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Editor's Comment

In this issue of the *Wilson Quarterly*, we examine "Teaching in America," specifically, teaching in the public schools. We are not alone. During the past year, the "rising tide of mediocrity" in U.S. education has become a media cliché, and it may survive to become an "issue" in the 1984 election campaign.

For our part, we have enlisted first-rate scholars to summarize a vast body of relevant new research. Our contributors try to explain *why* classroom learning has suffered so badly in America since the mid-1960s, to the point where high school diplomas are being awarded to thousands of youths, whites and blacks alike, who cannot read or write.

Oddly, little research exists to explain why so few American educators, journalists, politicians, and "experts" heeded the clear signs of trouble during the 1970s. Teachers' unions sought higher pay and shorter hours but did not encourage notions of quality control. Civil-rights spokesmen pressed for school desegregation and gained more jobs for black and Hispanic teachers, but they did not investigate why so many minority youths were being allowed to graduate as functional illiterates. University officials grumbled about their freshmen but did not prod the schools by tightening entrance requirements.

As any employer (or Army recruiter) can testify, the cumulative effect has been extremely damaging. A generation of young Americans has been cheated by the educators, and, hence, by the larger society that failed to demand enough of them or of itself. Reforms, our contributors suggest, are possible if adults really want them.

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

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

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

A Close Election In 1984

"The Divided Electorate" by William Schneider, in *National Journal* (Oct. 29, 1983), 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The presidential election season is upon us again, and given the fates of recent incumbents—Gerald Ford lost to Jimmy Carter, who lost to Ronald Reagan—it would be premature to bet on a Reagan victory.

Indeed, reports Schneider, an American Enterprise Institute political scientist, the race now looks like a toss-up. The much-heralded "new Republican majority" that was supposed to supplant the Democrats' New Deal coalition after Reagan's 1980 victory never materialized. Voters' party affiliations—45 percent Democratic, 25 percent Republican, 30 percent independent—have barely changed since 1980. In the 1982 elections, the GOP lost 26 seats in the House of Representatives.

While Reagan is personally liked (he is the only President since Eisenhower to enjoy increased popularity during his third year in office), public opinion on a variety of issues that helped him win in 1980 has changed. Support for bigger defense outlays dropped from 72 percent in 1981 to only 33 percent in August 1983. During the same period, popular sentiment on some key issues reversed itself. Two-thirds or more of the public now favors more federal spending for health, education, and welfare programs. To win re-election, Schneider speculates, the President must run on a new set of issues.

Other changes in the electorate bode ill for Reagan, especially considering his 1980 victory margin: He carried 44 states, but with only 50.7 percent of the total popular vote. The "gender gap" that emerged in 1980 has since widened. While 54 percent of American men have consistently given the President a "favorable" job performance rating, women's approval has dropped from 48 percent early in 1981 to 42 percent in September 1983. (Interestingly, the gap was widest between men and working women but nonexistent between men and full-time housewives, suggesting that high female unemployment, not just femi-

nist sentiment, helps to account for the split.)

Blacks, who vote overwhelmingly Democratic, could also upset the Reagan applecart. In 11 states, including New York, Massachusetts, and nine Southern states, the number of unregistered blacks exceeds Reagan's local 1980 margin of victory over Carter. And black voter turnout is on the upswing. About 43 percent of all blacks said they went to the polls in the 1982 congressional election, up 5.8 percentage points from 1978 levels.

All is not gloomy for the President. The South, where he is strong, gained electoral votes after the 1980 census. A continuing economic recovery or a foreign policy success (the Grenada invasion boosted his approval rating, at least temporarily) would be a shot in the arm. And if the 1984 election is as close as Schneider predicts, a John Anderson-style, third-party candidacy might well doom the Democrats.

Against Bipartisan Commissions

"The New Bipartisan Commissions" by Mark Greenberg and Rachel Flick, in *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Fall 1983), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 541, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

A new type of presidentially appointed commission is taking over jobs that America's top elected officials should be doing, and the change is symptomatic of a malfunction in the U.S. political system. So argue Greenberg and Flick, Senate and White House aides, respectively.

The first presidential commission was dispatched by George Washington in 1794 to investigate the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. But such panels were rarely used before the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who appointed 29 commissions between 1901 and 1909. Richard Nixon convoked 27 commissions in his first term, and by late last summer, Ronald Reagan had turned to special panels 23 times.

Traditionally, such blue-ribbon commissions simply gather facts on behalf of the president. Usually, they confront technical or administrative problems; sometimes, social issues; occasionally (as in the case of the Warren Commission charged to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy), a crisis. Though theoretically apolitical in nature, few have been entirely so. Jimmy Carter's Commission on Coal, for example, was designed to enhance the appeal of his energy program.

But last year, Reagan appointed three bipartisan commissions with explicitly political mandates. The Commission on Social Security and the Scowcroft Commission on the MX Missile broke legislative logjams not only by formulating policies, but also by devising schemes for easing compromise bills through Congress. The Kissinger Commission on Central America, still at work, has the same marching orders.

Why this resort to commissions? Twenty years ago, the president could haggle with a few key congressional party leaders and committee chairmen in forging a consensus. Currently, power on Capitol Hill is



In a January 1983 cartoon, a bipartisan panel rushes a Social Security rescue package past congressional Republican and Democrat resistance.

fragmented. Even freshman legislators expect to have their say.

Now that Congress holds most of its committee meetings in public (only 19 percent are closed today, compared with 34 percent in 1953), legislators faced with demands from competing single-issue interest groups are relieved to let someone else make the hard decisions.

Government-by-commission, say the authors, may work for a time. But voters faced with the spectacle of a president and Congress unable to act on their own will soon lose all confidence in their government.

Back to the Grassroots?

"From Progress to Modernization: The Conservative Turn" by Sheldon S. Wolin, in *democracy* (Fall 1983), 43 West 61st St., New York, N.Y. 10023.

"I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past," wrote Thomas Jefferson, voicing the optimism that would fuel liberalism in America for most of this nation's history. The banner of "progress," however, has been seized by conservatives, writes Wolin, a Princeton political scientist.

While Ronald Reagan cheers up his countrymen with visions of a booming economy and an America growing "more healthy and beautiful each year," liberals see "limits to growth" and look backwards to the New Deal for inspiration. President Carter's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, whose membership, says Wolin, was "an inventory of the liberal consensus," warned of a grim future for the cities of the Northeast and foresaw a "nearly permanent urban underclass."

The Founding Fathers' idea of "progress"—the vision of ever-increasing

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gains in human liberty and prosperity—was borrowed from the French Philosophes and other intellectuals of the 18th-century Enlightenment. These thinkers had a two-pronged notion of progress: the establishment of political rights and the growth of science and the economy. By the end of the 19th century, Wolin says, political "liberation" had been achieved in the West (with the exception of blacks and a few other "anomalies") and enshrined in new constitutions, legislatures, and civil liberties. Progress gradually came to mean just scientific and economic advance; demands for more political rights (e.g., "participatory democracy") were viewed as threats to material progress.

Thus, the idea of "progress" embraced by present-day conservatives, says Wolin, is "antidemocratic." Though it grew out of the Enlightenment ideal of realizing all the powers of the human mind, its aim is to apply science and technology in a constant effort to "rationalize," "modernize," and improve the efficiency of society. Political, corporate, and scientific "experts" must be allowed to function free from meddling by the "ignorant" masses. According to Wolin, that is why conservatives habitually disparage popular protests (e.g., the antinuclear movement) as too uninformed to be taken seriously.

America's liberals lost their way, Wolin believes, because they once shared this faulty notion of progress with conservatives and have now recognized its limitations. He argues that the Left must re-emphasize the idea of *political* progress and articulate a vision of a society where citizens have direct control over the nation's political and economic institutions and "where taking care of people and things, rather than using them up, is the basic stance toward the world."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Sink or Swim

"What's Wrong with NATO?" by Irving Kristol, in *The New York Times Magazine* (Sept. 25, 1983), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seems to be in perpetual crisis. For good reason, writes Kristol, a New York University professor of social thought. Now that the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity, NATO's strategies no longer make sense. Almost the only thing that can save the Alliance, he argues, is for the United States to pull out.

An air of unreality pervades the Alliance today. Neither the NATO battlefield doctrine of "graduated deterrence"—escalating from conventional arms, to tactical nuclear weapons, then to intermediate and strategic missiles to halt a Soviet advance—nor the U.S. threat to "engage in nuclear holocaust" with the Soviet Union for the sake of Western Europe is much more than a bluff, Kristol contends. A defense that guarantees the annihilation of all the NATO nations is unworkable.



Does Western Europe do its share? The United States pays 60 percent of NATO's bills, but most of the European nations demonstrate their resolve by requiring military service of their youth.

Kristol believes that eventually Moscow will call the bluff—perhaps with a new blockade of West Berlin or an occupation of northern Norway. NATO would have to choose between nuclear war or a demoralizing acceptance of the situation. He doubts that NATO would fight. It lacks sufficient conventional power, and its nuclear strategy, he says, "scares Western Europeans more than it does the Russians."

Building a NATO conventional force capable of repelling the Soviets, and backing it with a nuclear deterrent strong enough to discourage Moscow from initiating a *nuclear* conflict, is the only viable European defense strategy, Kristol argues. But that highlights another flaw in NATO: The Western Europeans are reluctant to pay for the necessary conventional build-up, because, unlike the United States, they take a benign view of Soviet intentions and because they find it easier to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

In effect, Kristol asserts, they "are asking the United States to run the risk of a nuclear holocaust so that they don't have to cut their social welfare budgets."

"Dependency corrupts, and absolute dependency corrupts absolutely," Kristol declares. The pseudo-protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has sapped the political will of West Germany and other NATO members to defend themselves effectively against the Soviet threat. He calls for a new all-European NATO, with the United States an ally but not a member. The Europeans might then face reality and regain their self-respect, a feeling of control over their own national destinies, and the spirit of nationalism that is indispensable to any successful foreign policy."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

THE DEBATE OVER CENTRAL AMERICA

While war has flared in Central America—leftist guerrillas are attacking the American-supported regime in El Salvador, U.S.–backed *contras* are harassing Nicaragua's Sandinista regime—American "policy intellectuals" and others have been fighting a battle of words over U.S. policy in the region.

Today's debate really began when the Sandinistas, with Cuban support, toppled dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979.

But instability in the five poverty-ridden Central American nations—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—has a far longer history. As Lawrence E. Harrison, a former U.S. foreign aid official, notes in "Nicaraguan Anguish and Costa Rican Progress" (*This World*, Fall 1983), the five nations agreed to form one republic, the United Provinces of Central America, after they won their independence from Spain in 1821. By 1838, bitter feuds had pulled them apart.

Nicaragua has since suffered internal strife under a succession of dictators, Harrison says, while democratic Costa Rica has fared relatively well. One reason: Costa Rica was so poor that Spanish colonizers never fully established the oppressive oligarchical plantation system that dominated Nicaragua.

Frequent direct U.S. intervention in Nicaragua (most recently, the presence of U.S. Marines between 1912 and 1933) stirred strong anti-*Yanqui* sentiment.

Today, the Sandinistas rally popular support by reminding Nicaraguans of past American interference and pointing to the U.S.–backed *contras*, reports journalist Stephen Kinzer in "Nicaragua: The Beleaguered Revolution" (*The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 28, 1983). They have welcomed Cuban and Soviet military aid and cracked down on political dissidents, the press, and businessmen.

The Sandinistas, Kinzer adds, "have given many downtrodden Nicaraguans something as precious as it is rare for poor people in Latin America: hope for the future." Yet chronic food shortages and rationing are sowing discontent.

But Arturo J. Cruz, a former member (1980–81) of Nicaragua's five-man coalition junta (dominated by the Sandinistas) says that the United States does not deserve all the blame for his country's plight. In "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution" (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1983), he argues that some of the Sandinista leaders were bent on creating a Marxist state from the beginning. "Dogmatism and adventurism," he writes, "seem to have wiped out the democratic and pluralistic ideals which, in 1979, united all Nicaraguan advocates of freedom."

Few specialists now doubt that the Sandinistas are exporting

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

arms and ideology to El Salvador, where 6,000–8,000 leftist guerrillas face a lackluster 40,000-man army and its 55 U.S. advisers. The question is what, if anything, to do about it.

"Change the Agenda" is Abraham F. Lowenthal's solution (*Foreign Policy*, Fall 1983). A specialist on Latin America at the University of Southern California, he argues that the era of "virtually unchallenged U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere is over." While he takes no specific position on El Salvador, Lowenthal believes that resisting leftist revolutions to the south is generally "counterproductive." Washington would gain more by increasing trade and providing economic aid.

Princeton's Richard H. Ullman is "baffled by the [Reagan] administration's obsession with Nicaragua." In "At War with Nicaragua" (*Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983), he argues that Nicaragua's role in the El Salvador conflict is small. Salvadoran discontent is home-grown. Even a Marxist takeover throughout Central America followed by the installation of Cuban or Soviet bases, he contends, would not jeopardize U.S. interests. America's overwhelming military power, he says, could easily "neutralize" such a threat.

Ullman believes that Washington should adopt a "hands-off" policy in Central America and negotiate an area-wide agreement barring the export of either revolution or counter-revolution.

But if Central America is not a vital U.S. interest, what is? asks Johns Hopkins's Robert W. Tucker in "Their Wars, Our Choices" (*The New Republic*, Oct. 24, 1983). He argues that if the United States does not halt Soviet- and Cuban-backed inroads in this region, it will encourage new challenges in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

Yet Tucker fears that a major U.S. military move in Central America would open political fissures at home, as during the Vietnam War. Washington should press El Salvador's regime to bring the guerrillas into the government and then enforce the peace with an international contingent of troops.

However, "Nicaragua is only the most recent example of how a coalition in which Communists are included . . . becomes a one-party regime," asserts *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz.

The 80 percent turnout in the 1982 Salvadoran elections demonstrated, he says, that the Salvadorans don't want the guerrillas in power. "Appeasement By Any Other Name" (*Commentary*, July 1983) is how he sees the position of those Americans who are unwilling to "do whatever may be required, up to and including the dispatch of American troops" to halt the spread of Soviet-backed Marxism in Central America.

Few dispassionate voices are heard when the subject is Central America. Ironically, the growing polarization of the debate—withdrawal versus massive intervention—leaves the White House policymakers occupying what now seems to be the "middle ground."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Invulnerable Submarines

"Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?" by Richard L. Garwin, in *International Security* (Fall 1983), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142; "The Invisible Force" by John Tierney, in *Science 83* (Nov. 1983), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Two legs of the U.S. strategic "triad"—land-based ICBMs and B-52 bombers—are shakier today than they once were. But the 34 U.S. Poseidon and Trident submarines will remain a virtually invulnerable deterrent for a long time to come.

While some specialists fear that advanced technology will make the oceans "transparent," Vice Admiral Charles H. Griffiths, commander of the U.S. submarine fleet, declared in 1980 that oceans are "becoming more opaque as we understand more about them."

According to Garwin, an IBM researcher, conventional sonar has a short range and is easily evaded. Ships using it are very vulnerable to attack. "Passive" sonar (underwater microphones) can "hear" submarines many hundreds of miles away, but ocean currents of varying temperature and salinity bend the sound waves, making it hard to determine their point of origin. And since the 1970s, scientists have found that the deep seas are far more turbulent than they had thought. Finally, sound travels so slowly in water that a submarine cruising at a modest 10 knots (roughly 12 mph) will be miles away from its original location by the time most sensors can detect it.

The difficulty in pinpointing a submarine, adds Tierney, a *Science 83* reporter, is illustrated by the Swedish Navy's failure after a three-week search in October 1982 to find a Soviet submarine it had trapped in an inlet 12 miles long and three miles wide. By 1990, U.S. Trident submarines will be equipped with new long-range missiles that will enable them to strike the Soviet Union from 6,000 miles away, giving the subs a hiding place of 40 million square miles of ocean.

The Soviets are so far behind the United States in antisubmarine technology that they have never successfully tracked a U.S. nuclear-armed submarine since the first went to sea in 1960. A single Trident can launch 200 warheads—enough to destroy every major Soviet city.

A 'Romantic' View of War?

"The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment" by John J. Mearsheimer, in *Orbis* (Summer 1983), 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

According to journalist James Fallows and other members of the increasingly vocal "military reform" movement, the U.S. Army needs fewer managers and more *leaders*. Today's field commander, they say, is mired in bureaucracy and weakened by reliance on unproven high-technology weapons.

Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago political scientist, dismisses

the reformers' views as hopelessly romantic. Their vision of war, he charges, recalls the pre-Napoleonic age, when armies were led by "great captains," and fighting "was very much an art." Hence, many reformers advocate a "maneuver" strategy, based on simple but reliable weapons, small but agile forces, and, above all, the creative genius of field commanders.

Modern armies are so large and face each other across such broad fronts that simply keeping them supplied and moving requires bureaucratic coordination. The Prussians pioneered military bureaucracy with the creation of a general staff in the mid-19th century, turning their army into the most successful fighting force in Europe. The Western allies feared the general staff so much that they tried (and failed) to keep the Germans from re-creating one after World War I. For the United States, with its far-flung military commitments, a large Pentagon bureaucracy is unavoidable.

The reformers' skepticism about technology is a useful antidote to some defense intellectuals' notion that there is a "technological fix" for every battlefield problem. But the reformers go too far in stressing strategy as a replacement for technology, Mearsheimer argues. Despite its many "great captains," Great Britain's status as a worldwide naval power began to decline when it trimmed its navy after World War II.

The U.S. military cannot afford to give up its preoccupation with technology, writes Mearsheimer, even though the practical value of new weapons is often not immediately apparent. The armored tank, after all, was built for the broad frontal assaults of World War I, but eventually ushered in a new strategy, the "blitzkrieg." Thus, the new M-1 tank and F-15 fighter (both assailed as costly and unreliable by the reformers) may yet prove their worth, depending on the locale and the nature of the battlefield. To some extent, Mearsheimer asserts, U.S. strategists will always be "prisoners of technology."

ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS

The Case for Protectionism

"Economic Prospects" by Robert Heilbroner, in *The New Yorker* (Aug. 29, 1983), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

"Foreign trade has always been relegated to the last pages of American economics textbooks," writes New School for Social Research economist Heilbroner, because, until recently, it played a small role in the U.S. economy. Now those books will have to be revised, along with economists' notions about trade policy.

When the United States was a virtually self-sufficient economic island, economists could confidently endorse free trade without harm, Heilbroner says. Just 10 years ago, the value of all U.S. exports *and*

imports equaled only 10 percent of the nation's gross national product. But today, up to 70 percent of all U.S. manufactured goods—computers, tractors, and steel—face competition from abroad. And 17 percent of the nation's total industrial and agricultural output is destined for foreign markets.

Classical free-trade doctrine, with its stress on assuring that consumers have access to the cheapest wares in the world, made sense when international competition was muted. But now, contends Heilbroner, free trade costs too many jobs both in the United States and in other industrial nations. The U.S. Steel Corporation, for example, was forced to close 13 mills in 1979–1980 alone, as Japanese, West German, and South Korean companies undercut its prices. Native "high-tech" industry offers little hope for salvation—witness Atari Inc.'s February 1983 decision to move several factories from California to Taiwan.

Eventually, Heilbroner believes, the United States will have to adopt "buffered trade." An America-versus-the-world posture is one possibility, but he believes that it might be better to establish four regional trade areas—a United States region in the Americas, a Japanese bloc in Asia, a European zone embracing Africa and the Near East, and a Soviet sphere encompassing its Eastern European satellites. *Within* each of these blocs, trade would be free, but each bloc would erect tariff and quota barriers against the others.

Most American economists would probably resist such protectionist measures, Heilbroner concedes. But they might change their tune if *their* jobs were threatened by free trade in economists.

Why an Industrial Policy Is Needed

"An Industrial Policy of the Right" by Robert B. Reich, in *The Public Interest* (Fall 1983), 20th & Northampton Sts., Easton, Pa. 18042.

Harvard public policy analyst Robert Reich can't understand why everyone is so earnestly debating whether or not the United States should have an "industrial policy." It already has one, he says.

Some U.S. industries gain far more than others from various provisions of the federal tax code—investment tax credits, depreciation, not to mention special tax breaks. Detroit's *effective* corporate income tax rate is 48 percent, while the electronics industry pays 29 percent, commercial banks two percent.

In 1978 (the last year for which figures are available), Washington picked up 70 percent of the tab for the nation's aircraft research and development (largely courtesy of the Pentagon), but only eight percent of R & D in the automobile industry.

Nations that have overt industrial policies, Reich argues, have generally fared better than the United States: While U.S. industrial output dropped by 8.8 percent in recessionary 1982, Japan suffered only a .3 percent loss, and West Germany bore a 2.7 percent decline. And while American industrial exports increased in absolute terms during the 1970s, the U.S. share of the world market for some vital goods shrank.

Some industrial policy advocates, notably banker Felix Rohatyn, favor aiding America's troubled "smokestack" industries. But others, including Robert Reich, would nurture new industries instead.

U.S. manufacturers sold nearly 40 percent of the world's semiconductors in 1970, but only 22.7 percent in 1980. Their share of the office machinery market—typewriters, calculators, and personal computers—dropped from 38 to 28 percent.

Even the conservative Reagan administration recognizes the need for a real industrial policy, Reich contends, though it is implementing it through the back door. The Pentagon, fearing that the Japanese will shut domestic companies out of new "strategic" technologies, is spending $500 million per year for joint industry-university-government research on advanced computer chips and $250 million on lasers. And Washington has committed $1 billion in federal funds to a five-year effort to build the next generation of "supercomputers" before the Japanese do.

In the United States, Reich argues, "No one picks the winners and losers; they are annointed inadvertently," as a result of lobbying by America's most politically active corporations and trade associations. The national industrial policy agency (modeled on Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry) that Reich favors would surely also be influenced by politics, but wouldn't it make more sense, he asks, to rationalize America's industrial policy?

If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It

"Industrial Policy: A Dissent" by Charles L. Schultze, in *The Brookings Review* (Fall 1983), 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

To hear the advocates of "industrial policy" tell it, American industry is a shambles, desperately in need of the wise counsel of government to guide it back to health. Schultze, formerly chairman of Jimmy Carter's Council of Economic Advisers, disagrees.

To be sure, certain industries (steel, autos) have stumbled, but overall employment grew by 24 percent in the United States during the 1970s. The second best performer, with a nine percent increase in jobs,

was Japan. The United States, Italy, and Canada were the only Western industrial nations to record an increase (though slight) in *manufacturing* jobs during the decade.

Schultze adds that an attention-grabbing influx of imported cars, TVs, and stereos has obscured more significant trends: U.S. exports of manufactured goods doubled during the 1970s; "high-tech" exports—computers, plastics, and aircraft—exceeded imports by $40 billion in 1979.

Industrial policy's promoters are wrong not only about the United States, Schultze says, but about Japan as well. They attribute Japan's postwar economic "miracle" to deft coordination of industry by Tokyo's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). But if that is so, Schultze says, MITI has lost its touch: Japan's gross national product grew at a vigorous 9.9 percent annual rate from 1960 to 1973 but has averaged only 3.5 percent since.

In fact, writes Schultze, astute Japanese businessmen can claim most of the credit for their country's success. They had great advantages: a huge pool of personal and business savings (30–35 percent of the Japanese GNP) to invest and, because they were playing "catch-up" with the United States, no need to buy untested manufacturing equipment or develop speculative products. Once Japan caught up during the 1970s, it no longer enjoyed these advantages and growth slowed.

MITI may have helped the Japanese somewhat (though it made some mistakes, such as trying to discourage the Honda company from entering the car business), but an American-style MITI wouldn't work at all, Schultze believes. American government, with its emphasis on fairness rather than efficiency, tends to spread money among all claimants. The U.S. Economic Development Administration, for example, was created in 1965 to revitalize "depressed areas" of the United States: Under EDA rules, 80 percent of the counties in the nation qualify for assistance.

An American MITI would become a giant pork barrel, Schultze fears. "We have enough real problems," he says, "without creating new ones."

OPEC Lives

"The OPEC Multiplier" by Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1983), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The choke-hold that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) once had on the Western industrialized nations has eased since 1980, but it could tighten again.

Mossavar-Rahmani, a former Iranian delegate to OPEC (1977–78) now at Harvard, writes that the oil cartel's fortunes have reached low ebb. Prices dropped from $35 or more per barrel in 1981 to $28 in late 1983. OPEC's output fell 16 percent in 1981, 16.8 percent in 1982, and averaged 16 million barrels per day (MBD) during the first half of 1983, its lowest level since 1966. These declines far exceed the world's largely recession-induced cuts in energy consumption since 1980, which have averaged less than one percent annually.

Therein lies a clue to OPEC's future, says Mossavar-Rahmani. Small movements in energy use—up or down—have disproportionate effects on OPEC because the cartel, which pumps half of the world's oil, bears the brunt of any change in consumption. When U.S. energy demand drops, for example, imported oil is the first energy source to lose customers. But when consumption rises and usable domestic supplies —oil, natural gas—are exhausted, domestic users must look overseas to meet all their new needs. Thus, world energy consumption increased by 5.2 percent in 1973, the year before the first OPEC "price shock," but OPEC's output grew by 14.4 percent. That, says the author, is the "OPEC multiplier."

Conservation, the development of new oilfields in Mexico, Alaska's Prudhoe Bay, and Western Europe's North Sea, and wider use of coal, natural gas, and other fuels may mute the multiplier's effects. But as the world economy revives, Mossavar-Rahmani says, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan will have to start importing more oil. By 1987, the cartel could be pumping oil at its peak capacity of 31 MBD —and that would put OPEC back in the driver's seat again.

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Going to College May Get Easier

"Higher Education's Future" by Herbert L. Smith, in *American Demographics* (Sept. 1983), P.O. Box 68, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

As the tail end of the Baby-Boom generation nears its 30s, U.S. college presidents are bracing themselves for declining enrollments and years of financial belt-tightening. But things may not turn out all that badly, according to Smith, an Indiana University sociologist.

On the face of it, he concedes, the future for American institutions of higher learning looks bleak. Children born in 1957, the peak year of the Baby Boom, are now past their college years. And the pool of potential students will shrink further: Whereas there were some nine million American men aged 18–21 in 1980, there will be only eight million in 1985, and seven million in 1990.

But that is not the whole story, writes Smith. Some countervailing trends suggest a happier scenario. For one thing, more and more women are going to college. Enrollment among women aged 20–21 jumped from only 11 percent in 1959 to 30 percent in 1981.

Moreover, despite rising tuition fees, most parents will find it easier to pay for their children's college education in the future. One reason: Families are getting smaller. The students of the 1970s and early '80s came from families with an average of three children; during the next decade, college-age youngsters will come from families with only two offspring. Also, those children will be spaced further apart than those

in earlier generations. In the age "cohort" now in its college years, nearly half of all second children were born within two years of the first. Among those born in 1970–74, only a third were. That means fewer younger siblings will be denied college educations because their parents cannot afford to pay for more than a year or so of two costly university tuitions at once.

Although a few economists and other critics have argued that a college education no longer "yields" enough future increased earning power to justify the investment (typically, about $40,000), Smith doubts that such claims will depress enrollment in the future. Salaries for freshly minted college graduates should rise as their numbers fall. And the existing glut of sheepskin-bearing Baby-Boomers will give future students every incentive to seek *graduate* degrees to get ahead of the pack.

"Only an economist," Smith adds, "could envision an American society in which college-graduate parents tell their children that a college education is 'not worth it.'"

Parent Problem

"Raising Kids" by James Q. Wilson, in *The Atlantic* (Oct. 1983), Box 2547, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Psychologists perplexed by violent or overly aggressive children have come up with a host of theories to explain their behavior—faulty genes, broken homes, and the Oedipal complex. But more and more evidence points to a simpler view, writes Wilson, a Harvard political scientist: "Incompetent" parents raise bad kids.

The notion that families might be responsible for growing delinquency was unpopular among social scientists during the 1960s, when socioeconomic theories were in vogue. But in 1969, University of Arizona criminologist Travis Hirschi broke ranks when he asked in his *Causes of Delinquency* not why people break the law, but why they obey it. He found that children of all social classes were more law-abiding if they had close family ties.

Therapists working in the field have gone further, Wilson notes. "Behavior modification"—setting up an explicit system of rewards and punishments for problem children in institutions—seems to work well for a time, but once children return home, they tend to revert to their old ways. Gerald R. Patterson of the Oregon Social Learning Center has achieved far more lasting results by teaching parents how to use a mild form of behavior modification at home.

Patterson believes poor child-rearing *skills*, not personality or income, account for most parents' failures to rear children well. Failure occurs when parents' rules are unclear to their children and are enforced erratically. Patterson advocates paying careful attention to the routine but vital interactions in which parents display approval or disapproval by word, tone, gesture, or expression.

Can parents have forgotten such basic tricks of the trade? There is no reason to think so, says Wilson. He speculates that "traditional social

and moral supports for family life" have weakened and that "opportunities for distraction and entertainment outside the family have become greater." Hence, parents are simply paying less attention to their offspring. Good parents are needed to raise good kids.

Superstars' Fat Salaries

"The Economics of Superstars" by Sherwin Rosen, in *The American Scholar* (Autumn 1983), 1811 Q St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

Are top baseball players, television news anchors, or rock singers worth the millions of dollars they can earn each year? Yes, argues Rosen, a University of Chicago economist.

Just a few decades ago, such figures were simply "stars." Today, they are called "superstars," an apt inflation in nomenclature, says Rosen, given the vastly expanded audiences they can reach thanks to the growth of television, movies, and records.

Not all vocations produce superstars. In those that can, minute increases in talent produce immense leaps in productivity. A football running back who is half a step faster than the rest will gain more yards and score more touchdowns, and his shoes couldn't be filled by any of a dozen slightly slower peers. The tiny increase in speed is worth an enormous increase in pay. By contrast, a salesman who is twice as success-



Elvis Presley, one of the first modern superstars, as immortalized in 1964 by Andy Warhol, an early superstar of the art world.

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ful as his competitors is worth exactly twice as much and no more.

When there is no substitute for that last iota of talent (or box-office drawing power), competition is intense. Sorting out the legions of U.S. high school and college basketball players produces only 250 National Basketball Association pros (average NBA salary: $250,000). Then, the superstars are culled from the stars. On the men's pro golf tour, Rosen notes, the top five money winners "have annual stroke averages that are less than five percent lower than the 50th or 60th ranking players, yet they earn four or five times as much money."

This disparity may not be "fair," writes Rosen, but from an economic standpoint it is inevitable. Television and other mass media magnify superstars' drawing power many times over. Why should viewers settle for mere stars when a superstar is just a turn of the dial away?

PRESS & TELEVISION

In One Ear, Out the Other

"What Do Readers Digest" by John Robinson and Mark Levy, in *The Washington Journalism Review* (Oct. 1983), 2233 Wisconsin Ave. N.W., Suite 442, Washington, D.C. 20007.

The national news media seem to have an annoying penchant for beating stories to death—for example, Nancy Reagan's china. But according to Robinson and Levy, researcher and journalism professor, respectively, at the University of Maryland, journalists should stick with some stories much longer than they do now.

Last May and June, the authors surveyed 1,070 adults—526 in "news savvy" Washington, D.C., and 544 nationwide—to learn how knowledgeable they were about the top news stories of the day. The researchers found much ignorance.

At a time when newspapers and TV newscasts were daily reporting on the Reagan administration's hostility toward Nicaragua's Sandinista regime and on U.S. support for the regime in neighboring El Salvador, fewer than one in six of the respondents could say which side the United States favored in both strife-torn countries. More than half of those who gave an answer thought that Washington was friendly or neutral toward the Sandinistas.

What those surveyed *did* tend to remember, the authors say, was "human interest" news. Nearly all of them knew that Sally Ride, America's first woman astronaut, was aboard the Space Shuttle orbiting the Earth in June. Four out of five knew that homosexuals were the likeliest victims of AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). Yet even being a "name in the news" was no guarantee of recognition: Fewer than half of the respondents could identify Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and even fewer knew who Yuri Andropov was.

"It is not the public's job to be on top of the news," Robinson and

Levy contend. Ordinary folk have "licensed" journalists to decide what is important and to explain it clearly. But newsmen incorrectly assume that their easily distracted audience follows the news as intently as they do, and that readers and TV viewers become bored with a continuing story when editors do. Journalists should try to understand their audience better—friends and colleagues are bad gauges—and learn what people need or want to know and how to convey it.

Simply putting a story on page one for a few days, the authors say, is not all that the press can do to assure that the news gets through.

Congratulations For Nothing

"Covering the EPA, or, Wake me up if anything happens" by R. Jeffrey Smith, in *The Columbia Journalism Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), 200 Alton Pl., Marion, Ohio 43302.

One morning last March, a *Washington Post* headline announced: EPA FIASCO: THE SYSTEM WORKS! The "system" was the check on bureaucratic malfeasance imposed by a vigilant press. But Smith, a *Science* magazine writer, doubts that such journalistic self-congratulations are in order.

Actually, he argues, reporters (especially those in Washington) ignored red flags at the Environmental Protection Agency for two years—signs of the questionable ties between its top officials and business and of lax enforcement of rules that ultimately led to wholesale firings and resignations. In 1981, for example, EPA administrator Anne Burford barred the agency's regional offices from citing manufacturers for violations of hazardous waste disposal regulations—a signal that she was trying to cut back on the number of citations. Not until February 1983 did reporters pay attention to Burford's October 1982 refusal to hand over documents to a House committee investigating EPA's performance in regulating disposal of hazardous materials in landfills.

About 20 Washington reporters cover the EPA more or less regularly, Smith notes, but their job is complex. No single reporter can grasp all the details in the fields—pesticides, air and water pollution—that the agency regulates. As a result, coverage has been superficial.

In October 1981, the CBS *Evening News* reported that Burford planned to cut EPA's budget, but it treated the news strictly as a political story, noting only that some congressmen feared the agency would be "gutted." Viewers never learned what regulations or research might be sacrificed. Reporters did no better once the Burford scandal surfaced last March, thanks to persistent congressional investigation. "Pack journalism" quickly set in, says Smith, as newsmen scrambled to record the charges and countercharges of EPA's congressional critics and the agency's top officials. Solid evidence, although available, was slow to appear.

"It takes energy and time," Smith concludes, "to reach deep into the federal bureaucracy and extract stories." In the EPA scandal, journalists did not try to reach very far.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy Is What Philosophers Do

"What Are Philosophers For?" by Richard Rorty, in *The Center Magazine* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, P.O. Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Cal. 93103.

Few contemporary philosophers grapple with political and social issues in the way that Plato, John Locke, or Jean-Jacques Rousseau did. Where, one might ask, have all the sages gone?

"Only a Philistine would ask such a question," asserts Rorty, a professor of humanities at the University of Virginia. The purpose of philosophy is not to solve social problems, he argues, but simply to produce philosophy, however that might be defined. The leading philosophers of the 20th century have followed radically different paths. Germany's Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was concerned with the individual's "spiritual heroism," and cared little for politics. American John Dewey (1859–1952) was primarily a "theorist of social change." Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) pioneered in analytic philosophy.

