiar concerns that now appear more alarming because higher education no longer enjoys (as it once did) the full support of national economic growth and prosperity. Still, there is no need for gloom or despair. For all its rigidities and idiosyncracies, the American higher education system is surprisingly resilient. Despite the frequent jeremiads issued by campus publicists, the crises of the past 200 years have always faded away; and the system as a whole has emerged stronger from each new storm. Analysts looking back two decades hence may well wonder what all the fuss was about.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE CHANGING AMERICAN CAMPUS

In the beginning there was Harvard College, established in Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636 "when the little community perched on the edge of a howling wilderness hardly numbered 10,000." The colonists gave thanks to Providence for inspiring the vision of "one Mr. Harvard." But as Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith make clear in **American Higher Education: A Documentary History** (2 vols., Chicago, 1961, cloth; 1968, paper), the urge to found "a place for the exercize of Larning" has also had considerable secular appeal throughout American history.

Statesmen like Jefferson, shrewd investors like Ezra Cornell, acerbic critics like Thorstein Veblen—all helped shape U.S. higher education as the small, quasi-religious colonial enterprises led to private liberal arts colleges, big land-grant universities, and, by the early 20th century, first-rate research universities rivaling their European models.

From the start, campus debate has been vigorous—over academic freedom, admissions policy, the curriculum, research. Should Harvard tolerate heretics (Cotton Mather, 1702)? Are the classics an anachronism (*The Yale Report,* 1828)? Must the university deal with populist as well as aristocratic tastes (Ezra Cornell, 1865)?

In Laurence Veysey's view (**The Emergence of the American University,** Chicago, 1965, cloth; 1970, paper), the genius of the American university as a species may be that it has never really drawn the line. Elitism? By 1900, universities were essentially open to all, even though "all" usually meant "children of northern European extraction whose fathers did not work with their hands." Quality? On a cushion of growing enrollment, advanced scientific and scholarly work prospered—even if most university administrators in the 1890s favored the collegiate, not the scholarly, ideal.

The full-fledged university is a relative latecomer in America. The best general histories of the broader academic enterprise—covering the whole spectrum of institutions, their changing curricula, students, purposes—include Frederick Rudolph's **The American College and University** (Knopf, 1962, cloth; Random, 1965, paper) and the more up-to-date **Higher Education in Transition, 1636–1976** by John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy (Harper, 1958; rev. 1976). Both surveys boast excellent bibliographies.

The diversity of the modern American post-secondary school system is partly a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the famous Dartmouth College Case of 1819, which, in effect, legalized the private sector in higher education. Elaine Kendall's **Peculiar Institutions** (Putnam's, 1976) looks at one group of private schools, the Northeast's Seven Sisters. Starting with Mary Lyon's founding of Mount Holyoke Seminary in 1837, Kendall traces the lives of a handful of brewers, spinsters, and assorted eccentrics who by bequest or other expressions of will power helped make women's education "an alarming success."

The end of a very different "peculiar institution"—slavery—spawned

the black colleges; the basic text here is Dwight O. W. Holmes's **The Evolution of the Negro College** (Teachers College, 1934; Arno, 1969). A more critical treatment is former U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl McGrath's **The Predominantly Negro Colleges and Universities in Transition** (Teachers College, 1965, paper). Writing before the influx of minorities into "mainstream" institutions, McGrath found that, on average, the poorly endowed black colleges had failed to keep pace, in terms of facilities, faculty, and academic standards, with comparable predominantly white institutions.

Philanthropy and the federal government have since helped stabilize the black schools; they are probably stronger than ever before. Yet most black college-goers now do not attend predominantly black colleges —a result of the civil-rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. One of the most concise overviews of "affirmative action" and minority enrollment is **Selective Admissions in Higher Education,** a report from the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies (Jossey-Bass, 1978, paper). The report endorses the consideration of race in college admissions; a statistical appendix buttresses the text. Sociologist Nathan Glazer supplies a contrary view in **Affirmative Discrimination** (Basic Books, 1975, cloth; 1978, paper), contending that the new "group consciousness" of the law threatens to erode the rights of individuals.

What do other professors say? According to a survey of 60,000 faculty members by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset (**The Divided Academy,** Norton, 1976, paper), preferential treatment of minorities and women has "sharply divided academe." At the same time, the professoriat retains a generally "liberal orientation."

Educators produce a sizable flow of more or less "philosophical" literature: distinguished lectures, occasional manifestos, reasoned "white papers." Often cited is John Henry Cardinal Newman's **The Idea of a University** (London, 1873; Oxford, 1976), portions of which were first published in 1852, which defined liberal education as an effort "to fit a man of the world for the world." Also cited is Alfred North Whitehead's crusade against "dead knowledge" and "inert ideas" in **The Aims of Education** (Macmillan, 1929; Free Press, 1967, paper). Three other little classics: the influential Harvard "red book" (**General Education in a Free Society,** Harvard, 1945); former University of Chicago President Robert Hutchins's **The Higher Learning in America** (Yale, 1936; 1962, paper); and Carnegie Council Chairman Clark Kerr's **The Uses of the University** (Harvard, 1963; rev. 1972). All three deal with the aims of "general education": how, as Hutchins defined the task, to "educate the student for intelligent action."

Unfortunately overlooked by many academic writers, we might add, is **The Elements of Style** by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White (2nd ed., Macmillan, 1972, paper). The precepts of "the little book" ("Use the active voice," "Be obscure clearly") have much to offer both to the general reader and to the scholar's world of publish or perish.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Help in choosing some of these titles came from Larry Van Dyne and Edward T. Weidlein, both on the staff of* The Chronicle of Higher Education.

Soviet Women:

THE 'PROBLEMY' THAT WON'T GO AWAY

Twenty-five years after Stalin's death, a clearer picture of everyday life in the Soviet Union is beginning to emerge in the West. To help its own social scientists, Moscow is publishing more analyses and more statistics on everything from housing and employment to birthrates and divorce. Nowhere are the stresses in Soviet society more evident than among its women, who bear the brunt of both economic austerity and contradictory official policy. Here, former Wilson Center scholar Bernice Madison, a frequent visitor to Russia, examines their situation, with a sidelong glance at their American counterparts.

by Bernice Madison

Readers' letters to the editors of Soviet women's magazines depict a society where household appliances break down, husbands drink heavily, and the process of divorce is often costly and time-consuming; where wage scales are low, where child care conflicts with the need to work, and husbands refuse to help with the household chores.

One cartoon shows a frenzied wife, exhausted from eight hours on the job, hurrying to prepare her family's supper. The husband, in house slippers, lounges in front of the television. "What's taking so long?" he demands. But humor provides only sporadic relief from the unremitting drudgery, movingly portrayed in much recent Russian fiction and starkly recorded in cold statistics. Even the Soviet leadership is worried. "We men," President Leonid Brezhnev told a recent trade union congress, "have done far from all we could to ease the dual burden that [women] bear both at home and in production."

In some ways, the positions of women in the Soviet Union and the United States appear to have much in common. In both

countries, women outnumber men, and women's average life expectancy is higher. In both countries, the marriage rate has declined, while the number of unmarried couples living together has risen. The rate of illegitimacy is almost the same. The number of all marriages ending in divorce—one out of three—is identical. And in both nations, women earn far less than men, though the gap is narrower in the Soviet Union.

Yet these shared characteristics mask extraordinary contrasts. For example, 40 percent of women in Russia live in rural areas, compared to 3.5 percent in the United States. The percentage of working American women holding "white-collar" jobs (63.5 percent) is almost double that of Soviet women (32.1 percent). There are fewer female "heads of families" in the United States, and far fewer abortions are performed (1.1 million annually compared with 7–10 million annually in the U.S.S.R.). Nevertheless, thanks to the Pill and other convenient birth-control devices,* the U.S. birthrate (15.3 per 1,000 population) is lower than the Soviet Union's (18.2).

At the time of the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks promised that through socialism, sexual exploitation would give way to sexual equality: A "new Soviet man" would supplant the oppressive fathers and husbands of czarist Russia. And indeed, in a striking improvement on the pre-1917 situation, Soviet women now share the legal rights of Soviet men within and outside the family. There is no ostensible need for an Equal Rights Amendment in Russia.

In practical terms, however, genuine equality has yet to be achieved. Russian women today are encouraged by the state to cultivate an identity as "good workers, good wives, and good mothers." Playing this triple role is never easy, even in America; but in the Soviet Union, for all its superpower status, poverty is still widespread. Three decades after the end of World War II, housing, consumer goods, and services are still scarce. Women bear the brunt of it all.

No longer able to blame this state of affairs on "capitalist remnants" in the Russian consciousness, the Kremlin has given planners increased latitude in rethinking the numerous *problemy* besetting Soviet women, and, by extension, the Soviet state itself. Data on time-use and public opinion are increasingly available, and research by Soviet social scientists is improving in quality. However, Western students of Soviet society must still cope with sizable information gaps.

*Most are available in the U.S.S.R. Some, such as condoms, are of poor quality; others, like the Pill, are discouraged for medical reasons. In general, Soviet officials are not enthusiastic about birth control, given the nation's falling birthrate and increasing labor shortages.

The most recent information on women as "good workers" reveals that almost 68 percent of the nearly 100 million Soviet women over age 16 are employed, accounting for 54.5 percent of all workers. (Roughly 48 percent of all such U.S. women are employed, accounting for 41 percent of the labor force.) For most Soviet women, working is quite simply an economic necessity: Either the husbands don't make enough money,* or the women don't have husbands.

About 70 percent of Soviet doctors are women, as are some 30 to 40 percent of the engineers, college teachers, and scientific personnel. Such jobs, however, employ only one-third of working Russian women; the other two-thirds serve in less exalted occupations: as factory workers, cleaning women, farm hands. Almost 20 million Soviet women (compared to 367,000 in the United States) work in agriculture. In low-status occupations, as in high-status ones, men enjoy privileged access to the supervisory jobs. Of collective farm chairmen and other senior farm managers, for example, only 2 percent are women.

The rate of pay for men and women in the same jobs is the same. But women predominate in sectors where earnings and wage rates are lower. On average, their wages amount to 60 to 75 percent of men's. Since sickness benefits and pensions (women's retirment age: 55) are computed on the basis of wages, inequality follows women into the sickroom—or into retirement. Many pensions would be inadequate anyway; the official "subsistence income" (or poverty level) has not been redefined since 1965; the current average pension falls below it.

Most Russian women are eager to marry and attach greater importance to the family than to work outside the home. But their efforts to be "good wives" can make it difficult for them to improve their skills as "good workers." The Russian male's disdain for household tasks is deep-rooted, and the time a working wife must devote to shopping, cleaning, and cooking amounts to a "second shift" and makes for an exhausting 13- to 15-hour day.

*The Soviet wage system was not designed for the one-breadwinner family. The *average* income of a Russian industrial worker is 150 rubles a month—well below the official (and outdated) poverty line of 200 rubles (or $220) a month for a family of four.

Bernice Madison, 64, is a professor of social welfare at San Francisco State University and a former Fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. Born in Frunze, Kirgiziia, in Soviet central Asia, she came to the United States in 1922. She holds a B.S. from Northwestern University (1935) and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago (1952), and wrote Social Welfare in the Soviet Union *(1968).*

ЭКСТРЕННЫЙ
ДАМСКИЙ
ВЫПУСК



"Lucky one!" sighs harried shopper as she eyes display featuring "Special Order of Women's Wear." From the Soviet journal Literatournaya Gazetta *(1977).*

The burden of the second shift is increased by a shortage of modern appliances (such as washer-dryers or dishwashers), long lines in food stores, and poor-quality consumer goods.

The causes of greatest suffering among women, however, are alcoholic husbands, an "elemental" problem that has been accompanied by a boost of 450 percent in liquor sales since 1940. (Per-capita Soviet vodka consumption may now be as high as nine pints monthly, more if one includes the produce of illegal stills.) One result: 70 percent of all Soviet divorces are initiated by women, with male alcoholism cited as the prime cause in up to 40 percent of the cases.

All this has an obvious influence on Soviet women's ability to perform as "good mothers." Yet, faced with the postwar decline in birthrate and with a troublesome labor shortage, the Soviet government is encouraging women to bear the "ideal" three children. Women are entitled to full pay for 112 days of pregnancy-maternity leave. They can take a year of unpaid leave to care for a child, without prejudice to job ratings. The most significant government service is day care, for which parents pay according to their income. There are now 12.7 million children in preschools—41 percent of all preschool-age Russian

UVAZHAEMYE REDAKTORY!

Few American women would willingly change places with their Soviet counterparts. But that is not to say that women in the U.S.S.R. meekly accept their lot. As their feisty letters to the Russian women's magazine Kresti'ianka (Peasant Woman) *suggest, Soviet women are quick to denounce everything from job discrimination to estranged husbands, from shoddy consumer goods to the endemic alcoholism that has destroyed so many Russian families. Some examples:*

Dear Editors! (Uvazhaemye Redaktory)

Do you remember the article in which you told about citizen M. who, for several years, has been hiding to avoid carrying out a court child-support order? As a result, his former wife, instead of support for her two daughters, receives only copies of official correspondence exchanged between several different legal jurisdictions.

We, the women of the city of T., wish to secretly inform you, dear editors, that M. is living on Lane L., number 9. We would be most satisfied if we could read that this time justice triumphed.

Women living on Lane L.

I recently bought some "quality" snaps to secure my clothing. They are not bad to look at, but they have a curious trait: While they are easy to open, closing them is impossible. I tried my hands, teeth, even a hammer—nothing doing. Then I had a happy thought: pliers!

Since then I go nowhere without pliers. I ordered a special chain and wear them instead of a pendant. I feel that soon this will become *le dernier cri* in fashion.

M. Kosogva

Last year you told about a special "bonus" at the agricultural station in B. province. There, the store manager gave away three new glasses with each purchase of a bag of flour.

"Half measures!" said Z., the chairman of our agricultural cooperative; he ordered that buyers of a bag of flour should receive two 100-gram bottles of cognac as well.

"With this system," says Z., "the peasant is less dependent on his wife in terms of the economic plan. Whether she wants to or not, she brings him a drink to cure the effects of his earlier drink."

Our drunkards are now in seventh heaven. When they see chairman Z., they dash forward to pump his hand—after having pumped plenty into themselves.

Tell us, dear editors, how you regard the initiative shown by Chairman Z. Perhaps this is a progressive method of serving the population and we simply do not appreciate it.

A. Gorokhov

children—compared with 6–7 percent (1.2 million) of their American counterparts.

So far, these programs have failed to induce women to bear the "ideal" three children. Why? Heavy workloads, cramped living conditions (average residential floor space per person in urban areas is about 8 square meters), and widespread poverty tell part of the story. The difficulty women have in obtaining child-support payments (most of them court-ordered) from ex-husbands is certainly a factor, as is the Soviet legal code, which, in divorce cases, does not allow the wife's portion of the couple's total property to be increased to compensate for her custody of the children.

With the "disincentives" to bearing children outweighing the incentives, it is understandable that many women publicly support the three-child goal while in fact they stop after only one or two children.*

How does this compare with the situation in the United States? Among Soviet women, employment has almost reached a saturation point; but the number of women in the U.S. civilian labor force is still growing rapidly, with women accounting for three-fifths of the total labor force increase in the last decade. Economic need is the main reason for married women working in both countries. But in the United States, this often means a desire to reach or maintain a certain standard of living, not sheer necessity. In both countries, women are underrepresented as managers and overrepresented in low-status, "female" occupations. But the opportunities are growing faster for American women.

Eligibility for U.S. social security benefits is acquired after 10 years of work—half as long as in the Soviet Union—and dependent wives may receive 50 percent of their husband's pension, compared to 10 percent in the U.S.S.R. Impoverished women pensioners or women on welfare may, in the United States, be eligible for income supplements (cash or food stamps) which lift many out of poverty. In the U.S.S.R. there are neither supplements nor food stamps; welfare is available only to aged or totally disabled persons who are destitute and have no relatives able to assist. Such people receive 10 rubles ($11) per month.

For married women, the most striking differences are qualitative. Although not all U.S. husbands help their work-

*An exception are the Muslim women in central Asia. In 1970, average family size in the Tadzhik S.S.R. was 5.4 persons versus 3.1 in Estonia. This "Muslimization" of Russia is viewed with a jaundiced eye by Soviet demographers; more than 50 percent of the population of the U.S.S.R. is now non-Russian.

WOMEN AS WORKERS AND WIVES, 1977

		USSR	USA
Population		257 million	216 million
	Women	53.5%	51.7%
	Men	46.5%	48.3%
Women in Labor Force		67.5 million*	40 million
Percent working part-time		negligible	28.6
Percent of women over 16		67.5	48.4
Percent of all workers		54.5	41.0
Families			
Average size		3.7	3.4
Children born out of wedlock		1 in 10	1 in 7
Female-headed families as percent of all families		17	13.6

*1974

ing spouses with household tasks, it is a safe bet that more Americans do so than Russians. In all but the poorest families, American women are also aided by a variety of laborsaving appliances, and food-shopping is a chore but not an ordeal. As for alcoholic husbands (and wives), the United States has its share, but alcoholism has not reached the epidemic proportions evident in the Soviet Union.

What about American women as mothers? The U.S.S.R.'s system of pregnancy, maternity, and sickness benefits (which includes a week's paid leave to care for a sick child) is comprehensive and generous. No counterpart exists in the United States. Two recent Supreme Court decisions,* although they did not produce a nationwide system of paid maternity leave, have entitled more pregnant women to (*a*) remain on the job as long as their physicians advise; (*b*) receive normal disability benefits during their pregnancy leave; and (*c*) be reinstated later in their old jobs. This case-by-case approach as yet does not compare with the established, all-inclusive Russian system.

In sum, although women in the United States were long regarded as creatures who could find real fulfillment *only* as mothers and wives, Americans have moved well away from this

**Gedulig* v. *Aiello*, 1974, and *General Electric* v. *Gilbert*, 1976. See also New York Court of Appeals, *Brooklyn Union Gas Co.* v. *Appeal Board*, 1976.

constricted view. And because it is far easier in the United States for citizens to raise difficult issues, social change can occur here far more rapidly than in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet government, however, still tends to view women as "productive units" expected to operate effectively in *both* the work place and the home. There is thus a conflict between official inducements to work and official inducements to bear children. In the future, will Moscow stress the "pro-natalist" view that considers women most useful to the state when bearing and rearing children? The result would be a loss of women workers—to say nothing of condemning working women to low-status drudgery. Or will the government opt for sexual equality with full participation and opportunity for women in the occupational sphere? This would inevitably lower the already low birthrate—a disastrous prospect in light of the Soviet Union's accelerating labor shortage.

Beyond this, there are some human questions. How can the Kremlin foster a fundamental change in the attitudes of Soviet males? How can it ensure that women get not only equal pay for equal work but also work commensurate with their education and training? And how can it lighten the often oppressive burdens for those millions of women it has encouraged to work and raise children at the same time? Even Soviet planners realize that more refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and washing machines alone will not prevent millions of abortions, increasing alcoholism, and a further dip in the birthrate.

In short, the Soviet leadership must come to terms with why the "new Soviet man"—and woman—have not materialized. How can the leadership balance what the Party wants with what women want? How can it fulfill even the minimal requirements of freedom and dignity? The internal contradictions are apparent. Even with growing Soviet research on the role of women in work and family, Moscow finds these questions difficult to pose, let alone answer.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *For added background, interested readers may wish to look up* The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia, *by Richard Stites (Stanford, 1978), and* Women in Russia, *edited by Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, and Gail Lapidus (Stanford, 1977).*

Inflation:

A RECURRING FEVER

Economists still haggle over a proper definition of inflation, but most Americans know inflation's impact: rising prices. From Kennedy to Nixon to Carter, Washington's stop-and-go anti-inflation strategies have proved inadequate. Here the editors outline the postwar record, and economist Laurence Seidman describes the latest proposed remedy.



According to Plutarch, Athens under Solon (fl. 600 B.C.) wrestled with severe inflation after depreciation of the mina. To restore stability, the Athenian lawgiver may or may not have resorted to the "draconian" measures named after his predecessor, Draco; Plutarch does not say. In our own times, unprecedented inflation scourged Germany and Central Europe after both world wars. Prices increased a trillion-fold in Weimar Germany between 1920 and 1923, doubling between meals in the last weeks of "hyperinflation."

Inflation in the United States has historically been a shadow cast by war. During the Revolution, the Continental Congress printed reams of paper money; prices shot up 13,500 percent between 1775 and 1780. Congress had no choice: It lacked the power to tax. But even later, governments were reluctant to levy enough taxes to cover the full cost of wars. The result: Soaring prices during or after the Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam. The current inflation is largely a legacy of the late 1960s—the Vietnam War ($135 billion) and the Great Society programs, whose costs were financed not by increased tax revenues or sales of government bonds but by deficit spending and monetary expansion. The 1.3 percent annual inflation rate of the early 1960s climbed to 4.2 percent by 1968.

While a 4.2-percent inflation rate now seems mild, it shocked pundits and bankers at the time. Nor did a belated 10-percent tax surcharge in 1968 bring it down. After Richard Nixon entered the White House, his administration applied the brakes to monetary expansion (but did not enact new taxes). Inflation dipped from its 1969 level (6.1 percent), but unemployment jumped to 6 percent and the stock market sagged.

Inflation slowed when Nixon imposed the nation's first peacetime wage and price controls in 1971. As controls were lifted in mid-1972, the economy experienced a boom that lasted through the election. Inflation resumed its climb, even as boom turned to near-bust in early 1973. Then came the OPEC oil price increases, which quadrupled the price of petroleum and sent an inflationary wave throughout the world economy.

When Gerald Ford became President in 1974, he inherited a 6.5-percent unemployment rate and a 12-percent annual rate of inflation. The dollar had eroded by 50 percent since 1967. The Ford administration's tight money policies brought inflation down slightly, but unemployment remained high (8.5 percent in 1975) as a stagnant economy limped out of recession.*

While the Carter administration has imposed a ceiling on federal pay raises, and the Federal Reserve Board has tightened the money supply by raising interest rates, the President has also sustained what Brookings economist Arthur Okun dubs "self-inflicted wounds." These were acquired as Carter and Congress attempted to help Americans cope with inflation through measures that are themselves inflationary, such as crop acreage restrictions to boost farm prices and protectionist import policies to help certain manufacturers. Meanwhile, the federal deficit is growing, and Washington has produced no coherent energy policy. Unemployment hovers around 6 percent.

The country's problems are due as much to the complex, anomolous nature of the current inflation (the projected 1978

*A recession is now generally defined as a decline in real Gross National Product (GNP) over two successive quarters. GNP is the value of all goods and services produced in the nation.



INFLATION: 1915–1978



rate: 9.7 percent) as to any lack of government will. Today's inflation is part of an uninterrupted post–World War II price rise. In the past, periodic depressions and resulting deflations kept long-term prices fairly stable. But the U.S. economy is now more or less depression-proof; there has been no *deflation* since the Great Depression.

Moreover, since 1973, the United States has been infected with "stagflation," a rogue strain characterized by high inflation and high unemployment at the same time. In the past, an inverse relationship was thought to exist between the two: High unemployment would dampen inflation, while high inflation would curb unemployment. Today, the rules seem to be flexible only in an upward direction: Lower unemployment, for example, still seems to increase inflation, but higher unemployment exerts little downward pressure on prices.

This makes inflation very hard to treat. Indeed, painful as



inflation is, it is not so painful as the cure. Nor do all Americans feel it when the economy is quite ill. It is the nature of a cost-price spiral that, *on average,* wages keep up with prices, a situation that, *on average,* tends to soften inflation's punch.*

Life is not played by averages, however. As Nixon's economic adviser, Herbert Stein, has noted, "the most significant fact about inflation is that some prices [and wages] rise more than others, and some do not rise at all." Who benefits? During inflation, "creditors" generally lose and "debtors" generally gain. A banker who made a 10-year, $1,000 loan in 1968 will receive back less than $1,000 in 1968 dollars, even at an extraordinarily high interest rate, when the loan is repaid in 1978. This applies to all fixed-value assets: bank deposits, mortgages,

*Since the onset of stagflation in 1973, *money* wages have increased by an average of 50 percent. However, the increase is illusory; *real* (inflation-adjusted) wages have increased by an average of only 8.4 percent.

bonds, life insurance, pensions, and, of course, currency. (Between 1946 and 1971, inflation wiped out an estimated $1.2 trillion worth of debt in the United States.) Thus, those on fixed incomes, such as elderly people who rely on pensions, have much to lose by inflation. Others have much to gain. Real estate agents do quite well, for example, since they receive a percentage commission on rising real estate prices. Yet, winners aside, inflation is inherently destabilizing. It renders corporate plans uncertain. Psychologically, it makes everyone try to "stay ahead." Inflation also increases the federal tax bite as incomes are boosted into higher tax brackets. The federal income tax share of the GNP will rise from the 1976 level of about 11 percent to a projected 13 percent in 1981. According to Walter Heller, a former Kennedy administration economist, this will amount to an unlegislated tax increase next year of $18 billion.

Classic ("demand-pull") inflation generally begins, according to the famous formulation, with too much money chasing too few goods: As demand rises, prices are bid up. This can result from a major tax cut. It can also happen when a government prints money to pay its bills, or when it steps into the market as a major buyer of goods and services, bidding prices up to secure what it needs, then leaving everyone else to bid up prices even further as they fight for what remains. (Hence wartime inflation, when the money supply expands even as production of consumer goods declines.) Demand-pull inflation can quickly turn into "cost-push" inflation. That is, after the initial spurt of inflation sends wages and costs higher, the wages and costs themselves will begin to send inflation higher.

If inflation begins with monetary expansion, monetary contraction can stop it in its tracks. "There is no technical problem about how to end inflation," Nobel economist Milton Friedman has pointed out. "The real obstacles are political." Cutting back the money supply is ruthlessly effective: The Confederacy's rampant inflation came to an abrupt halt when Union troops burned the South's Treasury Note Bureau in South Carolina in early 1865; no more paper notes could be circulated.

The Federal Reserve Board can tighten and loosen the money supply through its open market operations (buying or selling bonds), and by setting the interest at which banks may borrow from the federal government. Such short-term fine-tuning can cope with simple demand-pull inflation. Only if the tightening is applied long and drastically, however, can it cope with cost-push inflation as well. And in terms of unemployment, the side effects are sobering.

Because monetary policy, in politically acceptable doses,

does not seem to work, many economists have lately urged Washington to consider some form of "incomes" policy. The latest proposal: a tax-based strategy. Widely discussed in Congress and the White House, it is examined below.

A TAX-BASED INCOMES POLICY

by Laurence S. Seidman

Last May, a new approach to inflation made its debut in Congress when Senator William Proxmire's (D.-Wis.) Banking Committee held hearings on a "tax-based incomes policy" (TIP). When first proposed in 1971 by University of Pennsylvania economist Sidney Weintraub and Federal Reserve Governor Henry Wallich, TIP received little attention. However, it has gradually gained support from other economists; some, like Arthur Okun of the Brookings Institution, have designed their own versions. In essence, the aim of TIP is not to place the blame for inflation on labor or business, but to restructure incentives to restrain wage and price increases so that the outcome is best for labor, business, and the public.

In early 1978, the average annual wage increase was 8 percent. But because the average growth rate of productivity (industry output per man-hour) is only 2 percent annually and varies little, the average unit labor cost increase was 6 percent. Not surprisingly, the inflation rate was also 6 percent. The best way to predict the inflation rate is to observe the average wage settlement and subtract 2 percent. This rule of thumb is one of the most stable relationships in economics.

Nor is there any mystery about why. Every business must cover an increase in its unit labor cost by raising prices. The degree of competition in each industry establishes a specific relationship between unit cost and price; they move together. Both theory and history suggest that sustained price increases cannot occur without increases in unit labor costs. Instead, research suggests that a smaller wage increase—and therefore a smaller unit cost increase—will result in a smaller price increase. The only way to bring the inflation rate down to zero is to stop the advance of unit labor costs by gradually reducing the growth rate of wages and salaries (including executive pay and benefits) down to the growth rate of productivity.

The traditional cure for inflation is monetary and fiscal dis-

cipline. Such discipline must be one element in any successful anti-inflation strategy; but it cannot be the only element. There is only one way monetary and fiscal discipline can bring down the growth in wages: by causing a severe enough recession. This is precisely the policy that was tried in 1974 and early 1975, with dismal results. To be sure, if "tight" monetary and fiscal policy is applied long enough, and severely enough, it will eventually cause high unemployment and low profits, which in turn will reduce wage increases, unit cost increases, and therefore price increases. Those who advocate a balanced budget and slow monetary growth, however, seldom mention the painful aspects of this process. They leave the impression that there is a mysterious link between such discipline and the prices firms set. But firms will raise prices as long as unit costs increase; and unit costs will increase as long as wage increases exceed productivity increases.

Because monetary and fiscal discipline reduces wage inflation only indirectly, "incomes policy"—attempts to influence directly the growth rate of wages and salaries—was conceived as an essential complement to such discipline. Unfortunately, thus far incomes policy has relied on either persuasion or controls. Each strategy has serious shortcomings.

Persuasion is the current policy of the Carter administration;* business and labor are simply urged to restrain wage increases. When the policy is pursued aggressively, it is called "jawboning." When it is pursued prayerfully, it is called "wishboning." Its fundamental weakness is that it fails to recognize that in our market economy, business and labor respond primarily to financial incentives, not exhortation.

The other method, controls, was tried during the Nixon administration in 1971–72. The problem with controls is that they are rigid and interfere with the freedom of business and labor to make their own decisions. They prevent changes in relative wages and prices that are vital to efficient resource allocation—one of the great social virtues of a market economy. Under Nixon's Phase II, for example, all firms were required to limit wage increases to 5.5 percent, although firms seeking an excep-

*It was also the cornerstone of the Kennedy administration's "guideposts" policy.

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THE INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT TRADEOFF

In the mid-1960s, most economics textbooks taught that there was a tradeoff between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate; if one was high, the other would be low. It was thought that we could have either high unemployment, or high inflation, but not both.

The lessons of the past decade, however, have prompted some rethinking. Under the new view, the tradeoff is between the unemployment rate and the *change* in the inflation rate: Thus, a low unemployment rate will cause the inflation rate to increase; a high unemployment rate will cause the inflation rate to decrease.

The new view attributes a powerful role to inertia. If wage increases and therefore price increases have been high, a high unemployment rate cannot immediately be expected to achieve a low wage (and therefore price) inflation rate; it can only be expected to cause workers to accept somewhat smaller wage *increases* than they received in the previous year.

The 1974–76 recession contradicts the old view but is consistent with the new view. Although unemployment averaged 8 percent for over two years, the inflation rate remained above 5 percent throughout the recession. However, it did decline—from about 10 percent in 1974 to under 6 percent in 1976—even if it remained high.

Under the new view, there is a specific unemployment rate—the nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)—that will keep the inflation rate constant (not necessarily zero). The NAIRU has been estimated to be approximately 6 percent. My own research suggests that TIP may be able to lower it, perhaps to 4 percent, because the downward push of TIP on wages should counter the upward push on wages generated by a low unemployment rate and the accompanying labor shortage. When TIP is introduced, if monetary and fiscal policy holds the unemployment rate above 4 percent, then the inflation rate should decline. When it reaches zero, adjustments in monetary and fiscal policy can lower the unemployment rate to 4 percent. (Without TIP, a 4-percent unemployment rate would cause inflation to accelerate gradually.) The economy could then be run permanently at an unemployment rate of 4 percent, and an inflation rate of zero.

—*L.S.S.*

tion could appeal to the Pay Board. Yet when consumers increase their demand for product X, firms making X should be able to grant an above-average wage increase to attract more labor, without undergoing a costly, time-consuming appeal process. Consumers are harmed if they cannot.

If persuasion is too weak, and controls are too rigid, why not use financial incentives? This is the strategy embodied in a tax-

based incomes policy. Advocates of TIP have not yet agreed on the best design, but for illustration, one might consider a package that combines elements from Okun's "tax-carrot" proposal and Weintraub and Wallich's original "tax-stick" proposal.

In early 1978, as noted, wage increases averaged 8 percent; productivity increases, 2 percent; and price increases, 6 percent. Suppose that the initial TIP goals are a wage inflation rate of 6 percent and a price inflation rate of 4 percent. Then TIP might consist of the following incentives:

Employer Incentive. A firm that grants a wage increase in excess of 6 percent would incur a surcharge on its income tax in proportion to the size of the excess; if it grants less than 6 percent, it would enjoy a corresponding tax cut; if it grants 6 percent, its tax rate would remain at the base (48 percent of profits for many corporations).* Thus, if a firm grants a 7-percent wage increase, and the TIP multiplier (surcharge on each percent of excess) is 6, its tax rate would rise to 54 percent; if it grants 8 percent, its tax rate would rise 12 points to 60 percent.

Employee Incentive. Employees at a firm that grants an average wage increase in excess of 6 percent would receive a tax increase for that year in proportion to the size of the excess; if the firm grants less than 6 percent, they would enjoy a proportionate tax cut; if it grants 6 percent, their tax rate would remain unchanged. (Thus, if the TIP excess wage tax is, say, 50 percent, and an employee's 7-percent raise gives him $150 more per year than he would have received from a 6-percent raise, this $150 difference would be subject to a $75 tax.) The penalty or reward would depend only on the *average* wage increase at the firm, so that individual promotion is not discouraged.

Such incentives differ fundamentally from controls. For both employer and employee, the tax penalty would be stiff, but not prohibitive. Where market forces or special industry conditions call for a relative wage increase, it is essential that the firm be able to exceed 6 percent, though by less than it would have without TIP.† Like other tax incentives, TIP merely changes the profitability of particular decisions. Each firm remains free to do as it wishes, without the approval of regulators. TIP would, of

*Some advocates of TIP suggest limiting coverage to large firms, thereby keeping administrative costs down; others believe broader coverage would be more effective.

†For example, suppose firm A faces a sharp rise in product demand, and thus a labor shortage, while firm B faces a decline in demand, and thus a labor surplus. Without TIP, firm A might grant 9 percent, and firm B, 7 percent, for an average wage increase of 8 percent. With TIP, firm A might grant 7 percent, and firm B, 5 percent, for an average of 6 percent. TIP would not replace the market forces working on each firm, and would not prevent the relative wage increase required by firm A to attract additional labor.

course, complicate the tax code. But so do other tax incentives—such as the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation—which businessmen clearly do not regard as controls.

If the TIP package, together with monetary and fiscal restraint, succeeds in reducing wage inflation to 6 percent and price inflation to 4 percent, then the dividing line between penalty and reward should be lowered to 4 percent, and ultimately (after several years) to 2 percent, the growth rate of productivity—the rate required to keep the inflation rate near zero.

Although TIP focuses its incentives on wages and salaries, price inflation should automatically decline with wage inflation. Tax incentives to restrain prices or profits are thus unnecessary (and almost certainly unfeasible). Nevertheless, labor deserves protection against the unlikely event that wage increases decline further than price increases. Under Arthur Okun's "real wage insurance" proposal, Congress would authorize in advance tax cuts for employees to make up the difference. A second proposal, from Lawrence Klein and Vijaya Duggal of the University of Pennsylvania, would protect workers from any adverse shift in the ratio of after-tax profits to payroll. If the ratio for the whole corporate sector rises above a certain threshold while wage inflation declines, the base corporate tax rate would be raised equally for all firms to keep the ratio at the threshold. In my view, both proposals should be integrated into TIP.

A permanent reduction in the inflation rate would, of course, be a central benefit of TIP. But it would not be the only benefit. TIP may also be able to reduce permanently the *nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment* (the unemployment rate that will keep the inflation rate constant) from 6 percent to about 4 percent. This would yield large social benefits. According to Okun's Law (a 1-percent reduction in unemployment yields a 3-percent increase in real GNP), if the economy can be run at a 4-percent unemployment rate, *real* (inflation-adjusted) GNP, labor income, private investment, and profits will all be 6 percent higher each year than if the unemployment rate were 6 percent. Given these potential benefits, it is not surprising that a growing number of economists and policymakers are concluding that despite its initial administrative cost, TIP is a policy worth adopting.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *For added background, readers may wish to consult Robert Solow's "The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to Inflation"* (The Public Interest, *Winter 1975); and "Tax-Based Income Policies" by Laurence S. Seidman, in* Brookings Papers on Economic Activity *(1978).*

Poverty and prosperity vary greatly by region. In the map above, which shows all but the smallest of India's 31 states and Union territories, solid red denotes average per-capita income (in current U.S. dollars) greater than $120 annually; medium red, $100–120; light red, $80–100; gray, unknown.

India

Eighteen months ago, the West hailed India's return to democracy after Prime Minister Morarji Desai took office in the wake of voters' rejection of Indira Gandhi and her "Emergency" rule by decree. Since then, India has receded from the headlines (except during President Carter's flying visit last January). The nation's current economic and political health is relatively good, but the long-term outlook is a matter of dispute. We present here some diverse views. Former diplomat Edward O'Neill traces Indian-American relations since the bloody Moslem-Hindu Partition of the subcontinent in 1947; journalist B. G. Verghese looks at India's political history; and economist Lawrence Veit assays Indian "socialism."

UNREAL EXPECTATIONS

by Edward A. O'Neill

In 1928 an Anglophile American, Katherine Mayo, wrote a book called *Mother India* that remained on the best-seller list for two years. (The book is still in print.) Profusely illustrated with pictures of snake charmers, lepers, hypnotic swamis, child brides, grotesquely crippled beggars, bejeweled maharajas, elephants, tigers, and "sacred cows," *Mother India* presented a skewed image of India that persists in America to this day. While examples of all of Mayo's bizarrerie (save the bejeweled maharajas and the tigers—the one extinct, the other an endangered species) can still be found in India's crowded cities and mud-walled villages, the "real" India of 1928—or of 1978—is hardly the one she described.

Among the world's newly independent nations, India is

something of a phenomenon. Through all kinds of travail it has managed to keep to the principles on which it was founded—and survive. Survival has not been easy. In the 31 years since the British left, India has undergone the Muslim-Hindu trauma of Partition, four wars of varying ferocity, a half-dozen searing droughts, three near famines, innumerable savage squabbles over language, religion, and regional politics, and a brief flirtation with dictatorship. But thanks to the hundreds of millions of ordinary voters who rejected Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Emergency in the free elections of March 1977, India remains the world's most populous democracy. (India and neighboring Sri Lanka are the only former colonial areas in Asia that can boast free elections.)

The Indian judiciary, which provoked Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of the Emergency by convicting her while Prime Minister of election irregularities, is once more independent. It may yet send her to jail, as it did her son Sanjay. The Indian press, the best in all of Asia's former colonial countries, is free to speak out again. India's Army, the third largest in the world, could take over the government any time its chiefs might wish. But its leaders have scrupulously stayed out of politics.

Hindi-Chini Bye-Bye

The stereotype of "starving India" remains, yet food production has grown enormously. Grain *reserves* are now more than a third of what total grain *production* was 20 years ago. The country is essentially self-sufficient in a large number of manufactured goods, ranging from shoes and plastics to heavy trucks, small computers, military aircraft, and watches. India has even been able to make an atomic device, and may have rockets that could deliver it. As *Washington Post* correspondent Lewis Simons recently observed, India is "not the loser we make it out to be."

In practical terms, India is much better off now than it was during the heady period when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–64) was the beau ideal of the "nonaligned" nations and world leaders visited New Delhi in procession. Khrushchev and

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Bulganin came together, then Marshal Tito, Chou En-Lai, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and others, each visitor stroking the already inflated Indian ego. During Chou's visit in 1956, huge crowds greeted him with shouts of "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" ("Indians and Chinese are brothers").

But six years later the Chinese, enforcing border claims in the Himalayas, overwhelmed an Indian Army trained primarily to fight Pakistan. What India then lost in international prestige has never been recovered. Western newsmen, who streamed in to cover the brief mountain war, gleefully converted the 1956 slogan into "Hindi-Chini bye-bye."

In many parts of the world—even among the country's friends in Washington, to whom Indian diplomats' lectures on American international morality were always galling—wry satisfaction greeted this setback. Nonetheless, the United States quickly offered India political support and military aid against our then enemy, the "Chicoms." The panicky Indians eagerly accepted.

Ups and Downs

An ambivalence has long marked Indo-American relations, and it stems from a host of accumulated mutual misperceptions. Until a generation ago, Americans were taught little more than that India was the place where Alexander the Great stopped in 326 B.C. "because there were no other worlds to conquer." Until 1947, in geography books India was a large area colored red like the rest of the far-flung British Empire. Before World War II, there were probably fewer than a dozen social scientists in this country who could claim any expertise about India. Add to them a handful of roving newspapermen, tourists who had passed through, a sizeable number of missionaries, and some businessmen and consular officials (whose attitudes were as colonial as those of the British). That was it.

In similar fashion, educated Indians at the time of Independence knew practically nothing about the United States. Americans were "materialistic" but at the same time "idealistic." The Indian vision of America was formed in large part from Hollywood movies. In school, Indian students memorized the succession of English kings but were taught little about the British colony that broke away in 1776. Oxford, Cambridge, and other British universities attracted the sons of the Indian elite, with few coming to the United States. Those who did reach America had to return home once they had their degrees; until 1946, Indians, like all other Asians, were barred from immigrat-

ing. The U.S. quotas set in that year limited the admission of Indians to 100 persons annually. (Since 1968, when the quota system was abandoned, nearly 112,000 Indians have come to the United States to live. More Indians now attend colleges and universities in the United States than in England.)

Thus, it was inevitable that relations between India and the United States would not be smooth, and indeed, they have been marked by a curious yo-yo pattern. In the late 1940s, however, many officials in Washington and many romantic Indophile Americans believed that relations could hardly be other than excellent. Were we not the two largest democracies in the world? Had we not both won our freedom from the British Crown?

Yet by then, the yo-yo had already been going up and down for half a decade. It is commonly thought in the United States that, during World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt pressured Winston Churchill into giving India its independence. In fact, FDR did not press Churchill on the matter in order to keep the British Prime Minister sympathetic to other American war aims. And Indian nationalists, in jail or out, knew it. During the Truman era, Indian leaders hoped that we would be beneficent supporters of freedom in other colonial countries. Americans, in turn, had high hopes that India could play a large role in the confused new postwar world.

With the onset of the Cold War and India's quick avowals of neutrality, both sides awoke from their dreams. The year 1954 was bad on both sides. In February, as part of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's containment policy, the United States began arming Pakistan, India's next-door enemy. India, which had rejected a similar arms offer, as Dulles knew it would, reacted with anger. Indian officials contended that Pakistan accepted the U.S. offer of an anticommunist military pact only to obtain American weapons for use against India. As it turned out, the Indians were right.* That same year, Nehru upset Washington by joining the Communist Chinese in propounding *Panch Shila*, the five principles of peaceful coexistence. To Dulles, such neutrality was "immoral."

Soon afterward, however, India's economic development programs ran into serious trouble and Nehru turned once more to Washington for help. What had begun as a small trickle of aid in 1950 soon became a flood. (Total U.S. economic assistance to India in all forms—the larger part in food—has amounted to

*The Pakistanis used American weapons against the Indians during a skirmish in the desolate Rann of Kutch early in 1965, in the brief war in Kashmir and the Punjab a few months later, and in Bangladesh in 1971 when East Bengal became an independent country.

Drawing by Helen E. Hokinson;
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"It makes me so mad when I think how long I've been patient with India."

about $10 billion.) With American aid came hundreds of Yankee technicians and administrators who, as the years went by, eroded Indian good will by insisting on telling the "backward natives" how they should solve all their problems. Nonetheless, the aid was important to India and kept its economy afloat.

A high point in Indo-American relations was reached when President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited New Delhi in December 1959. Literally millions turned out to see the "Prince of Peace," as banners throughout the city proclaimed him. When John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower in 1961, Indian intellectuals assumed that the young new President would bring a period of American nonimperialism. Then came the Bay of Pigs. For the first time the American Embassy in New Delhi was stoned by demonstrators.