Most British and American university philosophers today work in Russell's analytic tradition. They are easy targets for critics, Rorty writes, because they are preoccupied with abstract problems couched in technical jargon whose solutions are interesting only to other philosophers. Theirs is an arcane world. But that is no argument against it, Rorty maintains. The discipline still attracts first-rate minds and sustains vigorous debate—a sure sign of health. Its critics forget that an equally recondite scholasticism in 13th-century Europe (whose practitioners included St. Thomas Aquinas) revived Greek and Roman classical thought and shaped the intellectual course of the Renaissance.

Rorty adds that it is unreasonable to expect philosophers to possess the wisdom necessary to cure social ills. The truly great mind needed for that comes along "about once in a century." Nor do philosophers have any special grip on the kind of humanistic knowledge that can be usefully applied to public affairs. Historians, classicists, and literary specialists have as much to say as philosophers.

Rorty's advice to today's philosophers is simple: Ignore demands for "relevance" and continue to scrutinize whatever you find interesting.

Martin Luther's Legacy

"The Enduring Relevance of Martin Luther 500 Years After His Birth" by Jaroslav Pelikan, in *The New York Times Magazine* (Sept. 18, 1983), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

On November 10, 1983, Christians of all denominations marked the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. Even the Communist government of his native East Germany spent millions to refurbish the surviving churches and monasteries of his day.

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Luther was an obscure Catholic monk and university teacher in Wittenberg, Germany, until October 31, 1517, the day he made public his revolutionary "95 theses." Legend has it that Luther, in a dramatic gesture, nailed his theses on the door of a local Catholic church, but historians have their doubts. The tract, recalls Pelikan, a Yale historian, attacked Rome's practice of raising revenue through the sale of "indulgences" releasing believers from the pains of purgatory. Four years later, Luther was excommunicated for his attack on the Church's authority.

Continuing to preach and write, Luther developed his doctrine of "justification by faith," in which he argued that continued faith in God, not church-prescribed penances, was the key to achieving forgiveness for sins. Thus, the sinner was both "righteous and a sinner at the same time." In Luther's "universal priesthood of believers," all believers, not just priests, had a direct relation to God. That meant that the faithful would have to be able to read the Old and New Testaments for themselves. Luther hastened the trend toward wider translation of the Bible from Latin into Europe's "vulgar" tongues, and even contributed his own German version.

Luther's ideas caught on first in the principalities of then-fragmented Germany. Today, there are 69 million Lutherans in 92 countries, including 8.5 million in the United States. Rome "has begun to treat Lu-

Hans Holbein the Younger (ca. 1497–1543) depicted Martin Luther as "the German Hercules," vanquishing officials of the Catholic Church. Luther's reputation for heroic individualism survives to the present day.

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ther more as an alumnus than an apostate," reports Pelikan. The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) accepted a number of Luther's theological points, and Pope John Paul II prays daily for a Catholic-Lutheran reunification.

Luther's continuing appeal, even to nonbelievers, says Pelikan, stems from his "spirited defense of the sanctity of the individual" in matters of conscience and from the sharp line he drew between religion and politics. Luther had little sympathy for challenges to the civil status quo and thought it a mistake to inject religion into affairs of state. He would have viewed with "exquisite scorn," Pelikan says, the "20th-century theocrats" of the Left or Right who invoke the will of God to further their own political causes.

Debating What Judges Decide

"Law without Law" by Shirley Robin Letwin, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1983), The Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Ave. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

"Courts are mere instruments of the law," declared Chief Justice John Marshall in 1824, "and can will nothing." After a long allegiance to judicial activism, Anglo-American legal theorists appear to be returning to something like Marshall's traditional "rule of law" jurisprudence. But appearances, warns Letwin, a British legal theorist, are deceptive.

Under the "rule of law" model, laws handed down by the legislature were absolute; judges simply applied them to individual cases, exercising discretion only when points of law conflicted. In the United States, support for that system began to fade early in the 20th century, spurred by two activist Supreme Court Justices, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Benjamin Cardozo. By the 1930s, writes Letwin, America's Legal Realists' argument that "the idea of law as a system of fixed rules should be dismissed as a utopian fantasy or a willful deception" had prevailed. What actually happens, the Realists said, is that different judges faced with one case often reach different decisions. The law is ultimately just what judges say it is.

Some contemporary legal philosophers, uncomfortable with potential abuses of unfettered judicial discretion, yet loath to revert to the rigid jurisprudence of old, have attempted to develop a new set of objective standards of law.

Oxford's Ronald Dworkin, the most prominent of the new theorists, argues that judges should apply political principles, unwritten but implicit in the law, in deciding cases. [See *WQ*, Winter 1982, p. 28.] He believes, for example, that Northern judges before the Civil War who upheld the letter of the law in returning escaped slaves to their Southern masters should have relied instead on "principles of justice and fairness" to free them. Dworkin contends that applying such principles would yield only one "objective" answer in each case; judges' discretion would thus be eliminated.

The problem, Letwin argues, is that there is no clear consensus on what principles are important or on how competing values (e.g., equality and individual freedom) should be balanced. Each judge would simply apply his or her own principles. But reconciling different beliefs, she contends, ought to be the job of elected legislators. Leaving the job to judges guarantees that the written law will be disregarded.

Letwin suggests that Dworkin and his colleagues take a cue from Socrates. The Greek philosopher was so convinced that a society in which the law was not supreme would be turned "upside down" that he submitted to a death sentence he knew to be unjust.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

A Chemistry Of Crime

"Locks—A Key to Violence?" and "Biochemical Aggression—The Legal Dimensions" by Janet Raloff, in *Science News*, (Aug. 20 & Sept. 10, 1983), 1719 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

For some people, violent behavior could be a matter of chemistry.

William Walsh, a chemical analyst at the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, has been studying the crime-chemistry link in his spare time for 17 years, reports Raloff, a *Science News* editor.

Last spring, Walsh released the results of a five-year-long study comparing concentrations of metallic "trace elements"—calcium, magnesium, and zinc—in the bodies of 96 "extremely violent" and 96 "nonviolent" men. Of the violent men, 35 were only sporadically so. All 35 shared a distinctive chemical profile: low levels of copper, high levels of potassium. Fifty-seven chronically violent "sociopaths" followed the opposite pattern: high in copper, low in potassium. The remaining four men were deficient in *all* trace elements.

Scientists do not know what causes trace element imbalances. Diet seems an unlikely suspect. Earlier, Walsh studied 24 pairs of brothers between the ages of eight and 18. In each pair, one boy was "very delinquent," the other, "all American." Each pair grew up together and presumably ate the same foods, yet displayed marked differences in trace element levels. Walsh suspects that the abnormalities stem either from a metabolic disorder or from a basic chemical imbalance. Nor do scientists know exactly what role trace elements play in the body's functioning, though some researchers suspect links between these nutrients and intelligence and diseases such as Tourrette's syndrome.

The key to all this intriguing research, writes Raloff, is hair. Trace element levels in individuals vary from day to day in blood or urine; hair serves as a more reliable table of contents, collecting trace elements 200 times more concentrated than those in the blood. Criminal forensic specialists have long used comparisons of hair samples to iden-

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Trace element imbalances are only one possible crime-chemistry link. Some researchers believe that high-sugar diets can induce violent behavior. Tests in which junk foods—soda, candy, snacks—were barred from prison diets suggest that the researchers may be correct. But conclusive proof is lacking.

tify individuals. Beginning in the 1960s, however, when mail-order charlatans promised to diagnose medical problems using locks of hair, disrepute tainted wider applications of hair analysis. Though the field is now governed by stricter standards, the doubts linger.

Meanwhile, Walsh is pushing ahead with his work. At his new Health Research Institute near Chicago, he is beginning to treat delinquent boys for trace element abnormalities. No results yet.

If they are confirmed, notes Raloff, Walsh's findings would raise a host of ethical questions. Can the chemically imbalanced be held accountable for their crimes? Should a young child be tested for chemical hints of criminality? What if his test were positive?

A Scientific Success Story

"The Origins and Development of the American Patent System" by Morgan Sherwood, in *The American Scientist* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511.

New methods of making candles, milling flour, and distilling alcohol were among the first inventions awarded U.S. patents. Today, more than 4,370,000 patents later, the patent system is quietly rolling along.

Americans take the system so for granted that they forget how complex it is, notes Sherwood, a University of California (Davis) historian. The system must balance two competing goals: encouragement to inventors and public access to their inventions. The Founding Fathers wrote their idea of a proper balance into the U.S. Constitution: a patent system granting inventors proprietary rights over their creations, but for a limited term (now 17 years). The Founders were, however, less than unanimous on the virtues of this scheme. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton favored awarding prizes instead. Both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin refused to patent their own inventions.

When Congress passed the first patent law in 1790, it deemed the matter important enough to create a board composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of State and War to evaluate applications. In 1793, a new law dropped the time-consuming requirement that applications be screened. The results were predictable. In 1829, an "inventor" patented the medieval farming technique of letting land lie fallow for a season to increase subsequent crops. By 1836, with the establishment of the U.S. Patent Office, the screening requirement had been reinstated and the foundations of today's system were laid.

The question of what can be patented has also fallen to the courts. The peddling of "patent medicines" during the early 19th century led to a judicial ban on patents for "mischievous" creations. In 1822, a federal court ruled that "mere abstractions" could not be patented. In 1978, the Supreme Court cited the 1822 decision in ruling that computer programs (based on mathematical formulas) were not eligible.

That principle, along with the Court's "obvious" rule—denying patents for common-sense improvements on existing designs—is bound to make for some complex cases as technology races ahead. In 1980, the Supreme Court had to decide whether new genetically engineered organisms could be patented. It said Yes. The patent system, Sherwood concludes, is probably up to any challenge that science can produce.

Equality for The Egg

"The Energetic Egg" by Gerald Schatten and Heide Schatten, in *The Sciences* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), The New York Academy of Sciences, 2 East 63rd St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Until the 1970s, cell biologists largely concurred with the view of Hippocrates and Aristotle that the female's contribution to human reproduction was essentially passive. Under a normal microscope, sperm appear active, while eggs seem inert.

But during the last decade, new electron microscopes, which magnify details 250,000 times, began to tell a different story. According to the Schattens, biologists at Florida State University, sperm and egg now appear to be "mutually active partners."

The electron microscopes show that as the sperm approaches the egg, it synthesizes a long, thin filament that "harpoons" its target, triggering chemical changes within the egg that rouse it to action. Hair-like "microvilli" on the egg's surface reach out and pull the male cell inward, finally clasping it to the surface.

Meanwhile, the egg begins a series of defensive measures to keep other sperm at bay. (In humans, up to 40 sperm may approach at once.) Within 30 seconds of the meeting of sperm and egg, a tough antisperm "umbrella" composed of proteins fends off possible intruders.

As the captive sperm, "lilliputian" in size relative to its host, begins swimming toward the nucleus, "microtubules" (only 25 billionths of a meter thick) within the egg push the swimmer toward its center. Once it arrives, the microtubules form themselves into a "sperm aster" that

radiates in all directions throughout the cell. The egg's nucleus, waiting off to one side, rushes down one of the corridors created by the aster and, within one minute, merges with the sperm nucleus. Almost immediately, the first steps toward creation of an embryo get underway.

Fertilization, the Schattens say, is "the riskiest of all biological processes." Small wonder then, that the egg has developed such aggressive mechanisms to ensure its success. No longer will it be possible to view fertilization as a solo act.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

What OSHA Is Up To

"Auchter's Record at OSHA Leaves Labor Outraged, Business Satisfied" by Michael Wines, in *National Journal* (Oct. 1, 1983), 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The Reagan administration's attempt to "deregulate" industry helped get the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into hot water. Meanwhile, hardly anybody is paying any attention to EPA's twin, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

OSHA director Thorne G. Auchter has not only avoided public controversy, he has even acquired a mild taste for regulation, writes Wines, a *National Journal* correspondent. For example, Auchter's OSHA was expected to abandon longstanding agency attempts to limit workers' on-the-job exposure to carcinogens. But last April, OSHA suddenly announced plans to issue emergency regulations on exposure to asbestos. OSHA also sidestepped chemical industry and White House opposition to regulations requiring labels with tips on handling and safety for all hazardous chemicals used in American factories. The initial cost to industry will be almost $600 million, plus $228 million per year thereafter.

Auchter's critics, chiefly labor union officials, believe, as one put it, that Auchter was "dragged kicking and screaming into regulation." He took action on asbestos, they say, only after a congressional committee grilled him in March. And the new regulations will probably just codify standards already accepted voluntarily by industry. Critics also charge that OSHA's enforcement of existing regulations is lax. In 1982, for example, the agency levied only $5.8 million in fines against violators; in 1980, Jimmy Carter's OSHA collected $18.5 million.

Auchter replies that his brand of "cooperative regulation" allows business to put its money into workplace safety and health rather than legal battles with OSHA. The agency's own resources have also been redirected. A controversial new "targeting" policy exempts from federal inspection factories in industries with low health-related absenteeism. (An existing program exempts all industries in the 21 states that have their own safety regulations.) OSHA officials claim that the cutback allows them to scrutinize the most dangerous workplaces, particularly

construction sites. The agency made 64,000 inspections in 1982, down by about 1,000 from 1980. Construction site inspections, however, were up from 28,000 to 31,000.

President Reagan's OSHA may not have broken much ground, Wines notes, but it probably hasn't lost much. Since the agency was created in 1970, job-related deaths have declined slowly, but workdays lost due to injury or illness have increased. That trend has not changed.

Fusion Energy: False Promise?

"The Trouble with Fusion" by Lawrence M. Lidsky, in *Technology Review* (Oct. 1983), Room 10-140, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

For several decades, scientists have touted fusion as the great energy hope of the 21st century. And generating electricity through fusion is scientifically feasible, writes Lidsky, an MIT nuclear engineer. But utility companies won't want to buy fusion reactors.

Experimental reactors are now under construction in the United States (at Princeton), Japan, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. Physicists are concentrating on the fusion of deuterium and tritium ("D-T fusion"), two forms of hydrogen that are abundant in seawater. It promises cheap, safe, virtually unlimited power—one cubic meter of seawater would yield as much energy as 2,000 barrels of oil.

In a fusion reactor, the hydrogen atoms would be heated to 150,000,000 degrees Celsius, held in a vacuum "bottle" created by super-magnets cooled nearly to "absolute zero" (-273 degrees Celsius). The fusion of the atoms' nuclei would release neutrons, which would bombard and heat containment walls within the reactor. The heat would be used to create steam to drive electricity-generating turbines.

Such a reactor, Lidsky suggests, would be a "large, complex, expensive, unreliable source of power." Within its walls would be some of the highest temperatures attainable on Earth and some of the lowest; the relatively heavy high-energy neutrons used in bombardment would quickly erode the reactor's core. Although a fusion reactor would be much safer than today's fission models—a "meltdown" would be impossible—its complex machinery would be subject to frequent minor but debilitating breakdowns.

Scientists have ignored these practical problems. Engineers and utility executives cannot, says Lidsky. By the 21st century, improved fission reactors will almost certainly be more attractive than the fusion alternative. Not that Lidsky favors abandoning fusion research. He argues that in the race to get quick results (and win government research grants), his colleagues have slighted a promising alternative. Fusion using lithium or boron might be simpler than D-T fusion, and it would produce heat without the need for troublesome neutrons.

That kind of research is a "high-risk, high-gain" proposition with a far-distant payoff. But if it works, Lidsky believes, it will deliver what D-T research once promised: inexpensive, plentiful energy supplies.

ARTS & LETTERS

Balloon People

"Botero's Blow-Ups" by Jasia Reichardt, in *Art International* (July-Aug. 1983), Via Maraini, 17-A, Lugano, Switzerland (CH-6900).

Colombian artist Fernando Botero's idiosyncratic paintings of fat people have won him a measure of fame in recent years. Yet the artist's obsession with inflated figures remains a mystery.

Since his first "fat mode" painting in the mid-1950s, Botero's work has centered on depictions of overblown "bishops, generals, tarts, aunts, and ordinary citizens" from his native Colombia, writes Reichardt. (Botero, an expatriate since 1960, now lives in New York.) The artist has offered only evasive explanations of his style—he claims that his subjects are actually thin, that blowing them up makes them more sensual, or that all art involves deformation.

The effects of Botero's style are clear. Inanimate objects and animals are endowed with unusual life and prominence when blown up. Indeed, Reichardt observes, Botero reserves for animals "expressions of friendship, pleasure, aggression, horror, or amusement." His melancholy human characters, almost always presented in couples or groups, stare straight out from the canvas, "even if they are engaged in making love." Inflation irons out many of their distinctive features, making them all

A typical painting by the prolific Fernando Botero: Three Musicians *(1983).*

seem interchangeable. Their straight-ahead stares, as well as their size, emphasize their alienation from one another, and from the viewer.

Many artists have influenced Botero's work, says Reichardt, but he owes his largest debt to the great French painter Henri Rousseau (1844–1910), who also painted "outsized puppets" (usually children) in dreamlike settings. Yet Botero's eccentric vision is his own. It may be impossible to discover *why* he paints the way he does, Reichardt says, but he does succeed in creating on canvas little worlds of "hypnotic clarity" with the timeless quality of myths.

Two Musical Populists

"Mahler and Ives: Populist Archaism and Musical Innovation" by Carl E. Schorske, in *The Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Oct. 1983), Norton's Woods, 136 Irving St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

At the turn of the century, two composers who would help to revolutionize classical music rose to prominence on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In their backgrounds, Charles Ives (1874–1954) and Gustav Mahler (1860–1911) could hardly have been more different, writes Schorske, a Princeton historian, yet each injected a strong note of populism into the prevailing classical style of music.

Ives was the scion of an old-line New England Yankee family. His father, flouting his parents' preference for more "respectable" vocations, became the all-purpose music master—choir director, dance band leader, violinist—of Danbury, Connecticut. Under his father's tutelage, young Charles learned to play everything from gospel and ragtime to classical standards. Mahler, born to a family of poor but upwardly mobile Austrian Jews, was immersed in high culture during his boyhood in Iglau (now in Czechoslovakia).

In 1875, a patron paid the young Mahler's way to the Vienna Conservatory. There, he was caught up in the general enthusiasm for composer Richard Wagner's nationalistic odes to the common folk. Thus inspired, Mahler wove the music of provincial Iglau—Czech folk songs, military marches, peasant waltzes—into his first four symphonies.

Ives followed the opposite path to musical populism. Unlike his iconoclastic father, Ives hewed to family tradition and enrolled at Yale in 1894. After graduating, he became an insurance salesman and began composing as an avocation. Unlike Mahler, Ives scorned high culture as effeminate. Strains of the popular music of his boyhood reappeared in such scores as *New England Holidays* (1904–13).

Popular music had found its way into classical composition before Mahler and Ives, Schorske notes. But it had been built into traditional musical structures. The two avant-gardists' arrangements shattered old forms by using their folk themes more naturally. Audiences and music critics found their music chaotic. By today's standards, it seems fairly tame—but that is because Ives and Mahler freed the composers who came after them to explore even more radically different forms.

OTHER NATIONS

Down but Not Out

"Poland's Eternal Return" by Martin Malia, in *The New York Review of Books* (Sept. 29, 1983), Subscription Service Dept., P.O. Box 940, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Among many Westerners, the December 1981 outlawing of the independent trade union Solidarity by General Wojciech Jaruzelski's Soviet-backed regime raised fears that Poland will never be Poland. A look at Solidarity in the context of the nation's history, suggests Martin Malia, a Berkeley professor of Russian history, is more encouraging.

Poland has lived under the yoke, in one form or another, since 1717, when Peter the Great made it a satellite of Tsarist Russia. In 1772, Catherine the Great bought off hostile Prussia and Austria by ceding Polish land to them. Poland ceased to exist in 1795, when the three powers partitioned its remaining territory. After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles brought to life a new republic under Socialist Jósef Piłsudski, but it soon fell to the Germans as World War II began; at war's end, Poland entered once again into the Russian orbit.

Despite centuries of foreign domination, the Poles have never lost their will to resist. Violent rebellions punctuate their history, beginning in 1794, and recurring in 1830, 1846–48, 1863, 1905, 1945, 1956, 1968, and the present day. Malia asserts that a distinctive Polish identity has endured because Poland is "less a place than a moral community, an idea or an act of faith."

Since A.D. 966, when the Poles, fearing absorption by the German Holy Roman Empire, turned directly to Rome for baptism, the Church has been instrumental in preserving this Polish "act of faith." After the 1772 partition, the Church became "the focus of society's resistance to alien and despotic state power." During the 1950s, primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszíński responded to Stalinist repression by proclaiming that "the true Poland lived by Christianity, not Marxism." Today, under the spiritual leadership of Polish-born Pope John Paul II, weekly attendance at Polish churches is up from a usual 65 percent to 95 percent.

Solidarity is one more manifestation of Poland's "eternal return." Pessimistic Westerners, cautions Malia, should remember that the Poles are "playing [not] to win, but only not to lose absolutely."

The Method in Qaddafi's Madness

"Qaddafi's North African Design" by Oye Ogunbadejo, in *International Security* (Summer 1983), The MIT Press (Journals), Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi may well be a violent revolutionary, a Soviet pawn, or a madman. But the dictator's seemingly bizarre actions may also have some underlying rationale, argues Ogunbadejo, a

political scientist at Nigeria's University of Ife.

Qaddafi's ideological principles, outlined in his *Green Book*, justify Libya's adventurism in the name of Arab-Islamic unity. He rejects capitalism as exploitative and communism as godless, and he regards today's individual Arab nations as relics of Western colonialism. Many of Qaddafi's aggressive moves since coming to power in 1969—backing coup attempts and rebellions in Niger, Upper Volta, Gambia, Ghana, and, most recently, Chad—can be seen in part as attempts to aid Muslim minorities in these countries and to build a Greater Islamic State.

The search for new energy resources also plays a role in Qaddafi's foreign ventures. While Libya (pop. three million) remains one of the world's major oil suppliers and has, as a result, the highest per capita annual income in Africa ($6,800), its wells could begin running dry in as little as 10–15 years. Already, the drop in world oil prices has forced Tripoli to curtail some domestic development projects.

Moreover, Qaddafi's adventures abroad divert attention from domestic troubles. While most Libyans live comfortably thanks to the nation's oil revenues, opposition to the dictator's iron rule is considerable. In 1980, more than 2,000 Libyans were arrested for political "crimes," and 800 were executed. Over the years, Qaddafi has quashed several attempted army coups.

While the Libyan leader has close ties to Moscow—he supported its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan—it would be a mistake, warns Ogunbadejo, to view him purely as a Soviet proxy. The Soviets have sold him a $13 billion arsenal of advanced weapons, too much for Libya's tiny 55,000-man army. Half the arms remain in packing crates or lie in the desert. Moscow has no wish to alienate Qaddafi's neighbors (Chad, Egypt, Niger) by urging him to pursue his grand designs.

What should the United States do? The downing of two Libyan jet fighters over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 by U.S. Navy interceptors, Ogunbadejo says, merely stirred up anti-Americanism among Qaddafi's neighbors. Rather than confront the Libyan dictator directly, Washington should help those neighbors ease the poverty that makes them ripe for Libyan-backed domestic subversion.

An Unlikely Japanese Hero

"Japan's Crusader Against Bureaucratic Waste" by Ezra Vogel, in *Asia* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), P.O. Box 1308-A, Fort Lee, N.J. 07024.

What would you get if you rolled Lee Iacocca, Abraham Lincoln, and Ronald Reagan all into one? If you asked the average Japanese, he might answer: Toshio Doko.

The 86-year-old Doko is the pre-eminent critic of Japanese affluence and Big Government, reports Vogel, author of *Japan as Number One* (1979). His life story—the subject last year of a Japanese television documentary—is a legend among his countrymen. Born a peasant, trained as an engineer, Doko rose through the ranks to become president of the

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Toshio Doko by Asahi Shimbun *newspaper cartoonist Shoji Yamafuji.*

giant Toshiba Electric Corporation in 1966. Eight years later, he took the helm of Keidanren, a powerful national business organization, becoming "'prime minister' of the business community," says Vogel.

Yet, Doko's personal life is austere. He rises at four every morning to pray. The simple wood-frame house he has lived in for 60 years lacks central heating. He allowed no electric appliances in his home until his Toshiba colleagues convinced him that it hurt the company's public image. According to Vogel, Doko is "easily the most respected public figure in Japan."

Doko worries that affluence and generous public welfare programs are sapping the Japanese will to work and promoting decadence. He is a harsh critic of Tokyo's taxing and spending policies (government at all levels consumes 35 percent of Japan's gross national product, 21 percent of the United States') and a stout defender of free enterprise. "If we go on like this," he says, "Japan will be a wreck in the 21st century."

In 1981, Doko was put in a position to make his prescriptions stick. Named by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki to head the government's Administration Reform Commission, he was given a broad mandate to suggest spending cuts. Among the Commission's recommendations, issued last March: Sell off the national railway, telephone, and tobacco companies, trim the government payroll.

Those proposals are now being debated by the Japanese Diet (parliament), where Doko's influence is considerable. In 1982, Tokyo's expenditures fell for the first time since World War II. Suzuki stepped down the same year, in part because he realized that he could not keep his

public pledge to Doko to balance the budget by 1985.

The current Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, is not bound by such a promise. But nobody in Japan was surprised that Nakasone's first official visitor after he took office was Toshio Doko.

A Soviet Oil Squeeze?

"Is There an Energy Crisis in the Soviet Union?" by Jonathan Kamin, in *East European Quarterly* (Sept. 1983), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80309.

The Soviet Union possesses 59 percent of the world's known reserves of coal, 30 percent of all natural gas. It pumps more oil (12.1 million barrels per day) than any other nation. Yet it may be on the brink of a major energy crisis.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Soviet oil output will drop to 10 million barrels daily by 1985. Mismanagement explains some of Moscow's woes, writes Kamin, a Northwestern University researcher. Soviet planners' pursuit of short-term gains over long-term potential is now paying grim dividends. To speed extraction, for example, the Soviets pump water under high pressure into oil wells. At first, the wells yield more oil, but gradually water dilutes the flow and cuts productivity. (The average Soviet well now pumps 50 percent water.)

The Soviets would have to boost output in oil-rich Siberia by 70 percent during the next few years to compensate for the loss of production in such wells. But in a region where the ground can freeze a mile deep in winter, development is costly and total success unlikely. To make up for the shortfall, Soviet planners hope to generate 20–25 percent of the nation's electricity from nuclear power by 1990, compared with six percent today, and to accelerate coal production. Kamin thinks their targets are unrealistic.

Could conservation ease the Soviet oil squeeze? There will be no relatively painless cuts in gasoline consumption as there were in the United States after 1974. Since there is only one car for every 42 people, autos are not big consumers. Industry, which accounts for 59 percent of Soviet energy use, could conserve by investing in energy-efficient machinery, but Moscow has to spend most of its available cash on expanding oil, gas, and coal production. Given autonomy, individual factory managers could cut energy use, but liberalization is anathema to Moscow.

The only bright spot for Moscow appears to be natural gas, which promises to replace oil as the nation's chief energy source by 1990. Gas exports to Western Europe will probably bring in $1.6 billion annually in hard currency through the year 2000, allowing the Soviets to buy much-needed Western energy technology.

Even so, Kamin believes, the Soviets face hard times. So do their Eastern European clients, who rely on the Soviet Union for much of their fuel. Barring an unlikely about-face in Moscow on economic reform, massive investments will be needed in the Siberian oil fields—money that will come out of the pockets of Soviet workers.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s."

Praeger Publishers/Center for Strategic and International Studies, Box 465, Hanover, Pa. 17331. 129 pp. $6.95 paper.
Author: David E. Albright

During the late 1970s, the Soviet Union made substantial inroads in sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder of the 1980s, predicts Albright, who teaches at the U.S. Air War College, will bring solid but less spectacular Soviet advances.

Soviet activity in black Africa is not unprecedented. Guinea, Mali, and Ghana all had close ties to Moscow during the 1960s.

But during the 1970s, Moscow signed special "treaties of friendship and cooperation" with four nations—Somalia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola—and prompted Cuba to dispatch some 30,000 troops to the latter two. The Soviets delivered weapons worth $3.4 billion to 21 black African nations and guerrilla groups in 1975–79, as opposed to only $182 million in 1961–71. By 1979, nearly 10,000 Soviet and Eastern European economic and military advisers were working in the region.

Yet the Soviet advance is not unlimited, Albright says. Moscow faces increasing economic difficulties at home and has more pressing preoccupations abroad than Africa—Eastern Europe, China, Afghanistan. The Soviets are also short of the kinds of forces (e.g., aircraft carriers, amphibious shipping) needed to conduct military expeditions far from home.

Soviet economic limitations are already apparent. During 1975–79, Moscow provided Ethiopia's Marxist regime with only $125 million in economic aid, while Western and OPEC nations and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank gave $725 million.

But even a stingy Moscow, Albright believes, will seize opportunities for intervention as they arise. And many probably will.

Black Africa includes some of the poorest nations on the globe, ripe for revolution. Twenty-six of the 48 political entities in the region (including Namibia, a disputed South African protectorate) suffered declines in their gross domestic product during the 1970s. In 26 states, population grew faster than per capita food output.

Political instability, aggravated by tribal rivalries, is ever-present. Chad, with a population of less than five million, is torn by discord among 11 political factions, with Libya joining in. Corruption among Africa's rulers has worsened enough to stir grassroots discontent, Albright says. It contributed to army coups in Liberia and Ghana during the early 1980s.

Albright sees several trouble spots developing. In mineral-rich Zaire, Africa's largest nation, Mobutu Sese Seko's pro-Western regime is imperiled by its own venality and the citizenry's continuing poverty. Somalia's President Mohammed Siad Barre, who tore up his treaty of "friendship and cooperation" with Moscow after the Soviets backed Ethiopia in the 1977–78 Somalia-Ethiopia war, faces food shortages at home and a variety of guerrilla groups on his borders. South Africa's military forays into neighboring Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique (see *WQ*, Winter 1983, p.40) are almost certain to lead to requests from these countries' leaders for more Soviet aid.

"America's Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy."

W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 500 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10110. 256 pp. $12.95.
Author: John E. Schwarz

"Government is not the solution to our problem . . . government is the problem," President Reagan declared in his 1981 inaugural address. It is a common view, and not only among conservatives.

Schwarz, a University of Arizona political scientist, contends that the federal government's bad image is unjustified. A look at the facts, he argues, shows that Washington's domestic policies during the 1960s and '70s—notably its frequently attacked antipoverty and environmental efforts—worked well and cost surprisingly little.

Between 1965 and 1972, for example, Americans' real per capita disposable income grew by three percent annually. But the new wealth did not "trickle down" to the poor, Schwarz says. Without federal welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, and other subsidies, 21.3 percent of the U.S. population would have lived below the poverty line in 1965, 19.2 percent in 1972. But when Washington's help is included, the decline in poverty is far steeper: from 19 percent of the population in 1965 to *nine* percent in 1972. By the late 1970s, poverty had dropped again, to between four and eight percent.

Washington made enormous strides in improving poor people's living standards. The rapid expansion of the food stamp program after 1969 virtually eliminated malnutrition in this country; Medicaid and other health programs drove down the infant mortality rate among blacks from 40.3 per 1,000 births in 1965 to 24.2 in 1975.

Federal environmental programs also achieved singular results. In 1970, for example, Congress mounted one of its biggest cleanup efforts when it greatly strengthened the 1963 Clean Air Act. By 1979, the levels of sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide in the air had dropped by 40 percent. Ten major cities studied by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) saw a 35 percent decline in the number of days per year with heavy pollution.

The cost of better air quality, according to the CEQ, was $16.6 billion in 1978. But the estimated benefits, chiefly in terms of improved human health, amounted to $21.4 billion.

Indeed, says Schwarz, government's critics have vastly exaggerated the burden federal programs place on taxpayers. Corporate income taxes, for example, actually dropped from an average of 47 percent of profits in 1960 to 39 percent by the late 1970s. While state and federal personal income taxes rose from an average of 10.8 percent of earnings in 1960 to 12.9 percent in 1979, they increased faster—from 7.2 to 10.8 percent—during the 1950s.

Government's growth is often blamed for the "stagnant" economy of the 1970s. But in fact, says Schwarz, the economy did quite well: Real per capita disposable income increased by 24.7 percent during that decade, twice as much as during the 1950s. Between 1965 and 1980, American businesses created 25 million new jobs. Chronically high unemployment was the result of the entry into the work force of record numbers of new workers from the maturing Baby-Boom generation and from the ranks of women.

If things really weren't so bad, then what went wrong? Vietnam and Watergate stirred up antigovernment feeling, Schwarz says, and conservatives were quick to capitalize on it. Setting the record straight, he contends, is the first step toward reversing that sentiment.

WILSON CENTER PAPERS

Summaries of key reports given at recent Wilson Center meetings

"United States–Latin American Relations: Shifts in Economic Power and Implications for the Future."

Paper by Sergio Bitar presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Wilson Center's Latin American Program, July 13, 1983.

Between 1945 and 1960, the United States and its Latin American neighbors developed a tightly knit economic and security relationship that virtually closed the Western hemisphere to outsiders. That arrangement has crumbled, says Bitar, an expatriate Chilean businessman and government official, though the full effects have yet to be felt.

In 1960, Latin America's gross domestic product (GDP) was 13 percent of U.S. GDP. In 1950, the United States provided 50 percent of Latin America's imports and bought 50 percent of its exports.

During the 1970s, things began to change radically. South and Central America's GDP had grown to 26 percent of U.S. GDP by 1980. Latin Americans were buying only 30 percent of their imports from the United States, and were sending only 33 percent of their exports north. The Latin Americans had opened their doors to business from outside the hemisphere. Imports from East Asia, for example, increased by almost 10-fold during the 1970s. In 1959, North American companies owned 111 of the 156 largest manufacturing firms in Latin America. By 1976, European and Japanese corporations had moved in, U.S. firms had moved out: Only 68 of the top 156 were North American.

While Latin America was welcoming new investors, U.S. businessmen were also looking elsewhere. Latin America's share of U.S. overseas investment dropped from 38 percent in 1950 to 12 percent in 1980.

The United States and Latin America have left behind them not only the "special relationship" and the massive U.S. aid envisaged by the 1961 Alliance for Progress, but also subsequent initiatives to promote trade by extending preferences to Latin America. Today, Washington is erecting protective barriers to impede the flow of cheap manufactured goods from the south.

Now that the United States no longer dominates the Americas economically, predicts Bitar, its political leverage in the region will decline. But the Latin nations have been slow to grasp what has happened.

Washington's muscle-flexing in Central America today makes it seem as if little has changed during the past two decades. But Bitar warns that the United States can ill afford to ignore alterations beneath the surface.

"Squaring Many Circles: West German Defense Policy between Détente, Alliance, and Deterrence."

Paper presented by Josef Joffe at a conference sponsored by the Wilson Center, September 22–23, 1983.

The political turmoil set off in West Germany by the December 1983 deployment of 572 U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles poses yet another test for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But West Germany is not likely to loosen its NATO ties, asserts Joffe, a West German journalist

now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

West Germany is the "product, the pillar, and the problem of the Atlantic Alliance," he says. It is a "child of the Cold War," nurtured by the Allies to counter Soviet expansion. After rearming in 1950, Germany joined NATO in 1955, and has since been one of its staunchest members. Today, the West Germans field 500,000 troops and provide 30 percent of all NATO combat aircraft in Central Europe, while playing host to 213,000 U.S. troops.

Yet harsh political and geographical realities separate the West Germans from the other members of NATO. Rearming and joining the Alliance were the price of regaining sovereignty after World War II. NATO membership meant abandoning all hope of reunification with East Germany. But maintaining cross-border family and cultural ties necessitated an "irreducible level of collaboration" with the Soviets that the NATO allies, particularly the Americans, sometimes find nettlesome.

Bonn's NATO membership also ensured that West Germany would be the front line in any superpower confrontation—it shares a 1,000-mile-long border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is always the temptation for Bonn, Joffe believes, to go it alone in defense to avoid being trapped between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The dilemma is deepened by uncertainty over the U.S. nuclear guarantee of West Germany's security. Ever since Moscow built its first ICBMs in 1957, West Germans have wondered whether Washington really would protect them at the risk of a nuclear attack on America.

Yet, the West Germans have long found the price of alliance worth paying. One reason, says Joffe, is that they could "enjoy the comforts of a cocooned civilian power while the United States, France, and England squandered their blood and treasure in military intervention around the globe."

The advent of the new American missiles—originally requested by the West Germans to ensure U.S. involvement in any East-West conflict in Europe—has exacerbated West Germany's "double-bind." Mass protests attest to the belief of many Germans that the weapons only increase the chance of a war in which they would be the chief victims.

The deployment controversy is not without parallel in West Germany. In the spring of 1958, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer forced and won a vote in the Bundestag to authorize the stationing of the first American tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. At the time, 52 percent of all West Germans favored a general strike to stop the deployment. But by the summer, the "grassroots had wilted," writes Joffe, and the antideployment Social Democrats lost badly in regional elections to Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union. Joffe argues that today's renascent peace movement is no more likely to prevail. "Every generation, it seems, must come to grips with the terrifying implications of nuclear weapons on its own."

Today's youthful protesters, he believes, will join their elders, most of whom accept the paradox of deterrence—"that we must forever hone our nuclear sword so as to render it ever more useless"—and the costs of membership in an alliance that guarantees their freedom.

This photograph of a Washington, D.C., elementary school class was taken by Francis B. Johnston, circa 1899. Between the 1899 and 1979 school years, U.S. public school enrollment grew from 15.5 million to 41.6 million.

Teaching in America

Since last spring, when the National Commission on Excellence in Education decried the "rising tide of mediocrity" in America's schools, a succession of blue-ribbon panels has joined in the chorus of condemnation and the search for effective reforms. Americans are again re-evaluating their expensive system of public education.

The chief problem, a by-product of America's turbulent 1960s, lies in the high school classroom. As researchers note, many, perhaps most, teachers now make a tacit deal with their restless students: "If you keep quiet, I won't make you work too hard."

The cumulative effects have been dramatic: One-third of 17-year-olds do no homework; 10 to 15 percent of high school graduates are functionally illiterate; one-fourth of *college* math courses are remedial; one-fourth of the Navy's recruits cannot read well enough to understand simple printed safety rules.

Our contributors variously summarize the latest research; Denis Doyle, looking to the future, sees a rare opportunity to upgrade teaching in the nation's schools.

WANTING IT ALL

by Patricia Albjerg Graham

The central quandary facing American teachers today is the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of the schools in which they work, the nature of the larger educational system of which those schools are but a part, and the relationship between the two. If education is more than mere schooling—and it is—then we should have been asking ourselves which educational activities truly belong outside the classroom door. Yet, increasingly during this century, and particularly in the years since World War II, we seem to have had as much trouble raising that question as we have had answering it.

The New England Puritans of the 17th century had no such problem. The purpose of education, they believed, was to prepare children to lead a moral and virtuous life; that task was shared, as a matter of course, among church, family, the larger

community, and, to a lesser degree, the schools. Because the role of schools was limited, the performance of teachers was a matter of limited concern.

Three centuries later, with formal schooling available to all and the responsibilities of each school more diverse, the old-fashioned certainties are not so obvious. Americans no longer agree on what a proper education (in a larger sense) consists of, or on what its ends should be, or on what proportion of those ends is best accomplished by the school (rather than by parents, neighbors, clergymen, and so on). Teachers, as a result, have been left adrift. They do not know whether their responsibilities are primarily cognitive or custodial or social, whether their aim is to produce good students or good citizens or both. They do not know where to focus their attention. Have they, for example, a special obligation to the bottom quartile of the class? Or to the top quartile? Or, heaven forbid, are teachers supposed to help every pupil do the best he or she can, patiently leading each along until achievement lives up to potential?

High School for Everybody

Teachers cannot answer such questions, let alone thornier ones, by themselves, and the lack of guidance from politicians, parents, and school boards makes harder a job that is already hard enough. There are reasons why that guidance has rarely been forthcoming, reasons why the messages to teachers about what they should be doing have been garbled. The fact is that the texture of life in the United States, of life as each of us lives it both in public and in private, has changed profoundly during the past four decades. Teachers were not the chief agents of social change. But they, perhaps more than any other professional group, have had to cope with the consequences.

The first of the several trends that complicated the task of teaching, and also made it more important, was the advent of mass education, mass secondary education in particular. In

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Patricia Albjerg Graham, 48, a former Wilson Center Fellow, is dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Born in Lafayette, Indiana, she received her B.S. (1955) and M.S. (1957) from Purdue, and her Ph.D. (1964) from Columbia University. She has taught in public and private schools in Virginia and New York City, and served as director of the U.S. National Institute of Education from 1977 to 1979. Her books include Progressive Education: From Arcady to Academe *(1967) and* Community and Class in American Education, 1865–1918 *(1974). This essay was adapted by the editors, with the assistance of researcher Michael Fultz, from a longer paper delivered at the University of Nebraska.*

1890, only seven percent of American youths between 14 and 17 were enrolled in school. High school, the National Education Association then observed, was reserved for the few "who show themselves able to profit by an education prolonged to the eighteenth year, and whose parents are able to support them while they remain so long at school." But an industrializing America required more of its workers. In 1945, the proportion of the 14–17 age group enrolled in high school had grown to 69 percent. By 1980, the figure was 93 percent—although only 72 percent graduated. Had all who graduated been able to perform at the 12th-grade level academically, we would have had much to be proud of. Unfortunately, that was not the case, although the certification provided by a high school diploma suggested that it was.

Good-bye to Algebra

The effect of mass education has not been confined to the academic side of schooling. As more and more children spent more and more time in the classroom, schools assumed growing responsibility for child-*rearing*. Between 1950 and 1980, the proportion of all families headed by a single parent (usually the mother) grew from 7.4 to 19.5 percent. Even in two-parent families, the mother, who in times past had often served as tutor, counselor, and conscience, was spending less and less time at home. By 1982, 66 percent of mothers with school-aged children held full- or part-time jobs (versus 35 percent in 1951). This second basic trend—the post-1950s restructuring of family and job market—gave the schools a set of new burdens with which teachers had to contend.

In response, educators developed a whole new array of subjects, marginally academic or not academic at all. Courses on alcohol and drug abuse, sexual conduct, and "consumer affairs" were added to the classroom menu. Between the mid-1960s and late 1970s, the proportion of graduating high school seniors who had received academic credit for driver education grew from less than one percent to 59 percent; for courses on "marriage and adult living," the figure rose from one to 16 percent. Meanwhile, the proportion of graduating seniors who had passed chemistry dropped from 51 to 45 percent, and the number who had completed intermediate algebra and introductory Spanish also declined.

Writing in *Daedalus* in 1981, David K. Cohen and Barbara Neufeld argued that the proliferation of curricular offerings had transformed high schools, in particular, into "a sort of state-

supported social agency for adolescents at loose ends."

While all of this was going on, a third factor expanded the schools' social role. Across the country, communities, like families, were becoming less cohesive. The U.S. economy, increasingly urban and corporate, demanded a mobile work force. The face of residential America changed accordingly. Vast housing developments, served by shopping malls, sprang up in the suburbs, providing shelter for transient families until the next job transfer took them someplace else.

TV As Nanny

Suburbia had its positive side. More middle-class and blue-collar families enjoyed a convenient compromise between urban amenities and rural elbow room. The increasing disorder and crime of the cities was left behind. But gone now was the circle of lifelong neighbors who, in earlier times, had extended beyond the home the family's protection and guidance of children. Mothers could no longer assume that their youngsters were always under watchful eyes. Playmates, and their parents, came and went; housing turnover was high.

Amid the commotion, the school stood out as a pillar of relative stability. After-school sports moved from the street or the corner playground to the high school gym, which also served as the site for weekend dances. Teachers found themselves supervising elections for Homecoming Queen and scheduling exams around pep rallies.

Not long after the schools began doubling as social centers, they became social laboratories as well. President Lyndon Johnson, a former teacher, decided early in his administration that schools could help lead the nation toward the Great Society. "Onto my desk each day come the problems of 190 million men and women," he told a group of visiting educators in 1964. "When we consider these problems, when we study them, when we analyze them, when we evaluate what can be done, the answer almost always comes down to one word: education."

Johnson waged his wars on poverty and racial discrimination largely in the classroom. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provided money to upgrade libraries, buy new textbooks, and give special instruction to children from low-income families. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforced the Supreme Court's 1954 ban on segregation in schools, requiring equal access to facilities involved in federally funded programs. Desegregation was long overdue. But rapid court-ordered shifts in enrollment focused the attention of many schools, North and


Stock market on the move again

75 LUCKY NUMBERS EVERY DAY

NEW YORK POST

FINAL
WALL STREET EXTRA

950,000

Koo leaves love nest in tears

STUDENT SETS TEACHER ON FIRE

Her first day on the job in B'klyn school

During the 1982–83 school year, New York City officials recorded 564 assaults on teachers on public school grounds.

South, on nonacademic matters.

Finally, even as schoolfolk were assuming obligations jettisoned or imposed by home and community, they faced stiff competition from a young upstart—the electronic media. The precocious growth of television since midcentury represents the last of the major forces that have heightened the uncertainty of the teaching profession.

Parents may have wanted schools to "do more," but they also seemed quite ready to let television play the role of nanny and friendly neighbor to their kids. The average child between the ages of six and 11 watched almost 29 hours of television per week in 1980, compared with 21 hours per week in 1966 and virtually none in 1950 (when only nine percent of American homes had TV sets). Teachers were caught in the middle, struggling for their pupils' attention while being blamed for failure by parents who were often happy to let Donna Reed do the baby-sitting at home. Television has competed not only for students' time, but for their psyches as well. Its messages, though incalculable in their effects, do not seem designed to shore up traditional values. An eight-year-old can learn many things from the average situation comedy. The virtues of hard work and self-discipline are not likely to be among them.

The five major trends just cited, from mass education to mass communication, all affected the complex balance of institutional responsibility for education. And it may be that as the schools' duties increased, their effectiveness diminished. Certainly, the rising tide of criticism of teachers and their schools had coincided with an ever-expanding definition of what formal education should amount to. Historically, the two have gone hand in hand.

As Lawrence Cremin has pointed out, American schools in the early decades of the century were already on the way to becoming "legatee institutions," inheriting new obligations. In the process, teachers increasingly came under attack. The fact that they had been saddled with new responsibilities did not spare them from criticism. "Seldom is the distance between what a profession thinks it is doing and what it is actually doing so great as in the case of teachers," wrote an editorialist in the *Social Frontier* in 1935. Teachers were variously deemed too inexperienced, too stupid, too old, too boring, too strict, too lax. Some of them undoubtedly were.

But, then as now, narrow criticisms often missed the more fundamental question, the question of function and purpose. How much, realistically, can we ask schools to do?

Soul-Searching

Public dissatisfaction with the public schools began to mount during the early 1950s as articulate critics, mainly from outside of education, took aim at professional educators and fired with devastating results. Teachers, they said, were neglecting the basics. They spent too much time on nonacademic subjects. They relaxed standards to enliven traditional courses. Style had won out over substance. "The issue is drawn between those who believe that good teaching should be directed to sound intellectual ends, and those who are content to dethrone intellectual values and cultivate the techniques of teaching for their own sake, in an intellectual and cultural vacuum." So wrote Arthur Bestor, whose *Educational Wastelands* (1953) and *The Restoration of Learning* (1955) ushered in a flurry of "back-to-basics" literature.

In 1957, the Soviet Union unwittingly galvanized American concern over elementary and high school academic programs. By launching Sputnik, the world's first space satellite, the Russians spread the soul-searching from the intellectuals to the people. Educational reform now had political momentum. A $1.1-billion National Defense Education Act was passed by Con-

From 1900 to 1960, mass education came to the high schools (right), bringing many students with no strong academic inclination. For teachers, this influx presented a pedagogical challenge . . .



HIGH SCHOOL ENROLLMENT



NUMBER OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS

For administrators, the challenge was bureaucratic. Districts, particularly rural ones, consolidated schools and merged with other districts (left) . . .

Source: U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education Statistics; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

PUPILS PER TEACHER



But efficiency has not increased, at least not in terms of the number of teachers and administrators required to educate a student. During the 1982–83 school year, $117.6 billion was spent on public education.

PUPILS PER ADMINISTRATOR



The growing percentage of women in the labor force (right) and rising family break-up rates (below) leave youths with less home supervision, placing new burdens on teachers.



*For 1951 and 1960, includes only women who are or have been married.



LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18

Migration from the Northeast to the South and West (as reflected below) has created temporary teacher shortages in some Sunbelt cities. School districts in Texas and California have placed ads for teachers in Boston and New York newspapers.

CHANGES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, BY STATE: FALL 1971 TO FALL 1981



Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.

gress in 1958, providing money to beef up math, science, and foreign language instruction (among other things). "We are engaged in a grim duel" for technological supremacy, warned Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.

The popular critique of public education soon evolved into an attack on teachers—and on teachers' colleges, the old normal schools. *The Education of American Teachers* (1963), by James B. Conant, former president of Harvard, and the vitriolic (and generally accurate) *The Miseducation of American Teachers* (1963), by James D. Koerner, president of the Council for Basic Education, set the tone. The theme permeating the protest literature was that teachers were incompetent, their incompetence reinforced by the professional educators they encountered in schools of education. As a result, American children were not learning as much or as well as they ought to be. Koerner's solution: "The remaining teachers' colleges of the United States should be shut down."

Crop-Dusting

In practice, efforts at reform focused, first, on placing public education in the hands of teachers trained in subject-matter disciplines, not in the ever-changing science of pedagogy; and, second, on enticing a new breed into teaching. The latter effort was aided by administrators at Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, and other universities, who set up Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) programs. Their goal was to channel a more academically advanced cadre of recruits, drawn from prestigious liberal arts institutions, notably eastern women's colleges, into the elementary and high school classroom.

The plan worked—for a few years. But the Radcliffe, Vassar, and Smith graduates who received their master's degrees soon found that, while teacher training had been modified, teaching conditions had not. For most MAT recipients, the classroom proved to be simply the first step on a road to other careers, —in business, philanthropy, law, or homemaking. Some became administrators, in schools or in other education-related organizations. Harvard closed its MAT program in 1973.

One alternative to reforming the education profession—an alternative that was attractive to many—was turning over the job to others better equipped to educate the young. Some believed that the task was simply a matter of providing a better, more rigorous curriculum, and the National Science Foundation spent $117 million between 1954 and 1975 on curriculum development, most of it organized by physicists, chemists, biol-

ogists, and other scientists at major universities. There was even some money to retrain teachers so they could understand the new material.

Meanwhile, private enterprise entered the arena with the "teacher-proof" curriculum, the assumption being that children would learn best if someone other than the teacher on the spot figured out just how the child should study the lesson. Intervention by the instructor was thought to be damaging—and, thanks to technology, possibly obsolete. In the Midwest during the 1950s, a four-engine airplane circled over six states, beaming prepackaged lessons onto closed-circuit television screens. In 1961, PLATO (Programmed Logic for Automatic Teaching Operations)—the first of many computerized teaching systems—made its debut at the Urbana-Champaign campus of the University of Illinois.

Yet despite attempts at educational "crop-dusting," despite the plethora of audio-visual equipment acquired by schools (and largely locked away in school storerooms), despite the transformation of school libraries (at least in name) into media centers, the great technological revolution in education failed to occur during the 1960s and '70s. To most teachers, Plato remained a Greek of distant memory.

O, Relevance

What is most striking about the educational climate of the past 35 years is the remarkable immunity that school people—instructors and administrators alike—felt from the criticism swirling about them, an immunity due partly to the demographic anomaly of the 1950s and '60s. With Baby-Boom enrollments rising, educators were a relatively scarce commodity. Even bad, they were often good enough. At the same time, the country's financial commitment to the schools was growing. The proportion of the gross national product spent on schools (including higher education), which had hovered around three percent from 1929 to 1959, reached 7.5 percent in 1969 and eight percent in 1975. With new schools going up and throngs of new students crowding the classrooms, teachers could afford to ignore the grumbling of the critics.

That immunity from rhetorical attack is one reason why the post-Sputnik emphasis on academic excellence failed to penetrate the schools more deeply than it did. There were other reasons, too. The 1960s brought vigorous criticism by the young of the "establishment" and the older generation. In the minds of students, teachers represented both. For many teachers, maintaining classroom order (and their own sanity) became a full-



The launching of Sputnik in 1957 prompted politicians and educators to voice renewed concern over the schools, but only six years later the long decline in students' SAT scores began.

time job. Academic matters took a back seat. Besides, the idea of devoting special attention to budding young scientists and engineers had an elitist ring to it. Elitism was emphatically not on the political agenda of the 1960s. Egalitarianism was. Compensatory education programs such as Head Start arrived on the scene. Teachers and supervisors embarked on a wave of experimentation. "Relevance," "open classrooms," "self-paced instruction," "affective education"—these were the watchwords of the day.

But the late 1970s and early 1980s have brought a reaction. Public discourse on education has reverted to the no-nonsense tone of the Sputnik era. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, whose widely read report was issued last year, concluded that Americans have, "in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament." Fingers are being pointed once again at teachers.

There are, however, crucial differences between the debate of 1957 and that being waged today. Now the external threat depicted is as much commercial as military—the adversary as likely to be Japan as the Soviet Union. Where post-Sputnik reformers called for cultivation of a competitive scientific and technical elite, reformers now demand *mass* improvement, contending that long-term economic health requires a more

broadly based excellence than winning the space race did.

There is one more vital difference: The days of rising enrollments and ever-greater spending are gone, and gone with them is the teachers' immunity from criticism. The number of annual U.S. births peaked in 1957 at 4.3 million. By 1975, enrollment was declining, schools were shutting down, "tenured" teachers were getting pink slips, and the percentage of GNP devoted to education was beginning to drop.

American teachers today face once more the dilemma they encountered during the late 1950s: The public expects more from the schools than just "book learning" but will accept no commensurate sacrifice of academic excellence.

The conflict between these demands, however, is more glaring now than it was after Sputnik. The intervening decades have been tumultuous. As noted, the family and many communities have become less and less stable. Respect for those in authority—be it teachers, parents, or public officials—has eroded. The electronic age has given birth to a new generation of distractions with names such as "Space Invaders," "Pac Man," and "Zaxxon." But if the problems go beyond the classroom, the solutions must still be found there—that, at least, is the curious bit of popular logic with which teachers must live.

The question for educators today, teachers in particular, is how to turn public dissatisfaction to good use. For one thing, teachers should become involved in the debate over what must be done to improve our schools; they know a great deal about what is feasible and what is not, and they know first-hand how elusive "improvement" will be without a clear statement of what the schools are supposed to achieve. What, precisely, are our goals? Teachers should also recognize that public attention, even if critical, has its value. They need that stimulus to push them to do better what they already do. Above all, they need what they are now getting: the implicit recognition by other Americans that what they do is important.



THE DEAL

by Gary Sykes

"A year or so before I began facing a classroom on a daily basis, I had the idea that teaching English would be a series of extended Socratic dialogues between me and my students. . . . I would lead forth my eager, responsive . . . idealistic students from the cave of adolescent mental wistfulness into the clear light of Truth upon the verdant and lush fields of literature."

So wrote Gary Cornog in *Don't Smile Until Christmas* (1970). Needless to say, he was mistaken.

Teachers have no monopoly on disappointment. Yet, in few professions does disillusionment come so quickly as in education. Teachers enter America's schools with uncommonly high ideals, and there, since the early 1960s, they have encountered an uncommonly harsh social reality.

Some teachers, undaunted by student apathy and disorder, merely redouble their efforts. Others, perhaps most these days, make certain adjustments. If they do not quit altogether, they slide away from the lofty goals that first drew them into teaching. They and their supervisors do not "fight the problem." Rather, in exchange for peace in the classroom, they settle for less and less from their students—and from themselves.

This widespread tacit accommodation, increasingly obvious to researchers but largely overlooked by outsiders, has helped to bring on the much-deplored "rising tide of mediocrity" in the nation's public schools.

Only by examining the average teacher's experience, from four years of formal education through four decades of schoolroom labors, can outsiders understand the maladies that afflict teaching, notably at the high school level, in the 1980s.

If there is one generalization that applies to virtually all 142,000 men and women who will enter teaching (in both public and private schools) for the first time this fall, it is that they are well meaning. They have chosen the job not for high pay or prestige (neither of which it now offers), but out of a sincere desire to help the young—to stir minds, to instill eternal values, even to act as surrogate mother, or father, to hundreds of youngsters. Many are driven by fond memories of a "special" teacher—someone who gave them their first solid dose of self-confidence or self-discipline, someone who showed them the beauty of art, literature, or logic.

In a typical group of beginning public school teachers, two-thirds (half of high school teachers and four-fifths of elementary

school teachers) are women. Nine percent are black—although 16 percent of schoolchildren are black.* Fifteen percent of public school teachers come from farm families, and 39 percent are the daughters or sons of unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled workers. The profession has long provided a "social elevator" for children of blue-collar parents.

Academically, young teachers are an undistinguished lot. The average education major graduates from college with a cumulative grade point average of 2.72, or a B-. In 1976, the American College Testing (ACT) program compared test scores of students in 19 fields of study and found those majoring in education tied for 17th place in mathematics and occupying 14th place in English. Education majors' Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores have fallen faster than those of the average high school student. Even before this long decline began in the early 1960s, teachers were not known as an especially intellectual group. A study conducted during the 1920s and '30s concluded that American teachers, on the whole, "have inferior minds."

Such perceptions by others burden aspiring teachers at many American colleges—particularly at those "elite" institutions where academic achievement is highly regarded. In *High School* (1983), Ernest Boyer, president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, cites the remarks of an Ivy League student who plans to teach: "We are under tremendous pressure all around to constantly justify our choice of a career. Professors want to know why we are taking this [career] course, and most of the other students think we are crazy."

The curriculum of the average student majoring in education does not inspire widespread admiration. Many of his courses richly deserve the scorn they receive from classmates in more taxing fields of study. Some lessons convey information better learned on the job—how to put together an attractive bulletin board, how to set up an opaque projector. Others aim

*These statistics describe the entire teaching force, but the population of incoming teachers differs little in terms of sex or race from the population of teachers at large. However, the percentage of black teachers—which has remained stable over the past few decades while the proportion of blacks among public school students has grown—may soon begin to decline. The increasing use of competency tests to screen incoming teachers has had a disproportionate impact on minority applicants. In Florida, for example, one-third of black applicants passed a 1982 teacher licensing exam, while 90 percent of white applicants did so.

Gary Sykes, 36, served as head of the Teaching Policy Studies Team at the National Institute of Education from 1980 until 1983, and is now at Stanford University completing his doctoral dissertation. Born in Milwaukee, Wis., he received a B.A. degree from Princeton in 1969. He has edited Value Conflicts and Curriculum Issues *(with Jon Schaffarzick, 1976) and* Handbook of Teaching and Policy *(with Lee Shulman, 1983).*

This portrait of a harried schoolteacher at day's end, titled "School Ma'am," was created by a New York City schoolchild more than 40 years ago.

higher—at techniques of teaching or the structuring of a curriculum. But too often these lessons only belabor the obvious and shroud it in the spun sugar candy of jargon. One manual on teaching in the elementary schools notes: "A unit, or a unit of work, can be defined as a purposeful learning experience focused upon some socially significant understanding that will modify the behavior of the learner and enable him to adjust to a life situation more effectively."

To be sure, some education courses are worth the time. There is a growing body of solid research, for example, on how best to teach reading and writing. But too few professors of education "keep up," and those who provide the new knowledge spend little, if any, time preparing prospective teachers for the classroom. Rare are education programs like the one at Michigan State University, which produces both good research and a good number of teachers.*

Many education majors will never teach in the public schools. Eighty-five percent will seek such jobs, attracted in part

*Education courses fall into two categories: "foundations" courses, which cover the legal, social, philosophical, or historical context of education, and "methods" courses. Students aiming for a high school teaching job usually satisfy degree requirements in their specialty—say, history or math—and allot many of their "elective" hours to education courses. Those headed into the elementary schools divide their "major" courses about fifty-fifty between education courses and a broad array of basic courses in math, reading, English, science, and history.

by the traditional security and long vacations that teaching offers. Only three-fourths of those will be hired. What it takes to be hired depends on many things—whether, for example, the job is sought at one of the nation's 2,134 urban public high schools, one of its 6,200 suburban high schools, or one of its (generally smaller) 9,721 rural high schools. If the district is large and urban, the applicant may have to traverse a bureaucratic maze: an interview with a personnel officer, a battery of tests administered by a consulting firm, and then more interviews—with a principal, a school superintendent, a committee of teachers. At a suburban or rural school, a college transcript, a few written recommendations, and a chat with the principal may suffice.

Whatever the process, the candidate's academic ability is not likely to loom large in it. Most studies indicate that applicants scoring high on standardized exams are no more likely to land a job than are low scorers. And they may be *less* likely. A nationwide study found that those education majors who *did not* find teaching positions in 1976 scored higher on four of five basic skills tests than those who did.

Waving at Passing Cars

If superior intellect does not help the candidate, then on what basis *are* teachers hired? What counts is the way they dress and talk; their sense of humor and of duty; and dozens of other unquantifiable indicators of how they will handle students, cope with daily chores, and get along with teachers and administrators. Like government bureaucrats and corporate executives, school principals, white or black, Northern or Southern, hire people they "feel good" about; they want employees who will "fit in," who will follow the rules, written or unwritten.

Even so, teaching is not a team endeavor. From his first day, the beginner is on his own.

Standing at the front of the class, concealing a bit of nervousness, he evaluates his young charges. He will likely be struck by their sheer diversity—a diversity not found in the classroom 25 years ago. In a matter of decades, we have desegregated our schools, introduced handicapped children into the classroom, and, in many districts, decided that pregnant teenagers and unwed mothers should stay in school. New immigrants from Mexico, the Caribbean, and East Asia have poured into the country. Roughly one-quarter of all public school students are members of minority groups. In Mississippi, Texas, and California, more than two-fifths are. Some ethnic politicians, concerned about preserving their "cultural heritage," insist that

immigrant children be taught in their native language while learning to speak English.*

The students are diverse in another sense as well—in terms of their eagerness to learn. A sizable number of them seem dedicated to the avoidance of work. Echoing widespread complaints, a seventh-grade teacher in Missouri last year wrote a letter to the Joplin *Globe* reporting that "children now come to school with two . . . ingrained notions: Society owes them something, and hard work plays no role in modern life." Teachers complain about this attitude not just because "force-feeding" knowledge to restless teenagers is difficult, but also because idle students are likely to distract others who would like to learn (or, at least, would not mind doing so).

For the teacher, the first day in class is crucial. Inevitably, several youths will seek to test his tolerance of disruption. Having measured it, they will push him to the limit routinely. In *Don't Smile Until Christmas*, Wylie Crawford describes a high school class in which he began the semester overlooking the transgressions of a few youths who sat on tables instead of in chairs, and occasionally gazed out the window. Before long, some were sprawled out on tables and others were waving at passing cars. "As far as the students were concerned, the testing period was already over, and they had won the game. I was going to be a pushover. And, since the other students had been watching the events of the first month, my list of offenders got longer as my blood pressure got higher."

Imposing Order

In frontier days, new male teachers sometimes faced a *physical* test during the opening weeks of the school year: They had to fight the biggest boy in class to earn respect. Unhappily, today's teachers, male or female, find themselves not much better off: More than 35 percent of them report feeling *unsafe* on the job. And even when the ritual testing of a teacher's mettle is a contest of will and not of might, it is a more demanding encounter than it was 30 years ago. In both cities and suburbs, veteran educators are nearly unanimous in testifying to the erosion over the past several decades of student civility and obedience.

Students are not the only cause of classroom disruption. Loudspeaker announcements, pep rallies and assemblies, bits of administrative paperwork—such chronic interruptions wreck

*This insistence on bilingual education is notable among Hispanics. Asian families are more likely to accept—indeed, to insist on—"total immersion" in English. Possibly as a result, Asian immigrants, as a group, make faster economic gains than do their Hispanic counterparts.

carefully planned lessons. One study found that 12 of the 57 minutes in the average high school classroom "hour" are taken up by administrative routine. As educational consultant Jerry Kaiser noted in his 1981 paper, "Sources of Stress in Teaching," "Teaching itself is not stressful—it's everything that gets in the way of teaching."

By the end of the first week of school, particularly high school, the beginning teacher understands the primary challenge: Impose order in the face of systematic disturbance. Then teach 20, 30, even 40 students—in spite of the fact that many of them do not want to learn.*

Striking a Bargain

The natural source of advice on how to perform such feats would seem to be other teachers. Here, however, the neophyte is in for a rude awakening. He rarely has a chance to talk to his colleagues; when "break" period finally comes, he finds that "shop talk" is frowned upon amid the cigarette smoke in the faculty lounge. Teachers cherish their autonomy. Each deals with classroom problems in his own way and prefers not to subject his idiosyncratic methods to discussion or inspection by others.

As time goes on, the newcomer may be lucky enough to find one or more "mentors" who will disclose the tricks of the trade. If so, he can ask them what to do about a 180-pound "boy" who not only hates to work, but ostentatiously refuses to do so; about teenagers who are afraid to display interest in a serious subject lest their peers shun them; about students who sincerely want to learn but simply cannot keep up with the class.

The old pro's answers to questions on such matters may not be inspiring. Particularly in high schools, where adolescent students are formidably strong in will and body, many teachers have resorted to what is widely known as "the deal."

The deal comes in several forms. At one level, it is a bargain struck between a teacher and one, or a few, students with a special penchant for disruption. The essence of the pact: "You don't bother me, and I won't bother you. You can do only token work. You can spend the hour daydreaming. But do so quietly. So long as you stifle your heartfelt desire to spread disorder, I will give you a passing grade."

Sometimes the deal is struck with an entire class. Consider this first-hand account, presented in Linda M. McNeil's 1982

*Research on the effect of class size on learning has yielded differing conclusions. Administrators tend to cite studies showing little or no effect. Teachers tend to cite studies showing that student achievement drops as class size grows—although the effect becomes marginal once class size exceeds 30.



Enrollment declines have reduced demand for teachers. Only 19 percent of teachers are under 30 (above left), down from 34 percent in 1966. Partly in response, the number of prospective teachers has dropped. So have their SAT scores—even faster than the national average (above right).



Source: National Education Association; Educational Testing Service; *Phi Delta Kappan*, Oct. 1981.

The most academically able teachers are least likely to continue teaching (above). One reason: salaries are low and have fallen in real terms (right).









Student marijuana use has leveled off, but use of harder drugs has not (above). Drug abuse—and crimes against person and property (upper left)—partly explain teacher discontent, which began rising in the late 1960s (left).

Source: New York City Board of Education; National Institute of Education; National Education Association.

study, *Contradictions of Control*, of how the subject of economics was introduced in a high school class: "Just announcing the topic makes students think they will have to do some work. The teacher gets them to cooperate without resisting by promising that indeed the study of this topic will require no commitment of effort, and little time on their part." McNeil calls this tactic "defensive simplification." A 1983 study cites the following remarks by teachers, overheard by researchers in various schools: "I'll write on the blackboard what you need to know"; "Helium, we won't worry about that"; and "Don't worry, we won't have any hard problems on the test."

The deal, a by-product of the tumult of the 1960s and 1970s, seems to make life simpler for all concerned. Multiple-choice tests, for example, are easier both to study for and to grade than essay exams. Thus, teachers and students alike can spend their after-school hours free from the exertion of focused thought. The average high school sophomore does 3.9 hours of homework per week—the typical senior only 3.7 hours.

Keeping Up the ADA

In many high schools, principals and administrators reinforce dereliction of the teacher's duty by insisting on peace but not on learning. The principal's office, after all, is today deluged with paperwork—preparing reports to higher authority, keeping track of federal and state dollars, teacher assignments, pupil absences. Disciplining students is not a welcome addition to this list. In most schools, new teachers soon learn that dispatching unruly children "to the office"—a traditional threat that can be an effective peacemaker so long as it is credible—is frowned on by the administration. And if it cannot be carried out, the threat is not credible. Hence, many teachers feel that they have no choice but to seek a "negotiated order" with their students, even if it turns the classroom into a virtual day-care center. Boyer recounts the words of a teacher in a school where aspirations had fallen to a low level: "The goal, I guess, is to keep things quiet and have kids come to school and get their ADA (average daily attendance) . . . and to get through the year."

There is another reason why administrators allow learning to be sacrificed in the name of order: Some have no great reverence for intellectual pursuits. Many of them, after all, did not enter the business of education to teach *academic* subjects. One 1978 study found that 35 percent of high school principals had previously been high school athletic directors. Moreover, academic rigor often means that not all students pass muster. Even

POWER SHIFTS

In British classrooms, corporal punishment (for boys) is an old tradition; in Sweden, it is a felony. In some French public schools, pupils must wear uniforms; in Norway, they may wear what they wish. In the United States, student councils may run the senior prom; in Denmark, they sometimes run the school.

The rights, privileges, and responsibilities of pupils, teachers, parents, and school administrators vary from country to country. But the trend in recent years throughout the industrialized West is striking: Schools are becoming more and more permissive. Administrators, in turn, are losing authority over both students and teachers.

Abroad, this trend is mainly the work of legislators and centralized ministries of education. In America, the courts are primarily responsible. Thanks to a string of civil liberties rulings since 1965, writes Columbia's Diane Ravitch, "almost no area of administrative discretion has been left untouched."

The biggest winners, at least in court, have been the young. Outside the schoolroom, children have increasingly been able to slip the leash. They have sued their parents for "divorce"—and won. They can buy birth control pills without their parents' knowledge. In most states, they can undergo an abortion without their parents' consent. And ever since *West Virginia* v. *Barnette* (1943)—when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that students could not be compelled to salute the flag—they have gradually acquired a broad array of First Amendment rights in the classroom. As Justice Abe Fortas put it in a landmark 1969 opinion (*Tinker* v. *Des Moines Independent Community School District*), students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression at the schoolhouse gate."