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 might have evoked an even more violent response, but by then, as noted above, Chinese soldiers were streaming across the Himalayan passes and routing the Indian Army. President Kennedy, the Soviet missiles gone from Cuba, reacted quickly, and U.S. Air Force C-130s began landing at New Delhi's Palam airport with arms and equipment. Before the American advisory presence had

A GIFT OF TONGUES

India's 1949 Constitution included a provision, passed by one vote, that made Hindi "the official language of the Union." Despite nearly 30 years of vigorous government efforts to promote the language, Hindi today is spoken regularly by only 30 percent of the population. Some 400 million other Indians stubbornly stick to their mother tongues, each of which boasts deep historic roots and a distinctive literary tradition.

A cursory examination of a rupee note (shown below), worth 12¢, illustrates the country's language problem. There are 15 languages represented, each in its own script. There is Hindi, of course, then 13 others "recognized" by the Constitution. The fifteenth, dominating the currency, is English, designated "an associate language" but still the country's lingua franca.

The languages of the north are Indo-European, cousins of our Western languages. Those of the south are Dravidian, with no connections to any tongue outside the subcontinent. (Three other language families are found in India: Tibeto-Chinese in the mountains of the north and northeast; Munda among aboriginal peoples scattered around the country; and Khasi in the Assam hills. The Indian census has counted more than 600 languages in the whole country.)



been fully established, however, the Chinese—having made their point—withdrew. India's gratitude evaporated in haggling over details of arms assistance with a large U.S. military mission that had established itself in a former maharaja's Delhi palace. The relationship soured, and the American military mission went home.

With the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam, relations between the two countries again plummeted. In answer to

India's loud criticism of the U.S. role in Vietnam, the United States in 1968 cited India's failure to protest when the armies of the Soviet Union and other communist countries put down Czechoslovakia's brief experiment in "liberalization."*

A "Tilt" Toward Pakistan?

Indo-American relations reached their nadir during the Nixon era when India, in its own self-interest, intervened in Bangladesh, where troops from West Pakistan were slaughtering rebelling East Pakistanis in 1971. A "leak" in Washington revealed that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was, in his own words, "tilting" toward Pakistan in the struggle. Then it was learned that a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and escort ships had entered the Bay of Bengal. The Indian reaction was predictable. A few months later Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union—then India's largest supplier of arms and almost always a strong supporter of India against Pakistan.

India emerged from the Bangladesh war in a better strategic position than it had enjoyed since Partition. No longer was there an enemy both to the east and to the west. By 1974, the American Embassy in New Delhi had begun talking to the Ministry of External Affairs about development of "mutual and stable relations." Prime Minister Gandhi's 18-month Emergency, which began in June 1975, was strongly criticized in the United States,† but no serious international difficulties arose. With the Emergency over and Mrs. Gandhi out of power, relations between the United States and India, under the coalition government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai, became warmer (as demonstrated by Jimmy Carter's visit to New Delhi in January 1978) than they had been in several years.

In the end, of course, India and the United States remain vastly different countries with widely divergent problems. Even as they agree on democratic values, Americans and Indians should not expect too much of one another; their strategic aims and interests will not always coincide.

*In 1956, when the Russians crushed the revolt in Hungary, Prime Minister Nehru was silent for days, but finally, under severe criticism from the Indian press, mildly objected.

†However, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former Ambassador to India and now a U.S. Senator (D.-N.Y.), managed to find a silver lining in the Emergency: He noted at the time that Gerald Ford would be remembered as the man who was President when the United States became the world's largest democracy.

THE CONGRESS PARTY: THIRTY YEARS OF POWER

by B. G. Verghese

At the midnight hour of August 14, 1947, Independence won, Prime Minister-elect Jawaharlal Nehru announced that "the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance." The Congress Party took over the colonial government left by Lord Louis Mountbatten, last of a long line of British Governors-General and Viceroys. Thereafter, for nearly 30 years, the party continuously controlled the Indian Parliament—and the Prime Minister's office.

The Congress held the country together in 1948 during the appalling trauma of Partition, when millions of people moved between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan and uncounted hundreds of thousands were slaughtered on the basis of their religious faiths. The Congress shaped India's 1950 Constitution and established the democratic framework that its latter-day leader, Indira Gandhi, drastically abridged before she, and the party, were brought down by one of the remaining safeguards: free elections. For the first time in its history, the Congress Party had been rejected nationally by the Indian people.

Now in partial eclipse, the party is by no means defunct. The Congress (I) faction—the "I" is for Indira—leads the opposition in both houses of Parliament, and holds or shares office in three states. The party, split by Mrs. Gandhi in 1978, could again become the democratic alternative to the ruling Janata Party (a disparate coalition that includes many former Congress members) but only if given new leadership committed to democratic principles. Until then, the future is clouded.

Organized with official encouragement by Allan Octavian Hume, a retired Indian civil service officer, the Congress Party held its first meeting in Bombay in 1885. Its object was to become the "germ of a native Parliament," a sort of tentative loyal opposition. Indeed, its first meeting concluded with "three cheers for Her Majesty, the Queen Empress."

The early character of the party was typified by Gopal Krishna Gokhale, a gentle and liberal Brahmin from Poona, who

tried to persuade the British to improve the social conditions of the country. Other party members, however, wanted to go further. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a fiery Brahmin nationalist who was inspired by the "Asian" victory in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War, called for *Swaraj*, or "self-rule." "*Swaraj* is my birthright," Tilak declared, "and I shall have it."

After Mohandas Gandhi returned to India in 1915, he propelled the nationalists into a mass struggle. Various men of note fell in behind Gandhi. Among them were Vallabhbhai Patel from Gujarat, who was to become the integrator of independent India; C. R. Rajagopalachari from Madras, who would be the first Indian Governor-General after Mountbatten; Rajendra Prasad from Bihar, who became the first President of the Republic; and Motilal Nehru, father of India's first Prime Minister. World War I temporarily interrupted the nationalists' forward movement, as more than 1.3 million Indians fought in France, the Middle East, and Africa against the Germans and Turks. But the end of the war brought fresh demands from the Congress—and fresh repression of Indians by the British.

In early 1919 in Amritsar, holy city of the Sikhs, violent protests erupted against the jailing of two Congress leaders. On April 13, as a crowd of 20,000 massed in an enclosed area, a nervous British general ordered his outnumbered troops to fire. When the smoke cleared, there were 390 dead and 1,200 wounded. Nationalist attitudes hardened overnight. The Jallianwalla Bagh massacre is still remembered and invoked in India.

The following year, Gandhi launched his first noncooperation movement, culminating in his imprisonment in 1922 after what he called a "Himalayan blunder"—his supporters had turned violent and burned a police station, with the policemen



A CLASH OF SYMBOLS

The three-decade-long dominance of the socialist Congress Party (symbol, left) over India's politics was broken only in 1977 with the victory of the Janata Party (symbol, right), a new coalition comprising nearly a dozen political parties—and many disgruntled Congress Party members.



inside. He did not revive the movement until the late 1920s. Turning instead to tasks of social and economic reconstruction, he encouraged village industries, school reform, and the production of hand-spun cloth called *khadi,* which became the proudly worn livery of freedom.

The Salt March

Disappointed with the pace of promised constitutional reforms, the Congress in 1929 pledged itself to *Purna Swaraj*, or total independence, a step beyond the dominion status it had hitherto sought. A few months later the second noncooperation movement was launched with Gandhi's famous Salt March to the obscure coastal village of Dandi in Gujarat. There he symbolically defied the British by taking crusted sea salt from the shore in violation of the government's salt monopoly. This simple act electrified the nation and brought him to the attention of the world. Once again Gandhi went to jail.

Following the 1935 Government of India Act, which introduced representative government in the provinces, elections put several Congress candidates in office. Their tenure was brief. In 1939, in the wake of the Viceroy's unilateral commitment of India to war against the Axis powers and Britain's failure to include Indian independence among her war aims, the Congress ordered its members in provincial governments to resign.

Not so the Muslim League, the prime political party for India's vast Muslim minority. Its leader, the brilliant lawyer and former Congress Party member Muhammad Ali Jinnah, pledged the league to the war effort. In return, he got from the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, a promise that his party would have a veto over any postwar change in the governance of India. In 1940 the Muslim League, meeting in Lahore, adopted the Pakistan Resolution, which formally set out the goal of separate Muslim-majority states in the northwest and northeast of India. Thus was the stage set for Partition.

By 1942, Gandhi was ready to raise the anti-British slogan

B. G. Verghese, 51, is one of India's best-known journalists and a member of the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament. Born in Burma, he was educated at the University of Delhi and Cambridge University, and joined the staff of the Times of India *in 1949, later becoming its special correspondent in New Delhi. After serving as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's information adviser (1966–69), he became editor-in-chief of the* Hindustan Times, *but resigned under government pressure at the beginning of the 1975 "Internal Emergency."*

"Quit India." It had immediate results. The Congress's final "No" to Britain's war effort meant imprisonment once more for Gandhi, Nehru, and virtually everyone else then active in Congress Party politics. The jail doors remained closed until after the surrender of Germany in 1945.

To some Indians, Britain's wartime difficulties seemed an opportunity to hasten Independence by direct action. One former Congress president, Subhas Chandra Bose, rejected Gandhi's nonviolence and organized 20,000 Indian prisoners of war to fight for Japan against the British in Burma. Most other Congress leaders stayed with their Gandhian principles. But one of them, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was beginning to move up to a position of power in the party, had already taken a different ideological path from Gandhi's.

Sophisticated and cosmopolitan, Nehru was impressed by the potential of the Soviet experiment as well as by the importance of planning and state-controlled development of heavy industry. When Independence came in 1947, Nehru was the mentor of India's "Congress Socialists." (The leadership of this faction was later taken by Jayaprakash Narayan, who, a generation later, was instrumental in bringing down Nehru's daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.)

Government by Faction

Mahatma Gandhi's last advice to the Congress was that it should disband itself with the attainment of Independence. By the time of Gandhi's assassination in 1948, however, his influence had already waned. The Congress had become India's government and Nehru its leader.

The Congress Nehru led was a coalition sheltering many diverse factions that united when necessary to win elections, then worked to advance their own regional, religious, or economic interests. Gradually, what began to matter in the public eye was not ideology, or even program, so much as integrity, style, and, of course, results. The last frequently were not forthcoming, and the Congress never won a majority of the popular vote after Independence. But it always controlled a majority in the lower house of Parliament.

As time went on, the Congress became more a vote-getting machine than a cohesive political party. The "ministerial wing," the people who ran the central government, took precedence over the "organizational wing," the party officers. The All-India Congress Committee, the party's government-controlled "High Command," paid little heed to state and provincial officials,

HINDUISM: A VAST SPONGE



India, according to its Constitution, is a secular state. Yet among its people are members of most of the world's major religions. There are more Muslims in India than in all of the Middle East. Christianity, traditionally believed to have been brought to southern India by St. Thomas the Apostle, has perhaps 14 million adherents of various sects. There are additional millions of Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains—religions of Indian origin. But dominating all are the Hindus, nearly 84 percent of the country's enormous population.

To the monotheistic world extending westward from India to the Pacific coast of the Americas, Hinduism has always been puzzling. Jews and Christians hew to Yaweh's dictum brought down from Mount Sinai by Moses: "You shall have no other gods before me." Muslims daily testify: "There is no god but God." But in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, Krishna, just one of the thousands of gods in the Hindu pantheon, says: "Whatever god a man worships, it is I who answer the prayer."

Hinduism over the millennia has developed a limitless capacity for absorbing every kind of belief, however incongruous. Even the Indian-born Buddha has been given a perverse reincarnation as the ninth and latest avatar of Vishnu. British historian Sir Percival Spear has likened Hinduism to "a vast sponge that absorbs all that enters without ceasing to be itself." The simile is not quite exact, as Spear concedes, "because

who went their own, sometimes corrupt, ways.

The growing factionalism of the Congress during the late 1950s and the first years of the 1960s coincided with the inevitable twilight of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was as much the Congress as he was India. The failures of the nation and the party he saw as his own. Planning had not ended poverty, and the public-sector industries faltered without spurring a take-off in economic growth. In the 12 years from Independence until 1960, annual per-capita income increased only by about 15 percent—in real terms, to about $70. The bright hope of nonalignment, meanwhile, was tarnished by the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, when China callously slapped India's face diplomatically and embarrassed it militarily before the world.

Nehru died a disappointed man—India's "tryst with des-

Hinduism has shown a remarkable power of assimilating as well as absorbing: The water becomes part of the sponge."

Has Hinduism been a force for good or ill? Educated Indians are divided on the question. N. C. Chaudhuri, best known in the West for *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951), regards Hinduism as one of the few cohesive forces on the subcontinent. Novelist V. S. Naipul agrees, but suggests in *India: A Wounded Civilization* (1977) that cohesion has been bought at the price of stultifying conformity:

"The key Hindu concept of *dharma*—the right way, the sanctioned way, which all men must follow, according to their natures—is an elastic concept. At its noblest it combines self-fulfillment and truth to the self with the ideas of action as duty, action as its own spiritual reward, man as a holy vessel .... But *dharma,* as this ideal of truth to oneself, or living out the truth in oneself, can also be used to reconcile men to servitude and make them find in paralyzing obedience the highest spiritual good .... *Dharma* is creative or crippling according to the state of the civilization, according to what is expected of men. It cannot be otherwise .... Indians have made some contribution to science in this century, but—with a few notable exceptions—their work has been done abroad .... The scientist returning to India sheds the individuality he acquired during his time abroad; he regains the security of his caste identity, and the world is simplified once more. There are minute rules, as comforting as bandages; individual perception and judgment, which once called forth his creativity, are relinquished as burdens, and the man is once more a unit in his herd, his science reduced to a skill. The blight of caste is not only untouchability and the consequent deification in India of filth; the blight, in an India that tries to grow, is also the overall obedience it imposes, its ready-made satisfactions, the diminishing of adventurousness, the pushing away from men of individuality and the possibility of excellence. . . ."

tiny," which he had evoked in his eloquent speech on the night of Independence, still unconsummated. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, a deft politician and Home Minister under Nehru, might have made some progress—if only in party reform. But after a year and a half in office he died in Tashkent, having settled, with Soviet mediation, the 1965 war with Pakistan. Indira Gandhi succeeded him.

Nehru's daughter's accession to office was hailed by many as the beginning of a generational change in Congress rule. But there was a degree of cynicism in her selection by the party's "High Command," which had put together enough support for her to shut out the ascetic Morarji Desai (now Prime Minister). The "Old Guard" believed they could control the then-insecure Mrs. Gandhi. But she had iron in her soul.

THE MAHATMA

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi is revered in India as "Father of the Nation."

In the 30 years since he was felled by an assassin's bullet, Indians may have diverged from the teachings of the scrawny little ascetic ("a half-naked fakir," Churchill once scornfully called him). But they cannot forget that without Gandhi and his extraordinary revolutionary methods, they would not have the nation they do.

Gandhi was born in 1869 in the tiny princely state of Porbandar, a remote coastal region of western India. His father was *diwan* (prime minister) and an orthodox Hindu of the Vaisya caste (merchants and moneylenders). Although Mohandas wanted to be a physician, his father sent him to London, a shy and frightened 18-year-old, to study law for two years.

As a fledgling barrister back in India, Gandhi was a failure—so timid he was unable to speak out for his clients. Nonetheless, in 1893 a group of merchants gave him a one-year assignment among the tens of thousands of Indians in South Africa. Faced with British colonial oppression of the Indian community, Gandhi discovered that he could speak out and sway people—indeed, that he had enormous reservoirs of courage and tenacity. It was here that he developed his ideas about peaceful, nonviolent opposition. He stayed in South Africa for 20 years—ultimately obtaining concessions on behalf of Indian indentured workers there—and was acclaimed a hero when he returned to India in 1915.

Despite his compatriots' admiration for his accomplishments abroad, he found on his return home that the Congress Party leadership, moderates and extremists alike, had no place in their plans for civil disobedience or nonviolence. Gandhi, a supremely patient man, set up his first *ashram* (religious center) and bided his time.

The Congress of that day was largely composed of wealthy businessmen, lawyers, and professionals, and had little contact with the people. Toward the end of World War I, Gandhi began appealing to

In her bid for supremacy, Mrs. Gandhi expediently donned a deeper shade of Fabian socialist pink. She nationalized the country's banks and secured the resignations of five conservative Cabinet members. Radical rhetoric filled the air.

A 1969 split in the Congress Party reduced Mrs. Gandhi's partisans to a minority in the Lok Sabha, but she continued in office with the support of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, a Tamil-language party in the south. The Moscow-oriented CPI believed that the Congress Party split signaled an opening to the left, a conviction

© Estate of Ben Shahn, 1978.
Collection: The New Jersey State Museum.

the masses. He helped textile workers win a bitter strike in Ahmadabad. He bested the tyrannical British indigo planters in Bihar. Soon the Congress leadership began coming to Gandhi. By the mid-1920s, he was the untitled leader of the party.

Gandhi's appeal to the Indian masses was traditional. The Mahatma (or "great soul," a title bestowed on him by Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore) was a rigidly celibate *brahmachari* seeking God, a holy man, a saint. "Men say I am a saint losing myself in politics," he drily observed. "The fact is I am a politician trying to become a saint." And it was as a master politician that he broke the age-old passivity of India's hundreds of millions, leading them to freedom from British rule.

Independence brought no joy to Gandhi. Depressed and saddened by the religious slaughter that followed Partition, he did what he could to bring it under control and displayed great concern for the Muslim minority remaining in the new India. On January 30, 1948, he came to his regular evening prayer meeting at the home of industrialist G. D. Birla in New Delhi. A young man greeted him with folded hands, touched his feet, rose, and fired three shots. Gandhi was dead in a few minutes, the victim of a fanatical Hindu.

fortified when Mrs. Gandhi dissolved the Lok Sabha in 1971.

That year the "Ruling" Congress faction—as opposed to the beaten "Organization" Congress, which went into opposition—entered into a formal electoral alliance with the CPI in a number of states, and in March it won a landslide victory. It followed up a year later by sweeping the polls in a number of key state elections in the wake of India's victory in the Bangladesh war.

Mrs. Gandhi's prestige was never higher. She could at that time have pushed for major reforms that were long overdue: in education, in agriculture, in planning, and elsewhere. In fact,

THE MAN WHO WOULDN'T BE KING

Jawaharlal Nehru, the gentleman revolutionary who spent nine years as a prisoner of the British before becoming India's first Prime Minister, grew up as a "brown Englishman." According to one prison-mate, he spoke English even in his sleep.

Young Nehru lived among the British until the age of 22. His wealthy lawyer father's home was the first built by an Indian in Allahabad's "Civil Lines," the residential area for high-level British officials. At home, British tutors prepared him for Harrow. From there he went to Cambridge, then on to study law in London's Inner Temple.

One biographer describes the young Nehru as "very handsome, debonair in his Bond Street clothes . . . . In the summer he did Europe." He himself recalled the period years afterward: "I am afraid that I was a bit of a prig with little to commend me."

After his return to India in 1912, he practiced law in a desultory fashion. Although his father was a very active member of the Congress Party, the son took only an armchair interest in politics. Even the chaos and slaughter of World War I failed to move him deeply.

Not so the 1919 Jallianwalla Bagh massacre. A year later, Nehru "discovered" the abjectly poor Indian peasant. Sensitized at last, he was ready to be enlisted by Gandhi. The dilettante was gone forever.

Although Gandhi and Nehru shared a deep mutual affection, they frequently disagreed. Gandhi represented Old India; Nehru, 20 years his junior, New India. The generation gap between them was too wide to bridge. But Nehru knew that freedom could not be won without the truly charismatic appeal of Gandhi. Despite their disagreements, Nehru clove to the Mahatma.

Gandhi's assassination was followed by the death in 1950 of Nehru's only serious political rival, Vallabhbhai Patel. After that,

however, she abandoned the initiative the moment she had it.

There was a manifest loss of direction, indeed, even of will. The Congress Party atrophied. Authority was centralized, then personalized as Mrs. Gandhi took over the party as well as the government. Through centralized fund-raising, she harnessed big business to her own brand of big-money politics. The party, holding for 90 years the middle ground in Indian politics, began to alienate its own rank and file. Political corruption grew.*

*In 1973, the Minister of State for Finance complained that his ministry was being denied the administrative powers to deal with smugglers. The Congress chief minister of Gujarat, Chimanbhai Patel, the state's top elected official, was accused by two of his own Cabinet colleagues of having entered into a deal with local oilseed merchants to siphon 2 million rupees into the Congress campaign chest for the 1974 election in Uttar Pradesh in return for allowing prices of vegetable oil (a staple in cooking) to rise.

Nehru *was* India. He traveled throughout the country, cajoling, prodding, ordering his people to do better. During Nehru's lifetime, India did not begin to achieve the goals he set for his country. But he held the country together when it might have fallen apart; and while he could have become a dictator at any time, he did not.

Nehru reveled in meeting and talking to people, and wasted his time extravagantly with foreign visitors. Perhaps this self-indulgence satisfied a need not filled by friends. He had very few. Among the closest were Viscount Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, and his countess. Their friendship began during the prelude to Independence in 1947. For years afterward, Countess Mountbatten regularly visited New Delhi in the lovely month of January. When she died of a heart attack in 1960, Nehru went into seclusion for three days.

One of Jawaharlal Nehru's habits was to jot down things he read that struck him. On his death in 1964 at age 74—he had been Prime Minister for nearly 17 years—a notepad was found beside his bed. On it he had copied the closing lines of Robert Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening":

The woods are lonely, dark, and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.



Drawing by Shankar, from The Big 4 of India, *Krishnalal Shridharani (Delhi: Malhotra Brothers, 1951).*

The economy plummeted, pushed into worse decline by drought in 1972 and 1973, by the financial drain of the Bangladesh war, and by the oil crisis and global inflation. The regime's contempt for established norms, plainly displayed in the ouster of independent-minded judges, stoked mounting protest, irresponsibility, and anger on all sides. As protests spilled over into the streets, the states of Gujarat and Bihar became centers of defiance under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, who seemed to embody the mood of the people. Then, on June 12, 1975, the Allahabad high court ruled that Mrs. Gandhi was guilty of corrupt election practices. She was ordered to vacate her seat in Parliament—and, consequently, the prime ministership.