Tinker involved a group of students who wore black armbands in class to protest the Vietnam War. Unless behavior "materially and substantially" disrupts classroom activities, students today may also speak out against school policies, criticize teachers and principals, publish underground newspapers, and (in most states) wear their hair and clothes as they please. Adults who violate these rights, the Supreme Court has ruled, can be held liable for damages.

What students have gained at the expense of teachers, teachers have gained at the expense of principals and school boards. In *Pickering* v. *Board of Education* (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that an Illinois high school teacher could not be fired for writing in a local newspaper that taxpayers "were really taken to the cleaners" by the local school board. Two years later, a federal court in Alabama de-

a modest pupil failure rate does not reflect well on the principal. Perfunctory "social" promotion of students, ready or not, from one grade to the next is thus encouraged—another costly deal.

Even fellow faculty members often do not place a premium on teaching children; rather, they value *trying* to teach chil-

cided that a high school teacher could not be dismissed for requiring her students to read Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s *Welcome to the Monkey House*, even though the principal considered it "literary garbage." Academic freedom, wrote Judge Frank Johnson, is "fundamental to a democratic society."

Teachers today also enjoy more leeway in their private lives. They can no longer be fired for getting married or pregnant, or for being fat. They are unlikely to lose their jobs for "immoral conduct" unless it clearly relates to their professional duties. In *Morrison* v. *State Board of Education* (1969), for example, the California Supreme Court reinstated a teacher who had been fired for engaging in a brief homosexual affair (with another teacher).

Needless to say, school administrators no longer rule the roost. They cannot require students to participate in religious exercises or junior ROTC, lower a student's grade for misbehavior, or suspend a student from school without a hearing. Former Boston school superintendent Robert Wood observes that administrators today cannot act without "looking nervously over their shoulders and conjecturing mostly about 'what the court will do next.'"

Yet, on a few issues, the judges have held the line. They have, for example, rejected students' attempts to sue schools for "educational malpractice." The U.S. Supreme Court has also left teachers and administrators free to search students' lockers for drugs or stolen goods and to employ corporal punishment—even when parents object. Forty-six states and most local school districts still permit teachers or principals to tweak ears and rap knuckles.

Whatever the incremental gains and losses on specific issues among the parties involved, the net effect is clear: Educators have less room to exercise their judgment in day-to-day affairs. "Administration by rule," RAND social scientist Arthur Wise notes, has increasingly supplanted "administration by persons"—a bureaucratic development, he adds, that ill suits "the reality of classroom life."

dren—spending time with slow learners, sponsoring extracurricular activities, staying late grading papers. Teachers who get an "A" for effort are well thought of—by both their students and their colleagues—even if they merit a "D" for their success in imparting knowledge.

One reason for this apparent contradiction is that it is difficult to determine when teachers are "succeeding" with children. Therein lies one of the central frustrations of the trade.*

Of course, those few teachers who remove all doubt as to their effectiveness will not become pariahs as a result. The "hard" teacher, who piles on the homework and makes true mastery of a subject a prerequisite for a good grade, will be highly regarded by his colleagues. Yet, the earnest, if less effective, teacher is also well respected—as is the teacher who, for *whatever* reason, is popular with his students.

Why are rigor and academic excellence not the *overriding* criteria by which teachers judge one another? Nobody knows for sure. The answer may lie in the kinds of people who want to be teachers; they are generally kind-hearted, and some may simply be *too* kind-hearted. Or it may be that administrators unwittingly screen out the more scholarly or zealous among the job applicants. Perhaps the root of the problem is the general lack of respect for demanding intellectual endeavor that, if the truth be told, pervades our society, including the educators. Whatever the reason, the fact is that the social pressures surrounding teachers in the 1980s often militate against good work.

No Excitement

As a teacher's first year in school draws to a close, the gulf between expectation and reality is all too apparent. Answering the questions of inquisitive students, mediating fervent class debates—these images lured many teachers into the profession, but for most they have remained images only.

Researchers for the 1983 study *A Place Called School* found that teachers spend less than three percent of their class time giving students "corrective feedback." They also noted a general lack of emotion in most classrooms. Laughter, enthusiasm, and such positive expressions from teachers and students as "You did a good job" or "This is interesting" were seldom heard. Even *negative* emotional expressions—"That was stupid," or "Go sit in the corner"—were rare. Whether a flat, somber atmosphere necessarily makes for bad education is debatable; but certainly many teachers entered the profession with a different vision of life in the classroom.

*The growing emphasis on standardized test scores has not roused the enthusiasm of teachers. While most consider the scores to be valid indicators of achievement in some areas, such as reading and mathematics, many feel that the tests do not accurately measure "higher order" skills such as interpretation and analysis. They worry that, because of the attention given to test scores by newspapers and the public, administrators will become so preoccupied with imparting basic "how-to" skills that more subtle intellectual habits will not be instilled in the young.

"Breakthroughs"—sudden flashes of interest from students whom other teachers have failed to reach—do occur, but rarely. So it is with the "good" classes: They exist, but not in abundance. Perhaps a few graduates will someday return to express gratitude, but not many. It is these intangible rewards, which are in such short supply, that are most treasured by teachers.

Thus, between 10 and 20 percent of teachers typically call it quits after one year on the job. In one extreme case, researchers found that two-fifths of the teachers who entered St. Louis public schools during the 1968–69 school year did not return for a second year.

Most remain on the job—perhaps because the profession does make good on *some* of its promises. Yet even these rewards often turn out to be double-edged swords.

46 Hours a Week

One such reward is the day-to-day freedom granted to teachers. Once they close the classroom door, how they teach is their business. They can use filmstrips, debates, or high drama to drive their lessons home. There are no superiors looking over their shoulder—and no peers, either.*

But sometimes a bit more oversight—or at least collegiality—would be welcome. In a survey conducted for a 1982 study of teacher "burnout," 62 percent of teachers in suburban schools said they had never or rarely received support or encouragement from their principals, and 60 percent had never or rarely felt a "sense of community" among the faculty and administration. In urban schools, the figures were 77 percent and 69 percent. In *Schoolteacher*, Dan Lortie recalls a grade school teacher's lament: "Lots of times you wonder. The principal never comes to see you. . . . You never see some of the other teachers. And you wonder, well, what do they think of you—are you doing a good job?"

To add to the frustration, the freedom that teachers enjoy has well-defined limits. How they teach is their business. But *what* they teach is determined, at least in a broad sense, by the state and by local school boards. Teachers can choose supplementary materials, but not basic textbooks.

The work calendar that seemed to offer so much time for va-

*The working conditions of "autonomy and equality" developed in response to the facts of the teacher labor market: Education has long been a profession of high turnover, providing, according to the stereotype, intermittent employment for women and temporary employment for men (or, as educator Willard Waller wrote fifty years ago, "unmarriageable women and unmarketable men"). So a faculty consisting of interchangeable—and not interdependent—parts made sense from the point of view of administrators.

TEACHERS, UNIONS, AND POLITICS

During the 1982–83 school year, under the auspices of the National Education Association or the American Federation of Teachers, 56,000 teachers went on strike in 106 school districts across the country. The education of 895,000 students was disrupted, in some cases for as long as three months. This was not an unusual year.

But the nation's two teachers' unions—to which more than 95 percent of America's 2.1 million public school teachers belong—do more than lead strikes. Both influence what is taught in the schools, and both are active in state and national politics. They lobby for and against education bills, contribute to political campaigns at every level, and marshal thousands of field workers—who have brains, energy, and spare time—to help get out the vote for favored candidates for public office. Most noticeably, the NEA, now led by high school teacher Mary Hatwood Futrell, routinely wages ideological crusades having little, if anything, to do with education.

The NEA, which now has 1.7 million members (not all of them teachers), was founded in 1857 as the National Teachers' Association, an elite fraternity of teachers and administrators devoted to bringing education to the masses. During the 1900s, it evolved into a full-fledged labor union—in fact, if not in name. As the association became more militant in the 1960s, it also expanded its agenda. In 1981, for example, the NEA co-sponsored a protest demonstration near Three Mile Island against nuclear power. Its spokesmen have opposed development of the MX missile. And some of its "education" publications have drawn fire for their strong political flavor.

An NEA curriculum guide on the Ku Klux Klan, prepared in the late 1970s, tells teachers that "the Klan is only the tip of the iceberg, the most visible and obvious manifestation of the entrenched racism in our society." An implicitly pro–nuclear freeze instructional kit ("Choices: A Unit on Conflict and Nuclear War") was labeled "political indoctrination" by the *Washington Post*.

Mary Hatwood Futrell

The rival AFT, formed in 1916 by the merger of four small midwestern teachers' organizations, was a labor union from the beginning. Led today by Albert Shanker, it represents teachers in New York, Chicago, and other big cities. The AFT, a 580,000-member AFL-CIO affiliate, takes a liberal stand on many domestic issues. But, compared to the NEA, it seems staunchly middle-of-the-road, even "traditional," on many school matters.

Where the NEA supports federally-mandated bilingual education, Shanker's union believes that state and local

governments should be free to decide how to teach non–English-speaking children. The NEA opposes the "misuse" of standardized tests for students —and considers "misuse" roughly equivalent to "use." Former NEA executive director Terry Herndon compared the Princeton-based Educational Testing Service, which administers the SAT tests, to "armaments manufacturers who say, 'Guns don't kill, people do.'" The association leadership is also against minimum competency tests for teachers. The AFT sees a place for standardized exams both in evaluating students and in screening new teachers. So clear are the contrasts between the two unions that Edward B. Fiske, education editor of the *New York Times*, has suggested that the AFT "would probably consider coming out against the use of lunch boxes if the [NEA] came out for it."



Albert Shanker

Indeed, the AFT likes to needle the NEA on its political and educational views. It published a brochure titled "The AFT vs. the NEA," which recounts, among other things, an NEA official's remarks on theft in the schools. Testifying before a Senate committee, he observed, "Any [economic] system that perpetuates children carrying money, and places those in an awkward position who do not have it to carry, requires a hard, close look."

With its left-of-center political leanings, the NEA has in recent years been the more conspicuous force in national (Democratic) politics. It was largely responsible for the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Education, which candidate Jimmy Carter pledged to establish in return for the NEA's endorsement in 1976. After honoring his vow, Carter got vital support from NEA delegates in his 1980 nomination fight with Sen. Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. (At the Democratic convention, 310 of the 3,331 delegates belonged to the NEA.) The NEA and the AFT have already endorsed Walter Mondale for President in 1984.

Shanker believes that the NEA will soon undergo a philosophical transformation—if only for strategic reasons. The association's opposition to teacher testing, he contends, will win it few political friends during the 1980s. And its leadership is clearly more liberal than its rank-and-file. According to a 1981 NEA poll, 70 percent of public school teachers consider themselves to be either conservative or leaning in that direction. Hence, Shanker believes, the NEA must choose between moderating its stance on educational and political issues or ceding influence to the AFT. He thinks it will choose the former. Speaking of the NEA at the National Press Club last year, he predicted: "Its position will become our position."

cationing and moonlighting is less attractive after a year on the job. True, summers are free; 29 percent of teachers spend the time traveling, 21 percent take outside jobs, and another seven percent work in summer schools. But during the school year, many holidays and some weekends are spent grading papers. The average teacher devotes 46 hours per week to instructional duties. (Nationwide, the average workweek for private, nonagricultural workers is 35 hours.) Further, 59 percent of secondary school teachers surveyed by the NEA in 1981 reported working without compensation on school-related activities for seven or more hours per week. And for many teachers, time in class is *not* spent teaching the subject they concentrated on during college.*

Good-bye to the PTA

But perhaps most demoralizing to teachers is the public's opinion of them. Historically, what esteem has been tendered to teachers in America has been qualified. As Lortie observed, "Teaching . . . is . . . honored and disdained, praised as 'dedicated service,' lampooned as 'easy work'. . . . Real regard shown for those who taught has never matched professed regard." Some evidence suggests that "real regard" has fallen even lower in recent years. Seventy-five percent of those citizens surveyed in 1969 said they would "like to have a child of [theirs] take up teaching in the public schools as a career." In 1972, the figure was 67 percent. By 1983, it was down to 43 percent. Parents' day-to-day support for teaching has fallen, too. PTA membership declined from 11 million in 1966 to 5.9 million in 1981 (although part of the drop was due to declining enrollment). Over that same period, the proportion of teachers belonging to a parent-teacher association dropped from 78 percent to 57 percent.

Indeed, although parents were once teachers' reliable allies in a campaign against ignorance and misbehavior, that alliance has suffered from neglect, or worse. Gerald Grant, a professor of education and sociology at Syracuse University, cites in a 1982 study the example of an elementary school teacher who sent a note to parents asking for cooperation in correcting their child's pattern of tardiness. In reply, the father told the teacher to "stop sending these notes that upset my child just because you have a middle-class hangup about time."

The reasons for the precipitous decline of esteem for teach-

*The problem of "misassignment" is less severe now than it was two decades ago. In 1961, 31 percent of public school teachers reported being assigned outside their area of preparation. By 1981, the figure had dropped to 16 percent. Still, in subjects where there is a teacher shortage, such as math and science, the quality of instruction continues to suffer from misassignment.



Students at Cardozo High School in Washington, D.C., tend their babies during lunch period. A day-care center was established at Cardozo in 1981. Pregnant teenagers are now accommodated in many schools.

ers among lay people are many. One is that, in the wake of "women's liberation," teaching is now derided by some feminist writers as traditional, hence oppressive, "women's work." And unionization may have tarnished the profession's image. Strikes and bitter salary negotiations, critics of unions say, have undercut the spirit of voluntarism in teaching and have eroded a long-standing source of psychic support for teachers—the sense that their profession is a noble calling, a "secular ministry."

In some ways, the very *success* of teachers has, over the decades, undermined their social status. As they have educated more youngsters and sent more high school graduates on to higher education, a vast new generation of middle-class Americans with college degrees has formed. Years ago, many parents stood in awe of a teacher's educational credentials. Few do so now.

It is no surprise, all things considered, that about half of all teachers leave the profession within seven years of their first day in class. The ones who remain will not be the cream of the crop. A study conducted in North Carolina found that, of those white female teachers whose scores on the National Teachers Examination ranked in the top tenth, 37 percent were still teaching

after seven years; of those who had scored in the lowest tenth, 62 percent were still on the job. Math and science teachers are especially likely to leave the profession early: Many can double their salaries by moving into the private sector.

Those who continue to teach will do their best to make the job bearable. For too many, that means settling for the deal. For others, it means specialization. Seeking students genuinely interested in the subject matter, they create courses with alluring names such as "Personal Relations," "Man to Man," and "Troubleshooter." Through such entrepreneurship, they acquire dedicated young followers—just as coteries form around charismatic college professors. Teachers thus end up in the paradoxical position of enticing students *away* from basic academic subjects. And they are succeeding. By the late 1970s, 42 percent of high school students were in the "general" or hodgepodge curricular track—as distinguished from the "academic" and "vocational" tracks. During the late 1960s, the figure was only 12 percent.

From Bad to Worse

This, in a sense, is another deal cut with students, one to which the entire school system is a party. Students who have no interest in high school are given a number of concessions in exchange for their agreement to go through the motions until graduation day. They are allowed to leave school early each afternoon for part-time work, to smoke at lunchtime, to take token courses, to graduate as functional illiterates. In return, the local school system can point to a high student "retention" rate, and thus, to "progress." Few parents or civic leaders complain.

Another strategy by which teachers make their careers tolerable is relocation. Black or white, they tend to transfer from districts that serve poor children to schools serving middle-class children—leaving already turbulent inner-city schools to be staffed by a continual influx of new, inexperienced instructors. This practice is fading as enrollments decline; where demand for teachers slackens, they cannot be so choosy. Yet studies indicate that slum districts and isolated rural schools still have particular difficulty attracting and keeping qualified teachers. Across America, the distribution of talent is as serious a problem as the supply.

For teachers who do not find refuge in offbeat courses or suburban schools, the second decade of teaching can be frustrating. By their late thirties, most have reached the top of the salary scale. Thereafter, they observe college classmates—and former colleagues who bailed out early—continuing to advance

in pay and prestige. The only way to move up is to move out: Become a school administrator, or get out of the business altogether. But how many companies want to hire an untrained 40-year-old? Many teachers, tired of their jobs but unable to find work elsewhere, spend the last two decades of their careers in a state of resignation. The fire is gone.

They are now more likely than ever to succumb to the temptation of the deal. Cumulatively, such compromises further reduce the value of school for the young and, inevitably, undermine public esteem for teaching. This loss of respect spreads from parent to child, eroding authority in the classroom and triggering further losses of prestige for the profession. Thus, low morale among teachers leads to bad teaching, which then leads to lower morale and worse teaching.

Of course, for at least a large minority of teachers, the profession turns out to be, if not all they had hoped for, at least a reasonable facsimile. The most successful teachers have deep reserves of energy, and of patience, and support from higher-ups and community leaders. They derive satisfaction from the knowledge that they make a small contribution—even if it cannot be measured—to the intellectual growth of their students. They endure—indeed, prevail over—the many frustrations engendered by the "system" and by the larger society.

But too many teachers do not. They spend their first day on the job trying to secure order in the classroom so that learning can proceed. But by the end of the week, or the end of the year, or the end of a decade, order has become an end in itself. And learning has fallen by the wayside. The costs to the young and to America are incalculable.



WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OTHERS?

by Val D. Rust

America is not the only country where teaching is not what it used to be.

In the once-homogeneous West German cities of Plettenberg and Altona, teachers must overcome barriers of language and culture much like those that complicate teaching in Florida, New York, and Texas. One of every three students in these two cities, and one out of five in Hamburg, are children of blue-collar "guestworkers"—from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain. Most speak little German, and their parents resist full assimilation into German culture.

American schools have no monopoly on violence or delinquency, either. The term "blackboard jungle" is used frequently by Japanese newspapers. In a nation preoccupied with scholastic achievement (see box, pp. 84–85), the pressure on teachers and pupils alike can be intense. Last year, a handicapped Japanese teacher, harassed by students, stabbed one of them with a fruit knife. In Kisarazu, near Tokyo, a 14-year-old girl was beaten with a bamboo sword for hours by a dozen classmates. Halfway around the world, West German teenagers in black leather jackets, Maltese crosses sewn on their sleeves, bully teachers and steal from classmates. A story about these *Halbstarken* ("half-crazies") appeared last year in the news weekly *Die Zeit* under the headline "Kids are Killing the Life of Teachers."

"Teacher burnout," too, appears to cross national boundaries. In France, the problem became so serious that in 1972, the government established a "National Re-Adaptation Center" where beleaguered teachers can receive free hospital care and psychotherapy. Hundreds have sought treatment. Concern for teachers' well-being has not, however, stifled criticism of their performance. Only last year, French President François Mitterrand, addressing his Council of Ministers, blamed shoddy teaching for the younger generation's "loss of a collective memory."

In England as well, public officials are demanding that teachers improve their work. Her Majesty's inspectors reported in 1982 that too many teachers "revealed insecurity in the subject they were teaching." Rather than engage their students in

thoughtful discussion, they relied on "narrow questions often requiring monosyllabic answers." The Secretary of State for Education and Science confirmed the diagnosis in a 1983 White Paper—but recommended against expensive remedies. Teachers must simply work harder, the report concluded, and their training should be tougher.

As teachers come under fire, their social status and their self-esteem inevitably suffer. A 1981 International Labor Organization study found that politicians and parents alike are losing confidence in the schools and those who staff them. The result in many countries has been a "lowering of morale and decreasing interest in teaching as a profession."

Declines in the psychic rewards of teaching help to explain the proliferation of teachers' strikes and work slowdowns. In 1979, West Germany's *Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft* (Union of Education and Science) used both tactics in a struggle to hold the teacher's classroom time down to 25 hours per week. In Japan, teaching has long been considered a "saint's job," but teachers are seeking more than spiritual compensation. The radical Japanese Teachers' Union now takes the position that teachers are "laborers" and must resist exploitation.

240 Schooldays

If it is more difficult to be a teacher these days, it is also more difficult to become one. Thanks to declining birthrates, the supply of instructors continues to exceed the demand. In most Western European countries, an aspiring teacher has only a one-in-three chance of landing a job immediately after finishing college. Some 40,000 of West Germany's unemployed adults are trained teachers.

Turmoil within the classroom, criticism from without, rising militancy, and a shortage of jobs—this is the teaching environment in much of the world. And when we look beyond the headlines, at the less-publicized conditions of teaching, we find further parallels among nations. The length of the school year, for example, varies little. The average American teacher is due in class between 178 and 185 days per year. In England and Norway, 190 days per year is typical, and in other European countries, the average falls between 180 and 200. (Japan and West Germany, where teachers work as many as 240 days per year, do not fit into this pattern, but West Germany will before long. It is moving from a six-day school week to a five-day week.) And, whereas America and England were once unusual in their reliance on women for teaching, females are now well represented

in schools throughout Europe.*

But are the *similarities* among classrooms in the West most illuminating to Americans? Not really. William Taylor, principal of London University, recently commented, "Educational conditions in different countries are about 95 percent the same . . . but the differences are the crucial ones." Indeed, we might learn something from such contrasts. By some major measures, school systems in the United States are inferior to those in Europe and Japan. It would be useful to know why.

Losing Ground

Arrayed against their peers abroad, American students have fared poorly in standard tests. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement administered exams to elementary and secondary school students in 17 developed countries, including Japan, West Germany, and Italy. Some 30,000 American pupils, ages 10 to 19, took a total of 19 exams in subjects ranging from mathematics to literature. As a group, they finished last in seven categories. On *no* test did they rank first or second. (Perhaps the most impressive performance was turned in by the Japanese, who participated in only six tests and finished first in three.) Some American scholars question the significance of these results. They note that the United States is more successful than most developed countries in keeping children on the school rolls; so perhaps the "average" American student found himself pitted against above-average students abroad. In 1980, 93 percent of American students between the ages of 14 and 17 were enrolled in school. In 1983, the estimated proportion of 14–17-year-old children enrolled in school was 95 percent in Japan, 85 percent in France and Britain, 79 percent in Australia, and 55 percent in Italy. But differences in teacher training and

*Japan and West Germany long excluded women from the classroom, but the two world wars ended this custom. Last year, 51 percent of the teachers in West Germany were women, compared with 40 percent in Japan, 61 percent in France, and 60 percent in Britain. Today, the "feminization" of teaching at all levels of schooling worries educators in some European countries, largely because of a sad but true fact: As the proportion of women in a given profession exceeds some critical level, the profession's status declines.

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

"Today we're discussing . . . splat . . . in social studies . . . pow . . . the topic . . ." was the caption of this cartoon, which appeared in the West German newsmagazine Der Spiegel *in 1979.*

ability may also account, at least in part, for the relatively poor showing of American youngsters.

In this regard, there is a key difference between the teaching professions in America and in Europe—what, in shorthand, we might call "dualism." The term refers to the separate and unequal treatment most European countries give primary school teachers, on the one hand, and secondary school teachers on the other. American teachers, grades one through 12, are remarkably similar in terms of education, pay, and ability. In Europe, grade school teachers are second-class citizens compared to their high school colleagues—who undergo far more rigorous training and reap the higher salaries and prestige awarded to respected academic professionals.

The roots of "dualism" go back 500 years—back to the separate historical meanings, in Europe, of terms that have become synonymous in America: grammar school and elementary school. "Grammar schools," the precursors of the modern European high schools, emerged during the Renaissance and played an important role in the popular revival of Greek and Roman learning. In the grammar schools, students as young as seven and as old as 20 acquired the linguistic and analytical skills needed to appreciate classical literature and philosophy. Upon

graduation, they typically pursued a university degree, which provided entry to the community of scholars and, hence, access to the fields of medicine, law, or teaching.

Grammar school teachers, like their students, were drawn primarily from the upper classes. They had attended elite schools themselves—the great "public" boarding schools in England, the *lycées* in France, and the *Gymnasien* in Germany. Like college professors, they belonged to academic societies, conducted arcane research, and read scholarly papers to assemblies of their peers. Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for example, wrote and published both volumes of his *Science of Logic* (1812 and 1816) during his eight-year tenure as headmaster of a Nuremberg grammar school.

Aping the Prussians

Elementary school students—and their teachers—were a different breed altogether. Lower schools did not appear in Europe on a large scale until the Protestant Reformation, as church-sponsored Bible-study classes. They eventually fell under control of local and then national governments, and their function changed accordingly. In a mercantile, hierarchical, religious society, they now imparted literacy, a common set of values, and devotion to God and country—in short, the ingredients of order in the emerging nation-state.

For such purposes, poor but literate laborers and housewives would do as teachers. Sometimes classes were held in church buildings, and gravediggers or sextons doubled as instructors. In 19th-century England, the task often fell to educated poor women—like Biddy in Charles Dickens's *Great Expectations* (1861), who keeps school for Mr. Wopsle's great aunt in "a little general shop."

Even during the mid-19th century, when primary school teachers in some countries were given education beyond elementary school, they did not partake of the rich diet given to the high school teacher; they attended not universities but special two-year teacher training academies, where subjects such as science, mathematics, and language took a back seat to religion, civics, and the rudiments of pedagogy.

In America, as the public schools developed, some educators set out to copy the Europeans. In 1836, Calvin E. Stowe, a classics scholar from Dartmouth and a proponent of universal education, declared the Prussian system of education "as nearly complete as human ingenuity and skill can make it," and challenged Ohio legislators to copy it. To a certain extent, they did.

So did lawmakers in other states. The disciplined atmosphere of the late 19th-century American classroom, where silence was rarely broken except by teachers' instructions or mass recitation, was Prussian in inspiration.

Yet this was only one-half of the Prussian system—the bottom half, designed to turn the masses into reliable followers. The "grammar school," where Europe's leaders and professionals were trained, was not replicated, at least not on a large scale. To be sure, well-to-do New Englanders sent their sons to Protestant boarding schools—Exeter, Andover, Deerfield, and Choate. And some students took practical courses at other private "academies" en route to jobs as technicians or businessmen. (The first of these, the Academy of Philadelphia, was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1751 and evolved into the University of Pennsylvania.) But such schools affected few Americans.

The American high school, which took form after the middle of the 19th century, had different roots. These schools grew incrementally, almost spontaneously, out of the grade school: "Advanced" courses, held for inquisitive teenagers, gradually gained the blessings of local school boards. During the last half of the century, state legislatures endorsed the idea of a separate school for "graduate" students. As the idea caught on, many educators, intent on building a system that would cut across class lines, shied away from the intensive academic focus found in Europe. In 1908, the National Education Association resolved that "the public high schools should not be chiefly [preparatory] schools for higher institutions, but should be adapted to the general needs, both intellectual and industrial, of their students and communities."

Separate and Unequal

If high school is merely an extension of grade school, why should the training of high school teachers differ much from the training of grade school teachers? The answer seemed obvious during the mid-19th century, and to some—including, it seems, the people who educate our teachers—it still does. Many of today's high school teachers, like elementary school teachers, qualified for their jobs by obtaining a bachelor's degree in education. True, their studies may not have been confined to child psychology and curriculum planning; many satisfied degree requirements in the subjects they teach. But is that enough? These days, a handful of college-level courses in math hardly qualifies one to teach an advanced placement course in Calculus II.

In Europe, educators seem to recognize this. There, mass

JAPAN: THE EXTREME CASE

In many countries, teachers are confused about what the public really expects of them. Not so in Japan. There, the teacher's job is well defined: to prepare students for standardized tests.

Performance on exams largely determines what kind of high school (vocational or academic) a teenager will attend—and whether it will be a first-rate school. In the last year of high school, a second round of testing channels the highest achievers into prestigious universities. One's alma mater, in turn, helps to shape the rest of one's social and economic life.

For young Japanese (and their parents), the result is an obsession with learning: hard work, high pressure, strict discipline, and conformity. Students wear uniforms in class, rarely ask questions or express opinions, and heed the old Japanese proverb, "The nail that protrudes will be hammered down." Pupils typically spend four or more hours a night on homework, often in addition to private lessons at "cram schools." (These *juku*s and other preparatory services gross an estimated $10 billion annually—one of every seven dollars spent on education.)

In class, teachers rattle off dates and names, facts and figures, uninterrupted; some prepare lectures by combing past university exams for questions often asked. "Information loading is the central goal," observes Thomas P. Rohlen, in *Japan's High Schools* (1983).



Teachers (mostly men) enjoy high status and relatively high pay. They are addressed by the honorific title *sensei* ("the one who has gone before") and earn more than the average government worker.

The price of status is hard work. School is in session Monday through Saturday, and teachers must report to work even during six of the 10 weeks of yearly vacation that students enjoy. In America, teachers send unruly charges to the principal's office; in Japan, they handle all discipline themselves.

The student-teacher ratio is higher in Japan than in any other major country. Yet instructors are expected to take a personal interest in each pupil's development. High school teachers sometimes make house calls to visit their *homurūmu* (homeroom) students.

Whatever its impact on creative thought, the school system in Japan succeeds in sharpening intellects. Over the last generation, the average Japanese IQ has risen seven points—and is now nine points higher than the average American IQ.



TWO HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS*



Stan Jackson	NAME	Suzuki Tatsuya
Garfield High	SCHOOL	Nishi High
Belmont, Iowa	DISTRICT	Shizuoka Prefecture (south of Tokyo)
37	AGE	35
male (like 51% of his colleagues)	SEX	male (like 85% of his colleagues)
B.A. in English	EDUCATION	B.A. in Japanese
$19,712	SALARY	¥4,250,000 ($17,000)
(2% of salary) x (number of years served).	RETIREMENT	100% of salary for 49.5 months; 70% thereafter.
$1,200 for coaching drama club.	EXTRACURRICULAR	¥14,500 ($60) per year for supervising archery club.
National Education Association. Dues: $57/year.	AFFILIATION	Japanese Teachers Union. Dues: $180/year.
7:45 A.M.	FIRST CLASS BEGINS	9:20 A.M.
2:15 P.M.	LAST CLASS ENDS	3:10 P.M.
50 min.	LENGTH OF CLASS	55 min.
22 min.	LUNCH TIME	60 min.
5 classes English	SUBJECTS TAUGHT	2 classes Modern Japanese; Japanese Classics I; Photography
25 classes in 5 days	CLASSES TAUGHT/WEEK	16 classes in 6 days
25–30	CLASS SIZE	40–45
First week in September–second week in June.	SCHOOL YEAR	First week in April–third week in March.
180	DAYS TEACHING	240
189	DAYS WORKING	268

*Information on this table represents a composite. Names are fictitious.

secondary education did not come until after World War II. In class-bound England, schools such as Eton, Harrow, and Winchester, hospitable to the sons of the powerful for centuries, became the models for schools that bright children from the middle and lower classes could attend for free. The teachers at these new high schools, like those at Eton, attended universities, not specialized training institutions. The same was true across Europe: High school teachers followed in the footsteps of grammar school teachers. The training of elementary school instructors remained separate.

Today, that division persists. European primary school teachers (like primary *and* secondary school teachers in America) spend a great deal of their time in college learning how, in theory, to teach. In England, for example, a first-year education degree candidate who hopes to teach third grade may take "Curriculum and Classroom Organization," "The Psychology of Play," and "Exceptional Children."

But European (and Japanese) secondary school teachers still learn *what* to teach. They immerse themselves in history, science, math, or language, just as an aspiring university historian, scientist, mathematician, or linguist would do. The European "bachelor's" degree is roughly equivalent to an American master's degree. In Norway or Germany, for example, university studies may last six years; often students have been concentrating on their specialty since the final years of secondary school. By the time European high school teachers enter the classroom, they are truly competent in their fields.

Weeding Out

"Methodology" is secondary. It is acquired on the job, as in West Germany, or in concentrated postgraduate courses, as in England and Norway.

Of course, one reason that a European teacher of science and math can—and must—acquire genuine competence in his subject is that the children he will be teaching are uncommonly bright and industrious. Most European countries have a system of student assignment, or "tracking," far more pervasive than that found in the United States. In some American high schools, children may still be put in either "accelerated" or "regular" biology courses, depending on their ability. In Europe and Japan, however, a child's ability may determine not only which biology class he takes, but whether he will even study biology. A student's entire course of study, not to mention which high school he attends—or whether he will attend high school at all, and

for how long—may hinge on his past grades, his performance on nationwide examinations, or some combination of these and other factors.

In West Germany, for example, children who seem bound for college are put into academic middle schools after fourth grade; those cut out to be engineers or mid-level managers are put on the "technical" school track; the "general" secondary school is populated mainly by those destined for blue-collar jobs. (In the end, only 21 percent of West Germany's college-age population enrolls in a university.) Thus, chemistry teachers in Hamburg or Bonn do not need to know enough about developmental psychology to cope with a disruptive student who has no interest in chemistry and no aptitude for it. They do, however, need to know enough about chemistry to stir the curiosity of potential future chemists.

Victims and Beneficiaries

The number of "tracks" and the means of dividing students among them differ from country to country. In Britain during the 1960s, Harold Wilson's Labor governments abandoned the two-track system of "academic" and "general" secondary schools in favor of the theoretically more egalitarian "comprehensive" secondary school. But Britain's comprehensive schools may have as many as 16 discrete tracks, into which students are channeled on the basis of their academic records. In West Germany, parents' preferences are weighed along with grades and test scores to decide what kind of secondary school a child attends. In Japan, students' test scores and academic records determine their secondary school. In Norway, tracking is based mainly on past performance.

Although the sorting of pupils in Europe is still quite extensive by American standards, a number of European nations have joined Britain in moderating the tracking system in recent decades. That partly explains an important trend: The gap between secondary and primary school teachers is narrowing; as high school students become a less elite corps, teaching them becomes a less elite profession. Another reason is that the education of elementary school teachers has been enriched. These days, one must pass the stringent "secondary leaving exam" after high school to be eligible for admission to a teacher training institution, and hence for subsequent employment in primary school. (The leaving examination has long been required in Europe for university enrollment. A sorting-out device, it tests general knowledge—history, the sciences, and mathema-

tics—in West Germany and Norway, and more specialized knowledge in Britain. In 1970, only eight percent of West German, nine percent of English, and 22 percent of Norwegian "secondary school leavers" passed these exams.) So elementary school teachers are now better qualified.

In spite of these developments, the profession has not become homogenized. In Goettingen, West Germany, where the elementary school teachers' training center is now part of Georg August University, the teachers' campus remains an island unto itself, socially and academically. In Japan, aspiring primary school teachers now attend national universities, but they still take almost no classes in common with the student body at large.

The persistence of Europe's dualism can also be seen in teachers' salaries. In West Germany, starting secondary school teachers make 13 percent more than first-year primary school teachers; by retirement, the differential is 18 percent. In England, the gap is 34 percent at the beginning of the teacher's career and 18 percent at the end. In the United States, by contrast,



At Eton, Britain's elite 543-year-old boarding school, pin-striped trousers and cutaway jackets are mandatory.

the average secondary school instructor earns about $950 more per year than the average elementary school teacher—a five percent difference.

European governments have acknowledged what most American school systems have not: Rare goods fetch high prices. Since fewer people can teach calculus than can teach long division, the former cost more.

The result of the special status bestowed upon secondary school instructors in Europe is excellence. Consistently, prospective high school teachers are among the universities' brightest students. By graduation, they clearly outshine their primary school colleagues and their American counterparts. The ultimate beneficiaries are the students. The West German high school student encounters teachers, teaching methods, and assignments comparable to those he will encounter in college; the American public high school student does not.

The Weakest Link

Clearly, American educators could learn much from high schools across the Atlantic. But for all the apparent advantages of the European approach to education, we should be careful about copying it.

Any extreme form of tracking, for example, runs up against the egalitarian premises that are deeply ingrained in America's character. West Germany's system—three kinds of high schools for three kinds of students—would not be warmly received in most U.S. communities. Still, it is true that a small fraction of U.S. high school students—perhaps 10 percent—get virtually nothing out of their academic courses and contribute even less, judging by most reputable studies. An entirely vocational curriculum for such teenagers might make life easier for them, their fellow students, and their teachers.*

In seeking to emulate European dualism, American school boards should not devalue their elementary school teachers. By some indices, these instructors do a better job than their colleagues in the high schools. According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the reading and reasoning abilities of American nine-year-olds have risen since 1975.

But 17-year-olds have shown declines in those categories,

*America's closest approximations of the European academic high schools are found among its private schools. But, whereas the European academic high schools select students by ability, the five million students attending America's 21,000 private schools are selected mainly by family income; particularly in urban areas, those who can afford to send their children to private schools do so. Researchers have found private schools to be generally safer, more orderly, and more conducive to learning than the nation's 86,000 public schools.

further confirming the widespread suspicion that high school teaching is the weak link in U.S. public education and could be vastly improved. Here is where we could draw a very simple lesson from the European example: In recruiting and training high school teachers, keep in mind that one of their main functions is preparing young adults for a college education.

In other words, hire brighter people and make sure they know their subjects. These two goals mesh nicely. If preparing to teach high school meant studying one's chosen field of expertise deeply—rather than studying it superficially while expending precious hours on "how-to-teach" courses—intelligent students would not be scared away from the profession. Of course, upgrading the training of high school teachers is not the only way to recruit more able applicants. As the European experience suggests, more money brings more status to any field.

Together, measures such as these can help teachers gain the respect of college professors, which now is often lacking. As more and more aspiring teachers graduate from college with honors, a long overdue rapport will develop between academics and schoolteachers. And such rapport is the first step toward bridging the gap between the American high school and the American college—and upgrading both of them.



WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

by Denis P. Doyle

America's occasional, often alarmist reassessments of the public school system usually leave something constructive in their wake. Sometimes the benefits are concrete, such as the subsidies for science and language instruction under the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Sometimes they are psychological—merely a residue of healthy nationwide anxiety. There are already signs that the current wave of soul-searching will follow this pattern; that America is, once again, summoning the resolve to turn adversity into advantage.

Moreover, this effort will coincide with a rare demographic opportunity to overhaul the teacher force. And the teachers are the most important single factor in the schools. But before looking at that opportunity, let us consider several recent developments which, together, give cause for optimism.

The first is perhaps the most promising. Academic specialists are at last reaching agreement on what "works" in the classroom. After years of doubting whether *anything* done by teachers could overcome the ill effects of parental neglect, broken homes, or poverty, they have concluded, happily, that a child's socioeconomic background does not necessarily predetermine his performance in Algebra II; that schools do, indeed, *matter*.

Given the right supervisory back-up, teachers who cherish their subject, scorn sloth, reward effort, punish indiscipline, work their students to the bone, and assign lots of homework (and take the time to correct it) can raise the achievement of any student from any neighborhood, even in schools that lack computer terminals, large libraries, and unscarred furniture (see box, pp. 96–97). This common-sense perception may come as no surprise to most Americans, but it has taken researchers and educators several decades of debate, often clouded by ideology, to reach the same conclusion.

That is why a second development—the decline of the "expert," and the emergence of the layman, as the prime mover in educational affairs—deserves at least two cheers. Over the next decade, such reforms as may be introduced in local school districts will not trickle down from the ivory tower or from Washington, D.C. They will instead be pressed by taxpayers and grassroots groups. Those reforms will be based less on regression analysis and theories of neurophysiological development

than on intuition and community values. Increasingly, these values will be traditional ones.

It is through state government that the man in the street is making his voice heard. During the 1960s and '70s, while Washington was preoccupied with egalitarian pursuits, more than two-thirds of the state legislatures passed laws requiring minimum competency tests for teachers or students. They did so in the face of apathy in Washington and concerted opposition from graduate schools of education and the teachers' unions. "There is no test conceived that would be helpful in determining whether teachers should continue to teach," asserted John Sullivan, a National Education Association spokesman, in 1979.

Paying the Piper

Taxpayers did not agree. Having been told for years that more money would mean better schools, parents and state legislators watched aghast as every new round of increased spending—per-student outlays more than doubled in real dollars between 1958 and 1982—was followed by lower achievement test scores. As the Baby-Boom generation passed through the schools and each class did worse than its predecessor, perplexity gave way to outright suspicion.

Suspicion alone might not have produced state intervention. But it happened that, at the same time, the state's role in financing education was growing by leaps and bounds. Historically, American public education had been a *community* concern, funded primarily by local property taxes. In 1920, local levies paid for more than 80 percent of the cost of public education. Even as late as 1945, the figure was still 64 percent. By the late 1970s, however, the statehouse had become the main source of money for most public schools. The federal government chips in about 10 percent, mostly for special programs such as bilingual education, compensatory education for underprivileged children, and aid to handicapped students. Whether this shift in financial responsibility caused or merely reflected state legislators' heightened interest in schools is not altogether clear. Suffice it to say that state officials are increasingly both paying the

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piper and calling the tune.*

Buoyed by citizen support, and sometimes by help from the business community, many states are even continuing to increase school budgets, despite declining enrollment and economic uncertainty. Two years ago, Charles Benson, one of California's leading authorities on public finance, was skeptical about the possibility of more state school aid. It would come, he said, "only if the citizens of California march on Sacramento and demand a tax increase." The citizens did not march. But the California Business Roundtable did endorse a one-year, $800-million increase in school expenditures—one-third of it to be raised through new business taxes. The bill passed.

Similar resolve is evident elsewhere. Democratic Gov. Bob Graham of Florida last summer signed into law a $228 million bill that includes $80 million for a lengthened school day and $10 million for a merit pay plan for teachers. In Mississippi, long an educational backwater, where to this day 42 percent of public school students drop out before high school graduation, Democratic Gov. William F. Winter in 1982 pushed through a package of school reforms that will cost an estimated $86 million per year through 1985. Among them: state-supported kindergarten, $1,000-per-teacher pay boosts, and a law requiring children to stay in school until age 14.

More Protein

From the point of view of professional educators, the growing participation of citizens and politicians in the education debate may seem intrusive. It is. It is also long overdue.

The nation's colleges and universities for years abdicated their responsibilities toward public education. But there is evidence of a turnaround here, too. This change is a third force impelling the public schools toward higher quality. After lowering standards for both matriculation and graduation during the tumultuous 1960s and '70s—between 1967 and 1974, an estimated 80 percent of America's four-year colleges relaxed their course requirements—state universities from Oregon to Massachusetts are atoning for their sins and tightening up.

At the University of California, for example, a high school

*Most of the legal power over education has always resided in America's statehouses, not in Washington, D.C.—thanks largely to the U.S. Constitution's failure to mention "education," much less locate it in the federal domain. The length of the school day and school year, conditions of teacher tenure, the rules of collective bargaining, the manner of textbook adoption, and the depth and breadth of the curriculum—all are state prerogatives. Local school districts, which manage affairs on a day-to-day basis, do so at the sufferance of (and as agents of) the state.

senior once had to pass 11 yearlong courses in basic subjects —English, algebra, history, and the like—to attract the attention of the admissions office; now the threshold has been raised to 16. And the state Board of Regents has asked that the new rules take effect as soon as possible in order to "transmit to the public high schools of California a sense of urgency" about the need for more rigor. As the regents noted, stiffer entrance standards in academe will ripple back into the high schools, forcing teachers and administrators to put more protein into their curricula and toughen examinations to prepare students for what lies ahead.

In view of the shrinking pool of college students—enrollment will drop by an estimated five percent by 1989—the new regimen in public colleges and universities seems audacious. How can admissions officers be choosy in lean times? The answer may be as simple as this: Those in charge are ashamed of themselves. "The general lack of concern on the part of higher education for elementary and secondary education is at the heart of the nationwide educational crisis," Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University, has written. "We can do much to help, and we should." It also seems, here and there, that state universities, like the public schools, are encountering a new quid pro quo—more public money in exchange for higher standards. Legislators and taxpayers alike, conscious of how little return on investment they have gotten in the past, are guarding the pursestrings more carefully now.

All in all, the signs are propitious—an indignant citizenry, insisting on reform; responsive state legislatures, committing fresh funds to the cause; and responsible colleges and universities, righting their past wrongs. But such trends can only come to fruition if America's schoolteachers do their job well. And here we have a real problem.

As numerous studies have shown, the average American

Analysts of higher education now report a reversal of the trend toward watered-down college curricula, which began during the 1960s.

teacher is not an intellectual. The learning impediment posed by teachers who are duller than their students has been compounded in many schools by one of the great egalitarian shifts, prodded by court action, of the past two decades: eliminating "tracking"—the segregation of students by ability in various courses of study. When students are "tracked," teachers are too. And when the fast and slow lanes are merged, mismatches can arise. Imagine one of the nation's 15,000 National Merit semifinalists, with combined SAT scores of about 1,450, seeking clarification on a nuance of inductive logic or non-Euclidean geometry from the nation's "average teacher"—who chalked up an 813.*

Bargain-Basement Teachers

In view of what teachers are paid, it is unsurprising that they do not constitute, overall, as illustrious a group as we might like. In 1982, their average starting pay (for less than ten months' work) was about $13,000. This compared with a $22,000 annual salary for a computer specialist with the same amount of schooling and $24,000 for a physics major. Mathematics majors leaving college could expect to make $21,000 (so long as they did not intend to teach math). Raises come with time, but only a handful of teachers ever go beyond the $20,000–$30,000 pay range. Last year, the 10 percent of teachers who fell into the highest income bracket had an average salary of $31,500.

Two historical "flukes" explain why Americans expect competent teachers at bargain-basement prices. The first is discrimination. Before World War II, teaching was one of the few white-collar professions that college-educated women could enter in large numbers without arousing resentment from men (and other women); teaching also conflicted with family responsibilities less than did other jobs. Similarly, teaching was long one of the more prestigious career avenues open to racial minorities, especially in the segregated South. Despite the low pay, the classroom attracted blacks, Hispanics, and intelligent women whose ambitions went beyond the home. A certain amount of status and authority came with the job, as did a (nominally) short workweek and long vacations.

The second factor was the Great Depression of the 1930s. By closing off many more lucrative job opportunities, the moribund economy induced a teacher "bonus" of historic proportions. Would-be businessmen, bankers, doctors, and lawyers —among the brightest men of their generation—gladly settled

*That was the mean score in 1982 for college-bound high school students declaring education as their intended major field of study.

A MATTER OF ETHOS

Equality of Educational Opportunity, sociologist James S. Coleman's landmark study, was commissioned by Congress under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. President Lyndon Johnson's campaign against poverty—especially the disproportionate poverty among blacks—relied heavily on federal aid to the public schools. Coleman, among others, thought his research would vindicate Johnson's faith in the ability of education to lift up the disadvantaged. When published in 1966, however, his report not only failed to do that; it raised doubts about the value of schools in general.

Coleman documented the disparity between white and black students' achievement test scores. At first he sought to explain the difference in terms of school facilities. However, in this regard, mostly black and mostly white schools proved surprisingly similar. It was not the quality of libraries, laboratories, or teaching materials that accounted for most of the "achievement gap," Coleman concluded. Rather, what mattered were the habits and values picked up from family, friends, and schoolmates. As oversimplified in press accounts, his verdict was clear-cut: "Schools don't matter."

Since the publication of *Equality*, Coleman and other researchers have been busy dispelling simplistic interpretations of it. By focusing less on schools' tangible assets and more on "intangibles," they have shown that applying sound principles of education can help students of any race or family background learn faster.

One key intangible is "ethos." The term gained currency among educators after publication in 1979 of Michael Rutter's *Fifteen Thousand Hours*, a study of 12 inner-London schools. Rutter used "ethos," a Greek term, to refer broadly to a school's sense of purpose and commitment—and, specifically, to a spectrum of 39 measurable characteristics found in particularly successful secondary schools. These schools had better records for attendance, orderliness, and scholastic achievement than analysts would have predicted on the basis of the incoming students' disciplinary and academic histories, which varied greatly.

Principals in these schools laid down clear guidelines and monitored teachers closely for compliance—checking, for example, to ensure that they assigned ample amounts of homework. Teachers expected high performance from their students and rewarded them

for the regular, if meager, paycheck that teaching offered.

But the instructors who signed on during the 1930s have since retired. Teachers hired at age 22 during 1940, the last year of the Depression, retired in June of last year. Most men of comparable caliber today enter more lucrative white-collar professions. And ambitious women are now free to seek careers in computer programming, law, medicine, and academe. Indeed,

in return. One of the few "tangibles" found to be significant—well-decorated halls and classrooms—turned out to reflect an intangible: Instructors gave praise when it was due, posting students' exemplary work on walls and bulletin boards.



James S. Coleman

A 1982 study by Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore indirectly supported Rutter's findings. In *High School Achievement: Public, Catholic and Private Schools Compared*, Coleman et al. concluded that the heavy homework assignments, ambitious goals, and strict discipline found in parochial schools accounted, at least in part, for their relative effectiveness. In Catholic high schools, between the sophomore and senior years, the difference in the test scores of blacks and whites narrows; it *widens* in public high schools.

Teachers, as well as academic researchers, are rediscovering ethos. In Washington, D.C., where pupils had long ranked well below the national average in standardized test scores, school superintendent Vincent Reed implemented a rigorous back-to-basics program in 1976. Teachers started monitoring students' progress more closely and providing intensive remedial tutoring in the Three Rs. In some schools, even gym teachers found themselves passing out homework —as many as nine essays a year.

By 1983, Reed's successor, Floretta D. McKenzie, could point to improved scores at both the elementary and secondary levels. And, for the first time, the District's third-grade and sixth-grade students *exceeded* national norms in math, language, science, and reading.

Washington's school system is 94 percent black. But reforms in districts such as Charlotte, N.C., which is two-thirds white, have also proved successful.

In 1973, the average Charlotte sixth-grade student read at a fifth-grade level and had the mathematical ability of a fourth-grader. School officials raised their expectations and made sure students got the message: Anyone falling short of the new standards would attend summer school and, if that failed, would repeat a grade. Attendance policies were toughened, too. The result: In 1983, Charlotte's sixth-grade students read at a seventh-grade level and handled math problems with the skill of eighth-graders.

between 1955 and 1980, the number of women receiving bachelor's degrees each year in engineering, once a male preserve, rose from 177 to 7,669. The net result is no surprise. Between 1966 and 1982, the percentage of college freshmen, male or female, planning to become teachers dropped from 21.7 to 4.7. This group includes too many who are not the best or the brightest.

Going to the bottom to recruit our teachers is bad enough.

The nature of most local public school systems makes the problem worse. School boards or school principals can exert little leverage over teachers once they are hired. Because of union contracts and uniform salary schedules, every instructor—eager or lethargic, bright or dim, strict or lax—receives roughly the same pay (seniority being equal). Not much can be done by way of financial incentives to reward dedication and skill; or, by way of penalties, to show incompetents to the door.*

Thanks to President Reagan's endorsement, the notion of merit pay has become a topic of heated discussion (see box, opposite). It is a wonderful, impractical idea.

Seizing the Moment

In my view, merit pay does not fit the culture of teaching. But less material forms of reinforcement may. Endowed chairs, university-style, can be used to attract eminent teachers. And sabbaticals for research or curriculum design can be granted to reward excellence—or merely to stimulate thinking. The National Endowment for the Humanities sponsors six- to eight-week summer seminars for hundreds of selected high school and primary school teachers on subjects ranging from "The Literature of Friendship" to "Documents of Slavery and Anti-Slavery" at college campuses across the country. By all accounts, the program has been a strong morale booster.

In the end, though, the only sure long-term solution to the problems of teacher incompetence, mediocrity, and apathy is to hire able, energetic instructors in the first place. That is why the remainder of this decade will be a critical period. For we are about to see a "window of opportunity," a chance to alter for decades the quality of public school instruction. Thanks largely to the "graying" of the teacher force—the fact that the once-young teaching population has developed a middle-age bulge—about half of the nation's 2.1 million public school teachers will have to be replaced by 1991, according to estimates by the National Center for Educational Statistics. Enrollments, meanwhile, will begin to rise again in the mid-1980s as children of Baby-Boom children—the Baby Boom's "echo"—start school. Between 1985 and 2000, the school-age population is expected to increase by anywhere from 12 to 18 percent. The demand for

*Tenured teachers can be dismissed for causes specified by state law. In Illinois, a school board can fire teachers for "incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality . . . or whenever, in its opinion, he is not qualified to teach." But the courts have placed the burden of proof on the school board, and have generally ruled that only misconduct substantially and specifically related to on-the-job performance is grounds for firing.

MERIT PAY?

Almost all of the $40.7 billion paid annually to American public school teachers is disbursed to individuals without regard to on-the-job performance. Last spring, however, President Reagan endorsed "merit pay," and the term has been in the headlines ever since. "If we want to achieve excellence we must reward it," Reagan said in June. "It's the American way."

Of the Democratic presidential candidates, only Reuben Askew of Florida has endorsed merit pay. Most others, while not embracing the idea, have refrained from denouncing it. And with good reason: A June 1983 *Newsweek* survey of the general public found that 80 percent of those polled were in favor of merit pay.

Yet the idea may work better in theory than in practice, many educators say. By what yardstick, for example, does one measure quality? And who will do the measuring? Willard H. McGuire, former president of the National Education Association, has argued that when principals and superintendents do the measuring, "personal relationships or subservient behavior [by teachers] is too often equated with 'merit.'" Even if the system rewards only the worthy, a question remains: Will the overall benefits outweigh any damage done to the morale of perennial also-rans?

These questions are now being confronted. The Educational Research Service estimates that "performance-based" pay schemes are either in effect or under active consideration in 21 states.

Thus, in Dallas, computers are being used to remove the "subjective" element from the selection process. When a school's pupils do better on standardized tests than their prior performance would suggest, the principal, teachers, and other staff receive bonuses. But critics contend that such a preoccupation with test scores is excessive.

In Tennessee, Gov. Lamar Alexander is pushing a "master teacher" program that not only rewards the "best" but enhances their influence. Under the plan, teachers who qualified to move up the pay scale—from "apprentice" to "professional" to "senior" to "master"—would spend some of their time teaching other teachers and designing curricula. Committees of teachers and administrators from one school district would evaluate teachers in another—thus (in theory) "depoliticizing" the selection process.

The jury is still out on merit pay. A task force commissioned by the House Education and Labor Committee last year warned that it is no panacea, but supported further experimentation. More pilot programs seem likely. Under taxpayer pressure, leaders of the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association have muted their longtime opposition to all "performance-based" pay schemes. (Not surprisingly, they seem most receptive to merit pay accompanied by some sort of across-the-board salary hike.) According to a 1983 poll, 63 percent of U.S. teachers support the idea that "more effective" teachers should receive more pay.

teachers will then rise. Altogether, government statisticians predict, we will need nearly 1.3 million new teachers by 1990.

They can be 1.3 million *good* teachers if we are willing to pay the price. But the price will be high. Quality costs.

This is not a novel point. Spokesmen for teachers' unions trot it out every year when salary negotiations roll around. But they usually fail to make their case persuasively, in part because they reject any notions of quality control. The result is often ugly—strikes, accusations, lingering bitterness—and, from the teachers' point of view, seldom productive; teachers' salaries fell by 12.2 percent in real terms between 1972 and 1983. Taxpayers always prefer something for nothing, and school board members listen to taxpayers. But, whether teachers know it or not, they have at their disposal a possible means of short-circuiting the resistance to higher pay.

Supply-Side Education

The key may lie in teacher licensing. A license is simply state approval to do something that is otherwise prohibited. A truck driver is someone with a truck driver's license, and a teacher is someone with a teacher's license. Licensing helps define the supply of workers, which, in turn, helps determine their pay. Require truck drivers to take three years of driver safety courses and there will be fewer truck drivers—and higher wages. Require prospective high school teachers to score above a certain daunting threshold on standardized exams and to hold a bachelor's—or master's—degree in the subject they will teach and the resulting scarcity will drive salaries higher.

For elementary school teachers, of course, licensing requirements should be different. The "how-to-teach" courses that clutter the curricula of our teacher colleges have *some* value to those who instruct the very young. But such training should be "hands-on" whenever possible. And the elementary school teacher must have a solid, balanced academic background. A licensing exam testing general knowledge would help keep those who overdose on pedagogy out of the classroom.

Bricklayers, lawyers, accountants, and embalmers have had no trouble grasping the basic relationship between supply and demand. The European craftsmen of the Middle Ages also understood it. By restricting entry into their crafts, they increased both their status and their earnings.

"Teachers Demand Tighter Standards" is a headline that reads much better to taxpayers than "Teachers Ask More Pay, Shorter Hours." And it is as good for their pocketbooks as it is

for their public image. Once any state significantly tightens its licensing requirements, school boards (and taxpayers) will have to put their money where their mouth is. Within a few years of doing so, they will have an abundance of qualified teaching candidates to choose from; the pool of prospective instructors is market-sensitive.

Higher pay might mean, at least for a while, that school districts could afford to hire fewer teachers. But the threat of teacher layoffs usually arouses public resistance. Fresh—and, probably, creative—scrutiny of the entire school budget, and of the school's academic menu, is a more likely long-run result.

Toughening up licensing rules is not the only way to put some quality into lackluster school faculties. If teachers do not seize the opportunity, the citizenry will no doubt find an alternative method—perhaps one that tenured instructors will find a bit more threatening. Teachers' unions would be wise to act soon if they want a hand in shaping the fate of their profession.

Imagine, for a moment, that American teachers, backed perhaps by the NEA and the AFT, finally drew a line in the sand. Only trained mathematicians could teach mathematics; no more retooled football coaches. Only scientists could teach advanced placement physics; no more part-time guidance counselors. Only English teachers with superb credentials could mark up the essays of juniors and seniors; no more earnest art majors.

Three things would happen: Teachers' salaries would start to climb. Teachers' status would rise with them.

And children would begin to learn again.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

TEACHING IN AMERICA

In 1776, a ship from Belfast docked in Baltimore and offered for sale "various Irish commodities, among which are schoolmasters, beef, pork, and potatoes." Such was the ignoble status of teachers in colonial America, notes Willard S. Elsbree, in **The American Teacher** (American, 1939; Greenwood, 1970), an account of the profession's slow climb to respectability.

The Puritans, and later the Founding Fathers, held the *idea* of education in high regard. Nonetheless, in **The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education** (Harvard, 1974, cloth & paper), David Tyack observes that salaries for teachers in many colonial villages were "below the earnings of scrubwomen and day laborers."

Teaching was often a last resort for misfits and outcasts, and the typical one-room schoolhouse was cramped and ill-equipped. But at least the teaching process was uncomplicated, as Carl F. Kaestle notes in **Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780–1860** (Hill & Wang, 1983). Teaching consisted largely of "repetition, drilling . . . with here and there a little of the birch."

Even as the new Republic prospered, teachers did not. In **Anti-Intellectualism in American Life** (Knopf, 1979, cloth; Random, 1966, paper), Richard Hofstadter argues that Americans never really respected schoolteachers as a group. Paradoxically, Americans stubbornly retained a "touching faith in the efficacy of popular education."

This faith inspired reformers, among them Horace Mann (1796–1859). His glowing reports on the school system in Prussia, where the teaching profession was so highly esteemed that only the best and the brightest entered its ranks, are included in the **Life and Works of Horace Mann** (Walker, Fuller, & Co., 1865; Norwood, 1979), edited by Mary Tyler Peabody Mann. With Prussia's vigor in mind, Mann in 1830 founded the Massachusetts Normal School, the nation's first teacher training institution. He later served as secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, the first such state board in America.

The movement to provide free common schools soon spread beyond Massachusetts. By 1860, most states could boast a (fledgling) public school system. One result: increased demand for trained instructors. Twelve new normal schools opened before the onset of the Civil War.

To be sure, many towns, particularly outside New England, ignored new state requirements for mandatory elementary education. And towns offering schooling beyond the sixth grade were almost unheard of. Public high schools nationwide numbered only 200 in 1870. But the trend toward universal public education and the resulting "professionalization" of teaching were both well underway by 1900.

Some of the most persistent ideas in American teaching have stemmed from the turn-of-the-century Progressive movement, partly a reaction against traditional learning by rote. Lawrence A. Cremin, in his definitive history, **The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876–1957** (Knopf, 1961, cloth, out of print; Vintage, 1964, paper), describes the movement as "a many-sided effort to use the schools

to improve the lives of individuals."

John Dewey (1859–1952) was its chief architect. In **The School and Society** (Univ. of Chicago, 1899; rev. ed., 1956, cloth & paper), he advocates the teaching of mathematics and other subjects "not as isolated things . . . but in their reference to [the student's] social environment." The schools, Dewey and his followers asserted, should foster not just "book learning," but moral, emotional, and vocational development. The teacher should be the student's guide rather than his taskmaster.

Variously interpreted, Progressive ideas blossomed for several decades, faded during the 1950s, and bloomed again during the 1960s, when many writers decried what they saw as a stultifying atmosphere in the classroom. One of the most prominent was John Holt, who in **How Children Fail** (Pitman, 1964, cloth, out of print; Dell, 1970, paper) laments the lack of "joy" in the schools. In **Death at an Early Age: The Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in the Boston Public Schools** (Houghton, 1967, cloth, out of print; Bantam, 1970, paper), Jonathan Kozol, a young teacher at an inner-city elementary school, asserts that the Boston school system was designed to "pulverize any sparks of humanity or independence or originality in teachers."

A new blueprint, calling for "open classrooms" with teachers acting as "learning facilitators" rather than as transmitters of knowledge, was provided by Charles E. Silberman in **Crisis in the Classroom: The Remaking of American Education** (Random, 1970, cloth, out of print; Vintage, 1971, paper). The prestigious Carnegie Foundation had commissioned the book, an endorsement that contributed to its widespread, if short-lived, acclaim among teachers and administrators.

The "facilitators" of the future would be computers, George Leonard predicted in 1968. Dismissing the "simplistic prescription that, to improve education, teachers merely needed to know their subjects and 'get tough'," he contended that students could (with a little help from technology) rediscover the "ecstatic moment" that had been stripped from the learning process by autocratic educators. Looking ahead to the year 2001 in **Education and Ecstasy** (Delacorte, 1968, cloth, out of print; Dell, 1969, paper), Leonard saw six-year-olds in geodesic domes entranced by machines that converted calculus lessons into psychedelic displays of "spinning wheels . . . slender and glistening like the spokes of a bicycle wheel."

Other critics of education, beginning after World War II, were worried not so much about the loss of ecstasy as about steady declines in student performance.

One of these "traditionalists" was Mortimer Smith, author of **The Diminished Mind: A Study of Planned Mediocrity in Our Public Schools** (Regnery, 1954; Greenwood, 1969). Though Progressives claimed success in teaching students to adjust to "real life problems," Smith notes that a 1951 survey of Los Angeles high school juniors revealed that 18 percent did not know there were 12 months in a year. Smith blames their ignorance on the Progressives' deliberate de-emphasis of "learning, in the traditional sense of disciplined knowledge."

In **The Restoration of Learning: A Program for Redeeming the Unfulfilled Promise of American Education** (Knopf, 1955, out of print), Arthur Bestor argues that the "fun-

damentals"—reading, writing, and arithmetic—constitute a pillar of democracy; Orwell's Big Brother in *1984* enslaves men's minds by undermining the disciplines of language and mathematics to the point where two plus two equals five.

Quite plainly, teaching the "basics" soon took a back seat to other concerns despite all the early warnings. In her highly readable **The Troubled Crusade: American Education 1945–1980** (Basic, 1983), Columbia's Diane Ravitch points out that the postwar "crusade against ignorance was understood to mean a crusade for equal educational opportunity." Especially since 1960, the emphasis on worthy social goals, in Ravitch's view, has often bewildered teachers and distorted the fundamental task of the schools, that is, the transmission of knowledge.

The overall effect has been devastating, according to much data and many critics. Paul Cooperman in **The Literacy Hoax: The Decline of Reading, Writing, and Learning in the Public Schools and What We Can Do About It** (Morrow, 1978, cloth & paper) notes that in college admissions tests, only one-fourth of current high school graduates attain the score that would have been considered average in the early 1960s. Ten to 15 percent of all graduates are functionally illiterate, unequipped to hold skilled jobs or to complete basic training in the military. Even Ivy League colleges have been forced to create remedial courses in writing and math for bright but ill-prepared freshmen.

Not surprisingly, the "traditionalist" view has gained ground since the

TEN BLUE-RIBBON STUDIES, 1982–84

1. **Academic Preparation for College**, Educational Equality Project; The College Board, New York, N.Y., May 1983. Free. Urges high schools to focus more on "adequate" college preparation, which it defines in detail.

2. **America's Competitive Challenge: The Need for a National Response**; The Business-Higher Education Forum, Washington, D.C., April 1983. $17.50. Calls for presidential advisers on education and industrial policy, private-sector financial support for teacher training in high school science and math, development of skills for "high-tech" economy.

3. **Educating Americans for the 21st Century**, Commission on Pre-Collegiate Education in Math, Science, and Technology; National Science Board, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1983. Free. Recommends tighter teacher certification and high school graduation requirements, higher salaries for science and math teachers.

4. **High School: A Report on Secondary Education in America**, Ernest L. Boyer; Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Harper and Row, New York, N.Y., 1983. $15. Contends that public schools are improving, but recommends reforms: gradual 25 percent teacher pay hike, tighter curriculum, mandatory community service for students.

5. **Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School**, Theodore R. Sizer; National Association of Secondary School Principals and National Association of Independent Schools, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass.,

mid-1970s, even among those writers who, like the Progressives, prize a "nurturing and caring environment" in the schools.

One of them is Sara Lawrence Lightfoot. In **The Good High School** (Basic, 1983), she profiles six successful schools, ranging from Atlanta's all-black George Washington Carver High School to the elite St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire.

In all these institutions, Lightfoot finds that "ideology, authority, and order combine to produce a coherent institution that supports human interaction and growth." Students at Carver sometimes chafe under their school's rigid rules, Lightfoot observes, but more often they are comforted by the assurance "that they will be protected, that people care."

The effects of the law-and-order regime at Carver, imposed three years ago by a new principal, have so far been cleaner halls and better attendance records, not vastly improved test scores. But "institutional invigoration and restoration is a slow, cumbersome process," Lightfoot says. She concludes: "These . . . minimal standards . . . [constitute] a first stage of movement towards higher goals"—notably, a solid education for all.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Readers may wish to consult previous* WQ *Background Books essays on The Changing American Campus (Autumn 1978), The Public Schools (Autumn 1979), The Changing Family (Summer 1980), and Children in America (Autumn 1982).*

March 1984. $16.95. Three-volume study (of which this book is the first) finds local school systems' bureaucracy stifling, urges greater control by teachers and principals over curriculum and teaching methods.

6. **Making the Grade**, Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy; Twentieth Century Fund, New York, N.Y., 1983. $6. Advocates "master teacher" programs, federal leadership in making literacy in English and science chief goals, more federally funded education research.

7. **A Nation at Risk**, National Commission on Excellence in Education; U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., April 1983. $4.50. Documents "rising tide of mediocrity" in schools, urges lengthening school year or day, re-emphasizing "basics," imparting computer literacy.

8. **The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto**, Mortimer Adler; The Paideia Group, New York, N.Y., Sept. 1982. $2.95. Recommends rigorous uniform nationwide curriculum as means to an educationally classless society.

9. **A Place Called School**, John I. Goodlad; Institute for the Development of Educational Activities, McGraw-Hill, New York, N.Y., 1983. $18.95. A first-hand study of more than 1,000 classrooms; recommends schooling from age four to 16, elimination of tracking, creation of a "head teacher" program.

10. **Successful Schools for Young Adolescents**, Joan Lipsitz; National Institute of Education, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, N.J., Nov. 1983. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95. Analyzes four exemplary intermediate schools; isolates ingredients of success.

DOES BIG BROTHER REALLY EXIST?

"In the few decades since Orwell wrote *1984*, we have gone a long way toward domesticating the idea of the total state," Irving Howe, coeditor of *Dissent*, wrote last year, "indeed, to the point where it now seems just one of a number of options concerning the way people live." George Orwell's classic anti-utopian novel, published in 1949, shocked and depressed Western readers in the heyday of Stalinism. Later, some of its phrases became common shorthand for horror—Newspeak, double-think, Thought Police, the Ministry of Love, Big Brother. More recently, scholarly arguments have raged over the importance of the differences between "authoritarian" dictatorships (Chile, South Korea, Franco's Spain) and "totalitarian" regimes (Russia, China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam) where, in near-Orwellian fashion, party cadres seek to shape the ordinary citizen's everyday life. What makes *1984* so shocking today, Howe observed, is that in its fundamental conception, it now seems "so familiar, so ordinary, so plausible." Here Robert Tucker suggests that it takes a flesh-and-blood Big Brother to make Orwell's vision really come true.

by Robert C. Tucker

Everything about totalitarianism, starting with the name, is problematic.

Whoever invented it, the name was put into currency by Benito Mussolini when he published an article in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* in 1932 in which he proclaimed himself a "totalitarian" and called the Italian Fascist state *lo stato totalitario*. That claim is widely taken by historians as more of a boast than a description of Italian Fascist reality.

Beginning in the later 1930s, the name was picked up by scholars, some of them refugees from the real, Nazi version of totalitarianism that took over in Germany in 1933. These scholars and others who wrote tracts about totalitarianism, of which



Born in colonial India, Eric Arthur Blair (1903–1950) took the pen name George Orwell. Besides 1984, *his best-known books include* Burmese Days *(1934),* Homage to Catalonia *(1938), and* Animal Farm *(1945).*

Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) is the best known and most influential, took Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia as the two indubitable historical cases of the totalitarian phenomenon. Arendt wrote that 1929, the year of Stalin's advent to supreme power, was "the first year of clearcut totalitarian dictatorship in Russia." Under his predecessor, Lenin, the Soviet order was, she said, a "revolutionary dictatorship," hence by implication, at most, pre-totalitarian.

Scholars had an understandable reason for adopting Mussolini's term for their uses. They needed a word to convey what they considered a very important fact: that Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia represented something distinctively, even radically novel, and in Arendt's phrase radically evil, which had come into existence in the political world; something qualitatively different from the many forms of authoritarian rule, dictatorship, tyranny, or despotism that the world had seen in earlier times, all the traditional authoritarianisms.

Although I will use the term "totalitarianism" now and then, I'm not sure that it is a good one for scholarly purposes and I won't be bound by it. My real inclination is to drop Mussolini's neologism and use the phrase: "the nightmare state."

But the words we choose are ultimately of secondary importance. What matters is that the phenomenon the scholars meant to denote by the term they used has been real and may again be-

come real; that we need to understand it better; and that this is difficult because we are dealing with something elusive.