THE LADY

Her father was an agnostic. His will specified that he wished to be cremated, but without a religious ceremony. Yet immediately after Jawaharlal Nehru's death in 1964, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, took it upon herself to arrange for a traditional Hindu funeral. The body was carried through countless mourners to a pyre on the banks of the Jumna River outside Delhi.

Was she responding to a deathbed change of heart that only she knew had occurred? Overruling Nehru's last wishes for his own spiritual good? Or were her motives political in large or small degree?

All these conjectures were voiced at the time. Mrs. Gandhi said nothing and retreated for months into her grief. She was then what she would be throughout her 11 years in the prime ministership—as she put it, "a very private person." Very private, very tough. To Henry Kissinger, she was always "the Lady."

When Indira Gandhi was seven, an aunt came upon her one day standing on the verandah, hand upraised and muttering to herself. Questioned about what she was doing, the lonely, only child explained, "I am practicing to be Joan of Arc."

At 24 she married for love and against tradition. Her choice, to her father's initial dismay, was a Parsee journalist-politician, Feroze Gandhi—no relation to the Mahatma. Shortly after the wedding in 1942, both were imprisoned for nationalist activity. The marriage later deteriorated when Indira became her father's hostess and moved into the Prime Minister's residence with her two sons.

Even before her husband's death in 1960, Mrs. Gandhi had moved slowly but inevitably into high political position. Her years at her father's side were an extraordinary apprenticeship for power, though she seemed not to seek it and vacillated about using it. By 1957, she had become president of the Congress Party. It was not

All might still have gone well had she bowed out gracefully pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead, *goondas*, or "toughs," from the Congress and elsewhere took the field under command of her son Sanjay, producing "rent-a-crowd," pro-Indira rallies. "Indira is India, and India is Indira," the Congress leadership proclaimed.

On June 26, 1975, less than two weeks after the Allahabad court decision, Mrs. Gandhi, without consulting the Cabinet or any other government officials, proclaimed an "Internal Emergency." It was a signal for mass arrests (more than 150,000 people were jailed), rigid press censorship, a virtual ban on political activity, abrogation of fundamental constitutional



Drawing by Laxman, from All in All, *M. Chalapathi Rau (Vyasa Publications: Delhi, 1972).*

surprising that on the sudden death of her father's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Congress Party's "Old Guard" in January 1966 made her Prime Minister. Nor was it surprising that they thought they could run her as it suited them.

Instead, she purged the "Old Guard" and replaced them with people of her own choosing. After the Bangladesh war of 1971, she was at the pinnacle of her power. The Indian masses adored her. But India still faced old problems of poverty, corruption, and inefficiency that seemed invincible. Gradually, Mrs. Gandhi retired into distrustful isolation.

Another side of her became apparent: the doting mother. Both of her sons—Sanjay, a somewhat swinging bachelor, and Rajiv, an unobtrusive senior pilot for Indian Airlines—lived with her. When she proclaimed the Emergency in 1975, Sanjay, though he held no official position, became his mother's principal agent.

Mrs. Gandhi, who will be 61 in November, is not finished politically. But guessing at her future is as difficult as probing her psyche.

Questioned about the Emergency during the state elections of January 1978, she blandly replied, "All that is past history." Then, as the little girl in Allahabad might have said, she added: "And besides, we have said we were sorry for any excesses."

rights including habeas corpus, intimidation of judges and lawyers, and suppression of dissent. India, it seemed, was going the way of most other Third World countries.

A Gambit Fails

By swift degrees Emergency rule became increasingly untenable. Compulsory sterilization programs and the mass razing—140,000 dwellings in Delhi alone—of so-called squatter settlements turned into campaigns of terror. Sanjay Gandhi, the mainspring of these programs, began to exercise other powers, making key appointments and laying down policies. Constitu-

A MAN WITHOUT AMBITION

In one of his short stories, Rudyard Kipling recounts the tale of Purun Bhagat, prime minister of a large princely state, friend of Viceroys and governors, knight commander of the Order of the Indian Empire, who one day decides to let everything go "as a man drops a cloak he no longer needs." He makes his mendicant way far into the lower Himalayas, where he stays for years in silent contemplation. Then a landslide threatens the village below. He breaks his trance and becomes an activist again, reaching the village in time to warn its inhabitants. When all are safe, death overtakes him.

Jayaprakash Narayan, to whom much credit must go for ending Indira Gandhi's Emergency, is something of a 20th-century Purun Bhagat.

As a college student, he was involved in the early days of the Gandhian movement. He left India in 1921 to go to the United States. For a while he attended the University of California, working at various odd jobs to support himself. After leaving Berkeley, he worked his way across the country, moving from job to job, ending up on an automobile assembly line in Detroit. He returned to India in 1929, a committed classical socialist.

Narayan's political and social beliefs drew him to Nehru, then something of a parlor socialist. Soon Narayan was leader of the Congress Party's socialist wing and at the same time one of the most active and effective workers in the freedom struggle. After Independence, Narayan refused to accept any position in the government. And in 1948, opposing many of its practices, he quit the Congress, organized the Praja Socialist Party, and became the head of the three largest labor unions in the country. Many people at the time considered him the logical successor to Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister.

Then, in 1954, he unexpectedly took the vow of *jeevandan* (literally, "gift of life") and, like Purun Bhagat, "went into the forest."

tional government was in fact being replaced by a palace caucus. But when Sanjay and other counselors advocated an indefinite postponement of elections—already put off a year by the Emergency decree—Mrs. Gandhi sought instead to legitimize herself by gambling on an easy victory over a disorganized, fearful, and divided opposition.

The gambit failed. The Janata Party, nurtured by Jayaprakash Narayan and forged, pre-Independence fashion, in jail, rode to victory on an upsurge of popular support. Even the most senior Cabinet minister, Jagjivan Ram, crossed over to the opposition, bitterly denouncing Mrs. Gandhi. The new Janata

© Shankar's Weekly, *1972.*

A vigorous 52, he joined the ascetic Vinoba Bhave in the *Bhoodan* (land gift) movement, an idealistic and largely unsuccessful effort to get landlords to give part or all of their holdings to landless peasants. For the next 21 years he walked with Bhave throughout the country, separated from all of his old activities. He scrupulously stayed away from India's turbulent electoral politics until Mrs. Gandhi was found guilty of election malpractices.

Then, on June 23, 1975, Narayan presided over a meeting of non-communist opposition leaders who demanded her resignation. On June 26, the Emergency was declared, and Narayan, though critically ill, was jailed without trial.

This action produced an outcry even the repressive Emergency could not silence. Jayaprakash Narayan in jail became the symbol of the betrayal of India's fight for freedom and of the erratic injustices of Indira Gandhi's regime. Rather than have his death on its hands, the government released him on November 12.

Now 76 and ailing, Narayan remains outside the turmoil of Indian politics. But while he lives, Indians expect he will raise his voice when it is needed.

government—like the Congress an amalgam of many points of view—took office under Morarji Desai on March 22, 1977.

In October 1977 the government arrested the former Prime Minister on corruption charges that were still under investigation. Emboldened by the wave of sympathy generated by this high-handed action, Mrs. Gandhi sought to stage a comeback following her release. She once again split the party, as she had in 1969, getting factional delegates to elect her as party chief. She was promptly expelled by the Congress. In her turn, she "expelled" the legitimate Congress president. Each faction claimed control over the party, its funds, and the election sym-

bol of "yoked oxen," which, along with the party name, still stirs a large measure of popular good will. In January 1978 Mrs. Gandhi held an enormous rally in New Delhi out of which emerged the Congress (I), which a month later made a good showing in three states, winning clear legislative control in two of them.

Whatever the future may hold for the fractured Congress, India today is going through a period of transition and political realignment that may take years to complete. Faint stirrings on the left suggest the possibility of a new constellation forming around the moderately Maoist Marxist Communist Party (CPI-M), which controls West Bengal and the small eastern state of Tripura. The ruling Janata Party has yet to establish a common identity and outlook, although India under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the epitome of Gandhi-ism, is rediscovering the Mahatma, and the Janata Party is claiming his inheritance.

But the critical problems are psychological ones. Can the Desai government instill a new dynamism in India affecting everything from the process of policymaking to mass political participation? Will the government, blessed with uncommonly large reserves of food and foreign exchange, take a cautious approach to economic growth? Or will it seek to capitalize on these assets to establish a self-sustaining, satisfactory rate of growth? In my own view the latter course is the most promising. But in the India of the 1970s, it is hard enough to predict who will be in power, much less what they will do with it.

A FRONTIER ECONOMY

by Lawrence A. Veit

Ring Road traces a serpentine path around New Delhi, providing a microcosm of the diversity within the city and in India as a whole. It cuts through elegant quarters and crowded slums, through a seemingly endless variety of neighborhoods that reflect India's sundry regions, religions, castes, and classes.

The daily traffic is an extraordinary mix: government officials, diplomats, and business executives speeding through the dust in their limousines; fleets of aggressive, gaily painted trucks; a seemingly endless parade of bicyclists and pedestrians; and a slow circus procession of farmer's bullock carts, buffaloes, goats, camels, and dogs.

What is remarkable is how the traffic, moving at such different speeds, manages to share the highway so successfully. By defying narrow generalizations and conforming to a seemingly invisible set of rules, the traffic on Ring Road is symbolic of India's economy: One must accept its mysteries before it becomes understandable.

Since 1947, pronouncements on the economic situation in India have moved from hopeful to despondent and back again. At times, economists have argued that "triage"—the abandoning of development efforts in "hopeless" areas in favor of places where there is at least a chance of progress—is the only practical approach. At other times, analysts have waxed so enthusiastic about India's progress—often seeing "self-sufficiency" in food just around the corner—that India and its supporters have been lulled into a false sense of security.

The less dramatic reality, however, is India's consistent capacity to encompass the bad and the good at the same time. Thus, in 1978, India appears to be further from "serious" famine than it has been at any time in more than a decade. Industrial production is rising. And India has confounded the pessimists by reaping unexpected side benefits from the hike in world oil prices: Foreign exchange earnings sent home by Indians newly employed in the Persian Gulf oil states have soared, as have investments by oil-rich Iran to develop Indian resources.

Yet even now there are hundreds of millions of people (per-

haps as much as 43 percent of the population) who live below what India itself defines as the poverty level. Investment of all kinds is still far below what is needed to employ the burgeoning work force. And the problems inherent in planning for the growth of modern industry within the context of a traditional agrarian society threaten to undermine the well-being of both.

Indians and non-Indians alike are responsible for broadcasting partly or completely erroneous information about the subcontinent's economy. While acute poverty is obvious everywhere, the causes of that poverty remain elusive. Some observers point to India's backward farming and lack of natural resources. Others cite the low productivity of the labor force (200 million people) or the glaring disparities in income. Still others blame continued underdevelopment on a stagnant, "socialist" regime. These generalizations, however, shed little light on the larger reality. Let us examine them.

Is India short of good agricultural land and mineral resources? India is not as readily able to feed itself as are France and the United States; but it is not as badly off as many Asian, African, and Latin American countries. India is not Mali or Chad. As for population density, the people-to-arable-land ratio of 334 persons per square kilometer is unfavorable compared to the U.S. figure of 117, but it stands up well compared to Brazil's 343, West Germany's 790, and Japan's 2,084.

Most Indian agricultural output consists of basic commodities such as wheat, rice, and cotton. Since the mid-1950s, the "Green Revolution"—essentially the application of hybrid seed, fertilizer, and pesticides, and better use of existing water reserves—has dramatically boosted local crop yields. Wheat harvests have increased three-fold in the Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh; rice production has gained in the Tanjore Valley and the Andhra coast. The Green Revolution is not, of course, a panacea; it cannot yet compensate for the disasters that result when the monsoons play truant. But Indian agriculture, by any yardstick, *is* improving.

India's mineral wealth is also underrated. The most striking fact about its natural resources is the extent to which they are

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INDIA'S INDUSTRIAL BASE



Despite its image as an economic "loser," India is rich in natural resources, and by the early 1980s may be self-sufficient in oil.

underutilized. Coal is abundant, and India accounts for about 10 percent of the world's known reserves of high-grade iron ore. For many years the country has met 35–40 percent of its oil needs from wells in Assam and Gujarat, and new offshore wells near Bombay have recently come into production. Seismographic surveys suggest that future offshore finds in the Bay of Cambay and elsewhere may be large enough to make the country self-sufficient in petroleum by the mid-1980s.

India also boasts adequate supplies of thorium, uranium, and other materials used to fuel nuclear power plants. One generating station, the Tarapur nuclear power plant outside

Bombay, has been in operation since 1969 (it uses enriched uranium from the United States, however); three others are under construction and many more are being planned.

Is the quality of Indian labor poor? India manufactures machinery and hand tools for export to Western countries, produces trucks that are used extensively in Asia and elsewhere, and fabricates aircraft and other sophisticated military equipment. These achievements, one could argue, are the work of an elite; the vast majority of Indians, tied to the rural economy,* are either unwilling or unable to produce. But how, then, does one explain the success in rural Punjab where the Green Revolution has transformed not just agriculture but small industry and commerce in general?

Socialism, of a Sort

The answer involves not only imported agricultural technology but also the capabilities of the Punjab's farmers and merchants. Not all rural areas in India are ready for such fast-paced change. But what has happened in the Punjab has occurred elsewhere in the country often enough to indicate that the vast rural labor force should be seen as an underused resource, not as a perpetual burden.

Has the Indian economy improved or grown since Independence in 1947? India today is among the world's 10 largest industrial nations, just as it was in 1947. At that time, however, Indian industry was heavily concentrated in "infrastructure" such as railroads and power plants, or in light manufacturing such as textiles (which accounted for 50 percent of all manufacturing in 1947). India has since expanded or introduced the production of steel, chemicals, a wide range of consumer and industrial products, and advanced electronic and engineering equipment.

One problem is diversity. For example, the country has a hodgepodge of factories encompassing the different, often incompatible technologies of India's many aid donors. Yet while the Indian economy has not grown fast enough to satisfy many of the people's basic needs, it has expanded much faster since Independence than it did in earlier years. Over the last three decades, real per-capita income has risen by one-third despite a near-doubling of population—an impressive performance com-

*Estimates for 1976 showed that more than 70 percent of the work force was employed in agriculture, 12 percent in industry, 6 percent in commerce, and more than 11 percent in government and services. Oddly, despite the government's efforts to promote industry, since 1947 the *proportion* of Indians working in each sector of the economy has remained virtually unchanged.

A CRUSHING TIDE

"I left India depressed," Otis L. Graham, Jr. noted upon his return from the subcontinent earlier this year. A University of California historian and a former member of the Wilson Center's academic advisory panel, he recorded his impressions in World Issues. *Some excerpts:*

The population problem seems hopeless. Even Indians now acknowledge it. Over the years, as China pulled her birthrate from the mid-30s down to 25 per thousand per year, as Taiwan went to 23 per thousand, as Japan attained a striking 17 per thousand (all three nations now have population growth rates under 2 percent), India has been able to lower her birthrate to only 36 per thousand.

India's cities stagger under a crushing tide of people, and rural migrants continue to pour in. Old Delhi is a cacaphonous hive of destitute humanity, peddling, washing, praying, eating, urinating. The broad sidewalks of the new city are awash with families who have settled in under hospitable trees, in tent camps, near taxi stations. Property owners with yards find their hedges used by families; guards are employed to keep the patient, pressing throngs from staking out squatting privileges on the lawns and in outbuildings.

This urban pack of humanity does not mean the countryside is depopulated. Rural India is jammed, but agriculture, which absorbs 70 percent of the working population, cannot offer employment to the 5 to 10 million who wish to enter the work force every year. Many of these people, most of them young, make their way to the cities.

In the short run, the economic picture is not without encouragement. There are substantial resources in India—coal reserves in the north, a wide range of agricultural products and capacities, rich coastal fisheries, some offshore oil, impressive mineral deposits. Two good recent crop years have ended the importation of food grains. The balance of payments in India is entirely favorable.

Yet the current picture is grim in other ways, and the long-range prospects are even worse. Economic growth in 1976 was only about 2 percent—but so was population growth, so that the Indian economy was virtually stagnant. The agricultural economy is terribly vulnerable to the monsoons. In a country whose annual grain crop is 120 million tons, grain reserves of 20 million tons are a razor-thin edge against starvation. The *Economic Times* acknowledged in January that 43 percent of the population is living below subsistence level, and that 25 percent of the work force is unemployed.

These figures sketch the outlines of a human tragedy and a politically and socially explosive condition. Or so it would seem to the outsider. The newspapers are never free of reports of labor unrest, especially in Bombay and in one or two eastern states. But the general feeling seems to be one of waiting with a certain resigned curiosity to see if the new Janata government can engineer a fresh spurt toward progress. That appears increasingly unlikely.

pared with the preceding half-century, when per-capita income remained virtually stagnant.

Recurring food crises are India's most publicized economic failure. But periodic shortages (in Bihar in the mid-1960s, for example, and in Maharashtra in the early 1970s) are less a reflection of India's inability to grow enough to eat (this is rarely the case) than of chronic difficulties in distribution—of moving grain across a big country from areas of surplus to areas with deficits.

Are income inequalities extreme? There is no denying the sharp disparities between rich and poor in India, as elsewhere in the Third World. The richest tenth of the population receives about one-third of all disposable income, the poorest tenth only 3 percent. In rural areas, 0.6 percent of the families own 11.1 percent of the land; 10 percent own no land at all.

Because income differences in India reflect old class, caste, and regional distinctions, they have often proved intractable. Recent studies have shown that, while average income has risen, the distribution of income—the percentage shares held by various income groups—has not changed. However, since average per-capita income is less than $150 per year, any variation is magnified. The difference between subsistence and something more can look enormous, and indeed, can sometimes be critical. But while disparities in wealth and income are great, the disparities in consumption of such items as food grain are not nearly as large.

Is the Indian economy socialist and rigidly planned? With India's academic and political thinking steeped in the Fabian doctrine long associated with the London School of Economics, and with Hinduism's emphasis on social order and hierarchy, it would have been surprising if Jawaharlal Nehru had *not* emphasized economic planning and socialism. The priorities and macroeconomic models established by the national Planning Commission (established with great fanfare in 1950) have had more than a symbolic hand in setting a pattern for India's economic development. In practice, however, despite its theoretical dependence on centralized decision-making and highly detailed five-year plans, the Indian system has rendered much of the Planning Commission's work irrelevant.

Indeed, since Nehru's death in 1964, the Planning Commission has been weakened by Prime Ministers who gave greater policymaking powers to other agencies, such as the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture. State and local governments also play a key role; in fact, by well-established custom, local governments ignore Delhi's policies when they conflict with their own.

POPULATION GROWTH RATES, 1951–1976
(Percentage change)



*The abrupt decline in Pakistan's population is due to the 1971 secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan).
Source: *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund, May 1978.

With birth control offset by lengthening average lifespan, India's 2.1-percent annual rate of population growth remains uncomfortably high.

If by the word "socialism" one means public ownership of the means of production or comprehensive, cradle-to-grave welfare support, India's regime does not qualify. In fact, the bulk of economic transactions in India are private—with half the GNP produced in rural areas and no nationalization of agriculture.

The concept of public responsibility for welfare remains, however, even if existing social programs are gravely underfunded. And, as elsewhere in the Third World, the government *does* seek to control the "commanding heights" of the economy, either by regulating private business or through direct ownership of "core" sectors of the economy: oil, steel, banking, and other key enterprises. Even here, however, a small but significant proportion of modern industry remains in private hands.

The big underlying problem is population growth. "Re-

moval of poverty and attainment of economic self-reliance" may have been the opening words in the 1972 draft of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, but paragraphs 2 through 10 deal with population control. Indeed, here "timeless" India may be running out of time. The Indian population of 635 million is currently growing at a rate of about 1 million per month—an annual increase greater than the total population of Venezuela.* Indian policymakers, confident that full employment and economic growth could more readily be achieved with a lower population growth rate, have had little chance to test their thesis.

The reason is simple: The effects of education, rising wealth, and family planning have been more than offset by the impact of penicillin and public health services. (Life expectancy, which was 32 years in the 1950s, jumped to 46 in the 1960s.) Thus, the current rate of total population growth—2.1 percent annually—may be less than that in many other Third World countries, but it is still uncomfortably high. And so the vicious circle continues: Broader educational opportunities and enhanced status for women (both of which could lead to a lower birthrate) are shaped in part by the pace of economic development—itself in part determined by the birthrate. The prospects? Uncertain.

An Odd Pattern

In some ways, India and the United States are similar. Both are large continental land masses with diverse agricultural and industrial resources. Both are relatively self-sufficient. But India has traditionally been a net importer of food and raw materials—not to mention investment capital. The United States has exported both. India began its postcolonial period with ample foreign exchange reserves, mostly sterling, the result of booming wartime trade. But by the mid-1950s, the decline in world prices and in the demand for jute, tea, and other traditional exports, combined with increasing Indian demand for imported industrial and consumer goods, led to a foreign exchange shortage that later became chronic.

As a result, India has had to rely on vast amounts of foreign aid ($30 billion since Independence). The major donors have been the United States and the Soviet Union, along with international agencies such as the World Bank. India has received 15 percent of all U.S. postwar foreign economic aid, representing one-third of India's total intake; the total is considerably higher

*The populations of Bombay (about 6 million) and Calcutta (7 million) have quadrupled since 1940.

if one adds in U.S. contributions to the World Bank and International Development Agency. But India has never received as much help as it could use effectively.*

In aspiring to be modern, socialist, independent, and democratic, India early adopted a strategy that has clearly affected the pattern and pace of development. In essence, that strategy called for (*a*) equal emphasis on economic growth, egalitarian income distribution, and a type of self-reliance falling midway between "autarky" and total dependence on foreign aid and investment; (*b*) government control of the critical sectors of the economy; (*c*) modernization and industrialization; (*d*) conservative fiscal and anti-inflationary monetary policies; and (*e*) an emphasis on import substitution over export promotion—that is, on consuming domestic goods rather than buying imported goods with export revenue.† Procedurally, this strategy required a high government profile and continual bureaucratic intervention in the economy.