The scholarly theorists seem to have sensed its elusiveness. For their writings show them seeking to define the diverse ways in which the totalitarian dictatorship, as seen in the cases of Stalin and Hitler especially, differs from traditional authoritarian states.

Thus, Emil Lederer saw the totalitarian party-state as being uniquely a "state of the masses," ruling in their name and possessing some sort of affinity with them. Sigmund Neumann found that whereas traditional authoritarianisms have generally been conservative regimes, the totalitarian state was revolutionary, indeed, that it embodied "permanent revolution."

Revolution for what? To remake the world according to a fanatically held ideological blueprint shared by the members of the ruling party (their "ideological supersense," Arendt called it), driving them to create, for example, a world without Jews or a world without Trotskyists and capitalists, depending on the ideology's content. And, of course, the totalitarian state, unlike traditional authoritarianisms, sought totality of control over its subjects, including their minds, although a few scattered "islands of separateness," Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski allowed, might exist in the family and the Church. The search for totality of control meant that the totalitarian state was a bureaucratic colossus, whose bureaucracy showed a "radical efficiency," Arendt suggested, as in the operation of the Nazi death factories. Franz Neumann differed on this point, seeing a constant collision of different bureaucratic machines in the totalitarian leviathan state that he called *Behemoth*.*

Finally, all the theorists emphasized that totalitarian rule

*See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951; Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1940; Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942; Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; Franz Neumann, *Behemoth*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1942.

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was terroristic in a novel way that Arendt sought to conceptualize by saying that totalitarianism pursues "*total* terror" rather than the selective, realistic "dictatorial terror" that strikes at actual or suspected enemies of a regime. Such total terror was, she said, "the very essence" of totalitarian government. The source of the terror seemed to reside in the ideological fanaticism that inspired the ruling party to remake the world in its fashion.

Perhaps, by this point, you have been forcibly struck, as I am, by a certain characteristic of this theoretical thinking about totalitarianism: its utter impersonality.

In this picture of totalitarianism, a ruling party is actuated by an impersonal "ideological supersense" to practice "total terror" through institutions that are "bureaucratic machines." There are *no persons* doing things. There is, briefly, an "it," totalitarianism, which does things through persons to persons; but the subject of the action is the "it."

It will come as no surprise, therefore, when I add that the scholars' theory of totalitarianism did not treat the personal needs of the totalitarian dictator as a motivating force in the radically evil behavior of the "it." The needs being fulfilled were those of the system. Brzezinski, who conceived of the terroristic purge as the core of totalitarianism, explained that "it satisfies the needs of the system for continued dynamism and energy." The theorists did not overlook the presence of a totalitarian leader. But they saw him as a function of the system and the fulfillment of its needs—not vice versa. Thus, Arendt wrote that in the view of the leader's lieutenants—which she seemed to accept—"he [the leader] is needed, not as a person but as a function, and as such he is indispensable." From this perspective, *Fuehrers* have the function of assuming blanket responsibility for everything done in their names, of enabling the Eichmanns and others to perform their criminal actions in good conscience and without any sense of individual responsibility.

"Not as a person but as a function." This phrase takes us to the heart of the issue I wish to pursue. There was, I believe, a fundamental flaw in the scholarly theory of totalitarianism: However impersonal the institutional workings of the nightmare state may be, the needs being fulfilled by its radically evil behavior are ultimately those of a person—the totalitarian dictator. And this flaw helps explain why the theorists were baffled in their persistent effort to identify the driving force of the "it." They did not grasp that the actions of the "it" must be traced to

their source inside a "him."

One of the most important contributors to our thinking about the nightmare state wrote the following:

> Totalitarianism has abolished freedom of thought to an extent unheard of in any previous age. And it is important to realize that its control of thought is not only negative but positive. It not only forbids you to express—even to think—certain thoughts, but it dictates what you *shall* think, it creates an ideology for you, it tries to govern your emotional life as well as setting up a code of conduct. And as far as possible, it isolates you from the outside world, it shuts you up in an artificial universe in which you have no standards of comparison. The totalitarian state tries, at any rate, to control the thoughts and emotions of its subjects at least as completely as it controls their actions.

I count seven uses of "it" here, plus one reference to "totalitarianism" and one to "the totalitarian state."

The passage just quoted was written by George Orwell in an article, "Literature and Totalitarianism," published in *The Listener* on June 19, 1941, three days before Hitler's armies invaded Stalin's Russia—since the accord of August 1939 Germany's ally. Earlier in the article, Orwell referred to Germany, Russia, and Italy as the three extant totalitarian states, and said: "I think one must face the risk that this phenomenon is going to be worldwide." To illustrate the effort of the "it" to control its subjects' emotional life, he also said:

> Every German up to September 1939 had to regard Russian Bolshevism with horror and aversion, and since September 1939, he has had to regard it with admiration and affection. If Russia and Germany go to war, as they may well do within the next few years, another equally violent change will have to take place. The German's emotional life, his loves and hatreds, are expected, when necessary, to reverse themselves overnight. I hardly need to point out the effect of this kind of thing upon literature.

From this, it is clear why Orwell, though no theoretician, was nevertheless a significant contributor to thinking about totalitarianism. As a writer, he was concerned about emotions, and although he kept speaking of the "it," he was interested in

the thing's effect upon people's emotional life. Very likely this was the impulse that led him to imagine the phenomenon of totalitarianism in a vividly concrete way and to portray it in his novel, *1984*, published in 1949. Orwell accepted the idea of totalitarianism's impersonality, yet did more than anyone else to dispel its elusiveness. By producing a work of creative literature rather than a theoretical tract, a picture instead of an abstract description, he achieved something that none of the theoreticians did: He made his imagined world real for us, whereas very much of the scholarly literature made the real seem remote.

1984 is about a society, Oceania, or one part of it, Airstrip One, whose name in 1948 had been England. Oceania is ruled by an Inner Party with the help of a larger Outer Party of which the hero, Winston Smith, and his illicit lover Julia are working members. Their love is illicit, and hence secret, because in Oceania's antisex ideology, all erotic emotion is to be fixated on the figure of the leader, Big Brother.

Winston and Julia are employed in the Ministry of Truth, whose function is to falsify the past in accordance with the needs of present policy. Thus, when Oceania suddenly shifts alliances, becoming the ally of Eurasia and the enemy of Eastasia, with which it had been in alliance against Eurasia, the Ministry of Truth falsifies all past records to show that Oceania never had been an ally of Eastasia and never an enemy of Eurasia.

The Ministry of Truth thus helps the citizens respond appropriately to the philippics against Eastasia that they now see and hear over their telescreens, and to the friendly references to Eurasia. And if they fail to think the proper new political thoughts as commanded, these telescreens, which are two-way affairs, enabling unseen authorities to spy on their doings and feelings inside their apartments, may detect in them evidence of "thoughtcrime." Offenders are taken to the torture chambers of the Ministry of Love, from which, if they emerge at all, they do so transformed into robot-like receivers of the telescreen's signals. Those who do not re-emerge have their names eliminated from all past records by the Ministry of Truth, so as to make it appear that they never existed. They become unpersons.

In a 1955 essay, historian Isaac Deutscher argued that Orwell borrowed "the plot, the chief characters, the symbols, and the whole climate of his story" from an earlier book, *We*, written in 1920 by the Russian, Evgenii Zamiatin. But that judgment is too sharp. For *1984* quite clearly reflects the deep impact on Or-

well of the contemporary political pageants of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, especially the former.

Thus, the sudden switch of alliances by Oceania resembles the switch by Stalin in 1939 to his accord with Hitler. The objects of the Two Minute Hate sessions on public squares and on everybody's home telescreens, Emmanuel Goldstein and "Goldsteinism," recall Trotsky (whose original name was Bronstein) and Trotskyism. Above all, the Big Brother who is both omnipresent and invisible, who never makes a personal appearance but whose portrait looks down on you everywhere, in public and in private, with his moustache and his enigmatic smile, evokes the reclusive Stalin. Hitler had a moustache, but no enigmatic smile.

When I first read *1984* soon after its publication, I was living in Moscow as a member of the American Embassy, and the story seemed very real to me. It portrayed things I had seen happening, such as individuals disappearing overnight and nobody even daring to try to find out from Stalin's secret police, the NKVD, what was happening to them. Terror at that time was universal in Russia. By contrast, today's Russia is no more than a repressive authoritarian police state of one particular kind. It is not the nightmare state of *1984* that actually existed in Russia in 1949.

The question then arises whether terror in an extreme form is in fact the "very essence," in Arendt's words, of the nightmare state. There are two issues here. First, her distinction between "dictatorial" and "total" terror, although important, is not one of kind, but one of degree. Dictatorial terror deliberately spreads fear among a far greater circle of people in a society than those actually victimized, their relatives, and their associates. Indeed, it is in the nature of state terror, which aims, by victimizing the relatively few, to paralyze the many by showing them that they too are in deadly danger if they speak out or resist the government in any way. Hence, "total" terror is but an extreme form of "dictatorial" terror. The distinction is nevertheless of huge significance to the people of a society, as evident in the difference between today's Russia and Stalin's. For example, anti-Brezhnev anecdotes were rife in the Soviet Union during the 1970s and could be repeated in conversation with impunity. But people overheard telling an anti-Stalin anecdote in 1938 or 1948 were often sentenced to ten years in a concentration camp.

The second issue is whether extreme or "total" terror is in fact the very essence of the totalitarian phenomenon. It belongs to the essence, but is not the whole of it, and perhaps the greatest merit of *1984* is that it shows what else belongs there. People are ruled by fear in Oceania, as in any authoritarian police state where terror is practiced by the government. But this fear is not the peculiar reality, the distinctive feature, of life in the nightmare state. Orwell depicts two other emotions as salient in the public and, to a great extent, the private life of Oceania: love and hate. Boundless love and adoration of Big Brother and, by association, anyone or anything closely linked with him; and fierce, sadistic hatred of those declared to be Big Brother's, and hence everyone's, enemies.

Orwell suggests that the ultimate distinction between an authoritarian and totalitarian state depends on the role and significance of love and hate in the controlled public life of the state in question. A land where people live in fear of the authorities because one can be made to disappear unaccountably and torture is practiced is not the full-fledged nightmare state, however nightmarish for those who fall victims to the dictatorial terror and those associated with them. A society that compels love for the leader and hate for those identified as his (and hence all society's) enemies, is the real nightmare.

Applying this criterion, we can see that the two cases of Stalin and Hitler are not the only ones on the record. Another was Mao Zedong's China of the so-called Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966, when Chairman Mao appeared on Tien An Men Square in Beijing at dawn, like the sun with which he was compared in a then popular song from a show called *The East Is Red*:

> From the Red East rises the sun,
> There appears in China a Mao Zedong.

This dawn appearance was the first of eight occasions when Mao reviewed troops of Red Guards whom he launched into the "Cultural Revolution" (Orwellian Newspeak for what might better be called the revolution against culture). When he appeared, a hundred thousand Red Guard throats opened to greet him in frenzied adulation. "Teenage girls became hysterical, their faces contorted; they wept uncontrollably and, half-fainting, had to be supported by those next them."

The account just cited comes from a Chinese-speaking Englishman, Roger Garside, who later became First Secretary of the British Embassy in Beijing. In 1966, he was living in Hong Kong. In the midst of this rally, which was being broadcast from

Beijing over a station heard in Hong Kong, Garside walked into the living room of Chinese friends and found them "listening in silent horror as a high-pitched voice whipped a crowd to a delirium of fury." The voice was that of Lin Biao, then a close companion of Chairman Mao (later an unperson). Mao was beside him as he spoke, "glancing over his shoulder at the text and smiling approvingly." Garside recalls: "The savage frenzy made me think of Hitler's Nuremberg rallies," and when Lin Biao shouted: "All our victories are victories of the Thoughts of Mao Zedong," Garside was struck by the thought that he was "unconsciously echoing the propaganda for Big Brother in George Orwell's *1984*."

He notes that little children during the Cultural Revolution were being taught to sing a song that went:

> Father is dear, mother is dear
> But Chairman Mao is dearest of all.

And during three years of exaltation, when people were exclaiming "Chairman Mao has come among us!", hundreds of thousands of people, old and young, were killed, maimed, and tortured as enemies of Chairman Mao—"freaks and monsters," they were called. Mao saw them as ghosts from the past, and called the Ministry of Culture the "Ministry of Ghosts" because it allowed figures from history and legend to crowd the theatrical stage and the pages of books. The scale of the repression that accompanied the adulation is suggested by the fact that nearly three million people purged or imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution had been rehabilitated (of course, in many cases posthumously) by 1979—this according to figures released by the present leader of China, Deng Xiaoping. The numbers of those done to death alone are estimated by usually reliable sources at 400,000.

Like Russia after Stalin, China after Mao remains an authoritarian state with a tightly controlled population; but it is not the nightmare state of Mao's last period. The nightmare vanished when Big Brother died. No more frenzied eroticism, no more paroxysms of hatred, and no more extremes of paralyzing fear.

The nightmare can exist in small forms as well as large, in little assemblages as well as great states. And it can come into existence among us, as is shown by accounts of the People's Temple Colony of Americans, transplanted to Guyana and ruled by a Big Brother named Reverend Jim Jones, whose megalomaniacal feelings drove him, finally, to ask the collective suicide of

his little flock of 900 men, women, and children. It was an act reminiscent of Hitler's effort to bring Germany down to destruction when he saw his cause was lost. In his limitlessly egocentric mind, the Fatherland, not having proved worthy of its *Fuehrer*, deserved to be destroyed.

In *1984*, Winston Smith is obsessed by an overwhelming question. As a functionary of the Ministry of Truth, he knows how the system works, but he can't puzzle out why it does the things that it does. He says: "I understand *how*; I do not understand *why*." This is Orwell's question, I think, expressed through his hero.

Winston suspects that the mystery of the *why* is bound up with the answer to a further question: Does Big Brother really exist?

Reading Emmanuel Goldstein's forbidden book, *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*, Winston finds a negative answer: "Big Brother," writes Goldstein, "is the guise in which the Party chooses to exhibit itself to the world. His function is to act as a focusing point for love, fear, and reverence, emotions which are more easily felt towards an individual than towards an organization."

Winston isn't satisfied: "He had still, he reflected, not learned the ultimate secret. He understood *how*; he did not understand *why*."

Then, when he and Julia are found to be lovers and to be secret followers of Goldsteinism, and are taken to the Ministry of Love for interrogation under torture, he takes the opportunity to ask the interrogator, O'Brien: "Does Big Brother exist?" O'Brien replies: "Of course he exists. The Party exists. Big Brother is the embodiment of the Party." Winston: "Does he exist in the same way as I exist?" "You do not exist," says O'Brien. As for the secret *why* of it all, O'Brien says to Winston: "The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power."

O'Brien was either misinformed or lying. For the truth that history has revealed about the *why* is that *Big Brother really existed*. He exists in every instance of the nightmare state, and it is his needs—above all the colossal grandiosity, the need to be adored, worshiped by millions of subjects, and to gain never-ending vindictive triumphs over hated enemies—that motivate, under his near-total domination, the life of the society and the workings of the state. They motivate its repression of every fact that contradicts a Big Brother's monstrously inflated image of

himself as one who could never err; its insistence on a culture of antisex so that all erotic emotion can focus on the single object at the center of it all; its projection of violent hatred upon the collective and individual enemy figure; and its twisting of historical reality to conform with the demands of Big Brother's demented self. Understandably, the fulfillment of such a set of needs necessitates virtual totality of control by the state over the private as well as public lives of its subjects. It has to be a total state, or something very close to it.

Orwell did not see the "him" at the source of the "it." Yet his genius broke through the obstacle of abstract sociopolitical reasoning at the end of the book, where Winston Smith, having been utterly broken by unbearable torture,

> gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.

In the person of his creation, Winston Smith, Orwell showed that the real purpose was not power for power's sake or torture for torture's sake or persecution for persecution's sake; it was to get everybody who counted to love Big Brother and to hate everyone Big Brother hated.

But while Orwell the artist understood, Orwell the political thinker failed to comprehend the *why*. His failure was manifestly not his own but that of a generation of powerful, uncomprehending theorists who influenced his thinking about the elusive phenomenon.

Had not the real-life Goldstein, Trotsky, written in his book *The Revolution Betrayed* in 1937: "Stalin is the personification of the bureaucracy. That is the substance of his intellectual personality." Orwell certainly read that book.

Had not Franz Neumann written in his *Behemoth* in 1942 that the totalitarian state must *not* be seen as a *Fuehrerstaat*, despite its proclamation of the *Fuehrerprinzip* and its ruler cult? For the doctrine of one-man rule was, he wrote, "merely a device to prevent insight into the operation of the social-economic mechanism," in which "the decisions of the Leader are merely the result of the compromises among the four leaderships." Orwell very likely read this book too.

These and other brilliant minds resisted the thought that Big Brother as a person might be "the very essence" of the phenomenon with which they were dealing, although acceptance of that thought would in no way absolve the Eichmanns, the Berias, and thousands of other executors of Big Brother's will of their full share of responsibility for the misdeeds they committed in the leader's name.

But all credit still goes to Orwell for what he did do in his book: He showed us this infinitely evil thing in action. He gave us the *how*, without which the answer to the *why* wouldn't really take us very far. In his own way, he told us the truth about the nightmare state, where, by virtue of various techniques of control and manipulation, the inner workings of a dictatorial leader's mind are institutionalized in political life. The fantasies of a Big Brother—fantasies of being loved by the multitude of people, of being the savior, the hero, of being omnipotent, and of wreaking a terrible vengeance upon those he has come to hate as enemies—are enacted for him by servile functionaries and masses of often deluded men, women, and children.

Perhaps a better name for it would be Big Brother's "fantasy state." The fantasies are enacted for him in the most diverse settings and forms: in courtrooms, where purge trials take place and the victims, after confessing their crimes, abase themselves by paying a final public tribute to him, their murderer, upon pronouncement of the death sentence; in theaters, where idealized versions of his fantasized hero's life are performed for him by talented artists; in mass rallies, where people by the tens of thousands enact their adoration of him; in schools, where children are taught to thank him for their happy lives and, if need be, to denounce even their parents as his enemies; in concentration camps, where hated ones are destroyed in awful ways for whatever he fancies their crimes to have been; and perhaps on battlefields, where soldiers go into combat for his greater glory.

It is his fantasies that are being enacted by contrivance of the organs of the state. And he, in whose mind the fantasies arose, is not only the author but also the appreciative spectator of the performance, because he believes it. When he dies or is displaced, the show is over. Left behind are death and misery, guilt and the denial of guilt, wasted lives, memories of horror, another authoritarianism with its army, police, and other institutions—the ruins of the fantasy state.



The Danube River as it flows through the Transylvanian Alps in the heart of the Balkans. "For hundreds of years," wrote Graf Helmuth von Moltke in 1836, "the Danube has divided civilized and barbaric peoples, but today it brings them together." Plans for some sort of "Balkan Federation" were repeatedly proposed (and forgotten) during the 19th century. In the 1980s, cooperative ventures in the region center once more on the Danube.

The Balkans

Forbidding mountains. Gypsies. The Sarajevo assassination. Tito. Peasants dancing *horos*. Bulgarian hit-men. In the American mind, the Balkans appear as a series of disconnected images. And perhaps for good reason: The region's history is complicated and confusing. The Balkan republics were detached from ailing empires during the past 150 years. The experience proved unsettling. Ethnic and religious animosities, centuries old, divide the peoples of the peninsula. Only fitfully have their countries been free of outside interference. They worry about that. "I think there is a large danger that the great powers will intervene again in the Balkans," Belgrade University historian Branko Petranović recently observed, "because the Mediterranean is valuable to them, and we are between the [East and West] blocs." Yet, since the end of World War II, the Balkans have enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace. Here, David Binder looks at the Balkan states, at their history, and at their current predicaments.

by David Binder

"Balkan" is a Turkish word for mountain, and it denotes today a range of peaks extending across Bulgaria from the Yugoslav border to the Black Sea. During the late 18th century, northern European geographers labored under the mistaken impression that, geologically, the Balkan chain encompassed *all* of the mountains that stretch along the wide peninsula formed by the Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean, and Black Seas. The term "Balkan Peninsula" (*die Balkanhalbinsel*) was coined by Johann August Zeune in 1808. As the 19th century wore on, and new political entities were imposed upon this contested ground, Zeune's usage became popular. It was subsequently pared down to "the Balkans."

It is convenient shorthand but a term of limited value, and different scholars have defined the Balkans in various ways. It is customary to include what are now Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which together take up a Texas-sized chunk of the peninsula. But four other countries—Greece, Hun-

gary, Turkey, and the Soviet Union—also occupy portions of the Balkan peninsula. Down through the ages, Greeks, Hungarians, Turks, and Russians have had much to say about the fate of the Balkan peoples on their doorsteps.

In any event, "the Balkans" is not a phrase one hears the peoples of the Balkans using frequently to describe their region. For different reasons, it does not sit well with most of them.

The "Powderkeg"

To an Albanian, the term ignores his nation's origins in ancient Illyria—the birthplace of Diocletian, who ruled the Roman Empire for 21 years—and lumps Albanians together with relative newcomers to the peninsula such as the South Slavs.

To the Romanians, the word seems to belie their claim to a direct link with the Roman legions who occupied ancient Dacia between the first and third centuries A.D. The Romans left behind a largely Latinate tongue of which the Romanians—who speak of themselves frequently as a "Latin island in a sea of Slavs"—are inordinately proud. The fact that more than one-quarter of the words in their language are Slavic in origin is only grudgingly acknowledged.

To a Greek, the usage neglects the memory of classical Athens and the Golden Age of Pericles. It disregards Greece's historic involvement in the Mediterranean, its whole maritime tradition.

To the Hungarians, who did not hesitate to extend their rule in centuries past over (Balkan) Slovenia and on into (Balkan) Croatia, the Vojvodina, and the Banat, the coinage is an unspeakable insult to their Central Europeanness, their claims to be a *Kulturvolk* along with the Austrians and Germans.

That leaves only the various peoples of Yugoslavia, not loving one another, torn by a history of lurches to the West and to the East, and somewhat embarrassed at having been the ones whose turbulent politics gave rise during the 19th century to clichés such as the "Balkan powderkeg"; and the Bulgars, an Asiatic tribe Slavicized by the people they overran, who have looked to Berlin or Moscow for rescue from foreign oppression and for restoration of the Macedonian lands held under two Bul-

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In the Balkans, political boundaries rarely correspond to ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions. As a result, every Balkan country (except, perhaps, Albania) is to some degree a multinational state. Over the years, each has voiced claims to part of a neighbor's territory.

garian empires, one expiring ignominiously during the 11th century, the other during the 14th.

Neither the Bulgarians nor the Yugoslavs care much for "the Balkans" either.

The term has not been entirely shunned, however. From time to time, proposals have surfaced for some sort of economic or political "Balkan cooperation." A regional Inter-Balkan Conference was held in Athens in 1976, and more recently both Athens and Sofia have called for creation of a Balkan "nuclear free zone," which would have a practical effect only in Greece, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deployed nuclear weapons. But the truly serious attempts since the mid-19th century to establish formal linkages among the Balkan countries have all met with failure, the short-lived Balkan Entente during the 1930s being one case in point. It is almost as if the name "Balkan" were itself enough to doom any regional initiative.

Yet geography, if nothing else, has given a certain historical unity to the Balkans, dictated their evolution, compelled their people to share a past, a present, and a future.

I
THE LIVING PAST

In few other places on earth have the contour and lay of the land proved so decisive to the fortunes of those who would live upon it as they have in the Balkans.

There is, to begin with, the Danube, coursing ever stronger from the center of Europe in Germany, through Austria, along the border of Czechoslovakia, beginning its great reverse-S curve through Hungary and into Yugoslavia, serving as part of the Yugoslav border with Romania, continuing as the boundary between Romania and Bulgaria, and, finally, plunging through Romania until it touches the southwestern tip of the Soviet Union and pours into the Black Sea. The Danube, navigable today all the way to Ulm in West Germany, has served since pre-Christian times as a great natural highway, "beckoning invaders and settlers and merchants," in the words of one historian, "and linking the peninsula with Central Europe to the west and the Russian steppes to the east."

There are the mountains, from the Julian Alps of Slovenia down to the northwest-southeast ridges of the Dinaric Alps. Farther to the east are the Transylvanian Alps, curving north in the center of Romania to greet the Carpathians. Straddling the Greek-Albanian frontier, the Pindus Mountains rise to 8,650 feet, the more dramatic for their proximity to the Ionian Sea. The rugged terrain of much of the Balkans presents vistas of breathtaking beauty. However, as historian Fernand Braudel observed in *The Mediterranean* (1949), "In the mountains, civilization is never very stable."

Below the peaks are high pastures and verdant valleys, inviting to herders of sheep and goats since time immemorial. Other stretches consist of mile after mile of bone-white, chalky limestone—the bleak *karst* of the Dalmatian coast, pitted here and there by deep, water-carved depressions where a handful of cattle may graze. Vast plains run alongside the principal rivers: the Danube, of course, but also the Sava, the Drava, the Tisza, the Morava, the Vardar, the Prut, the Siret, the Maritsa. Alluvial soils make some of these lowlands rich producers of grains. Other flatlands, such as the Bărăgan region northeast of Bucharest, have a steppe-like quality and, in inclement weather, when cold winds blow off the sister steppes of Russia, a visitor may feel the breath of Siberia.

For millennia, the Balkans have served as both land bridge

and buffer between East and West, and since the earliest times the traffic has moved in both directions, along the great river valleys that slice through the mountains. The high ridges that divide and "Balkanize" the peoples of the peninsula are cut by passes that provide access to the Aegean and Adriatic and Black Seas, to the Pannonian Plain and the Dardanelles and the Ukraine, and between any one of these points and any other.

Today, one of the chief routes for narcotics smuggled in from the Middle East crosses from Turkey into Bulgaria and then goes over the Dragoman Pass to Yugoslavia, and from there on up into northern Europe. The drugs, mostly heroin, are typically moved in customs-sealed trucks whose manifests may describe the contents as fruits, vegetables, meats, or machinery.

The route is precisely the one used by the Turks as they marched on Vienna during the 16th century and by the Crusaders as they journeyed to the Holy Land during the 11th. It was the route employed by the Roman Emperor Constantine (ca. A.D. 280–337), that eminent son of the Balkans, when he journeyed between his native Niš (in Serbia) and Constantinople, the imperial capital he founded on the Bosporus. Later he would say



"Mowers Resting," by Romania's painter Camil Ressu (1880–1962). Most people in the Balkans before World War II lived in peasant societies. "Land meant more to the peasant than money in the bank," one writer observed. "It meant more than food on the table; it meant life itself."

that his favorite city in the empire—and he had seen most of them, from London to Palmyra—was not Constantinople (which would dominate Balkan life for centuries) but Sardica, modern Sofia, on the other side of the Dragoman Pass from Niš.

So it is with the other major land routes of the region. Modern thoroughfares follow centuries-old caravan trails, which followed Roman roads, which followed rivers and other gashes in the terrain, routes taken by primitive peoples who could neither read nor write but understood well enough how to travel.

The Balkan peninsula is unusually vulnerable, its perimeter pitted by scores of natural harbors, the waters beyond flecked with islands ripe for occupation, the interior easily penetrated along one of a dozen natural corridors. It was penetrated very early—at least 40,000 years ago, so far as scholars have been able to tell. Sculptures of that age, with a distinctly Asian cast, have been unearthed by archaeologists along the Danube near the Iron Gates rapids. Carved stone house gods of more recent vintage, similar to others found in Asia Minor, have been unearthed in Kosovo, Yugoslavia.

Ancestral Lands

By roughly 1,000 B.C., at the beginning of the Iron Age, a large portion of the western Balkans was inhabited by an apparently indigenous people called the Illyrians. Their presence was known to the Greeks, who had already developed a relatively advanced civilization, founded city-states on the Aegean, and fanned out across the Mediterranean and along the Balkan coasts.

Contemporary with the Illyrians but inhabiting the southeastern Balkans were the Thracians, who gave us the god Dionysus and were mentioned by Herodotus both for their peculiarly savage style of fighting and for their political instability. Their cousins to the north, in Transylvania, called themselves Dacians. To the northeast, above the marshy Danube delta, lived the Scythians, who were probably of Iranian origin. Illyria and Thrace were subjugated by the Romans in the second century B.C., but not until A.D. 106 did the Emperor Trajan succeed in conquering the Dacians and thereby push the empire's frontier to the Danube. That achievement is celebrated in marble basrelief on Trajan's column in Rome.

The relevance to our own time of all this activity may seem obscure, and yet the distant past remains oddly pertinent to the politics of the Balkans today.

In the case of Albania, for example, the Stalinist government of Enver Hoxha has lately been invoking "scientific" au-

thority to assert an unbroken connection between the Albanians of today and the Illyrians of the dawn of history. The link, says Hoxha, justifies Albania's claims to "ancestral" lands lying well beyond its present frontiers, in the Yugoslav republics of Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia (where 1.7 million Albanians live today), not to mention the northwestern corner of Greece.

In Romania, the Dacian connection has been cited with increasing stridency by the government of Nicolae Ceauşescu to counter Hungary's more recent claim to Transylvania as well as to assert Romanian rights to Bukovina and Moldavia, portions of which were seized by the Russians during World War II.

Slavs, Bulgars, and Turks

The Balkans have not, for the most part, been a melting pot. Each of the many groups that have arrived over the centuries has generally found a cul-de-sac or two to call its own. Imperial Rome, for example, lives on in the blood of the Vlachs. Presumed to be descendants of Roman colonists who settled in the Balkans two millennia ago, the Vlachs are for the most part nomadic sheepherders and cattle traders who speak a Latinate language and are scattered throughout the uplands of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania. (The Vlach "capital," Samarina, is located in Greece.) During World War II, Mussolini attempted, without much success, to recruit Greek Vlachs into a special legion. Today, despite assimilationist pressures, the Vlachs everywhere retain a strong sense of identity.

The South Slavic peoples, who together constitute the majority of the population of the Balkan region today, arrived on the scene long after the Romans, probably not until the sixth century A.D. in any sizable numbers. While there is general agreement that the original home of the South (or *Yugo*) Slavs lay somewhere west of the Dniester River in what is now the Ukraine, there is also a consensus among scholars that a number of distinct Slavic tribes were involved, and that they came by different routes and at different times.

The Serbs, for example, are unquestionably cousins in blood and tongue to the Western Slavs now settled in the upper Elbe valley of East Germany, who call themselves Sorbs. Some Slovene historians, including Bogo Grafenauer of Ljubljana University, believe that the Slovenes arrived by way of Czechoslovakia. The Bulgars were originally a Hun people from the edge of Mongolia who crossed the Danube in the seventh century A.D. and were gradually absorbed by indigenous Slavs.

The last of the Balkan peoples to migrate to the region were



Turkish troops lead away Christian captives. The Turks completed their conquest of the Balkans in the 16th century. Among those who opposed them: Romania's Vlad the Impaler (inset), inspiration for Count Dracula, and "a man of diseased and abnormal tendencies."

the Turks, who first infiltrated the peninsula during the 14th century, a hundred years before they seized Constantinople in 1453. Today, more than 500,000 Muslim Turks inhabit Bulgaria. Another 200,000 can be found in Yugoslavia, and 120,000 live in Greece. While their Ottoman ancestors came as rulers and administrators, now, except in a few places such as Yugoslavia's Novi Pazar (the former Turkish district separating Serbia and Montenegro), the Turks of the Balkans are the poorest of the poor.

The ethnic diversity of the Balkan peninsula is reflected in religious divisions. In the Balkans as elsewhere, religious conviction often followed on the heels of conquest, the fortunes of one faith or another varying with the vicissitudes of empire. The Church of Rome, for example, first extended its reach over the Balkans during the reign of Constantine. It subsequently lost its monopoly but retained a grip on Dalmatia by way of Venice and on Slovenia and Croatia by way of Vienna and Budapest—and there today one finds strongholds of the Roman Catholic Church. Constantinople, closer by river, road, and temperament, found sympathy in Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and even Albania,

and it was in these regions, not to mention Greece, that the (Eastern) Orthodox Church gained adherents.

One notable quality of the Orthodox faith was that it left room for national expression, beginning in the ninth century with the creation of the Cyrillic alphabet, which made possible a liturgy in Slavic languages (rather than Greek). This alphabet permitted, even encouraged, the ultimate development of native Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Romanian Orthodox churches, all of which fostered the evolution of corresponding nation-states.

"The Crack of Doom"

Islam, spread by the Ottoman Turks, was fiercely rejected by many in the Balkans but welcomed by some. A curious example of the latter comes from the Bosnian Slavs who, by the time of the Turkish conquest during the 15th century, had adopted an austere, Manichaean-related Christian faith called Bogomilism, which held (among other things) that the physical world was a creation of the devil. Viewed as heretical by both the Byzantine and Roman churches, the Bogomils were threatened by twin crusades. In the end, they welcomed the Muslim Turks almost as liberators and willingly converted to Islam, becoming Slavic Muslims. Roughly 40 percent of Yugoslav Bosnians today retain the Islamic faith adopted by their forefathers.

Indeed, Yugoslavia's Communist leaders found themselves confronted in 1983 with a fundamentalist Muslim revival in Bosnia that resulted in at least 12 citizens being tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison on charges of hostile propaganda and sedition. Something of a religious awakening is, in fact, occurring all across the Balkans these days (except in Albania, which banned all forms of worship in 1967), not only among Muslims but among Catholics and Orthodoxians as well.

To awaken religious sentiment in the Balkans is usually to inflame old, and sometimes not-so-old, wounds. During the course of World War II, a number of scores were settled. Upset that they had become (thanks to territorial adjustments made in 1918) a minority in their native Vojvodina, Hungarian Catholics in Yugoslavia set thousands of Orthodox Serbs upon Danube ice floes to freeze to death in 1942. Croatian *Ustaše* (Fascists), under Hitler's protection, slashed the throats, gouged out the eyes, and otherwise disposed of hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Serbs retaliated in kind against Catholic Croats, and so on.

Anti-Semitism was widespread in the Balkans (though

Bogomil graves in Yugoslavia. Such forlorn monuments in forests and mountains are almost all that remains of the once powerful Christian sect. Embraced by Bosnia's nobility after the 12th century, Bogomilism developed into a national movement that endured for three centuries.

some countries, notably Greece and Bulgaria, were relatively free of it). Most Balkan states cooperated with the Nazis to some degree in rounding up the Jews for deportation to the death camps.* All told, roughly 350,000 Jews from the Balkan region lost their lives during the war. The postwar immigration of the survivors to Israel and elsewhere deprived the Balkan states of some of their richest heritages. Historically, the Balkan Jews had provided a link not only to Venice and Toledo but also to Prague, Vienna, and Frankfurt, a link to certain centers of learning and culture that would otherwise have been weak.

To have lived through Balkan history is to have been exposed in equal measures to beauty and terror. While the details of each national history may vary, the basic pattern is common to all: episodic invasion, ethnic and religious discord, foreign interference. This cycle in turn has bred a distinct sense of fatalism in the people of the region. "The crack of doom is coming soon," runs one Gypsy verse. "Let it come, it doesn't matter."

*The situation was complex. For example, while Bulgaria did not kill or send to the camps any *Bulgarian* Jews, the Bulgarian government did yield up some 11,000 "foreign" Jews—Jews from Thrace and Macedonia who were under Bulgarian authority. The government in Bucharest was responsible for the deaths of 250,000 Jews, though it spared those from Old Romania. The Yugoslav Partisans welcomed Jews to their ranks. Tito himself was coached in Marxism during a prison term by a prominent Jewish Communist, Moša Pijade.

II
A CLASH OF EMPIRES

From a contemporary perspective, the history of the Balkan states must be viewed, to use a phrase employed by historian Robert Lee Wolff, as "interrupted history." No country in the Balkans was permitted to evolve on its own terms. Ruled during most of the past five centuries by either the Austro-Hungarian emperor or the Ottoman sultan, the people of the Balkans came relatively late to the concept of nationhood.

"Interrupted history." To Slovenes, the phrase captures the fact that they held onto independence for less than a hundred years, ending in the ninth century, only to acquire (partial) statehood again as one constituent part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of South Slavia after an interruption of more than a thousand years. The Bulgars, as noted above, twice had a brief fling at empire, but the Turks in 1398 overran the last of sovereign Bulgaria. It took the Bulgarians 500 years and the help of Russia to regain their independence.

The Croats, led by King Tomislav, achieved independence during the 10th century but soon fell under the sway of Hungary, remaining so until 1918 when they were incorporated into the South Slav Kingdom. The more romantic Croats still hanker after a separate Croatian state, for which the most radical are prepared to fight with guns and bombs. During the early 1970s, Croatian nationalists in exile conducted a terror campaign against Yugoslav diplomats and twice hijacked commercial airliners (including a TWA flight from New York to Chicago).

The Serbs established an independent state in the 12th century and something of a Balkan empire in the 14th only to lose on the field of battle to another expanding empire, that of the Turks. The Greeks, who had erected a powerful state in the fifth century B.C., subsequently came under the domination of a series of foreigners until they achieved independence from the Turks in 1829. Romania, whatever its pretensions to noble origins, acquired full autonomy only in 1861 (with the union of the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia), and formal independence in 1878. Albania, the youngest of the lot, although its inhabitants were arguably the first of the Balkan peoples, had sovereignty conferred upon it by Europe's Great Powers in 1912.

It is ironic that just when other countries were curbing the powers of royalty, the new Balkan states in the 19th century saw fit to revive the institution. "Monarchies got stronger here at a time when they were supposed to be getting weaker," observes

historian Ljubo Boban. As Turkish power began to wane and various Ottoman territories acquired autonomy, the burdens of rule often passed to prominent local families—the Obrenović family in Serbia, for example, and the Petrović family in Montenegro. (Montenegro's King Nicholas I, blessed with six beautiful daughters who married into other royal families, was known as the "Father-in-Law of Europe.") Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece all had to import their first kings, who were selected with the approval of the Great Powers. Ultimately World War II would destroy all but one of the Balkan monarchies. The last of the neighborhood's kings to go was Constantine of Greece, who fled into exile after the Greek colonels seized power in 1967.

Striking East

Some of these Balkan monarchs were able men, some wily and adventurous, some tragically ineffective. Conspiracies were frequent and more than one monarch was forced to abdicate at gunpoint. But Bismarck once advised a young German prince, who was considering whether to accept the Romanian crown, to take the job, commenting: "If you fail, you will at any rate have a pleasant reminiscence for the rest of your life."

Whatever the political ups-and-downs in Balkan capitals, life for most of the peninsula's population changed little. By late 19th-century northern European standards, conditions remained primitive. Cities were small, railroads few. The principal occupation was agriculture, and peasants throughout the Balkans lived on the land as they had for centuries, largely uninterested in events outside their village. Meanwhile, in the mountains and in city cafés, nationalist revolutionaries from Bosnia to Bulgaria to Macedonia plotted armed uprisings. Guerrilla clashes and even skirmishes between regular army units were frequent along a half-dozen frontiers.

The fighting took its toll on the populace. One American journalist, John L. C. Booth, described the aftermath of an engagement in 1904 between Macedonian insurgents and Ottoman troops: "Men and women looked tired—dead tired and sick of life, and well they might be. Their village, Belitza, had been rushed by the Turkish soldiers . . . and such of the village folk as could get away made a rush for the hills—nearly all women, carrying their children and helping the old men. As they ran, the blackguards fired into them; some dropped, others sprang forward, hard hit, to fall in the awful scramble up the hillside. Looking back, they saw the smoke rise over their homes. . . ."

In our century, the Balkans have been the seedbed of three

National frontiers shifted frequently between the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) and World War I. The map depicts the situation in 1909. Balkan rulers, clockwise from upper left, included: Emperor Franz Josef; King Carol I; Tsar Ferdinand I; Sultan Mehmed V; King Nicholas I; King Peter I.

major wars: the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 and, of course, World War I, sparked by the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, on June 28, 1914.* Following that first global catastrophe, scholars and literary figures, among them Graham Greene, Eric Ambler, and Rebecca West, combed the region in substantial numbers on the not implausible assumption that yet another major conflict could commence in the Balkans. "It appeared to me inevitable that another war must follow," West wrote, recalling the 1934 assassination, in Marseilles, of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.

*In the First Balkan War, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece together pried Macedonia away from Turkey. Discord arose over division of the spoils. When Bulgaria invaded Serb- and Greek-occupied sectors of Macedonia, its forces were repulsed. In the Second Balkan War, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro were joined by Romania and Turkey.

The Second World War, as it turned out, started someplace else, but it came to the Balkans soon enough. Hitler's dreams of expansion lay principally to the east and west of his Germanic fortress, and it was in those directions—toward Poland in September 1939 and France in May 1940—that he struck most forcibly. But the Nazis moved early to secure a crucial supply of petroleum, through their Romanian clients, from the bountiful Ploieşti oil fields at the foot of the Transylvanian Alps. Hitler himself contemplated a flanking move in 1941 that would have carried his armies across a prostrate Balkan peninsula into neutral Turkey and on toward Baku, in the Soviet Union's vital oil-producing region on the Caspian Sea. In the end, the Wehrmacht, joined by 15 Romanian divisions, took a different route, across the Ukraine. Even so, they nearly made it to Baku.

Acts of Defiance

Nor should one neglect the other European partner in the Axis, Benito Mussolini, who had already brought war to the Balkans more than four months before the Nazi invasion of Poland. Il Duce's troops crossed the Adriatic and overran King Zog's Albania in April 1939. The operation took scarcely a week, during which time a son was born to the Albanian monarch. "How long will he be an heir to the Albanian throne?" Italy's foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, asked sarcastically on hearing the news. Zog fled the next day to Greece with his Hungarian wife and infant prince. The boy, named for Albania's national hero, Skanderbeg, lives today in Paris. He is a weapons dealer and aspires still to his father's crown.

As the conflict went on, the march of the Axis powers through southeastern Europe was impeded by two acts of defiance in the Balkans. The first was that of the Greeks, who said No (*"Ochi!"*) to Mussolini's attempted occupation in 1940 of "certain strategic points on Greek territory." Greek soldiers, moving swiftly through their familiar mountains, halted the Fascist advance along the valley floors and then chased the best of Italy's soldiery back into Albania.

The second act of defiance was the coup of patriotic Yugoslav army officers at the end of March 1941, in protest against a humiliating pact—amounting to subjugation—that the Belgrade leadership under Premier Dragiša Cvetković had just signed under duress with the Axis powers. Led by Air Force General Dušan Simović, the officers rejected the infamous Tripartite Agreement and thereby knowingly provided a pretext for invasion by all of Yugoslavia's foes.

Historians have since concluded that the April 1941 Axis sweep through Yugoslavia and Greece not only diverted Hitler from any possible thrust into Turkey but, more importantly, delayed Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, by two critical months, perhaps sparing Moscow from capture in the winter of 1941–42. After the war, German generals and historians confirmed that the Yugoslav resistance, eventually led by Josip Broz Tito, tied down 20 German and Italian divisions at a time when those troops were desperately needed on the eastern and western fronts.

For more than a decade after V-E Day, Western military strategists, diplomats, politicians, and assorted academics continued to view the Balkan region with the special interest reserved for a special case. One reason for this, of course, was that Russia's Red Army had "liberated" the Balkans in 1944 and helped install Communist regimes in Belgrade, Tiranë, Sofia, and Bucharest. The transformation of the Balkan states, through collectivization and industrialization, was begun. Russia now dominated peninsular affairs as no single power had done since the height of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century.

Spurning the Soviets

Another reason was the 1946–49 civil war in Greece. That bloody conflict, which cost the lives of 5,219 civilians, 14,356 soldiers and police, and some 50,000 insurgents, remains one of the least understood episodes of the immediate postwar era. To Britain and the United States, the emergence of a Communist-led military force, ELAS (the Greek acronym for National Popular Liberation Army), in Greece could only be the work of Stalin when, in fact, its supplies came mainly from Tito's Communists in Yugoslavia. To be sure, when the Greek civil war began, Tito was an ally of Stalin. But, like the Serbian empire builders seven centuries earlier, Tito and his aides (especially the Macedonians among them) were attracted by the idea of playing a dominant role in the affairs of the lower Balkan peninsula.

With Britain bled white by World War II, the United States stepped in to take over its ally's affairs in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Washington channeled money, military advisers, and materiel to the shaky government in Athens, shouldering a burden that the British had once elected to assume; a burden deriving from the cynical counting house chit drawn up by Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. Under that gentleman's agreement, the British and the Russians were to have a fifty-fifty "interest" in Yugoslavia, the British would retain a "90 percent

In 1941, the Nazis offered a reward of 100,000 Reichsmarks for capture of Yugoslav Partisan leader Josip Broz Tito. Tito's guerrillas eliminated rival factions and led the resistance against the Axis occupation.

interest" in Greece, and the Soviets a "90 percent interest" in Romania.

Out of Truman's support for Greek government forces against the Communists in 1947–48 came the U.S. commitment to support Turkey and creation of what was later to become the southern "flank" of NATO. But something else happened in 1948 that would cast the Balkans into an even larger spotlight: Tito stood up to Soviet efforts to penetrate the Yugoslav secret police and spurned Russian demands for the formation of a variety of joint economic enterprises. Yugoslavia's postwar leaders were, as historian Barbara Jelavich has noted, "supremely self-confident, even arrogant," and immoderately proud of the Partisans' wartime exploits (which Stalin took pains to belittle). They were not about to stand idly by as the Soviets reduced their nation to satellite status. Tito's break with Stalin instantly opened a fissure in the international communist movement that has been widening to this day.

Many factors contributed to the popularity of Tito's action—memories of the crude behavior of Soviet troops as they passed through Belgrade during the war; Moscow's overbearing propaganda efforts; the Russians' air of superiority. "We were to keep to our muddy roads," one young Yugoslav recalled, "walk

on them in our peasant *opanke* [sandals], and step aside when the Russian engineers rode past in their motorcars just as the Serbs used to do when the Turks rode by on mules."

Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, trade agreements with other Communist nations were cancelled, and Tito and his associates were denounced as (among other things) "dogs tied to American leashes, gnawing imperialist bones." But Tito stood his ground, with consequences that bear directly on the geopolitical situation of the Balkans today.

The Apple of Discord

For one thing, the breach in the Communist bloc cut loose tiny, backward Albania from what had been Tito's paternal, almost colonial domination, pushing it further into the arms of Moscow. Albania's leaders eventually forsook the Kremlin's embrace in 1961—Enver Hoxha deemed Khrushchev too "soft" —only to bind themselves for another 15 years to Mao's faraway China, and finally to seek solace in hermetic isolation.

Belgrade's break with Moscow also allowed Bulgaria to extricate itself from federation talks with Yugoslavia and to reassert its old claims to Macedonia, especially those parts of the region that had been reconstituted, thanks to Partisan successes on the battlefield, as the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslavs have always argued that the Macedonians are a distinct ethnic group and complain about the treatment accorded Macedonians in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians, by contrast, regard "Macedonian" and "Bulgarian" as synonymous terms and resent the division of one people between two political entities.* The truth is actually somewhere in between, but the Macedonian issue, that old "apple of discord" in the Balkans, continues to sour relations between Belgrade and Sofia.

Finally, Yugoslavia's sudden isolation forced Tito to secure his borders, in the process withdrawing support from the Greek Communist insurgents and ensuring their collapse, and to settle his claims against Italy involving the status of Trieste and its environs. Yugoslavia's subsequent success in maintaining its independence and gaining friends far from its frontiers has enabled the country to radiate its milder, more Western-oriented form of communism. It is partly thanks to Yugoslavia that neighboring Hungary and Romania can today conduct themselves in (differing) ways that make them more tolerable to Western governments than the re-

*The Yugoslavs have accused Bulgaria of "statistical genocide" as far as Macedonians are concerned. In the 1946 census, Sofia reported the existence of 169,544 Macedonians in Bulgaria. That figure fell to 8,750 in 1965 and to zero in 1976.

gimes in, say, Czechoslovakia or East Germany.

The focus of international attention on the Balkans was very sharp in 1948 and for several decades thereafter. Suddenly, the East-West demarcation line had shifted without a bullet being fired or a penny spent by the West. Only two years earlier, Winston Churchill in his famous Fulton, Missouri, speech had spoken of an iron curtain stretching from Stettin (Szczecin) in the north to Trieste in the south. Already the curtain had been moved east, to the Drava, the Danube, and the Pirin Mountains.

But it was still drawn. The great divide between East and West still ran through the Balkans the way it had during the eighth century after Charlemagne and Constantinople's Empress Irene failed to negotiate a marriage.

III
LOOKING AHEAD

If the Balkan peninsula was contested ground for some 3,000 years, it does not seem so today. While neither the West nor the Soviet Union is disengaged from the region, strategic rivalries over the Balkans no longer loom large. With the exception of a flurry of headlines about alleged Bulgarian complicity (which I do not believe) in Mehmet Ali Agca's attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981, American newspaper and newsmagazine stories about the region have been rare since the death of Tito in 1980.

At first glance, one might even remark that the Balkans have again been Balkanized, that the "bloc" of Balkan states dominated by Moscow has split up once more into national fragments operating at cross purposes. Twenty years ago, the Balkan scholar John C. Campbell asked: "Will the Communist empire absorb the Balkans, or will the Balkans absorb and 'Balkanize' communism?" There is yet no definitive answer, but the Balkan states do seem intent on going separate ways.

Bulgaria remains in most respects Moscow's devoted retainer and willing surrogate. (Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov once remarked that his regime's "political watch is exact to the second with the watch of the Soviet Union.") But Bulgaria has learned all the same to cultivate its own little garden and has become a mildly prosperous exporter of grain, fruit, wine, and tobacco—it has a license to manufacture Winston cigarettes—not to mention industrial machinery and some light weapons. The Bulgarians do not share the Soviets' fear of foreigners. Hoping to lure new tourists to their inexpensive Black

Sea beach resorts, the Bulgarians have launched an aggressive advertising campaign in the West.

Romania, also allied to the Soviet Union, has nevertheless maintained an independent foreign policy for the past 20 years. At the same time, it has gone broke, partly because it is no longer self-sufficient in oil, and partly because of a Stalinesque policy of neglecting agriculture in favor of heavy industry. (Having once fed the Turkish empire, Romania must now import grain.) Meanwhile, President Nicolae Ceauşescu has made himself the object of an official cult of personality and rules his fief as sternly as any 19th-century Balkan despot.

Albania, emerging from the mists of history and promoting aggressive nationalism in a manner most Balkan states abandoned during the 19th century, is held in virtual solitary confinement by Enver Hoxha, despite a few recent signs that the

THE CENTRAL BALKANS IN BRIEF

YUGOSLAVIA
(Socijalistička Federativna Republica Jugoslavija)
Collective Presidency (nine-member council, rotating presidency)
Current head of state: Mika Spiljak
Area: 98,766 square miles
Population: 22.5 million (1981 est.)
Ethnic Composition: 40% Serbian, 22% Croatian, 8% Slovene, 6% Macedonian, 6% Albanian; Remainder: Hungarian, Turkish
GNP: $52.4 billion (1979); $2,370 per capita
Currency: 100 para = 1 Yugoslav dinar = U.S. $.01

BULGARIA
(Narodna Republika Bŭlgariya)
President: Todor Zhivkov
Area: 42,823 square miles
Population: 8.9 million (1981 est.)
Ethnic Composition: 85.3% Bulgarian, 6.2% Turkish; Remainder: Gypsy, Macedonian, Armenian, Russian
GNP: $32.5 billion (1979); $3,630 per capita
Currency: 100 stotinki = 1 lev = U.S. $1.02

ROMANIA
(Republica Sociolistă România)
President: Nicolae Ceauşescu
Area: 91,699 square miles
Population: 22.4 million (1981 est.)
Ethnic Composition: 88.1% Romanian, 7.9% Hungarian; Remainder: German, Ukranian, Serbian, Jewish, Tartar, Russian, Bulgarian, Croatian
GNP: $46.3 billion (1979); $2,100 per capita
Currency: 100 bani = 1 leu = U.S. $.22

ALBANIA
(Republika Popullore Socialiste e Shqipërisë)
First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee: Enver Hoxha
Area: 11,096 square miles
Population: 2.8 million (1981 est.)
Ethnic Composition: 96% Albanian; Remainder: Greek, Vlach, Gypsy, Bulgarian
GNP: $1.9 billion (1979); $740 per capita
Currency: 100 qindars = 1 new lek = U.S. $.15

country is beginning to open up.* Thousands of beehive bunkers dot the Albanian landscape, concrete talismans against invasion. When an earthquake struck the country in 1980, Tiranë refused all offers of foreign assistance. Albania's traditional place as the poorest country in Europe seems, for the moment, secure.

Yugoslavia, meanwhile, three years after Tito's departure, is undergoing an economic crisis that also reflects an underlying political crisis. The country's leadership—a collective presidency—is trying to maintain Titoism without Tito, and having a difficult go of it. It is faced with a bureaucracy that, on the one hand, wants to protect the privileges it has gained with political and economic decentralization, but on the other cannot quite let go of the conservative, centralist bias common to socialist planners. Belgrade's leaders are worried that pressure from Yugoslavia's constituent republics may turn Tito's "different road to socialism" into six or eight different roads.

Getting Together

Next door is Greece. For a time a NATO stalwart, and now the newest member of the European Economic Community (admitted in 1981), Greece has, under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, pursued the sort of political adventurism that Aristophanes caricatured in *The Clouds*. Papandreou played host to Yasir Arafat in September 1982 when the PLO was already in decline and a few months later devalued the drachma without notifying his Common Market partners. At this writing, Greece is virtually on a war footing with fellow NATO member Turkey over the future of Cyprus.

To outsiders, the Balkan states today seem preoccupied with their own, sometimes petty, concerns. Modernization and communism have not made the peoples of the peninsula or their governments appreciably more homogeneous or buried ancient feuds. Balkan federation, logical as it appears from a glance at the map, is as inconceivable now as it was a century ago.

Yet the fact remains that, in the 1980s, a variety of intra-Balkan projects are underway, gradually making the countries of the region more involved with one another than they have ever been in modern times. This activity goes far beyond the rit-

*Trade agreements with Yugoslavia, Romania, and China were renewed in the autumn of 1983. On November 7, ferry service was resumed between the Albanian port of Durrës and Italy's Trieste. Loyal party cadres may avail themselves of a special (censored) version of Italian TV, purged of "decadent capitalist and revisionist influences." Some Albanian students have also been allowed to study in Vienna, Rome, Stockholm, and other western European cities.

Tourism is an expanding industry throughout the Balkans. This poster touts Bulgaria's Black Sea "riviera," long favored by vacationing Russians and East Europeans.

ual exchange of folk-dance troupes. The new ventures include making cars and mining coal. They include hydroelectric stations such as the two at Djerdap on the Danube built jointly by the Romanians and Yugoslavs and the one under construction by Bulgaria and Romania downstream at Belene. There is the Bar-Shkodër railway line soon to be completed between Yugoslavia and Albania, despite a burning official animosity between both countries, that will free Tiranë from dependence on truck freight and potentially open it up to greater commerce with northern Europe. (Yugoslavia is Albania's No. 1 trade partner, with a total volume of $112 million planned in 1984.)

Less formally, there is a great deal of human movement in the Balkans. The flow of refugees to relatively free and independent Yugoslavia from neighboring Communist countries numbered more than 3,000 people in 1982. There also exists a substantial amount of what Europeans have traditionally called "small-border traffic"—citizens of frontier communities crossing over into a neighboring country without a visa. Thousands of crossings, tolerated by the authorities, occur every day. Some border crossings, such as the annual meeting between Yugoslav Macedonians and their Bulgarian counterparts, are ceremonial occasions hallowed by tradition. Despite the official animosity between Belgrade and Sofia, which intensified

last autumn owing to military maneuvers and revived nationalist politics, some 100,000 Macedonians assembled in September in the Bulgarian town of Kjustendil. They consumed fried meats, drank plum brandy, danced and sang, without incident.

The movement of people does not occur only across national frontiers. Regardless of where one travels in the Balkans today, one is conscious of immense internal mobility, even in the relatively "closed," regulated societies in Romania and Bulgaria. One phenomenon common to almost all of the states in the region is the influx of rural men into the cities. In the case of Romania, the trend began to alarm officialdom in Bucharest several years ago when it was discovered that many of the country's farms were being run not only by women but by elderly women. The cities, meanwhile, are bursting with jobless workers, including doctors and dentists who could easily find patients, good wages, and even subsidized housing by moving to an outlying town.

Squeezing Serbia

Making predictions about the future of the Balkan peninsula has been a risky business from the start. This has not stopped natives and strangers alike from indulging in futurology and penning assessments that, in hindsight, seem bizarre. Still, it may be possible simply to register some of the current developments and speculate on where they might lead.

Jaka Stular, editor of Slovenia's daily *Delo*, reflected recently on the not-so-distant past when the Balkans were a playground for imperial powers. "Now," he concluded, "is the time of the small imperialisms." He gave as one example the new demands by Sofia for a Greater Bulgaria (which I have noted) and by Tiranë for a Greater Albania, both at Yugoslavia's expense.

Yugoslavia today has to cope with an explosion of irredentist passion among the nearly two million Albanians in the country, manifested in strikes and riots and encouraged by Albania. To give more ground—the Serbs are already far outnumbered in the Kosovo region, the heart of medieval Serbia, by a growing (77.7 percent) Albanian majority—would be to encourage separatists in other Yugoslav republics, especially in Croatia. For all the persistent remnants of what one Belgrade skeptic terms "democratic Stalinism," the Yugoslav government is in fact attempting to address its nationality problem in a more or less democratic fashion. It has to, because the competing pressures from the country's ethnic republics require it. Something like what we would call "pluralism" is the order of the day.

Still, the prospects are troubling. From the perspective of dominant Serbia, which is feeling squeezed into insignificance by ethnic Albanians from the south and ethnic Hungarians from the north, comes the following observation of a man born in the heartland of the Serbs, in Čačak: "To give the Albanians a republic would perhaps quiet some of them, but it would encourage others. It would be giving a finger to people who want your whole arm."

Albania worries Yugoslavs not only because of the new Albanian nationalism but also because, at 75, Enver Hoxha's days on earth are numbered. Just as foreign policy specialists in Washington debated during the late 1970s what would happen "after Tito," their counterparts in Belgrade today ponder the Albanian future "after Hoxha."

Belgrade's trade- and railroad-building policies are designed to create communities of interest between the two nations that will survive the current period of hostility and make better relations possible in the future. After all, Albania cannot change its geography either. Perhaps, in years to come, Yugoslavia and Albania may find ways to become good neighbors. Certainly Albania needs a friend, as those who will succeed Enver Hoxha probably realize already.

Romania also disturbs the Yugoslavs because they see there, in some respects, a mirror image of themselves, albeit a distorted image. The two nations are of similar size in territory



Eminent Albanians: national hero Skanderbeg (left), who fended off the Turks for 50 years during the 15th century; Ahmed Zogu (center), the Muslim bey who reigned as King Zog from 1928 to 1939; and Enver Hoxha (right), Albania's Communist party boss and Prime Minister since 1944.

and population and are both rich in (different) resources. Both seek to be independent of the Soviets. Both have large ethnic minorities—Hungarians and Germans in the case of Romania. Like Yugoslavia, Romania is in the midst of a severe economic crisis, brought on, in the words of one Bucharest economist, by "25 years of misguided policies."

Yugoslavs may look with disdain on the repressive regime of Romania's President Ceauşescu, and they do, but they are also grateful to have a friendly Romania as a neighbor. Ceauşescu finds Yugoslavia's independent streak congenial. But his successor may lack the means to be a maverick, particularly if economic conditions continue to worsen on the near side of what the Romanians call *Dunărea Noastră*, "our Danube."

What Next?

Bulgaria remains a puzzle. Governed by a regime that seems still bent on proving that Bulgars can be pro-Russian—instead of pro-German as they were in two world wars—Bulgaria has been something of an economic success story. Its per capita income is the highest of any country on the peninsula except Greece. Even some of the neighboring Yugoslav Macedonians, conditioned by education and propaganda to think otherwise, have begun to look with envy across the Pirin Mountains.

The big change for Bulgaria in recent years has been a rapprochement not only with Turkey (whose leaders take a solicitous interest in the welfare of Bulgaria's ethnic Turks) but also with Greece. Considering that Greek-Bulgarian animosities date back to the 11th century (when Basil the Bulgar-Slayer blinded 14,000 Bulgarians whom he had captured in battle) and were reinvigorated in two 20th-century world wars, this development verges on the astounding. Not only has commerce burgeoned, but visits have been exchanged by Presidents Todor Zhivkov and Constantine Karamanlis. Older Americans may sometimes shake their heads when they consider that Germany and Japan, their bitter wartime foes, have become peacetime U.S. allies. The changes in the Balkans are, on their own scale, no less wondrous.

Yet, while the Greeks have made up with the Bulgarians, they have snubbed Belgrade so often that it has drawn top-level protests—from Yugoslav Communist party leader Aleksandar Grlickov, among others. Most recently, in 1982, Athens angered Belgrade by encouraging some 1,000 Greek students enrolled at the University in Skopje to withdraw and take up

studies in Greece. The fact that Greece's land lines of communication and transport run up to Western Europe through Yugoslavia has thus far not prompted restraint on the part of the present Greek government.

What is one to make of all of this? Talk to historians of the Balkans such as Ljubo Boban at Zagreb or Bogo Grafenauer at Ljubljana or Cristian Popiştineanu at Bucharest and you will be told that virtually everything that is happening today has happened once before, in one form or another. There exists a certain kind of continuity.

Except, perhaps, in one respect. For the moment, it would appear that the 75 million or so people who inhabit the peninsula, for all the spites and hatreds deriving from their pasts, prefer to live in peace with one another. The relative strength and independence of modern Yugoslavia has much to do with this state of affairs. Not only has Belgrade more or less successfully incorporated some of the more fractious Balkan ethnic groups into a federal system, but by virtue of its size and position Yugoslavia has also acted as a buffer between East and West.

The Balkan peninsula has experienced one generation of peace and is now embarked on a second. Harmony is another matter, but harmony is seldom found anywhere on this earth, and peace is not a bad substitute.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE BALKANS

"The countries with which this book deals—Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania—are not major powers; their resources are not of critical importance to the United States. American interests in the Balkan region appear to be minimal.

"But all of us have seen half a dozen movies in which the idyllic peace and quiet of an early 20th-century American home are interrupted by the announcement that in the Balkans an Austrian Archduke has been assassinated, an announcement to which nobody pays attention. In the next sequence on the screen the hero is invariably waist-deep in the mud of Flanders, and the shells are whistling overhead.

"Since 1914, we [Americans] have slowly and painfully been coming to realize that, baffling as they seem, Balkan politics necessarily involve us."

So writes historian Robert Lee Wolff in his masterly **The Balkans in Our Time** (Harvard, rev. ed., 1974, cloth; Norton, rev. ed., 1978, paper), which concentrates on the period since World War I but provides an illuminating 100 pages of historical background.

Wolff sketches not only the modern history of the four nations in the central Balkans but also, when necessary, that of the four countries on the region's periphery, portions of which are still "Balkan" in character and may once have been Balkan in name. He forays into economics, religion, culture, education, and the arts —noting, for example, how postwar Communist regimes doctored the plays of Shakespeare. ("A little judicious editing transformed the Montagues and Capulets into exploiting reactionary capitalists.")

As far as the Balkans are concerned, this is the one book to read if you are reading only one.

Unfortunately, the volume is 10 years out of date. Barbara Jelavich's dry but comprehensive two-volume **History of the Balkans** (Cambridge, 1983, cloth and paper) covers much of Wolff's terrain and brings the story forward to the 1980s. She details the events of the turbulent 18th and 19th centuries, when many of the Balkan peoples experienced a "national awakening" and began agitating for independence.

They usually achieved it, Jelavich notes, with the connivance of one or more of the Great Powers, and with mixed results. "Once the gunsmoke and the clouds of glory have faded away the net result will remain," observed one Russian during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, "that is to say enormous losses, a deplorable financial situation, and what advantages? Our Slav brothers freed, who will astonish us with their ingratitude."

Neither Wolff nor Jelavich lavishes much attention on the 2,000-year span when the Balkan peninsula was subject to the rule of Romans, Greeks, and Turks. Two books fill the gap: George Ostrogorsky's **The Byzantine State** (Beck, 1940; Rutgers, rev. ed., 1969) and Lord John Kinross's **The Ottoman Centuries** (Morrow, 1977, cloth; 1979, paper). Both are highly readable and amply illustrated.

As for nontechnical studies of individual Balkan countries, the pickings in English are slim (except on Yugoslavia), and often out of print. Much of what does appear on U.S. library shelves consists of translations of official works recently published in So-

fia, Belgrade, Bucharest, or Tiranë. They lack a certain credibility, as they depict the "conflict between socialist enlightenment and religion" or describe work as "the best anvil for forging the new socialist mentality."

Nevertheless, there *are* some useful volumes by Westerners. R. W. Seton-Watson's standard **History of the Roumanians** (Cambridge, 1934; Archon, 1963) ends with the 1920s. Stephen Fischer-Galati's **Twentieth-Century Rumania** (Columbia, 1970) takes the tangled story from there. The best overall treatment of Enver Hoxha's Stalinist paradise on the Adriatic probably remains **The People's Republic of Albania** (Johns Hopkins, 1968, cloth, out of print; 1968, paper), by Nicholas C. Pano. And the land of the Bulgars, past and present, is treated in Mercia Macdermott's **History of Bulgaria, 1393–1885** (Praeger, 1962, out of print) and Joseph Rothschild's **The Communist Party of Bulgaria** (AMS Press, 1976).

A useful listing of more than 30 of the better books on Yugoslavia—by writers as diverse as Milovan Djilas, George F. Kennan, Fitzroy Maclean, and Adam Ulam—can be found in the bibliography of Dusko Doder's vivid, popular **The Yugoslavs** (Random, 1978, cloth; 1979, paper).

Doder emphasizes the differences among Yugoslavia's four main ethnic groups—from the "sober, discreet" Slovenes and "moody" Macedonians to the "urbane, self-possessed" Croats and "authoritarian, talkative" Serbs.

But all of them, he writes, especially the intellectuals, "are prone to dwell upon the real or fictitious glories in their history, conveniently ignoring the painful fact that their ancestors had lived for centuries in what could only be described as a cultural and political void."

Some of the best writing about the Balkans was done before World War II by British travelers, such as Rebecca West in **Black Lamb, Grey Falcon** (Viking, 1943, cloth, out of print; 1983, paper), and by amateur sociologists, such as Irwin T. Sanders (who was a U.S. agricultural attaché in Bulgaria during the 1930s). Sanders's **Balkan Village** (Kentucky, 1949; Greenwood, 1975) portrays a peasant culture in transition, its traditional values and customs undermined by new schools, new roads, new forms of entertainment, and other encroachments of modern civilization.

"Whenever I wanted to stir up a lively discussion," Sanders writes, "I could rely on one question to do the trick: 'Was life better 50 years ago than today?' The oldest person usually led off; after that the discussion became a verbal free-for-all. . . .

"Perhaps the village drunk spoke words of wisdom when he finally got the attention of the group long enough to say: 'Everything is better but it is also more difficult.'"

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Some of the titles in this essay were suggested by Wilson Center librarian Zdeněk V. David. Interested readers may wish to consult* WQ*'s Background Books essay on Yugoslavia (Spring '78).*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

PERÓN: A Biography
by Joseph Page
Random, 1983
594 pp. $25

Though dead for 10 years, Juan Domingo Perón (1895–1974) is almost as powerful a political force in Argentina today as he was when he ruled the country as its president. He continues to be to his nation, on a somewhat smaller scale, what Charles De Gaulle was to France: the vital symbol of its historical sense, its powerful military establishment, and its thwarted but undying will to greatness.

Perón was born in Lobos, a small country town 100 kilometers southwest of Buenos Aires, to a family whose declining fortunes put it near the bottom of the middle class. His origins troubled him all his life, not only because his mother was an Indian but also because his parents did not marry until he was six. Perón's route to respectability and power was the army. Graduating from Argentina's military academy in 1913, he served in a number of key posts—professor of military history, attaché in Chile, and, from 1939 to 1941, member of a military mission to Italy. Traveling through Europe, he studied the totalitarian regimes whose practices he would later, at least in part, imitate. But if fascism formed the base of Perón's ideology, his political and social programs also embraced populist and Catholic social welfare principles. Above all, he envisioned a new Latin American alternative (which he labeled the "Third Position") to counter equally the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union.

After a military coup in 1943, Perón was appointed director of Work and Welfare. Using that position to build a large labor following, and campaigning with his wife, Eva ("Evita") Duarte, Perón was elected to the presidency in 1946. The next nine years saw the full bloom of "Perónism": nationalization of banks and utilities, public works and welfare programs, aggressive nationalism, accompanied by the suppression of some civil liberties. In 1955, after a violent confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy, Perón was deposed and exiled in the name of a Christian Argentina.

Considering Perón's complexity, it is not surprising that his previous biographers have examined only a few aspects of the politician and the man. Some, such as his official biographer, Enrique Pavón Pereyra, have even distorted or left out important facts. Page, a Georgetown professor of law, is, by contrast, thorough, scholarly, and reliable. To say that he has gathered all the questions and provided most of the answers is to affirm the excellence of this work.

Page is particularly skillful in illuminating two key episodes in Perón's political life. The first concerns the U.S. Ambassador, Spruille Braden, who tried to block Perón's ascent to the presidency in 1946. Not only did Braden fail, as Page puts it, "to do for the Argentines what General

Douglas MacArthur was doing for the Japanese," he played perfectly into Perón's strategy to excite anti-American sentiment. Page also makes sense of the crucial power game played between the ex-president and his nominal allies, the labor union chiefs, from his aborted return to Argentina in December of 1964 until the end of his exile and his remarkable re-election to the presidency in 1973.