In practice, an odd cyclical pattern has marked India's economic policy. When the Indian economy performs poorly, economic policymaking in New Delhi becomes more pragmatic and implementation more effective. When the economy is performing well, policy tends to be more ideological, more generally "socialist."

Thus, in the wake of a successful first five-year plan, the government in 1955 pledged itself to a comprehensive "socialist" pattern of society. But in 1966, amid drought, an acute foreign exchange crisis, and industrial bottlenecks, government policy shifted to favor incentives to productivity, import liberalization, and a freer rein for the forces of supply and demand.

Similarly, in response to the nation's comfortable food position in 1969, Indira Gandhi moved leftwards, split the Congress Party, and nationalized India's 14 largest banks. Then, following the agricultural and industrial reverses of 1973, the wholesale wheat trade was de-nationalized and costly social programs were cut back.

The extremely high cost of famine relief and of recurrent economic crises demands an improvement in the quality—and consistency—of government policy. Some analysts believe that

*Between 1969 and 1974 India received $5.3 billion in foreign aid. Of this amount the United States contributed $1.5 billion; the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe $250 million; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development $219 million; and the International Development Association $780 million.

†This emphasis on self-reliance, often counterproductive, can be traced back to the *Swadeshi* (or "buy Indian") movement that began early in the century.

CHANGES IN PER-CAPITA GNP: INDIA AND OTHERS*



*In current U.S. dollars.

Source: *International Financial Statistics*, International Monetary Fund, May 1978.

India's per-capita GNP, up 30 percent since Independence, lags behind those of Brazil, Korea, Pakistan. The U.S. figure: $7,060 in 1975.

India may now be heading toward a different economic pattern. During the last months of her 11-year tenure as Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi moved away from doctrinaire socialism, gave more freedom to the private business sector (including multinational companies),* and enforced unusually strong sanctions against organized labor. She pressed the lackluster bureaucracy to be more responsive to public needs by working harder, making decisions faster, and functioning more imaginatively. To some degree, market forces were again allowed to take precedence over direct government involvement in economic affairs.

These shifts, introduced just as India was recovering from a spate of bad harvests, helped the economy to recover. But despite improved food production, a reduced rate of inflation, and a rapid rise in foreign exchange reserves to $5 billion (due partly to remittances from those Indians working in the Persian Gulf, and partly to a crackdown on illicit foreign exchange transactions), the gains for the overall economy were modest. Employment barely expanded in 1975–77, investment stayed in the doldrums, and the population, of course, kept growing.

In March 1977, when Morarji Desai's Janata Party over-

*India officially welcomes foreign investments; in fact, however, the environment for foreign operations has not been the best. Foreign equity holdings in India are limited to 40 percent—with very few exceptions. IBM and Coca Cola have recently shut down their Indian operations.

whelmed Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party, economic policy promptly became the subject of a great national debate. Although the conflicting views of the ruling coalition's leaders virtually ensure that the debate will continue to be lively, the tentative outline of a new policy is evident: There is a greater commitment to rural development, including small-scale cottage industries, instead of large, capital-intensive manufacturing. The shift would have pleased Mahatma Gandhi.

What has always been most difficult to explain about the Indian economy is the significance of noneconomic factors. Gunnar Myrdal in *Asian Drama* underscored the negative impact on India's development of caste, regionalism, and tradition. And indeed, these cultural factors, along with competing ideologies, have made compromise, not consistency, the necessary ingredient in economic policy. Yet all this has allowed India to modernize while remaining a single nation, and the economic costs are outweighed, in my view, by the benefits in terms of national cohesion and a democratic way of life.

Poverty is so acute that outsiders cannot understand how the political task of "nation-building" could be more important than economic progress. Yet India's leaders, from Nehru to Mrs. Gandhi, have given precedence to noneconomic matters. As they saw it, India experienced internal and external challenges in the past quarter-century that could be ignored only at the cost of its new status as a sovereign nation: mass migrations, three outbreaks of war with Pakistan, border differences with China that led to war in 1962, and periodic domestic clashes over language and religion. All of this has sapped India's economic development effort.

The post-Independence Indian experience in politics and economics has sometimes been described as an experiment. This characterization is inaccurate and belittling; the Indian environment is not a carefully controlled laboratory. Rather, it is a frontier environment—rough and, despite some familiar elements, full of surprises. Indira Gandhi's Emergency was a surprise; so was her electoral defeat at the hands of Morarji Desai. The biggest surprise of all will come if Prime Minister Desai's shaky coalition can actually accelerate the pace of economic development—something Desai's predecessors repeatedly failed to do. Yet to fail now would be as great a danger to India's democracy as the Emergency ever was.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

INDIA

Until the late 18th century, few attempts were made to study India's ancient past. And not until the 1920s were large-scale excavations undertaken by the Archaeological Survey, which the British Viceroy, Lord Curzon, had reformed and enlarged in 1901.

Profiting from the digs at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, A. L. Basham's **The Wonder That Was India: A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-continent Before the Coming of the Muslims** (Grove, paper, 1954; Taplinger, cloth, 1968) begins the story 2,500 years before Christ. At that time the once-fertile Indus Valley in the northwest (today a part of Pakistan) already supported an advanced pre-Aryan civilization.

Basham provides absorbing detail on this rich agricultural society. Its great cities boasted brick houses and sewers at a time when neither amenity was known to the distant forebears of the British archaeologists who dug up these artifacts. The succeeding Vedic (Hindu) and Buddhist eras (c. 1500–500 B.C.) were followed by Alexander of Macedon's invasion in 327–325 B.C. and the temporary establishment, soon aborted, of small Greek kingdoms in the northwest. The Greeks were the only foreign intruders until Muslim invaders came not just to raid but to rule in late medieval times. Thus, India's ancient civilization differs from those of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece in that its earliest traditions have been preserved to the present day. "The humblest Indian," Basham writes, knows the names of "shadowy chieftains who lived nearly a thousand years before Christ, and the orthodox Brahmin in his daily worship repeats hymns composed even earlier."

Those chieftains, and warring gods and demons, figure in South Indian novelist R. K. Narayan's retelling of **The Mahabarata** (Viking, 1978) and **The Ramayana** (Viking, 1972, cloth; Penguin, 1977, paper). Both are modern renditions of 2,000-year-old epics still regularly re-enacted in village pageants or in more sophisticated urban theaters on Hindu holidays. Also a good read is Anglo-Indian writer Aubrey Menen's mock-heroic version of **The Ramayana** (Scribner's, 1954; Greenwood reprint, 1972). Iconoclastic and anti-Brahmin, it was banned in the Republic.

Many translations exist of the even earlier *Rigveda* (c. 1500 B.C.), and of the *Bhagavad-Gita* hymns (curiously embedded within the war story of *The Mahabarata*). Also available are *The Upanishads,* philosophical treatises developed over several centuries, and *The Arthasatra* (c. 300–450 A.D.), a sort of Hindu version of Machiavelli's *The Prince.*

All are best approached with a good guide, such as Heinrich Zimmer, the famous German scholar, whose **Philosophies of India** (Pantheon, 1951; Princeton, 1969, cloth & paper) has been superbly edited by American mythologist Joseph Campbell.

Several excellent historical surveys cover the whole 4,000 years from Vedic to modern times. The most complete and dependable, albeit strongly British in its emphasis,

is **The Oxford History of India** by Vincent A. Smith (Oxford, 1919, 1968), edited in its later editions by Percival Spear. The reader may want an Indian antidote—perhaps in diplomat K. M. Pannikar's **A Survey of Indian History** (Bombay and New York: Asia Publishing House, 1954, cloth; 1972, paper). Another is Jawaharlal Nehru's **Discovery of India**, a less chauvinistic chronicle than Pannikar's even though the future first Prime Minister wrote it in a British prison (John Day, cloth, 1946; Doubleday-Anchor, 1960, paper).

Most American readers will probably find Percival Spear's **India: A Modern History** (Univ. of Mich., 1961; rev. ed., 1972) the most useful of all one-volume surveys. Spear focuses on "the new India" that was born in the Mutiny of 1857, but he does not skimp on the ancient and medieval periods nor the heyday of Muslim influence in India under the Mogul emperors.

The effects, early and late, of a millennium of Muslim influence are well chronicled and analyzed in H. G. Rawlinson's **India: A Short Cultural History** (Praeger, 1952).

Piratical Arabs invaded the coastal area of Sind in the 8th century A.D. Then in 1001 Mahmud of Ghazni swept into Peshawar, killing and looting. Wave after wave of Muslim invaders from central Asia—Turks, Afghans, Moguls—followed. The Mogul dynasty, which began with Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, extended its sway over most of the country, ruling supreme from Agra and Delhi until their empire began to unravel after the death of the great Aurangzeb in 1707.

Westerners who visit India today can see much of its early history in the Muslim architectural monuments and the surviving Hindu and Buddhist antiquities. These are illustrated and explained, along with sculptures and paintings, in **The Art of Indian Asia: Its Mythology and Transformations** (Pantheon, 1955; Princeton, 1960). Vol. I consists of a text by Heinrich Zimmer, edited by Joseph Campbell. Vol. II is a cornucopia of black-and-white photographs by Eliot Elisofon and others of sculpture, drawings, paintings, mosques, temples, tombs, stupas, and commemorative pillars.

Also recommended are Ananda K. Coomaraswamy's pioneering **History of Indian and Indonesian Art** (Dover, 1965, paper), first published in 1927, and **The Art of India** (Abrams, 1977), a new one-volume compendium (1,175 illustrations) by Calambur Sivaramamurti, director of New Delhi's National Museum. Americans may prefer the dry prose of Zimmer/Campbell's classic study, but Sivaramamurti's book has the advantage of showing 180 wall paintings, Rajput miniatures, sculptures, and buildings in color.

The British were responsible for the preservation of Mogul emperor Shah Jehan's memorial to his beloved Mumtaz Mahal (the Taj Mahal) at Agra and many other architectural treasures throughout India. They also left their own architectural mark on the Indian landscape—in the airy, high-ceilinged colonial houses and the monumental red sandstone government buildings of New Delhi. The new capital city, designed by Sir Edward Luytens, was built late (1912–31) in the British period that began with the East India Company's first establishment of a port warehouse at Surat in 1612.

Most readers know something of the British in India—if only through Kipling's classic *Kim* (1901), E. M.

Forster's 1924 novel, *A Passage to India*, John Masters' popular best-sellers *(Bhowani Junction, Nightrunners of Bengal, The Deceivers)*, and the evocative Bengal- and Kashmir-based stories of the Godden sisters, Rumer and Jon. A good, little-noticed novel by Paul Scott, **Staying On** (Morrow, 1977), poignantly describes the hill-station retirement and decline of a British Army couple who at Independence in 1947 elect not to go "home" (where, essentially, they have never been).

The East India Company and the British raj occupy much space in the historical surveys mentioned above, and memoirs and critical analyses flesh out the description of events up to the transfer of power and division of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan.

One well-written account, pro-British but otherwise balanced, ranges from 1599, when London merchants petitioned Queen Elizabeth for a charter "to traffic and merchandise" in the East Indies, to the final trooping of "the King's Colours" through the Gateway of India out of Bombay in 1947. This is **The Men Who Ruled India** (St. Martin's, 1954, cloth; Schocken, 1964, paper) by Philip Woodruff, a former member of the prestigious Indian civil service.

Woodruff's labor of love, now only available in libraries, is divided into two volumes. **The Founders** brings to life the bold, greedy merchants of the East India Company, and their dealings with the Moguls, and chronicles the mid-18th-century revolution in Bengal, the 19th-century Sikh Wars, the final conquest of the Punjab, and the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. **The Guardians** describes the civil administration of a vast territory, one-third the size of the United States, by what was never more than a few hundred young English district officers. They were supported when necessary by an army that, in 1939, had only 50,000 British troops and 150,000 Indians (Sikhs, Gurkhas, other warrior castes).

Biographies and critical studies of Indian leaders—both those who led the freedom fight and those who have held power since Independence—include Louis Fischer's **The Life of Mahatma Gandhi** (Harper, 1950; Macmillan, 1962, paper) and Erik H. Erikson's **Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence** (Norton, 1969), a psychobiography by the inventor of the genre. Among the many books on Jawaharlal Nehru, one that stands up well is Michael Brecher's **Nehru: A Political Biography** (Oxford, 1959; Beacon, 1962, abr. ed., paper).

Western social scientists have created a cottage industry out of the study of rural and urban life in independent India, its output as voluminous as all the published history that has gone before. Some village studies make good reading, but much of the scholarship is turgid and narrow. Contemporary fiction gives the general reader a far better sense of the changing patterns and stresses of life in India today.

The bloody horrors of Partition have only begun to subside from North Indian minds. Khushwant Singh, journalist and scholar of Sikhism, published a novel, **Train to Pakistan** (London: Chatto & Windus, 1956; Grove, 1956, paper; Greenwood reprint, 1975, cloth), that gives a devastating portrayal of the 1948 deaths of up to 1 million people—Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs—moving from one new nation to the other.

The problems (and pleasures) of South Indian life have a different

cast. The widely-read novels of R. K. Narayan, (*Bachelor of Arts, The Guide, The Financial Expert, Mr. Sampath,* many others) are published in the United States by Viking and the Michigan State University Press. All are set in Malgudi, a mythical town in his home state of Mysore that bids fair to become a South Indian equivalent of Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha County. A lesser-known collection of Narayan's tales is **A Horse and Two Goats** (Viking, 1970).

The title story satirizes the gaps in Indo-American understanding through a brief, hilarious encounter between a U.S. aid technician, who wants to buy a clay statue of a horse he sees along the roadside, and a peasant who thinks he's selling the American his two goats.

Much read in India, as in England and the United States, are the novels of Polish-born Prawer Jhabvala *(The Householder, The Nature of Passion, To Whom She Will).* Her keenly observed tragicomedies of contemporary Indian urban life often depict nouveau-riche entrepreneurs, their gossipy wives, and yearning daughters.

If one had to choose a single literate book on the Republic of India's social and political development, foreign policy, and politics over the past 30 years, from an American viewpoint, the winner might be **The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh** (Harvard, 1953; 3rd ed., 1972, cloth & paper) by W. Norman Brown.

Brown was for many years the head of the University of Pennsylvania's South Asian studies program. His book offers a bonus: a solid bibliography directed to the interests of the general reader. We suggest it as a supplement to this essay.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Many specialists recommended background books on India, more books than we could mention here. Among our advisers were: Edward A. O'Neill, Lawrence A. Veit; Dennis H. Kux, former country director for India and Nepal, U.S. Department of State, now serving in Turkey; William J. Barnds, author of* **India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers;** *and Wilson Center Fellow Manakkal Venkataramani.*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

SAMUEL BECKETT
by Dierdre Bair
Harcourt, 1978
736 pp. $19.95
L of C 77-92527
ISBN 0-15-179256-9

Samuel Beckett is arguably the most important English writer of this century after his great friend James Joyce. He has also been the most passionately private of men. But now Beckett has broken his long silence, responding to the questions of a hitherto unknown English professor from the University of Pennsylvania. Dierdre Bair's biography is thus something of a literary event as well as a treasure-trove of information. With assiduity and patience, she has constructed from interviews and previously unavailable letters the story—or *a* story—of Beckett's life, including many new details about his only recently disclosed service with the French Resistance in World War II, for which De Gaulle awarded him the Legion of Honor. Bair portrays Beckett's struggles with self-doubt as well as his heroic dedication to writing, even to writing about the pointlessness of writing. Both as an interpreter of Beckett's work and as a prose stylist, she leaves much to be desired. Such complaints are gratuitous, however, since her book presents a wealth of new material both for students of 20th-century fiction and readers with a special interest in one of the darkest and richest authors of our age.

—Frank D. McConnell

TWO CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM
by Irving Kristol
Basic Books, 1978
288 pp. $10
L of C 77-20408
ISBN 0-465-08803-1

This powerful, provocative statement on the modern liberal state is, says Kristol, editor of *The Public Interest*, "a kind of intellectual autobiography." Written over the past seven years, it clarifies the author's political evolution from "someone who was once simply content to regard himself as a 'liberal'" to one who "has come to be a 'neo-conservative.'" Although he withholds the third cheer for capitalism, Kristol denounces all forms of socialism, communism, and fascism as either

"utopian illusions or sordid frauds." Our society continues to come under attack, he suggests, in part because of its very success and also because its ability to generate wealth has created a new class of professional academics who seek political influence while rejecting traditional bourgeois values. His lucid examination of the American corporation seems sure to raise hackles in many an executive suite: Kristol urges business leaders to blend private morality with an increased sense of public responsibility—sometimes even to the point of forgoing profits. But everyone needs to rethink current assumptions. "The idea of progress in the modern era has always signified that the quality of life would inevitably be improved by material enrichment," he writes. "To doubt this is to . . . start the long trek back to pre-modern political philosophy—Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hooker, Calvin, etc. It seems to me that this trip is quite necessary."

—Robert Hawkins ('76)

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945
by Jack Bass and Walter De Vries
Basic Books, 1976, 538 pp. $17; New American Library, 1977, 543 pp. $5.95
L of C 75-36375
ISBN 0-465-08695-0
ISBN 0-452-00470-5 pbk.

Following the violent resistance to the 1960s civil-rights movement, the South has emerged as the nation's politically most dynamic region. The old courthouse politics of the Deep South, where black-belt county voters were disfranchised, relied on white support. Malapportioned legislatures blocked potential Republican strength in the region's growing cities and suburbs—a consequence of postwar industrialization. But the Supreme Court's 1964 "one-man, one-vote" ruling, which required smaller districts based on population, drastically altered the character of Southern politics. And with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, black voter registration soared. In Mississippi, where blacks make up 37 percent of the population, the percentage of registered black voters rose from 6 percent in 1965 to 60 percent by 1969. Throughout the South, the black vote has become a significant and often decisive factor, as in the 1976 presidential election. The shifting profile of the Southern electorate—its racial composition, changing ideology, party affiliation, and increasingly urban character—has produced

new political strategies: In the past decade conservatives, moderates, liberals, and populists have all found ways to win state elections. The authors of this fine book suggest why some of these strategies have succeeded in local situations and speculate whether victories in one direction or another represent short- or long-term trends.

—James J. Lang

DIVIDED LEGACY: A History of the Schism in Medical Thought (3 vols.)
1. **The Patterns Emerge: Hippocrates to Paracelsus;**
2. **Progress and Regress: J. B. Van Helmont to Claude Bernard;**
3. **Science and Ethics in American Medicine, 1800–1914**
by Harris L. Coulter
Washington, D.C.: Wehawken Book Company
1973–77; 537, 785, and 546 pp. respectively, $17.50 per vol.
L of C 73-75718
ISBN 0-916386-00-7

Few physicians have time or the inclination to mull over such basic questions as the nature of disease or its exact relationship to a living organism. Yet in medicine much depends upon the answers to these questions. Coulter believes that medical thinkers throughout history may be divided into two great schools: the empiricists, who deny that it is possible to "know" genuinely how a substance cures and base their therapy upon observed results; and the rationalists, who "seek their criterion of reliability in some discipline external to the therapeutic process" (e.g., chemistry or physiology) and believe that a physician can "know" why a living organism reacts as it does. Delving into the little-examined foundations of medical thought from Hippocrates onward, Coulter analyzes both European medicine over the centuries and 19th-century American medicine, the latter deeply divided between allopathic (rationalist) and homeopathic (empirical) practice.

—Charles A. Moser ('77)

THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT: A Contribution to Messianic Ecclesiology
by Jürgen Moltmann
Harper, 1977, 407 pp. $15
L of C 76-62932
ISBN 0-06-065905-X

Well known for *Theology of Hope* (1965) and *The Crucified God* (1973), the German Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann in this book portrays the Church as a fellowship of freedom, the vanguard of a new humanity. In line with his vision of the Church committed to a worldwide mission of liberation, Moltmann argues for a free, congregational polity, unencumbered by hierarchical office. He sees no need for the sacraments of confirmation and ordination, which in his view are linked with the questionable practice of infant bap-

tism (instead of believers' baptism). At the Lord's Supper he recommends an open table to which even the unbaptized may be invited. Though many of his arguments are contestable, Moltmann sets them forth with impressive learning and consistency.

—Avery Dulles, S.J. ('77)

THE BORZOI ANTHOLOGY OF LATIN AMERICAN LITERATURE (2 vols.)
1. **From the Time of Columbus to the Twentieth Century;**
2. **The Twentieth Century—From Borges and Paz to Guimarães Rosa and Donoso**
edited by Emir Rodríguez Monegal
Knopf, 1977, 493 pp. and 982 pp., $7.95 each, paper only
L of C 76-19126
ISBNs 0-394-73301-0 and 0-394-73366-5

Readers who have followed the adventures of the Buendias in *One Hundred Years of Solitude* have surely guessed that Gabriel García Márquez's novel offers only a glimpse into the immense treasure chest of Latin American literature. This wide-ranging anthology samples more of the wealth now to be had in translation. Regrettably, the Mayan and Aztec texts that survived the Spanish conquest are not included. But the *Royal Commentaries* (1609–17) by Inca Garcilaso de la Vegas, the hemisphere's first revisionist historian, are here. This bastard son of a conquistador and an Indian princess wrote to rescue his kingly forebears from the slanderous pens of official historians in Madrid who rationalized the Spanish treatment of the "barbarians." Despite the presence of many lesser-known poets and novelists alongside such established current favorites as Borges and Paz, one may question certain omissions: Where is Sor Juana's "feminist" poetry? Where the many Andean fiction writers? Still, there is much to admire. A passion for naming every bit of the fauna and flora as well as the social institutions emerging in 19th-century South America rings a humorous note in Argentinian poet Estanislao del Campo's "Doctor Faust in the Pampas." His contemporary José Hernandez tells us that *"Know-it-alls are losers here/only experience counts/. . . this lock takes a different key/and the gaucho knows which it is."* And in the 1930s there is an avant-garde poetry movement with Vicente Huidobro urging Latin American writers to: *"Invent new worlds and watch your word/the adjective when it does not create, kills;/Do not sing the rose, make it bloom in the poem/the poet is a little God."*

—Sara Castro-Klarén

NEW TITLES

History

THE VIRGINIA JOURNALS OF BENJAMIN HENRY LATROBE, 1795–1798
(2 vols., 1795–1797 and 1797–1798)
by Edward C. Carter II
Yale, 1977
667 pp. $60 set
L of C 77-76301
ISBN 0-300-02198-4

When Thomas Jefferson needed professional help for his building projects, he turned to Benjamin Henry Latrobe (1764–1820), perhaps the finest architect in America before Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright. Latrobe's talents, embodied in his work on the U.S. Capitol, assured his place in history—but obscured his boundless activity in other fields. In his papers, Latrobe emerges as the antithesis of the specialized professional who is the norm today. A pioneer engineer, master draftsman, and water colorist, he was also a botanist, chemist, poet, linguist, author of Gothic tales, and a passable clarinetist and pianist. These volumes (of a projected 10) cover the first three years after his arrival from England in 1795. Latrobe roamed the young Republic, recording his impressions in paintings, drawings, and urbane, often bemused descriptions. The journals must have delighted his children, for whom they were intended. He was a good listener to whom George Washington could confide his fears for public morals if valuable minerals were to be found in Virginia. And he had a keen eye. On the banks of the York River, Latrobe sketched mason wasps, locally called "dirtdaubers," which yielded up to his pen the secrets of their "architecture."

IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period
by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
Oxford, 1978
448 pp. $15
L of C 76-51713
ISBN 0-19-502387-0 (v. 1)

U.S. Circuit Court Judge Higginbotham provides a painstaking, moving survey of slavery, the courts, and the legal codes in colonial America. (Later volumes will carry his "lineage of contemptuous law" forward through 1964.) At issue: whether the slaves were human; if so, whether they were a species apart. Most colonies said "yes" to the second question if they said "yes" to the first. But in Virginia, from the time of their arrival

in 1619, slaves were held equivalent to "horses, dogs, and real estate." Georgia, oddly enough, briefly outlawed slavery in 1730; more gradual, lasting reforms came in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. In general, however, equal justice proved elusive. Indeed, Higginbotham contends, with the famous *Sommersett* case (1772), England proved itself "more hostile to domestic slavery than the colonies." Does his legal study give too restricted a view of slavery? Perhaps. But as abolitionist William Goodell put it, "no people were ever yet found who were better than their laws."

THE TWILIGHT LORDS: An Irish Chronicle
by Richard Berleth
Knopf, 1978
316 pp. $12.95
L of C 77-15125
ISBN 0-394-49667-1

Nowhere was the dark underside of the reign of Elizabeth "Gloriana" (1558–1603) demonstrated with more ferocity than in Ireland, where for 30 years Protestant England fought a kind of Vietnam War against feudal, Gaelicized Norman Catholic lords. The long fighting resulted in the near depopulation of the country as the peasants, "mere Irish" discounted by both sides, died by sword and rope or from starvation, exposure, and disease. Destruction of forests, cattle, and cropland, as well as people, was particularly heavy during the "Desmond Wars" (1568–83) in the once rich southeast province of Munster. Here the defending twilight lords, descendants of William the Conqueror's followers, fought against the encroachment of such new English landlords as Sir Walter Raleigh and poet-courtier Edmund Spenser. Berleth displays a grasp of detail and sense of a tragic story's inexorable sweep. Admittedly, he skimps a bit on the last uprising led by Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, a true Gael who, though raised in England, in 1595 united his countrymen and went on to defeat Elizabeth's favorite, the Earl of Essex. But O'Neill's forces lost in the end, and the English established their first authentic colony with the Ulster plantation. "The face of Ireland," Berleth says, "was altered permanently," and the estrangement of the two countries hardened finally into a lasting enmity that still haunts them.

THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: The History of Manners (Vol. I)
by Norbert Elias
Urizen, 1978
328 pp. $15
L of C 78-104651
ISBN 0-916354-32-6

If a man accidentally intrudes upon a woman in the bathroom, his *polite* apology might be "Excuse me, ma'am," his *tactful* one, "Excuse me, sir." To Norbert Elias, the difference speaks volumes (a second is due in December). In this 1936 classic, newly translated from the German original, Elias traces the growth of the ideal of manners from *courtoisie* (court behavior) through *civilité* (bourgeois urbanity) to *civilization* (democratized *civilité,* ready for export), each more socially inclusive—and self-conscious—than the one before. Elias sees manners as the prism of the polity: Medieval nobles who thought it good form to eat meat with their hands from a common vessel "stood in a different relationship to one another than we do." The book is a trifle scholarly but deft and lucid as it shows changing mores. "If you cannot swallow a piece of food," counseled the Dutch humanist Erasmus in 1530, "turn round discreetly and throw it someplace."

IMPERIALISM AT BAY: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire 1941–1945
by William Roger Louis
Oxford, 1978
594 pp. $19.95
L of C 78-1068
ISBN 0-19-821125-2

How did it happen that the world gained 75 new sovereign states in 1940–70? Diplomatic historian Louis conveys the mix of imperial, strategic, and idealistic motives that guided Allied policymakers in shaping the future of extraordinarily diverse colonial societies in Africa and Asia during and immediately after World War II. The Americans were alternately liberal and annexationist. Determined to retain former Japanese islands in the South Pacific for strategic purposes, they endorsed some form of international trusteeship for everyone else's colonies, whether ex-German or British. (One key U.S. adviser called the American commitment to decolonization "like setting a bird free, but only in the garden.") Churchill, insisting that he would not "preside over the disintegration of the Empire," echoed British Tory and Labor views, while Lord Cranborne, Colonial Secretary, maintained that "our Colonies . . . at present are children and must be treated as such." The staunchest anticolonialists were the Australians and New Zealanders, especially cantankerous Australian Foreign Min-

ister H. V. Evatt. Many of his ideas were embodied in the U.N. Charter in 1945. The compromise solutions of that year carved up former Italian and Japanese colonies. But the victorious British, Louis contends, quoting elder historian A. J. P. Taylor, in the end did not relinquish their empire by accident (as has been widely written). Rather, they ceased to believe in it.

THE MILITARY IN GREEK POLITICS: The 1909 Coup d'Etat
by S. Victor Papacosma
Kent State Univ., 1978
254 pp. $12.50
L of C 77-22391
ISBN 0-87338-208-0

The "1909 Revolution" was the first major intervention by the Army in Greece's parliamentary politics. Universally praised by Greeks as the catalyst to reform, it strengthened the nation just prior to the Balkan Wars. Kent State University historian Papacosma now offers a revisionist analysis, terming the "Revolution" a coup d'état, and finding the officers' attempts at reform as conservative and ineffectual as those of the squabbling politicians the Army replaced. But the coup did launch the brilliant career of Eleftherios Venizelos, prime minister and founder of the reformist Liberal Party, and gave an ideological cast to Greece's patronage-hungry political parties, until then indistinguishable from one another.

FIGHTER: The True Story of the Battle of Britain
by Len Deighton
Knopf, 1978
285 pp. $12.50
L of C 77-20356
ISBN 0-394-42757-2

Infinitely more complicated than the legend that grew up around it was the actual struggle for control of the skies over Britain in the wartime summer of 1940. The welter of detail made so absorbing in *Bomber* (the author's earlier account of an RAF bombing raid) almost overwhelms this sequel. Drawing on official records and countless interviews with veterans from both sides of the epic "Battle of Britain," Deighton describes the flight paths of innumerable German bombing raids and the often futile British efforts to stop them. We gain a comprehensive picture of the aircraft, the tactics, the strategies, and the blunders. What comes through less clearly was what it was really like to be an ill-trained, inexperienced RAF Spitfire pilot facing the Luftwaffe for the first time high over the English Channel.

Contemporary Affairs

ETHIOPIA: Empire in Revolution
by David and Marina Ottaway
Holmes & Meier, 1978
224 pp. $20 cloth, $10 paper
L of C 77-28370
ISBN 0-8419-0362-X
ISBN 0-8419-0363-8 paper

The military overthrow of Ethiopia's 82-year-old Emperor Haile Selassie (the "Lion of Judah") in 1974 led to a "socialist" upheaval. It also brought intermittent, often mysterious, massacres and the arrival of Cubans and Russians to help the Army deal with conflicts in Ogaden and Eritrea. On hand were the Ottaways—he a *Washington Post* correspondent, she a political scientist. Theirs is the first comprehensive report on the new Ethiopia. They soberly analyze the evolution of the shadowy ruling Military Council, or *Derg*, its savage feuds with civilian radicals, its effective land reform, its arming of the peasants. By late 1977, despite all the chaos, the authors contend, Selassie's former empire still had the potential for becoming the birthplace of Africa's "first real revolution."

CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation
by Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss
Knopf, 1978
312 pp. $10
L of C 77-75000
ISBN 0-394-41275-3

The authors worked on the staff of President Ford's short-lived Clemency Board, set up in 1974 to grant conditional pardons to convicted draft resisters and discharged deserters. They use Board statistics and anecdotal material to show the inequities of the Vietnam draft, the erratic punishments meted out to GI deserters and military offenders, and Washington's recent fumbling efforts to remedy past injustices. They note that only one-third of the 27 million draft-eligible Americans ever served, and less than 10 percent ever went to Vietnam—with college graduates the most adept at avoiding military service, and low-income high school graduates most likely to be drafted and to serve in combat. Only 3,000 men went to jail for violating the draft laws, although 200,000 were officially charged. Some 250,000 servicemen received less-than-honorable discharges, although only 13 percent were court-martialed. Baskir and Strauss favor a much broader amnesty effort to bring about a "true national reconciliation."

Arts & Letters

TOLSTOY'S LETTERS:
(2 vols., 1828–1879
and 1880–1910)
edited by R. F. Christian
Scribner's, 1978
737 pp. $35 set
L of C 77-90494
ISBN 0-684-15596-6 set;
0-684-15670-9 v. 1;
0-684-15671-7 v. 2

The passion for letter writing gripped Europe and America for a century before the rise of the telephone. Few succumbed to it more completely than Leo Tolstoy. Besides his dozens of novels and tales, Russia's greatest novelist penned countless letters, of which some 8,500 have survived. Until now not many had been translated; English readers have had no way of knowing that literally thousands are still as interesting as they were when they were written. This selection is therefore a landmark. Never mind that the translator chose to censor out "vulgar or obscene words." Tolstoy was scarcely addicted to them. These volumes show the bewildering range of his intellectual-literary-philosophical-political-theological world at the same time that they reveal a man engaged in a myriad of daily concerns, family cares, petty feuds, and intense friendships. If Tolstoy's "graphomania" was not unusual for his time, his letters are unique in suggesting how important each part of his life was for the others. All flowed into his epic novels.

CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN ARAB SOCIETY TODAY
by Jacques Berque
Univ. of Texas, 1978
370 pp. $19.95
L of C 77-16099
ISBN 0-292-70330-9

A French scholar, whose knowledge of Arab society from Morocco to Iraq is unsurpassed, surveys contemporary Arabic literature, music, poetry, painting, theater, and philosophy. He finds that the search for "the ideal of modernity" without losing cultural authenticity that marks contemporary Arab poetry characterizes all modern Islamic scholarship and theology, as well as the popular novel and Arab music (classical, popular, and Westernized). Berque discusses Mideast poets who strive to reconcile foreign borrowings with rigid Islamic verse forms ("intensification of metaphor in today's Arab poetry balances the loss of rhyme and meter"). Although "altercation and affinity with the West have always characterized the Arabs," decolonization is stripping away foreign layers from language and thought. No acceptable synthesis has so far emerged.

FIELDS OF FIRE
by James Webb
Prentice-Hall, 1978
344 pp. $9.95
L of C 78-4046
ISBN 0-13-314286-8

For the unsung American rifleman, or "grunt," the Vietnam experience varied greatly from place to place, from year to year. Novelist Webb, a former Marine officer and Navy Cross winner, depicts one of the worst places in 1968–69—the guerrilla country around Anhoa, southwest of Danang. *Fields of Fire* is no egocentric memoir-in-disguise. Webb develops a half-dozen complex characters and their changing reactions to the endless, murderous round of combat in the "bush." Even an awkward romance-on-Okinawa episode fails to derail his powerful story, which ends with a surprise confrontation between a war-crippled Harvard ex-Marine and peace demonstrators in Boston. This first novel's unspoken message is clear: Those who served in that lost war deserve better from the country that sent them to fight it.

THE EXECUTION OF MAYOR YIN AND OTHER STORIES FROM THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION
by Chen Jo-hsi
Indiana Univ., 1978
248 pp. $8.95
L of C 78-1956
ISBN 0-253-12475-1

Taiwanese-born Chen Jo-hsi was a 28-year-old graduate student at Johns Hopkins when she immigrated to the People's Republic of China in 1966. Her stories were written after she was allowed to leave the P.R.C. in 1973. Though less than great literature, and somewhat narrow in scope (too often the protagonists are U.S.-educated intellectuals), they nonetheless evoke a people for whom everything has changed while much remains the same. One still can hope that neighbors and friends from one's hometown will overlook an indiscreet complaint. Ancestry still determines status ("she came from a good background—before Liberation her family had been impoverished"). But political conformity intrudes almost everywhere. When a 4-year-old, awakened for midnight interrogation, confesses to saying "Chairman Mao is a rotten egg," a young woman voices concern that the child may never escape the counter-revolutionary stigma. (Her own infant's first words were "Mao Mao," not "Ma Ma.") *The Execution* not unexpectedly was banned on the mainland. Perhaps because it tempers disillusionment with compassion, this "dissent literature" was also censured in Taiwan.

Science & Technology

THE ORIGINS OF KNOWLEDGE AND IMAGINATION
by Jacob Bronowski
Yale, 1978, 146 pp. $7.95
L of C 77-13209
ISBN 0-300-02192-5

Uncertainty pervades all the efforts of men to know the external world and themselves. Such is the basic view stated by philosopher-mathematician Bronowski (1908–74), of BBC-TV *Ascent of Man* fame, in this eloquent little book of lectures. One of the least coarse instruments with which men seek to understand immensely complex and refined data, he believed, is science, which provides a dictionary for the testing and confirmation of perceptions of the real world. But, because everything in the universe is interconnected, each scientific explanation must be partial, relative, and mistaken. To Bronowski, although the delineation of a closed world system remains forever impossible, progress in knowledge takes place through the eradication of error.

COMPUTER CAPERS: Tales of Electronic Thievery, Embezzlement, and Fraud
by Thomas Whiteside
Crowell, 1978
164 pp. $7.95
L of C 77-25184
ISBN 0-690-01743-X

We have no evidence of an electronic homicide (yet). But computer crimes perpetrated by ingenious or merely opportunistic humans range from those as serious as the 1973 Equity Funding case, which cost shareholders millions of dollars and was a swindle masterminded by company management, to the destruction of Girl Scout records by a disgruntled employee who ran a magnet over reeled tape at the Scouts' national headquarters. A high quotient of amusing anecdotes makes this collection of articles good reading. But Whiteside's serious purpose is to offer the public a view of the scope and magnitude of computer-assisted theft and fraud in a period when many important changes in computer use are taking place; his treatment of the vulnerability of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems (EFTS) is particularly timely. "Crime by computer is relatively new," he says. "But when it strikes it is not shy." Understand the electronic tools on which we depend, he cautions; don't bend, fold, spindle, or mutilate; and above all don't always believe neatly printed numbers.

PAPERBOUNDS

VIRGINIA WOOLF: The Inward Voyage. By Harvena Richter. Princeton reprint, 1978. 290 pp. $4.95

In a year that has seen an unprecedented outpouring of books about Virginia Woolf (1882–1941) and her circle, is this paperback edition of a 1970 study superfluous? No. The flourishing new Bloomsbury industry is based largely on collections of letters, diaries, and the fugitive journalism of Mrs. Woolf, her husband Leonard, and their literary group. Much of it deals in gossip. Richter, an English professor at the University of New Mexico, provides something else. Her systematic analysis of character portrayal in the Woolf novels is persuasive even when applied—no easy task—to the levels of fantasy represented by the hallucinations of Rachel ill with typhoid in *The Voyage Out* (1915) and the disturbed minds of Septimus Smith in *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) and Rhoda in *The Waves* (1931). Richter is always on the lookout for the novelist's "intensity of identification" with her characters, which she described as an irresistible urge "to lodge myself somewhere on the firm flesh, in the robust spine, wherever I can penetrate or find foothold," until, finally inside, "we reach the eyes." Mrs. Woolf's achievement was that she took the reader inside with her so often.

ISRAEL AND THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS. By Edmund Wilson. Farrar, 1978. 432 pp. $5.95

In 1947 a Bedouin boy known as Muhammed the Wolf was tending goats on the western shore of the Dead Sea. He tossed a stone into a cave, heard something break, and ran away in fright. Later he returned to find several tall clay jars containing those now-famous leather Hebrew scrolls that Edmund Wilson described for the *New Yorker* in 1955. Following a second visit to Jerusalem in 1967, Wilson updated his scholarly detective story in *The Dead Sea Scrolls, 1947–69.* This book encompasses discoveries of other scrolls, the disputes over the dating of the scrolls (100 B.C., 200 B.C., earlier?), and the continuing debate over the significance of the texts. Incontestably pre-Christian, the scrolls anticipate much of the New Testament. Now, in this paperback edition, enriched by the addition of 100 pages on Israel from *Red, Blond, Black, and Olive* (1956), we learn how Wilson, while giving a seminar in criticism at Princeton in 1952, began to study Hebrew at the university's Theological Seminary. Why? Because he had found a Hebrew Bible belonging to his grandfather, a Presbyterian minister. It piqued his pride and curiosity. A noted intellectual in his late fifties who had mastered Latin and Greek (as well as French and Russian), Wilson had never seriously read the Old Testament. Soon finding himself "heavily enmeshed in 3,000 years of Jewish literature and history," he was the right man for the *New Yorker* to send as its investigator to the shores of the Dead Sea.

GUTS & GLORY: Great American War Movies. By Lawrence H. Suid. Addison-Wesley, 1978. 379 pp. $6.95 (cloth, $12.95)

At least two authors of recent books about Vietnam—Philip Caputo in *A Rumor of War* and Ron Kovic in *Born on the Fourth of July*—have made much of growing up with Hollywood pictures of war in their heads. This book brings those pictures into focus. Don't be put off by the title. Suid has given us not another edited coffee-table picture book but a serious, important study. He examines more than 70 war films from World War I (*The Big Parade, What Price Glory?*) to Vietnam (*The Green Berets, Apocalypse Now*). In

every case his overriding interest is the military services' relations with Hollywood film factories in the making of these movies. Readers may disagree with Suid's interpretation of some films but will find much to ponder in his overall analysis of how Hollywood has reflected changes in America's image of its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

ELS QUATRE GATS: Art in Barcelona Around 1900. By Marilyn McCully. Princeton, 1978. 160 pp. $10.50 (cloth, $25)

Spain's Catalonia between 1890 and 1910 was a nursery for modern art. The name of a Barcelona tavern that became a headquarters for the best Catalan artists, Els Quatre Gats, is still attached to *modernismo.* During the six lively years the café was open it was always filled with popular ceramic art, and crowds were attracted to its puppet shows and exhibitions of paintings. Pablo Picasso had a show there in 1900. He also designed many of the tavern's flyers, posters, menu covers, and possibly its sign of four (really two, shadowed) cats. All are among this book's 76 spirited illustrations. Others are by painters Pere Romeu, Miguel Utrillo, Santiago Rusinol, and Ramon Casas, the moving spirits of the place and its real-life "four cats"—a colloquial Catalan expression for "only a few people." When they began to disperse, going to Paris and elsewhere, their meeting place closed, signaling the end of a brief moment of intense artistic activity in the history of modern Spain.

STALKING THE WILD TABOO. By Garrett Hardin. Kaufmann, 1978. 293 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $11.95)

In 1956 Garrett Hardin, professor of human ecology at the University of California, published an essay entitled "The Meaninglessness of the Word Protoplasm." It raised enough dust to set him on the track of taboos or prohibitions that, in our society as in more primitive cultures, exclude words or subjects from "*use, approach,* or *mention,* because of their sacred and inviolable nature." In this book he discusses abortion (Right-to-Lifers operate within "the mainstream of Western civilization," making a Twenty-Eighth Amendment "giving the zygote all the rights to existence enjoyed by an adult" still a possibility). He also swings into religion (the meek "*have* inherited the earth. How many heroes do you number among your neighbors?"); certain aspects of technology (the high cost of predicting earthquakes makes it more sensible not to try); certain kinds of competition (the abyss within academe that separates biologists and sociologists is hidden behind "professional courtesy"—to him "a euphemism for taboo"). No breast-beater, Hardin depends on wit and verve to hold the reader.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NIGHT AND DAY. By Bin Ramke. Yale, 1978. 74 pp. $2.95 (cloth, $7.95)

Editor Richard Hugo's fine first selection for the Yale Younger Poets series introduces a Texas writer whose subjects seem to make up an impossible conglomeration: Corpus Christi processions in Texas Baptist towns, the science and apparatus of astronomy, infidelity and lust, the voice of Baron Corvo, the death of a dog. But with these images Bin Ramke forges a poetry of great strength, even at its most personal and arcane. Isolation is a constant theme: that of "my first major sacrilege" (taking communion without having gone to confession); the loneliness of a man driving the long miles from his lover to his wife; the separateness of a man hearing the faint cries of his wife in childbirth (*"the bones of the ear are unbelievably/small and can never be mended"*). The moments of human connection are rare; only a dog *"loved me like clockwork until he died."*

Gauguin: The Artist as 'Savage'



Self-Portrait *(1814) by Paul Gauguin. National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., Chester Dale Collection.*

The great canvases of Paul Gauguin (1848–1903) hang in the world's major museums—the Louvre, the Tate, New York's Metropolitan, Washington's National Gallery. His sculptures, ceramics, watercolors, and other works are in collections in cities as diverse as Moscow and Manchester, Stockholm and Indianapolis. Last year an 1894 Gauguin woodcut, *Te Faruru—Ici On Fait L'Amour,* sold for $28,500; an early (1886) oil brought $75,000; a small fan-shaped watercolor he did in Tahiti in 1892 sold for $77,500. In 1976 a major oil on canvas, *Nature morte à l'estampe japonaise,* painted in 1889, went for $1.4 million. Gauguin's early paintings belong with those of the French impressionists, whose work he himself collected when he was an affluent Parisian stockbroker. They were shown in the last impressionist exhibition in Paris in 1886. But his growing interest in primitive sculpture and in Romanesque and Oriental (particularly Japanese) art led him to abandon impressionism for "synthetism," as he abandoned Europe and his family for the South Seas. The paintings Gauguin did after 1891 were unlike anything the West had seen; they were among the chief precursors of non-naturalistic 20th-century art. As he painted, Gauguin wrote—prodigiously. Excerpts from a revealing new collection of his letters, notes, books, and journalism—*The Writings of a Savage* (1978)—appear below, following a brief introduction.

A SUNDAY PAINTER'S STORY

The symbolist poet and art critic Charles Morice, his collaborator on *Noa Noa,* published a biography of him. Numerous studies of his early paintings and his later, more characteristic post-impressionist work, as well as monographs on his ceramics, his ideas, and his travels, are available. There have been collections of his letters to his Danish wife, Mette, and to his friend and fellow artist, Georges-Daniel de Monfried. During his lifetime and after his death, various versions of his journals and his accounts of South Sea life and mythology appeared in France. His son Pola wrote a memoir, *My Father, Paul Gauguin.* Yet the *Encyclopedia Britannica* flatly (and rightly) states: "There is no definitive biography of Paul Gauguin."

The chronology is clear enough. He was born in Paris on June 7, 1848, to a journalist from Orléans and his half-French, half Peruvian-Creole wife, and christened Eugène-Henri-

Paul Gauguin. When he was three years old, the family fled France following the coup d'état in which Louis Napoleon, who as president of the Republic could not succeed himself, was declared Emperor Napoleon III. Paul's father, a political refugee, died en route to Peru. The boy, his sister, and their mother—the mother he was to idolize all his life as a primitive Eve, "with small India-rubber fingers"—stayed with relatives in Lima for four years.

They then returned to Orléans, where Paul went to school until, at age 17, in 1865, he joined the merchant marine. In 1871 his guardian procured a position in a Paris stock brokerage firm for him. Over the next 11 years, the young Gauguin worked hard and enriched himself by way of astute speculations. Under the tutelage of his guardian, he acquired an interest in art and became a Sunday painter.

In 1873, he met and promptly married a beautiful Danish girl, Mette Sophie Gad, whom he happened to sit beside in a boarding house near the stock exchange. Soon the couple had five children, and by 1880 the successful young stockbroker also was the proud possessor of paintings by Manet, Renoir, Monet, Cézanne, Pissaro, Daumier, and other masters. He cherished them both as works of art and as investments.

Then in 1883 the Paris stock market crashed. Abruptly, Paul Gauguin decided to give up his financial career and "paint every day." Already he had advanced from being a Sunday painter to one who spent whole weekends and holidays painting with Pissaro and Cézanne. But his works did not sell. Not surprisingly, his wife, though she loved him and respected his talents, found his decision hard to take.

She persuaded him to move for a time to Copenhagen to live with her family. This move proved disastrous. Gauguin's early work, unappreciated in Paris except by a few friends and dealers like Theo van Gogh, brother of the painter Vincent, was despised in Denmark. The marriage fell apart, though for a long time neither he nor Mette seemed to realize with what finality. From then on, to the end of his life, Gauguin lived for art and in penury.

In late 1885 he was in Paris, in 1886–88 at Pont-Aven and Le Pouldu in Brittany, and in the autumn of 1888 at Arles in Provence, with Vincent van Gogh. During this period he also journeyed to Panama and to Martinique, for the first time consummating his love for the tropics, which he saw as a product of his "savage" (Peruvian) blood.

Running Away

In 1891, after three years of much contradictory romanticizing in letters to Mette and many other correspondents about whether he would settle in Martinique, on an island off Panama, in Madagascar, or in the South Seas, Gauguin again left France for Tahiti. There he lived, painting and writing furiously, until 1893, when he returned to Paris to exhibit his startling canvases.

In 1895, in his own words, he "ran away" once more to live for another six years in Tahiti. In 1901 he fled a final time from what he saw as the encroachments of civilization on his paradise in the countryside outside Papeete, the capital of Tahiti. In his last "savage Eden"—the Marquesas Islands—despite his poverty and increasing illness, he painted, wrote, and (as he had on Tahiti) stayed in almost constant trouble with the French authorities over his involve-

ment with "native" causes. He died at Atuana in the Marquesas on May 8, 1903.

In 1974 a book, *The Writings of a Savage: Paul Gauguin,* edited by a noted French critic, Daniel Guérin, appeared in France. An English translation, with an introduction by Wayne Andersen, professor of art history and architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was published in the United States earlier this year.

"Gauguin had literary pretensions, I suspect," writes Andersen. Certainly the artist made as much of an effort to "package" his more elaborate writings as he did to find galleries, sponsors, and buyers for his paintings. This tendency had unfortunate results in *Noa Noa,* his famed idyllic account of life in Tahiti, which exists in three versions, one published as recently as 1954.

Gauguin allowed Charles Morice, who helped him assemble the book, to overburden the first version with Morice's own poetry. Worse, Gauguin included in the manuscript an extract from his earlier illustrated notebook, *Ancient Maori Religions.* All would have been well if the legends thus twice told by Gauguin, and so masterfully depicted in several of his Tahitian paintings, had not been lifted word for word from *Voyages aux îles du grand océan,* published in 1837 by Jacques-Antoine Moerenhout, U.S. consul-general to Oceania.*

To read Gauguin's steady stream of letters, notes, and critical essays, as well as his more formal published works, and even his plagiarisms, is to take a new measure of this complex man. "His powerful personality," Daniel Guérin writes, "greatly exceeded the resources of his art, prodigious though his palette, pencil, knife, and chisel were. It is impossible to grasp him fully without having some acquaintance with his written work."

Greedy for experience, for sensation, for comprehension, he yet once wrote that he had to will himself "to want to want." So devoted to his friends and to his families (European and Polynesian) that he was unable to disentangle himself without remorse from their demands, yet so devoted to his inner vision that he could not let human affection cloud its tropic colors, he emerges in his own words as "too savage a man to live a civilized life, too civilized to be a happy savage."

*Oceania, a term no longer much in use, embraces Australia, New Zealand, New Guinea, and the islands of the Pacific, as far north as Hawaii.

IN HIS OWN WORDS

His burning desire to understand everything about painting led Gauguin to look at the work of other artists with an especially keen eye. Rembrandt was "an awesome lion who dared everything," but his Night Watch *was "on an inferior level," the sort "the masters 'do' as crowd pleasers." Raphael in* The School of Athens, *wrote Gauguin, committed "the most incomprehensible errors of construction" and yet "the effect is right. (You bet it is.)" Many of his comments*

were in letters to a fellow artist and former business colleague, Emile Schuffenecker, who remained a stockbroker and also a lifelong friend of Gauguin. In the first (1885) letter of several excerpted below, Gauguin, then in Copenhagen, had asked Schuffenecker to send him a photograph of Eugene Delacroix's Wreck of Don Juan, *"if it doesn't cost too much."*

Delacroix's drawing always reminds me of the strong, supple movements of a tiger. When you look at that superb animal you never know where the muscles are attached, and the contortions of a paw are an image of the impossible, yet they are real. Similarly, the way Delacroix draws arms and shoulders, they always turn around in the most extravagant way, which reasoning tells us is impossible, yet they express the reality of passion.

In his *Wreck of Don Juan* the boat is the breath of a mighty monster.... All those starving people in the middle of that sinister ocean. Everything disappears behind their hunger.... The boat is a plaything that was never built in any seaport. No sailor, Monsieur Delacroix, but at the same time what a poet.

In another age Rembrandt's genius made people believe they saw color .... Velázquez, Delacroix, Manet did beautiful color work, but the only direct feelings their masterpieces give come from the drawing. They drew with colors. Delacroix thought he was fighting in favor of color, whereas, on the contrary, he was helping drawing to dominate.

The impressionists studied color, and color alone, as a decorative effect, but they did so without freedom, remaining bound by the shackles of verisimilitude. For them there is no such thing as a landscape that has been dreamed, created from nothing. They looked, and they saw, harmoniously, but without any goal: they did not build their edifice on a sturdy foundation of reasoning as to why feelings are perceived through color.

They focused their efforts around the eye, not in the mysterious center of thought, [but] some of them, such as Claude Monet, achieved real masterpieces of harmony.

[Today everybody has] a preference for some specific color. Paul does not like blue, Henri hates green (spinach!), Eugène is afraid of red, Jacques feels sick when he sees yellow. Confronted with these four critics a painter does not know how to account for himself; timidly he tries to say a few words about observation of colors in nature. [Then] as easily as you let out a fart in order to



Study of Horses, *Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, Rotterdam.*

get rid of someone who's a pain in the neck, Cézanne says, with his accent from the Midi: "A kilo of green is greener than half a kilo." Everyone laughs: He's crazy! The craziest person is not the one you think. His words have a meaning other than their literal meaning, and why should he explain their rational meaning to people who laugh?

The photography of colors will tell us the truth. What truth? The real color of a sky, of a tree, of all of materialized nature? What then is the real color of a centaur, or a minotaur, or a chimera, of Venus or Jupiter?

One of the painters whose use of color Gauguin praised was Vincent van Gogh. It was not until 1894, six years after the tragic events of their stay together in Arles, that Gauguin set down his vivid recollection of what happened during those two hectic months that ended when van Gogh cut off his ear and gave it to a prostitute. During his second stay in Oceania, Gauguin wrote:

I went to Arles to join Vincent van Gogh after he had asked me a number of times to come. He said he wanted to found the Atelier du Midi, and I would be its leader. This poor Dutchman was all ardor and enthusiasm.

When the two of us were together in Arles, both of us insane, and constantly at war over beautiful colors, I adored red; where could I find a perfect vermilion? . . . He loved yellow, did good Vincent, the painter from Holland. Gleams of sunlight warming his soul, which detested fog. A craving for warmth. . . . Taking his yellowest brush, [he] wrote on the suddenly purple wall:

Je suis sain d'esprit
*Je suis Saint-Esprit.**

It is surely a coincidence that during my lifetime, several men who have frequently been in my company and conversed with me have gone crazy. This is true of the two van Gogh brothers, and some people have, either maliciously or naively, blamed their insanity on me. Doubtless [there are those who] can have a greater or lesser degree of influence on their friends, but that's a far cry from causing them to go mad.

We worked hard, especially Vincent. But between two human beings, he and myself, the one like a volcano and the other boiling, too, but inwardly, there was a battle in store, so to speak.

First of all, everything was in such a mess that I was shocked. The paint box was barely big enough to contain all the tubes that had been squeezed but never capped, and yet, in spite of the chaos and the mess, his canvases glowed; so did his words. Daudet, de Goncourt, the Bible were burning up this Dutchman's brain.

Despite my efforts to discern some logical reason for his critical views, I was unable to account for all the contradictions between his painting and his opinions. For instance, he profoundly hated Ingres, Degas was his despair, and Cézanne was nothing but a humbug.

How long did we stay together? I have completely forgotten. Although the catastrophe happened very quickly, and although I'd begun to work feverishly, that period seemed like a century to me.

Unbeknownst to the public, two men accomplished in that time a colossal amount of work, useful to

*"I am of sound mind, I am the Holy Ghost."



Portrait of Vincent Van Gogh Painting Sunflowers. © *S.P.A.D.E.M., 1978.*

both of them.* Perhaps to others as well? Some things bear fruit.

. . . Toward the end of my stay, Vincent became excessively abrupt and noisy, then silent. . . . I decided to do a portrait of him in the act of painting the still life he liked so much, sunflowers. When the portrait was finished, he said to me: "That is me, all right, but me gone mad."

. . . All the rest is already known, and there would be no point in discussing it but for the extreme suffering of a man in a madhouse who regained his reason every month enough to understand his condition and, in a frenzy, paint those admirable pictures of his.

The last letter I received was written from Auvers, near Pontoise. He told me he was forced to recognize that a cure was impossible. "Dear Master" (the only time he ever used

*Between late October and late December 1888, in Arles, Gauguin is known to have produced 17 paintings or drawings, as compared with approximately 40 during the preceding eight months he spent in Brittany. In addition to the portrait, *Van Gogh Painting Sunflowers*, these included such works as *Landscape with Farm Building and Cypresses*, *The Alyscamps*, *The Alyscamps (End of the Avenue)*, *Woman in the Hay with Pigs*, *Washerwoman*, *Arlésienne*, and a vanished still life described in notes by van Gogh as being of a "white linen tablecloth, with an orange pumpkin and apples set out on this cloth, and a yellow foreground and background." Van Gogh produced some 25 works, closely matching Gauguin's rate of production during the first 10 months of 1888. These included: *The Sower*, *Old Yew Tree*, *Falling Leaves in the Alyscamps Avenue* and *The Alscamps* (two versions of each), *The Red Vineyard*, *Brothel Scene*, *Arlésienne* (after Gauguin's study), and *The Chair of Gauguin*.

that word), "it is more worthy, after having known you and caused you some sorrow, to die in a sound state of mind than in a degrading state."

And he shot himself in the belly, and it was not until several hours later that, lying in his bed and smoking his pipe, he died, with his mind fully alert, with love for his art, without hatred for mankind.

During his second, final stay in Oceania, Gauguin also wrote a bitter screed against Denmark and the character of his Danish wife. It appeared in the book Avant et Après, *published after the artist's death but produced for the most part during his last months in the Marquesas.*

I hate Denmark—its climate and its inhabitants—profoundly.

Oh, there are some good things in Denmark, that is undeniable. In Denmark they do a lot for education, science, and especially medicine. The hospital in Copenhagen can be considered one of the handsomest establishments of its kind, because of its size and above all for its cleanliness, which is first-class.

Let's pay that much tribute to them, especially since aside from that I can't see any but negative things. I beg your pardon, I was about to forget one thing: The houses are admirably built and equipped either to keep out the cold or for ventilation in summer, and the city is pretty. I must also add that receptions in Denmark are generally held in the dining room, where one eats admirably, [and] the system of getting engaged is a good thing in that it doesn't commit you to anything (people change fiancés the way they change handkerchiefs). It has every appearance of love, liberty, and morality. The mantle of engagement covers everything. You can fool around with "going-almost-all-the-way-but-not-quite," which has the advantage, for both parties, of teaching them not to be careless and get into trouble. With each engagement the bird loses a lot of little feathers that grow back without anybody noticing. Very practical, the Danes. Have a taste, but don't get too enthusiastic, or you might regret it. Remember that the Danish woman is the most practical woman there is. Don't get me wrong: It's a small country, so they have to be prudent. Even the children are taught to say: "Papa, we've got to have some dough; otherwise my poor father, you're out on your ear." I've known such cases.

In those scales of theirs up north, the biggest heart in the world cannot outweigh a coin worth a hundred sous. Before you are married everything is nice and cozy, but afterward, watch out, brother; things turn to vinegar.

In Ibsen's play *An Enemy of the People,* the wife becomes (but only at the end) worthy of her husband. As commonplace and self-centered as the great majority of people, if not more so, all her life long, she has just one minute that melts all the ice of the north that she has in her.

I know another enemy of the people whose wife not only did not follow her husband but, what's more, brought up the children so well that they do not know their father; and that father, who is still in the land of wolves, has never heard a voice murmur in his ear: "Dear Father." If he leaves anything to inherit when he dies, they'll be there, all right.

After leaving his family behind in Copenhagen, however, Gauguin at first wrote often to Mette, sometimes tenderly, sometimes with heavy sarcasm. Many of the letters lamented his failure to gain recognition as an artist. In others he boasted of his triumphs. The most peculiar are those to her and to other correspondents in which he describes his constantly changing and astonishingly impractical plans for setting himself up in a tropical painter's paradise.

To Mette. My reputation as an artist grows bigger every day but meanwhile I sometimes go three days at a stretch without eating, which destroys not only my health but also my energy. The latter I want to recover and then I'm going to Panama to live like a savage. I know a little island (Tobago) in the Pacific, a league out to sea from Panama; it is almost uninhabited, free and fertile. I'll take along my colors and my brushes and find new strength far away from people.

I will still have to suffer from the absence of my family but I will no longer have to live this beggarly life which disgusts me.

—April 1887, Paris

To Émile Bernard. I have put in many applications to go to Tonkin. . . .

—November 1889, Le Pouldu

To Mette. May the day come (soon perhaps) when I'll flee to the woods on an island in Oceania, there to live on ecstasy, calm, and art, with a new family by my side, far from this European scramble for money. There, in Tahiti, in the silence of the beautiful tropical nights, I will be . . . free at last, without financial worries and able to love, sing, and die. . . .

—February 1890, Paris

To Émile Bernard. My mind is made up: I am going to Madagascar.

–April 1890, Paris

To Émile Bernard. What I want to do there is found the Studio of the Tropics. With the money I'll have I can buy a native hut, like the ones you saw at the Universal Exposition. Made of wood and clay, thatched over (near a town, yet in the country). We'll have a cow, hens, and fruit—the main items in our diet—and after a while we'll be living without any expenses at all.

Out there, having a woman is compulsory, so to speak, which will give me a model every day. And I guarantee you that a Madagascan woman has just as much heart as any Frenchwoman and is far less calculating.

—June 1890, Le Pouldu

To Odilon Redon. My mind is made up, and since I've been in Brittany I've altered my decision somewhat. Even Madagascar is too near the civilized world; I shall go to Tahiti and I hope to end my days there. I judge that my art, which you like, is only a seedling thus far, and out there I hope to cultivate it for my own pleasure in its primitive and savage state.

—September 1890, Le Pouldu

To Mette [en route to Oceania, May 1891]. Is my family thinking of me? I hope so. Will I, now and then, receive some news out there in Tahiti? Not necessarily on a letter-for-letter basis. But I hope that I will not always be a pariah. I am eager to get settled and start working.

In July 1891, Gauguin wrote to Mette from his long-sought Eden, which he believed he had found in Tahiti.

Twenty days have already gone by since I arrived, and I have already seen so many new things that my mind is in a whirl. It will be some time yet before I can do a good painting. I am going about it gradually by studying a little each day. . . . I am writing you in the evening. This silence at night in Tahiti is even stranger than the other things. Here and there, a large dry leaf falls but does not give an impression of noise. It's more like a rustling in the mind. The natives go about at night barefoot and silent. Always this silence. I understand why those individuals can remain seated for hours, days at a time, without saying a word, and look melancholically at the sky. I feel all of this is going to overwhelm me and I am now wonderfully at rest.

It seems to me that all the turmoil that is life in Europe no longer exists and that tomorrow will always be the same, and so on until the end. Don't let this make you think I am selfish and that I'm abandoning you. But let me live like this for a while. Those who heap blame on me don't know everything there is in an artist's innermost being, and why should they try to impose on us duties similar to theirs? We don't impose ours on them.



Paul Gauguin. Offerings of Gratitude (Maruru). *(c. 1891–93). Woodcut, on end-grain boxwood, printed in black, 8 1/16 x 14". Collection, The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Lillie B. Bliss Collection.*

Back in France in 1893, Gauguin wrote to Mette thanking her for her suggestion that he come to Denmark but said he would be "tied down all winter." He reported that the show of his Tahitian works in Paris "did not actually achieve the result that was expected of it" but was nonetheless "a very great success, artistically speaking"—arousing "fury and jealousy." He also said that "a book on my trip is causing me a lot of work." This was Noa Noa, *adapted and excerpted in brief below. The title, he told an interviewer for* L'Echo de Paris *in May 1895, shortly before he left again for the South Seas, "in Tahitian, means fragrant. It will embody the scent that Tahiti gives off."*

"You want a wife?"

"Yes."

"If you like I'll give you one. She is my daughter."

"Is she young?"

"Eha (Yes)."

"Is she pretty?"

"Eha."

"Is she healthy?"

"Eha."

"All right, go and fetch her."

She was gone for a quarter of an hour, and while they were bringing in the meal of *maioré,* wild bananas, and some shrimp, the old woman came back, followed by a tall girl carrying a little bundle in her hand.

. . . Her charming face seemed to me different from the faces of the other girls I had seen on the island so far, and her hair grew thick as the bush and slightly frizzy. In the sunlight an orgy of chromes. I learned that she came from the Tonga Islands.

When she had sat down near me I asked her some questions.

"You're not afraid of me?"

"Aita (No)."

"Do you want to live in my hut forever?"

"Eha."

"You've never been sick?"

"Aita."

That was all. . . . This girl, a child of about 13, charmed me and frightened me: what was going on in her soul? In mine, blushing and hesitation, for this contract had been so



Sketches from Noa-Noa. *© S.P.A.D.E.M., 1978.*

hastily concluded and signed, and I was almost an old man.

Perhaps the mother had ordered her to come, had discussed the deal at home. And yet this tall child displayed the proud independence of the whole race, the serenity of a praise-worthy thing.

I took my horse and mounted. The girl followed behind; the mother, a man, and two young women, her aunts, she said, also followed. We came back to Taravao, nine kilometers from Faaone.

A kilometer farther I was told: "*Parahi teie* (Live here)."

I dismounted and entered a large, very cleanly kept house. . . . A rather young couple, graceful as could be, lived there, and the girl sat down next to [the woman] whom she introduced to me [as her mother]. Silence. We took turns drinking cool water as if it was an offering, then the young mother, moved, with tears in her eyes, asked me: "Are you good?"

Having examined my conscience, I answered, somewhat disturbed: "Yes."

"You will make my daughter happy?"

"Yes."

"In one week she must come back. If she is not happy she will leave you."

This matter of the two mothers worried me. I asked the old woman who had offered me her daughter: "Why did you lie to me?"

"The other woman is also her mother, her foster mother."

In what seemed a day, an hour, the week was up. Tehamana asked if she could go to see her mother in Faaone. I had promised.

She left and very sadly I installed her in the public vehicle with a few piasters in her handkerchief to pay for the ride and give her father some rum.



Tahitian Angel. © *S.P.A.D.E.M., 1978.*

Several days later she came back. I set to work again and bliss followed upon bliss.

Each day, at dawn, the light in my home was radiant. The gold of Tehamana's face bathed everything around it. . . .

Conversations about how things are done in Europe, about God, about the gods. I teach her, she teaches me.

For about two weeks the flies, scarce until then, had been appearing in great numbers and become unbearable. And all the Maoris rejoiced. The bonito and the tuna were going to come in from the open sea. And the people began to check their lines and hooks.

The day came when they launched two large dugout canoes attached to each other; in the front there was a very long pole that could be raised up quickly, with two ropes reaching to the back. By this means, once the



Noa-Noa *(Title of the manuscript).* © *S.P.A.D.E.M., 1978.*

fish has bitten, it is immediately lifted out of the water and brought into the boat.

When I asked why they didn't let a long line down into the tunafish hole, they answered that it was a sacred place. The god of the sea resides there.

The captain of the boat chose a man to throw the hook out of the canoe. For some time not one tuna was willing to bite. Another man was called. This time a superb fish bit, making the pole bend.

My turn came; I was chosen. In a few minutes we caught a large tuna: a few blows with a stick on its head and the animal, shuddering in its death agony, shook the countless fiery spangles of its mirror-like body.

A second time fortune was with us: The Frenchman certainly brought good luck! They all shouted that I was a good man and I conceitedly did not contradict them. We continued fishing until evening.

When the supply of small fish used for bait was exhausted, the horizon was ablaze with the reddening sun. We made ready to return. Ten magnificent tuna overloaded the canoe.

While all was being put in order, I asked one young boy why there had been all that laughter and those whispers when my two tuna were being brought into the canoe. He refused to explain it to me but I insisted. So he told me that when the fish is caught by the hook in the lower jaw, this means that your *vahine* has been unfaithful while you have been away fishing. I smiled, incredulous. And we came back.

A thousand questions. Things that had occurred during the fishing. Came time to go to bed. One question was eating me up. What was the use? What good would it do?

At last I asked it: "Have you been a good girl?"

"*E(ha).*"

"And was your lover today a good one?"

"*Aita.* I didn't have a lover."

"You lie. The fish spoke."

Over Tehamana's face came a look I had never seen before. Softly she closed the door and prayed out loud. "Keep me from coming under the spell of bad behavior."

When she had finished she came up to me with resignation and said, tears in her eyes: "You must beat me, strike me many times."

Beautiful golden flower, fragrant with Tahitian *noa noa*, whom I adored both as an artist and as a man.

"Strike me, I tell you, otherwise you will be angry for a long time and you'll get sick."

I kissed her. . . . It was a night of tropical sweetness. And morning came, radiant.

My mother-in-law brought us some fresh coconuts.

She looked questioningly at Tehamana. She knew.

How much of the personal romance described in Noa Noa *was real? How much a product of the painter-writer's powerful imagination? Whatever the truth, the Paradise Regained on Gauguin's second trip to Oceania, though he continued to idealize and celebrate it in words, watercolors, and oils, soon turned to Paradise Lost. Sick, miserable, out of funds, in constant hot water with the gendarmerie for his scandalous behavior and with the priests for his attacks on the Catholic religion, Gauguin toward the end wrote despairingly to Georges-Daniel de Monfried, perhaps the most faithful of all his old friends:*

Without a dealer, without anyone to find me a year's supply of grub, what's to become of me? I don't see any way out except Death, which solves all problems. My trip to Tahiti was a mad adventure, but sad and miserable it has turned out to be.

Since my paintings are unsalable, let them go on being unsalable. A time will come when people will think I am a myth, or rather something the newspapers have made up. And they will say, "Where are those paintings?" The fact is that there are not even 50 of them in collections in France.

If I have done beautiful things, nothing will tarnish them; if what I've done is s---, then why go and gild it, why lie to people about the quality of the goods? In any case, society will not be able to reproach me for having taken a lot of money out of its pocket through lies.

In Defense Of Chester Arthur

One hundred years ago last summer, Chester Alan Arthur was suspended from his position as collector of the New York custom-house. Accused of corruption and abuse of office, Arthur deftly parlayed the charges into a vice-presidential nomination in 1880 that led ultimately to the Presidency. Here we present some brief second thoughts on our 21st President's life and times, mindful that some who remember history would just as soon forget it.

by Sybil Schwartz

The difference between a moral man and a man of honor is that the latter regrets a discreditable act even when it has worked and he has not been caught.

—H. L. Mencken

Seldom has a towering historical personage been more successfully veiled from posterity than Chester A. Arthur. "Chet" to his friends, the best-dressed man in Washington during the Gilded Age, our 21st President enjoys no place in the national pantheon. In an age of presidential memorials, his consists of a weathering statue in New York's Madison Square that must stare across the park for eternity at a monument to his political crony-turned-nemesis, New York Senator Roscoe Conkling. Arthur's meager papers in the National Archives and the Library of Congress go unread, though they include a prolonged correspondence with Julia Sand, his 32-year-old confidante from Brooklyn. He himself burnt the rest of his memorabilia—reason enough, one would think, for the serious scholar to try to lift the veil.

Until Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft came along, Arthur was the weightiest figure to occupy the White House, his corpulence nourished by state dinners that called for as many as 378 wineglasses for 54 guests. A presidential employee later recalled that "he wanted the best of everything, and wanted it served in the best manner." This

meant 14 courses when General Ulysses S. Grant was in town. It also meant hiring Louis C. Tiffany to redecorate 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Tiffany began by hauling away 24 wagonloads of furniture dating to the John Adams era.

It is difficult to say what, beyond blind fate, put Arthur in the White House. A preacher's son, Arthur was born in 1830 in Fairfield, Vermont. He attended Union College and during the Civil War served, comfortably, as quartermaster-general of New York State. He then moved through Republican politics to become collector of customs of the Port of New York, and ultimately gained the Vice Presidency. But history's great summons did not come until July 2, 1881, when President James A. Garfield was gravely wounded by an assassin's bullet at the Washington, D.C., railroad depot.* Arthur assumed the Presidency upon Garfield's death two months later.

"Arthur is President now!" This startling assertion by Garfield's assassin, Charles Guiteau, had raised the smell of scandal at the very outset of Arthur's three-year term. A disgruntled office seeker, Guiteau had had designs on the U.S. Ministry in Vienna and had written letters hinting at his availability. When apprehended, he calmly gave the police his recommendations for the new President's Cabinet and told one of his captors, "Arthur and all those men are my friends, and I'll have you made chief of police."

Though correctly interpreted by the jury as the outbursts of a mad-

*President Garfield had been on his way to speak at the commencement of his alma mater, Williams College.

man, Guiteau's words were not forgotten by those who knew Arthur to have surpassed all previous Vice Presidents but Aaron Burr in the extent of his disloyalty to the chief executive. In 1880, along with Roscoe Conkling, chief of the "Stalwart" faction of the G.O.P., Arthur had worked against Garfield on behalf of General Grant's near-nomination to a third term. Unfortunately, public concern over the general's qualities as world statesman had arisen when he summed up his latest foreign tour by stating that Venice would be more attractive if the streets were drained. Arthur was given the No. 2 spot on the Garfield ticket to assuage the Stalwarts.

Pro Bono Nostro

By the time of Garfield's assassination, Arthur had long demonstrated a refined ability to identify the Public Good with the interests of his own pocketbook and political faction. Nor was this a secret. Andrew Dickson White, for one, knew enough of Arthur's dubious machinations over three decades to greet the portly New Yorker's accession to office with the exclamation, "Chet Arthur President of the United States? Good God!"

That is not to say Arthur lacked public spirit. As collector of customs in New York he had earned up to $80,000 a year—about $530,000 in today's dollars; nevertheless, he willingly took a pay cut of $70,000 to become Vice President. Ever solicitous for the well-being of the nation's leaders, while in New York he had personally guided 205 cases of imported French champagne through customs for the use of President Grant and his Cabinet. No written expression of official gratitude for this generous service has survived.

Back in the days before income tax, the customs provided the federal government's chief source of revenue. As collector in New York, Arthur presided over an "industry" that grossed five times more than the nation's largest corporation. To encourage in custom-house employees a sense of civic spirit, Arthur expected them all to make "voluntary contributions" to the Stalwart cause. This *pro bono nostro* tithe was declared flatly illegal by the Civil Service Commission in 1872. Under Arthur's leadership, the custom-house was also assiduous in collecting fines and forfeitures. These "moieties" were then parceled out to informers and customs officials, including the future President and his friends—an efficient system of greasing the wheels of public life until it, too, was outlawed in 1874.

A Personal Burlesque?

Well before the end of Arthur's term at the custom-house, the entire operation of that agency came under widespread attack. Finally, President Rutherford B. Hayes called for a complete investigation by the so-called Jay Commission. Magnanimous as ever, Arthur took an active hand in selecting the members of the Jay Commission and saw to it that he was the first to testify. Later he attacked it for having a rigged membership. By the time Hayes suspended Arthur from his post on July 11, 1878, Civil Service reform had become a national crusade. And who better to champion that crusade than

Sybil Schwartz is the pen name of a young American historian who occasionally takes time out to illuminate the more obscure nooks and crannies of the Republic's past.

Chet Arthur, the "Gentleman Boss" himself?

Those who believe that only the blatantly virtuous can act virtuously in public office might study the career of Chester Arthur. When Civil Service tests were introduced at the custom-house, Arthur made sure that the questions on "general aptitude" were transmuted into a test of political reliability. A spoilsman's spoilsman, the young Arthur was described by reformer Horace Greeley as "a personal burlesque upon Civil Service reform."

To Catch a Thief

Yet it was this same Arthur who, as President, lent his support to the bill introduced by Senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio to outlaw politicking by public employees and to establish a new and permanent Civil Service Commission. Civil Service reform had been gaining momentum steadily well before Arthur's Presidency, and the circumstances of Arthur's accession to power made him more responsive to such pressures than he might otherwise have been. Still, President Arthur went on to administer the Civil Service Act of 1883 with fairness and vigor. Thanks in part to his expert knowledge of the subject, corruption in the federal bureaucracy was dealt a blow which, though less than fatal, prevented the evil genie from coming out of the bottle for decades. One wonders whether today's zealous Civil Service reformers would not do well to enlist the aid of people who, like Arthur, have tasted whereof they cook.

In three annual messages to Congress he called for federal aid for black education and criticized the Supreme Court for declaring illegal the Civil Rights Act of 1875. He went far beyond his predecessors in protecting Indian lands and made a personal inspection of the Yellowstone area to show his support of Missouri Senator George G. Vest's efforts to expand the park. Never mind that his expedition required 175 pack animals laden with whiskey and wine; the results anticipated Teddy Roosevelt's efforts on behalf of conservation. In any case, was not Arthur, as the *New York World* noted, "one of the best salmon fishers in the country"?

President Arthur also sought to set right U.S. relations with the nations of Latin America, handling with skill the "Isthmian question" concerning American rights to build a canal through Nicaragua. He vetoed the pork-barrel rivers and harbors bill when he realized that "as [it] becomes more objectionable it secures more support." He conscientiously pursued the Star Route Gang, which had amassed windfall profits by juggling the horse-drawn mail routes. Finally, he called for the abolition of excise taxes and still managed to leave office with a large surplus in the Treasury.

"Good Old Chet"

Chester Arthur, when he is recalled at all, is remembered as a mediocrity. Perhaps he was. But it is a special type of mediocrity who would take evening strolls through Washington, unprotected, after his predecessor had been assassinated by a man who had done his target practice on the banks of the Potomac. Maybe Arthur refused to parade his virtue because he knew he had little. He frankly enjoyed a good time and wanted others to do the same. An ordinary man, he did not play at being a common man. True, his modest background may have led him to indulge in such compensatory excesses

as designing a presidential flag or ordering 20 pairs of tailor-made trousers at a time (for which he quickly earned the newly popular epithet of "dude.")

But these were harmless projects, and may have distracted him from the more substantial mischief of which he was demonstrably capable. For the same reason, even his renowned sloth may have had a positive side. Not without admiration did a White House clerk note that "President Arthur never did today what could be put off until tomorrow." Thus did Chester Arthur apply Jefferson's maxim that "that government is best which governs least."

Since the 1960s the American Presidency, like the late Roman imperium, has been surrounded by artificial pomp while ridden with guilt over the office's more modest republican past. When an incumbent proclaims his keen sense of privacy, the public suspects, often with good cause, that even this is a move in the constant game of "image building." But Arthur cared not a whit whether people objected to the elegant green coach he had made for himself in New York, and when a visitor to the White House began prying into his personal world he told her, "Madam, I may be President of the United States but my private life is nobody else's damned business."

Direct, fallible, and disarmingly honest in his mediocrity, Arthur demonstrated a kind of uncalculating stubbornness. It was New York's Stalwart boss Roscoe Conkling who literally carried Arthur's suitcases when the Vice President raced back to Washington after Garfield's assassination. Yet within months Arthur had given Conkling and other Stalwarts the cold shoulder, to the extent that "Good Old Chet" was passed up for his party's nomination in 1884. By then he had Bright's disease, then an invariably fatal affliction of the kidneys, though typically he did not advertise the fact. He simply retired quietly, observing that "there doesn't seem anything else for an ex-President to do but go into the country and grow pumpkins." He died in 1886.

Partly because he had other, if more modest concerns in life than to perpetuate his term in office, partly because of his *volte-face* (executed without pride or smugness) on the question of Civil Service reform, Arthur earned the grudging respect of more than a few of his more cynical contemporaries. "In the opinion of this one–55 millionth of the country's population, it would be hard to better President Arthur's administration." So Mark Twain described the veiled knight of the Oval Office in the twilight of his Presidency. We, too, should pay our due respects.

COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly *and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.*

The Establishment's Chairman Speaks

I think it was a bit unprincipled of Richard Rovere ["The American Establishment," *WQ*, Summer 1978] to disclose my election as chairman of the Establishment since *they* had not even informed me. Of course, *they* never do, mainly because even the Executive Committee is a nameless front whose members, of course, know each other, but certainly not as members. So while *they* all agree about important decisions, these matters are never formally discussed or voted upon, except when discipline is involved, and then the action is the vote. You may be sure that it is both instinctive and unanimous. *They* do not stand for any nonsense in matters of principle. After all, if right ideas were not so important, why have an Establishment anyway?

By the way, who are *they? They* know. And if you are not one of them, you know too. Some years ago, I sat on a four-man—all persons—panel next to Ben Bradlee. We were book-ended by a very conservative senator and the C.E.O. of a very large corporation. Some innocent soul in the audience asked, "Isn't America really run by a very small and influential group of Americans?" "Of course not," responded the senator. "Heavens, no," echoed the C.E.O. Ben leaned over and irreverently whispered in my ear, "Bull----." He knew.

(Rev.) Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.
President, University of Notre Dame

Korea and America

Re: "The Two Koreas and Washington" by Ralph Clough [*WQ*, Summer 1978]:

The Korea–United States bilateral relationship developed solely in the context of the Cold War; thus, it has been seen primarily as a defensive alliance against the physical threat posed by North Korea. The fundamental question is whether such an alliance can be transformed into a meaningful bilateral relationship.

It may be that the alliance will continue in terms of defensive military capability, but that it has reached a crossroads where it must find a new foundation to build a viable and lasting solidarity or the alliance will erode and South Korea will look elsewhere. To some extent the "Koreagate" activities have prompted a move in the latter direction. With the passage by the House of a resolution favoring the curtailment of P.L. 480 assistance and the threat in the Senate to withhold Export-Import Bank loans for nuclear reactors, it is not surprising to find the South Korean government considering Australia as a wheat supplier and France as a nuclear supplier.

More significantly, we Americans need to look beyond our traditional focus on a military alliance to consider why we encounter difficulties in our Asian relations. How are we, and South Korea, systematically to correct errors of policy perception that arise because of profound structural differences in political culture? Certainly, we have no mutual understanding of one another's social and cultural dimensions, which help to explain societal trends. Such a development must undergird any truly meaningful bilateral relationship. A military alliance even with a sizable level of economic activity is insufficient to coalesce the forces necessary to sustain a true relationship.

Although I believe in the basic wisdom of the withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea, the tactics of that policy have been questionable. There was no attempt to use troop withdrawal as a bargaining chip for North Korean concessions or even the agreement to begin the

dialogue. The manner and style in which the decision was reached and announced has exacerbated doubts about the U.S. commitment in Asia. In particular, the Japanese were for a time quite fearful, given the potential for a disruption by 600,000 Koreans in Japan and the possibility of massive refugee flows in the event of hostilities. In effect, the policy by-passed an opportunity to seek conducive conditions to stabilizing the peninsula. Nevertheless, the slowdown of the withdrawal and the demonstration of continuing interest in South Korea may help to convince Kim Il-sung that the R.O.K.-U.S. ties are solid.

South Korea is, in effect, a country that has evolved from a client to an ally, and now faces an uncertain future.

John Glenn, U.S. Senate
Chairman, Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Mutual Hostility

I would like to add a few comments to Ralph Clough's discussion of relations between North and South Korea.

Clough writes correctly that "only Seoul and Pyongyang have the power to moderate their mutual hostility." But in addition there is the implication, I believe, that a desire for moderation is a goal the Koreans share with us. I would submit, however, that the rulers in Seoul and Pyongyang have a quite different outlook. First of all, they want to stay in power. Economic development, the promotion of national ideologies, and unification are important goals, but the highest priority goes to reinforcing domestic political control.

With regard to unification, each ruler realizes that he must prevail absolutely, unifying the country on his own terms. If this is impossible, preservation of the current status quo and the continuation of undisputed authoritarian rule is far preferable to him than any in-between, compromise arrangement that involves a sharing of sovereignty.

It seems to me, therefore, that despite the enormous economic burdens of armament, the great popular appeal of unification, or the North Korean need for a more moderate image in order to gain access to the international economy, there is little prospect in the short run of a relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Neither regime has any real interest in compromise.

While these comments may seem sourly unproductive, it is nevertheless useful sometimes to recognize the limits of our influence.

Vincent S.R. Brandt
Mr. Brandt is the author of
A Korean Village: Between Farm and Sea.

Yugoslavia After Tito

Developments in Yugoslavia after Tito [*WQ*, Spring 1978] will not vary radically from those at the present—at least in the immediate post-Tito period. The lack of a strong center of power—the one true Yugoslav, Marshal Tito—is perhaps the most serious problem for this multiethnic society. Policy questions related to regional inequalities, the national question, the impact of greatly increased educational opportunities, the question of human rights raised again recently by Kardelj, Yugoslavia's probable successor to Tito, and finally Yugoslavia's position between the two superpowers, will present serious challenges to Tito's successor. Within the framework of set geopolitical and strategic factors, Yugoslavia's various internal centrifugal and pluralistic forces and continuing regional inequalities have raised problems, not much different from those existing at the present time, that will have to be solved. That this will not be an easy task is obvious, and the success of these policies will greatly depend on both internal and external forces, the avoidance of serious internal disorder, the continuing emphasis on compromise among the various decision-making bodies, and the relationship between the superpowers. (A possible nonintervention agreement between the U.S.S.R and the United States was suggested and, to a large degree, will leave its impact on Yugoslavia after Tito.) A continuation of Yugoslavia's thus far successful foreign policies will be in her

interest and, with certain changes, in America's interest. The broad outline of her domestic policies is here to stay, perhaps again with some modifications on the side of greater liberalization, but no fundamental changes can be expected until the post-Partisan, younger generation assumes power and finds value in a more pluralistic society.

Professor George W. Hoffman
University of Texas, Austin

Transit Testimony

In your Spring 1978 issue you published a review of a report, "Urban Transportation and Energy: The Potential Savings of Different Modes" by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. On October 5, 1977, the American Public Transit Association (APTA) submitted rebuttal testimony to the Committee, showing that the CBO report was heavily biased against rapid-rail transit. A copy is available from APTA, 1100 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Winthrop C. Wolfe
Washington, D.C.

"Popular" Semantics

I must admit that I have never been in favor of the term "popular culture," [*WQ*, Summer 1978] nor have I quite understood what the words are supposed to mean (or imply). It would have been much more enlightening (and honest) on the part of the critics and academics who coined and propagated the words as a catch phrase to have used "unpopular culture" instead (unpopular in their own eyes, of course). I believe that the adoption of the term, which smacks of unwarranted condescension and exclusion, reveals less an intellectual quest for truth (which would not accommodate such *a priori* judgments) than a bourgeois striving for status (if only status by opposition). The opposite of "popular culture" can only be "aristocratic culture," and I suspect that many of the detractors of nontraditional cultural forms aspire to the status of aristocrats (of the intellect, at least). They seem to me the direct descendants of the students of humble origin admitted to the ancient universities of Europe by dint of effort and diligence, and whose names were followed on the college roles by the derisive notation *sine nobilitate* (or s. nob., for short).

At any rate, I would very much like to see scholarly journals get away from this snobbishness, or foolishness, and study film, or comics, or television on their own terms. The word "popular," when applied to any cultural form, is predicated upon so many assumptions, and hedged with so many qualifications, that it is all but meaningless, and its use should have no place in any reasoned discourse. To bring quantitative criteria into the play of qualitative judgment is fraught not only with peril but also with ridicule: After all, isn't the Bible the best seller of all time?

Maurice Horn
Editor, The World Encyclopedia of Comics.

Corrections

If author Frank D. McConnell ["We Are Not Alone," *WQ*, Summer 1978, p. 112] had watched *Rocky* more carefully, he would know that the fight between Rocky and Apollo Creed took place on New Year's Day, 1976.

Lorraine J. Vyskocil
Amityville, New York

In the Spring 1978 issue of *The Wilson Quarterly* (p. 105) there was a slight error in the listing of my recent book on the *Praxis* Marxists that I should like to call to your attention: namely, that I am the *author* and *not* the editor of the work [*Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia*]. The review also mentions a "reprint" of an essay by the Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić, although only an extract from his essay actually appeared in the book; it might also be mentioned that the Ćosić passage quoted in the review appears to be worded somewhat differently than the passage quoted in the book.

Gerson S. Sher
Reston, Virginia

WILSON QUARTERLY BIENNIAL INDEX

Volumes I and II (Autumn 1976 through Autumn 1978)

In alphabetical order below is a guide to separate articles (in boldface), clusters of essays on given topics (set out by capital letters), and all authors appearing in the Quarterly *to date, followed by a separate list of Background Books essays.*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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