Page's primary object was to study the public period of Perón's life beginning with his leap to fame as director of Work and Welfare in 1943 and ending with his death 31 years later. But the brevity with which Page passes over Perón's youth (and particularly the conflicts between Perón and his parents) and early military career is probably the book's greatest weakness. The Perón who assumed a leadership role in the nationalist revolution of 1943 was already a soldier who had taken part in the army's bloody repression of two blue-collar strikes (in 1918 and 1919). He had also played a major role in the military coup that brought down the democratically elected president, Hipólito Yrigoyen, in 1930. Failing to go deeply into these matters, Page leaves his readers with little understanding of the military role that has darkened Argentine life since the middle of the 20th century.

Nevertheless, within the limits which Page himself has set, this biography of Perón is the best explanation of a man whose personality and record remain deformed by the passions that his name alone unleashes.

—Tomás Eloy Martínez

UNCONDITIONAL DEMOCRACY: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952
by Toshio Nishi
Hoover, 1982
367 pp. $19.95

At a time when Washington is urging Tokyo to play a greater role in matters of defense and international security, we are fortunate to have a book that traces the roots of the current pacifist orientation in Japan. Nishi, a Hoover Institution Fellow, was born in Japan in 1941 and received all but his graduate education there. He thus seems to have been drawn to the subject of the U.S. occupation of his country by a natural curiosity about his past and about America's role in it.

Nishi is not alone. In 1982, a controversy swept Japan, pitting pro-American nationalists, who wish to remove occupation-instilled pacifism from school textbooks, against anti-American pacifists, allegedly intent on fighting "militarism." Last year, a documentary film about the Tokyo Tribunal of 1945 (which tried Japan's war criminals) became a stunning box-office success. What will come of this powerful new wave of historical curiosity and revisionism?

The future of U.S.–Japanese relations will depend in part on the extent to which the two peoples can come to terms over the settlement of the Second World War. The unusual arrangement gave the conquering power

complete freedom to reshape Japanese government and society. Nishi, happily, reaches beyond his stated subject, American-directed educational reforms, to analyze and evaluate the nature of that effort, particularly the imposition of a "no-war" constitution. "Unconditional democracy" summarizes the author's judgment that, while the goals of the U.S. occupation (1945–1952) were substantively correct, the means employed, outright dictation, posed many problems. One consequence, for example, of imposing a democratic constitution upon the defeated nation is that Americans continue to doubt the true strength of democracy in Japan.

Recounting his own experiences as a student in Japanese schools after the war, Nishi goes on to present an overview of the initial postsurrender reforms and of subsequent U.S. efforts to correct those reforms (e.g., the "Red Purge" of communists earlier "liberated" from jails; the reorganization of the armed forces despite constitutional prohibitions). Nishi concludes with the San Francisco Treaty of 1952, whereby the United States effectively enlisted Japan as an ally in the growing chill of the Cold War. In the course of his narrative, he touches on a number of topics that have previously been scanted. Notable among these were the efforts of Douglas MacArthur's aides to force the Japanese to rewrite their history texts (the aim: to "pacify" Japan's past) and to ban the Japanese language throughout the country and replace it with English. Ironically, occupation forces also played an important role in fostering the Japanese Teachers' Union, which has since become a radical anti-American political force.

The Japanese have adjusted well to the occupation reforms. They have become a great economic power, while remaining wholly dependent upon U.S. protection. America is obviously dissatisfied with this state of affairs. But before anything can change, the United States must recognize that it has placed the Japanese in a double-bind: Having imposed a "no-war" constitution upon Japan, it now insists that Japan play a greater defense role. Unless America comes to grips with this contradiction, the Japanese problem will continue to fester.

—Tetsuya Kataoka

C. WRIGHT MILLS: An American Utopian
by Irving Louis Horowitz
Free Press, 1983
341 pp. $19

When C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* first appeared in 1956, it seemed to many readers to be a devastating critique of the political naiveté of most Americans—notably their faith in U.S. governmental institutions and processes as infallible guarantors of democracy. Analyzing the historical development of America's political establishment, Mills argued that the United States was run by a largely nonelected and unobserved network of politicians, businessmen, and soldiers. This elite held power because the broad populace was disorganized and ineffective.

The book's analysis was less than novel. In fact, such interpretations of

the defects of Western democracy were commonplace long before 1956 (and most were, like that of Mills, non-Marxist). Nevertheless, Mills's book went on to become the bible—often unread—of the New Left during the 1960s.

Mills's real importance, this biography shows, was not that he said such things but that he said them even though he was a member of the American academic community of sociologists—a supposedly value-neutral community, at least during the quiescent '50s. Mills (1916–1962) was a renegade, being, for one thing, a Texan, at a time when that state was more on the edge of American cultural and intellectual life than it is now. He also took unusual stands, including opposition to American involvement in World War II, apparently as an old-style isolationist.

Horowitz, himself a sociologist at Rutgers University, traces Mills's career from student days at the University of Texas on through his teaching years at the Universities of Wisconsin, Maryland, and Columbia. Interestingly, Horowitz reveals, American philosophers such as William James and John Dewey had an earlier and more enduring influence on Mills than did the European pantheon of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Mannheim. Mills had a considerable impact upon American Marxists, but despite certain affinities, he could never accept their mechanistic class analysis of American society. His political outlook, radical and populist in the American tradition, made him distrustful of European-style leftism and Marxism, both of which, in his view, placed excessive faith in an intellectual elite and in revolutionary change.

Horowitz describes Mills as a "utopian," using the word idiosyncratically to mean someone who is concerned not so much with designing the perfect political system as with engaging in direct action to achieve reform. During his last years, from around 1957 until his death in 1962, he abandoned academic analysis and began pamphleteering against American foreign policy (particularly Washington's preoccupation with the Soviet threat in the Third World) and for the causes of the New Left. Yet, perhaps his most successful work of these years was his popular and devastating appraisal of the pretentiousness and emptiness of contemporary research in sociology, *The Sociological Imagination* (1959).

I would argue that Mills was a kind of 20th-century Tom Paine who attempted to devise a style of social analysis that was consistently "anti-establishment" in tone. At the very least, he succeeded in stirring up his academic peers. Sociologist Edward Shils, reviewing *The Sociological Imagination*, described Mills as a "burly cowpuncher" from the provinces, dealing with matters far beyond his intellectual grasp. Mills ignored this heavily *ad hominem* attack. Oddly enough, Horowitz sees Mills's refusal to reply as marking his "final disaffiliation from professionalism in sociology." In fact, it seems to have been a very professional thing to do.

—*Tom Garvin*

NEW TITLES

History

A PERSONAL HISTORY
by A. J. P. Taylor
Atheneum, 1983
278 pp. $14.95

Taylor, 77, a British historian, has enjoyed both academic acclaim and general popularity during his lifetime. While some colleagues disparaged his success as a newspaper columnist and television debater, none could deny that he was a master of his profession. Taylor's 27 books are scholarly, readable and often provocative. In *The Origins of the Second World War* (1961), he argued that the Great Powers stumbled into a conflict because of diplomatic blunders on *both* sides. The story of his solitary and bookish life, from his Lancashire boyhood to his career as a Manchester and Oxford don, is less absorbing. But as a picture of mandarin irresponsibility, it is instructive. Taylor's reflections on the political events that shaped this century and his own life seem willfully iconoclastic: The man "who was never troubled by communism" believed that Stalin's first Five-Year Plan was nothing more than "socialism in action"; Britain's intervention in the Suez Crisis in 1956 was "comparable to Hitler's invasion of Poland"; the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) was all for the better. Taylor rehashes old academic squabbles and indulges in disingenuous self-mockery, claiming that he was regarded "as pretty much of a joke" in school, that he learned "precisely nothing" while a student at Oxford, and that he never became a great historian. But most of Taylor's works prove otherwise.

LANDSCAPE TURNED RED:
The Battle of Antietam
by Stephen W. Sears
Ticknor & Fields, 1983
431 pp. $17.95

On the sunny morning of September 17, 1862, George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac met Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia outside the village of Antietam, Maryland. Twelve hours later, 22,719 Americans lay dead or wounded, casualties of a day of fierce, inconclusive struggle, a day that still ranks as the bloodiest in American history. Sears, a former *American Heritage* editor,

supplements his vivid chronicle of the battle and the maneuvers leading up to it with excerpts from regimental diaries and recently discovered letters from survivors of the engagement. Southern audacity and Northern ineptitude enabled the shoeless, underfed Confederates to punish a larger, better-equipped Federal force. McClellan, "Little Mac" to his troops, "Tardy George" to his critics, failed to exploit his two-to-one advantage in troop strength, even when presented with a captured copy of the Southern order of battle. "His deep concern for his men," writes Sears, "his fixation with avoiding casualties, revealed a sensitivity of nature admirable in most of life's pursuits but crippling when making war." Lee's battered army, still intact, slipped south across the Potomac. But the battle's political effects helped to seal the fate of the Confederacy. For the Union, avoiding total defeat was in itself a victory, and, thus encouraged, Lincoln's fractious cabinet members papered over their disputes. England and France, starved of cotton and sympathetic to the South, were waiting for another Northern defeat as the occasion to recognize the secessionist government. Lee's narrow escape from disaster at Antietam persuaded them to remain aloof.

THE RETURN OF MARTIN GUERRE
by Natalie Zemon Davis
Harvard, 1983
162 pp. $15

In the 1983 film *The Return of Martin Guerre*, set in rural 16th-century France, Bertrande, a beautiful peasant woman, welcomes home her husband, Martin, after a mysterious eight-year absence. Four years later, Martin's uncle and other relatives accuse him of being an impostor. Near the end of the ensuing trial at the Criminal Chamber of Toulouse, a man claiming to be the real Martin enters dramatically. The court finds against the "husband" of four years, sentencing him to be hanged. Improbable as it may seem, the plot is based squarely on fact. Princeton historian Natalie Davis, the film's consultant, was nevertheless troubled by certain departures from the surviving record, and she resolved to "give this arresting tale its first full-scale historical treatment." Among the questions she hoped

to answer: How was the impostor able to dupe an entire village? Was Bertrande among those he fooled? Davis attempts to broaden her chronicle (evidence for which comes largely from two 1561 accounts of the trial) with excursions into such topics as Protestantism and marriage, rural life, the criminal courts, family roles, and "the significance of identity in the 16th century." But her treatment of such issues is too sketchy to bear comparison with such recent social histories as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error* (1975). For all its interest as a complement to the film, the book promises more than it delivers.

Contemporary Affairs

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: An International Perspective
by Thomas Sowell
Morrow, 1983
324 pp. $15.95

The provocative gospel according to Thomas Sowell now enjoys a certain notoriety. Elaborated in *Ethnic America* (1982) and other books, it proclaims that disparities in economic performance among America's ethnic groups result less from discrimination than from the cultural values of those groups. For example, discipline, frugality, and persistence are culturally-fostered traits that have enabled the Chinese to prosper in America (and elsewhere) despite often severe discrimination. Projecting his argument upon the international scene, Sowell, a Hoover Institution Fellow, finds that "culture" also explains disparities between the wealthier and poorer nations. While Sowell is particularly dubious that race is a handicap, he is also suspicious of the traditional explanation that environment is the key to some nations' economic difficulties. India's poverty cannot be attributed to overcrowding or lack of resources, he argues, since far more prosperous Hong Kong is at a significant disadvantage in both respects. Human capital, the gamut of organizational skills of a national population, is decisive. (And colonialism, he avers, has often enhanced this resource, the sometimes brutal behavior of colonialists notwithstand-

ing.) Foreign aid that merely redistributes the wealth of prosperous nations among the poorer ones thus does not really help the people of a nation who lack the skills needed to produce wealth; educational and vocational programs, he believes, are far more beneficial. Sowell's words may chasten some would-be rescuers of the poor. But his excessive reliance on single-cause explanations, and his claim that the proof is "simple and obvious" (What, one wonders, happened to the Indians, who had the "advantage" of British imperialism?), occasionally diminish the force of his argument.

REFLECTIONS OF A NEOCONSERVATIVE: Looking Back, Looking Ahead
by Irving Kristol
Basic, 1983
336 pp. $19.95

If Irving Kristol cannot win readers over to neoconservatism, probably nobody can. Kristol is coeditor of the *Public Interest* magazine and unofficial "godfather" of neoconservatism—a movement of once-liberal intellectuals who moved Right after being, as he puts it, "mugged by reality" during the tumult and disarray of the 1960s. In this collection of essays, all previously published, Kristol recounts his own conversion, beginning with the wry "Memoirs of a Trotskyist," and lays out the key themes of neoconservatism. He joins such traditional economic conservatives as Milton Friedman in backing free-market principles, but argues that economic concerns must take a back seat to political goals. An example: Confronting the Soviets overseas requires a U.S. military build-up, even if it means bigger budget deficits. At home, Kristol favors a limited welfare state designed chiefly to provide a social safety net, not to redistribute income. Kristol believes that the government has a legitimate responsibility to shape the habits and tastes of the people. Accordingly, he supports some constraints to keep offensive behavior behind closed doors. His comment on the absence of celebration by liberal opponents of literary censorship after they won their battles during the 1960s and pornography came into the open epitomizes the neoconservative temper: "Being frustrated is disagreeable, but the real disasters in life begin when you get what you want."

ALONG THE EDGE OF THE FOREST: An Iron Curtain Journey
by Anthony Bailey
Random, 1983
332 pp. $15.95

In 1981, *New Yorker* correspondent Bailey traveled from the Baltic Coast to the Aegean Sea along the west side of, and occasionally across, the border that Winston Churchill dubbed the "iron curtain" nearly 40 years before. His aim: to meet and talk with those who live under the shadow of that nearly impenetrable divide—and with those who have attempted to cross it from the east. Interviewing West Germans, he found that their nonchalant attitude toward the barrier often clashed with his own sense of anger. In West Berlin, or "the island," as natives call it, Bailey himself felt everything "from rage through curiosity to resignation (though never disinterest)." The Berlin Wall seemed to him "in its perverse way one of the wonders of the modern world." Continuing south, he reached the physically less-forbidding Czechoslovakian border; in Austria, he passed along the boundaries of Hungary and Yugoslavia. Side trips to Prague and Budapest yielded the most interesting interviews. "[Communism] is a system that suits the second-rate," complained one Prague resident, "those who don't have aspirations or don't want to try too hard." Another Czech sounded perhaps the most despairing note: "It's like living in a year without seasons. It will go on and on and on like this. We would be deluding ourselves to think otherwise."

Arts & Letters

THE ODES OF JOHN KEATS
by Helen Vendler
Harvard, 1983
330 pp. $18.50

If John Keats had lived beyond his 26 years (1795–1821), he might well have become his century's Shakespeare. Both in his late poetry and in his famous letters, he expressed a growing interest in dramatic poetry. Tuberculosis cut off any such flowering, and Keats's reputation rests solely, but securely, upon his lyric achievements. Among these stand out six incomparably crafted odes, including the famous "Ode to a Nightingale" and "Ode on a Grecian Urn," all written between March and September of 1819. Haunt-

ing ("I have been half in love with easeful Death") and enigmatic ("Beauty is truth, truth beauty"), these poems have justifiably received wide critical attention, but perhaps none so close as that given in this new study. Vendler, professor of English at Harvard and Boston University, views the odes as a sustained argument and a "system of inexhaustible internal relations," with each poem illuminating "Keats's authorial choices in the others." In each successive poem, Keats attempted to improve upon earlier "solutions" to vexing formal, philosophical, and personal questions: the legitimate uses of classical myth and allegorical language in "modern" poetry; the relation of nature to art; the poetic "state" (indolent or active?); the attractions and hazards of romantic love. Keats's larger aim, Vendler concludes, was self-transformation. Poetry, he came to realize through his odes, was the means by which he, a religious nonbeliever, could fashion his own "soul." Vendler is very much a poet's critic, and her thoroughness may wear on general readers. Yet those who persist will be rewarded: Like all good critics, Vendler compels one to return, with renewed curiosity, to the works themselves.

THOMAS EAKINS: The Heroism of Modern Life
by Elizabeth Johns
Princeton, 1984
207 pp. $42.50

American painters are finally beginning to receive serious scholarly attention. Wanda Corn's recent Grant Wood retrospective (*Grant Wood: The Regionalist Vision*, 1983) and Karal Ann Marling's history of Depression-era murals (*Wall-to-Wall America*, 1982) are but two examples of this important cultural recovery. Johns, a University of Maryland art historian, adds to the effort with her biographical and critical study of the Philadelphia painter and sculptor Thomas Eakins (1844–1916). Though trained in Paris and versed in European masters, Eakins took the people of his native city as his lifelong subject; he was, moreover, an enthusiastic portraitist at a time when most serious painters shunned his genre. Eakins was particularly drawn to the *portrait d'apparat*

(which depicted the subject at work), and for a special reason: He wanted to capture the "heroism" of late 19th-century life. For Eakins, this heroism consisted of professional excellence in one's chosen field, whether it be sport ("Max Schmitt in a Single Scull"), medicine ("Portrait of Professor Cross"), or art ("The Concert Singer," "Walt Whitman"). Focusing on five major paintings, Johns reveals much about Eakins's technique, particularly about his dramatic use of lighting. And her passing notes on Philadelphia life (everything from schools to athletics), the practice of surgery, and 19th-century notions of good character and professionalism add a nice slice of social history.

PIPERS AT THE GATES OF DAWN: The Wisdom of Children's Literature
by Jonathan Cott
Random, 1983
327 pp. $19.95

Many adults' notions of "good" children's literature run to Victorian specimens, books that teach manners or narrate trivial adventures of elves and cute animals. Cott, a poet and journalist, believes that children like fiction for much the same reasons that adults do: It provides consolation for, escape from, and criticism of our lives. Cott here weaves interviews with six authors of children's classics with samples (graphic and textual) from their work. Cott's subjects explain their work using the language of folklorists, literary critics, and, most frequently, such explorers of the psyche as Sigmund Freud, Karl Jung, and Wilhelm Reich. William Steig, known to adults for his *New Yorker* cartoons, and to children for *Abel's Island* (1976), works from Reich's theory that facial gestures and expressions are truer language than mere words; Maurice Sendak (*Where the Wild Things Are*, 1963; *Outside over There*, 1981) speaks of the influence of his feminine side (the Jungian anima) on his imagery and plots. These authors discuss the slow, painful death of wonder in childhood. But all find in the making of their books a means of recapturing that fresh view of the world. Says Astrid Lindgren, creator of Pippi Longstocking: "I don't write *for* children . . . I write books for the child I am myself."

Science & Technology

GREAT SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS
by Rom Harré
Oxford, 1983
224 pp. $17.95

Selecting 20 experiments from the fifth century B.C. to the present, Harré, an Oxford philosopher, shows that the essence of science lies, first, in a systematic way of asking questions and, second, in painstaking testing and observation. These experiments range from ancient biology (Aristotle's notes on the development of chick embryos) to modern physics (Otto Stern's demonstration of the wavelike properties of matter). Some demonstrate that reason and observation yield theories whose proof must often await a powerful tool. During the 1950s, for example, researchers François Jacob and Élie Wollman had no direct evidence for their theory about the transfer of genetic material, but during the 1960s, the electron microscope proved them right. To his text, Harré adds a rich sampling of scientists' logs, drawings, even poetry.

A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES
by Jacques Barzun
Harper, 1983
344 pp. $19.95

Henry James, the novelist, described his older brother William (1842–1910) as "my protector, my backer, my authority, my pride." Barzun is almost as reverent: This informative "stroll" unabashedly celebrates the Harvard psychologist who quietly proved to be "one of the makers of the new culture of our century." James's name has come to be associated with Pragmatism, a doctrine often misconstrued as a form of anti-intellectualism. Pragmatism held, as James himself explained, that "ideas become true just insofar as they help us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience." Barzun, a former professor at Columbia, rightly identifies the 1890 masterpiece, *Principles of Psychology*, as the foundation of all James's explorations of human behavior, art, philosophy, and religion. James proceeded from a neurological base; his discussion of reflexes, Barzun argues, remains unrivaled. He made clear, among other things, that a "conditioned reflex," of the sort that Pavlov's dog made famous, is not a true reflex because it disappears when the stimulus is repeated

without reward. Though a naturalist, James refused to reduce mental life to a simple mechanistic theory, and that may account for his relative lack of renown: Even in America, Freud's reductivistic psychology eclipsed James's subtler notion that in experience alone were to be found "the constituents of the mind and the explanations of its performance." His horror of oversimplification may also explain why James acquired a small but select following (e.g., mathematician Alfred North Whitehead, physicist Niels Bohr, psychologist Jean Piaget). Barzun's book should, however, help bring James's arguments to a wider audience.

REVOLUTION IN TIME: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World
by David S. Landes
Harvard, 1983
482 pp. $20



Great thinkers from Heraclitus to Einstein have reflected upon the nature of time, but few have given much thought to its keeper, the clock. Landes, a Harvard historian, has done so in this richly detailed exploration. The Chinese, the pioneers of timekeeping, constructed as early as 1086 a water-powered clock that reproduced the movement of the "three luminaries" (the sun, moon, and stars) and showed both the hours and the *k'o* (roughly 14½ minutes). Destroyed by Tartars in 1126, this instrument marked the zenith of China's horological effort. In medieval Europe, the Church's strict observance of holy days and prayer times demanded accurate timepieces. The growth of cities, where time was more a function of commercial rhythms than of natural ones, made timekeepers of the bourgeoisie. The replacement of weights with springs reduced the size of the clock and led in the 16th century to the making of watches. People began living with one eye on the dial, a practice of which Protestant John Calvin heartily approved. As its precision increased, so did the scientific applications of the instrument. The invention of the marine chronometer in 1759 enabled navigators to determine their position by longitude. Modern atomic clocks in today's observatories beat 9,192,631,770 times a second. The nature of time may still elude us, but, as Landes observes, "we sure know how to measure it."

PAPERBOUNDS

BANARAS: City of Light. By Diana L. Eck. Princeton, 1983. 427 pp. $10.95

The city of Banaras is more than a relic of India's ancient Hindu past. As seen by Eck, a Harvard professor of religion, it is a place that preserves the past "like a palimpsest," the older layers of civilization partially visible through more recent additions. Founded in the sixth century B.C., Banaras was physically altered by foreign invasions lasting from the 13th to the 17th centuries. But its religious significance to Hindus has remained constant: Thousands still bathe there in the sacred Ganges. And along the shore, on *ghats* (steps), they still tell the story of Shiva, the revered god who chose the city as his earthly home. Nineteenth-century Christian missionaries, vainly struggling to convert the Hindus, were shocked by the ubiquitous symbol of Shiva: a phallus, or *linga*, from which the god was often depicted emerging. In fact, though it has sexual connotations, Shiva's *linga* is believed to be the pillar at the center of the earth, an infinite shaft symbolizing the god's unfathomable powers. Eck's explanations of this and other Hindu beliefs enable the Westerner to see the fabled city through the believer's eyes.

BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science. By William Broad and Nicholas Wade. Touchstone, 1983. 256 pp. $6.95

Scientific fraud is as old as science. Galileo reported experiments that never took place; Newton fudged figures in his *Principia* to strengthen his case against archrival Leibnitz. In this historical exposé, *New York Times*men Broad and Wade examine the carefully cultivated facade of scientific objectivity and catalogue the many ethical abuses. This century's professionalization of a pursuit once limited to the dedicated amateur has increased the rewards, and lessened the risks, of cutting corners and falsifying data. The built-in safeguards against deceit are inadequate. Repeating the experiments of a colleague seldom results in either glory or new grant money; peer review now relies, essentially, on an "old boy" network with little emphasis on merit. Until scientists agree with Thomas Huxley that science is "no purer than any other region of human activity" and begin surveying their own field more closely, time, "the invisible boot," will remain the only reliable arbiter of scientific veracity.

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER. Edited by Richard B. Morris. Princeton, 1983. 251 pp. $7.95

Originally produced for the U.S. Bicentennial by the Department of Labor, these six essays trace the American laborer's plight and progress from indentured servitude and slavery through the early industrial system, the rise of unions, and the spread of collective bargaining. One theme recurs: the relationship between the health of the economy and the strength of workers' organizations. Before the 1873 depression, for example, unions won concessions in the coal, construction, and iron industries, but the depression, like others before and since, wiped out their gains in wages and conditions of service. The essays (some of whose authors have had shopfloor *and* academic experience) are enriched by revealing statistics: Until 1776, 80 percent of all immigrants, excluding slaves, were bound laborers. And during the 1880s, 40 percent of working-class families earned less than $500 a year, the bare minimum in those days for a family of five.

The Mosher Affair

"Every stomach comes with hands attached" was Chairman Mao's initial response to the issue of overpopulation in China, a land of 500 million people in 1949. China's population has doubled since then, and today, under Deng Xiaoping, birth control has high priority. Women may not marry before age 20, men before 22. Married couples are encouraged to have only one child and are penalized for having more than two. The price of disobedience can be stiff. Reports have come out of rural China of severe repercussions—abortions forced on women in their eighth or ninth month of pregnancy; the murder by parents of girl babies to make room for a hoped-for boy. One American anthropologist who published such reports is Steven W. Mosher, author of *Broken Earth: The Rural Chinese* (1983). But Mosher's work and on-the-job conduct have stirred controversy in both China and America. His experience, Peter Van Ness suggests, raises important questions about the ethics of anthropologists, the objectivity of American China-watchers, and the future of Western scholarly research in China.

by Peter Van Ness

"Why aren't we able to cope with the grays?" mused a young research economist, sharing a *sushi* lunch at a restaurant near the Stanford campus. She had written her Ph.D. dissertation on China's agriculture after a year of field work in the Chinese countryside. Our conversation was about doing research in China and what seems to be an American compulsion to paint China in either black or white colors.

Everything in China somehow has to be either all bad or just wonderful—nothing in between. One is either *for* China or against it.

Our talk had begun on the topic of Steven Mosher, a graduate student who had been thrown out of Stanford's anthropology department in February 1983.

Mosher, according to a statement issued by the university, was guilty of abusing his status as an anthropologist and engaging in "illegal and seriously unethical conduct while in the People's Republic of China." While the 47-page report upon which the anthropology department's decision was based, along with the specific charges and evidence that it contains, remains secret, the case of Mosher versus Stanford is already being tried in the news media and in the academic rumor mill.

America's China-specialist com-

Steven W. Mosher and some of the villagers he lived with in China during 1979–80. Trained as a biologist, Mosher learned Chinese during a stint in the U.S. Navy, afterwards enrolling at Stanford as a graduate student.

munity is virtually unanimous in its support for Stanford's action, for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, editorial writers for major newspapers, such as the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*, seem equally certain that Mosher was sold out by Stanford in response to Chinese pressure.

Both sides insist that the case of Mosher versus Stanford must be black or white, but, in fact, it illustrates the gray areas both in social science research and in the American educational exchanges with China that began in 1978.

Mosher, 35, one of the first Americans permitted to do field research in China, studied an agricultural production brigade in Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong, from September 1979 to June 1980, and lived in his Hong Kong-born wife's ancestral village. (Mosher and his wife subsequently divorced.)

Among other things, Mosher was interested in collecting documents, and he had received a $13,500 grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for this purpose. Including $4,000 in matching funds from the Hoover Institution at Stanford, the project called for microfilming some 20,000 frames of materials from the locality Mosher was studying, such as "land registers, household registers, crime registers, class status registers, and economic data." (The materials in the end were to be turned over to the Stanford and Hoover Institution libraries.)

Some of these materials were extremely sensitive, from the Chinese point of view, but Mosher had been urged by G. William Skinner, his adviser at Stanford, in effect, to go in and get everything he could get. From the start, he was in a delicate position.

Obviously talented and immensely ambitious, Mosher was aided in his work by his ability to speak fluent Cantonese and Mandarin, and required no interpreter. Therefore, the Chinese had no one continually at his

elbow observing his interviews.

Determined to take full advantage of this remarkable opportunity, Mosher, as *Newsweek* put it, "adopted a freewheeling style that smacked more of Indiana Jones than Margaret Mead." One member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is said to have been amazed that any foreigner could be so skilled in the language and familiar with Chinese culture that he could quickly come to understand the life of rural China and begin to operate like a Chinese.

A Woman Scorned

American press reports note that Chinese officials have accused Mosher of "traveling in forbidden areas, trying to smuggle old coins out of the country, bribing villagers to gain information, and bringing in an unauthorized female companion from Hong Kong." Other Chinese have alleged that Mosher might even have been an intelligence agent in the service of a foreign power.

Mosher's response, in published interviews as well as in a statement he prepared that was released by Stanford University in February 1983, has been to deny the charges. He has asserted that what has prompted the allegations is Chinese anger over the results of his research in Guangdong Province—particularly the abuses he found in the implementation of China's birth-control policy—and "absolutely false and unsubstantiated slander" by his former wife, Maggie So, whom he has described as a "scorned woman who vowed to ruin me."*

Mosher argues that the Chinese government wanted to restrict social research done by foreigners in their country, and that they threatened American scholars with "negative consequences" for the Sino-American educational exchange if Mosher were not punished. American scholars, Mosher asserts, "instead of coming to my defense, have abandoned me." Mosher has threatened to sue some of those who have talked publicly about his case.

The Mosher controversy has raised many important questions.

The Chinese wonder if Steven Mosher was somehow encouraged to go to China to test the limits of the system, to see just how far a foreign researcher could go in that country.

Some American scholars ask: Did Stanford officials, pressured by the Chinese, sell Mosher out? Was Stanford fearful of losing its access to China after having been the first American university to establish ties

*During Mosher's collection of what the *New York Times* has called "a highly unusual collection of local police and government documents that the Chinese consider secret," his former wife apparently became convinced that Mosher's activities were endangering her relatives in the village. According to the *Times*, Maggie So, following a quarrel over Mosher's demand for a divorce, went to the American consulate in Guangzhou (Canton) in the spring of 1980 and there accused Mosher of bribing local officials to obtain documents.

Peter Van Ness, 50, a former Wilson Center Fellow, teaches at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Born in Paterson, New Jersey, he received a B.A. from Williams College (1955) and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (1967), both in political science. Since 1971, he has been a member of the board of directors of the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations. He is author of Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy *(1970), and a contributor to* China from Mao to Deng *(1983).*

in the People's Republic, when the post-Mao leadership began to open to the West in 1978?

Or, did Mosher, as charged, behave illegally and unprofessionally in a way that most anthropologists, had they access to the evidence, would condemn and judge to be grounds for expulsion from the profession?

Country Life

What about Mosher's findings —his articles on abuses of China's birth-control program and female infanticide, and now his new book, *Broken Earth*, in which he concludes that life for the peasants he studied in Guangdong Province was actually better *before* Liberation than after?

Is Mosher being pilloried for having uncovered embarrassing facts (for example, women in the third trimester of their pregnancies being forced to undergo abortions) that Beijing had kept concealed behind a wall of secrecy?*

Can scholars dispassionately assess the value of his writings without making a judgment about his behavior?

Mosher's anthropological field research in China was in the tradition of ethnography, the "descriptive study of living cultures." His objective was to obtain a comprehensive "micro-level" picture of how rural society in China actually operates. This kind of anthropological research is often undertaken by a scholar working alone. It usually requires living for several months in the village being studied. Such field research is sensitive work in *any* country, and in China, extremely sensitive.

The American Anthropological Association enjoins researchers to be especially careful to protect the welfare and confidentiality of those whom they interview and observe. One obvious problem this injunction raises in the case of China is that foreigners doing field research there are customarily accompanied in their work either by Chinese officials or by a Chinese colleague who observes virtually everything they do and everyone they speak to. Mosher was an exception. He was permitted to work alone, unlike several other Americans.

The Good Old Days

Broken Earth, a popularized account of life in rural China based on Mosher's conversations with peasants and incidents he witnessed during nine months in the village, is another in the current "China stinks" genre of books by Americans who have recently lived and worked in China. His bias is transparent. Everything is wrong and nothing is right in the People's Republic: black and white.

Yet many of Mosher's observations have a ring of truth about them, and his findings should provoke serious debate. Mosher describes country life in vivid detail—peasants staggering under the weight of an oppressive and mindless state bureaucracy; corrupt Communist cadres handing out favors through the "back door"; Chinese women, liberated from traditional confinement in the peasant household, only to find themselves caught in a "double-bind"—expected now to do both housework and fieldwork.

Is it possible, as Mosher argues, that many Chinese peasants feel that life was better before Mao's triumph in 1949? We know from independent studies that, *in the aggregate*, China is

*The strongest Yes comes from Irving L. Horowitz in "Struggling for the Soul of Social Science," *Society*, July-Aug. 1983.

materially much better off today than it was before the Communists came to power. The World Bank, for example, concluded that China's average annual per capita income during the past two decades grew faster than that of the average low-income country. By 1979, China had achieved a life expectancy at birth of 64 years (well above the average for so-called middle-income countries, which is 61 years).

How can China be materially better off, yet Chinese peasants still tell Mosher that things were better before Liberation? Scholars must confront this seeming anomaly.

The Telegram

But it was not *Broken Earth* that prompted Stanford's action against Mosher—the book was published months after the anthropology department's decision. Mosher's troubles began early in 1980 as he was doing his field work in the Pearl River delta.

He had been in China for only a few months when, in February, he received a letter from John Jamieson, the academic liaison at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, communicating Chinese complaints about Mosher's importing a van and engaging a research assistant (both from Hong Kong), obtaining "sensitive documents," and hiring local villagers to help in his research work. Mosher dismisses the charges as "false and fatuous," arguing that he subsequently responded satisfactorily to all of the allegations and "bent over backwards to alleviate Chinese concern."

A few months later, in June, Mosher, with a Chinese driver, traveled by van through Guizhou, an area well known to be prohibited to foreigners. He was discovered, detained by local Public Security officials, and returned to Guangzhou (Canton). According to the Chinese account, Mosher, while detained, wrote a self-criticism, admitted that he had violated travel regulations for foreigners, and apologized for his actions.

But after returning to Guangzhou, Mosher repudiated his self-criticism, argued that his travel permit had indeed been appropriate for the trip, and telegraphed the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing protesting his treatment. Apparently, what particularly angered Chinese authorities was Mosher's telegram, which smacked to them of a foreigner demanding "extraterritoriality"—that is, to be exempt from Chinese law as foreigners had been in China's pre-Liberation past under the provisions of the "unequal treaties."

A Meeting with Zhao

Mosher left China at the beginning of the summer, having been refused a three-month visa extension by the Chinese. Rumors about his behavior in the field persisted.

In January 1981, seven months later, when a U.S. humanities and social science commission was visiting China, two members of the group—Kenneth Prewitt, president of the Social Science Research Council, and Michel Oksenberg, chairman of the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies (which funded Mosher's dissertation research)—spoke about the Mosher case with Zhao Fusan, deputy secretary general of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

This was the first of at least two meetings between Prewitt and Zhao dealing with Mosher. According to a letter from Prewitt to the Stanford investigating committee, Zhao in that first meeting raised three issues that troubled the Chinese. They were, said Prewitt, that Mosher "had

"NONE OF YOU HAS ANY CHOICE"

In this excerpt from Broken Earth, *Steven Mosher describes a family-planning session at Equality Commune, to which the Sandhead Production Brigade belonged:*

Family-planning meetings, which all women who were pregnant with their third or later child were required to attend, or who had had their first child within the last four years, had already been in progress for four days in each of the commune's twenty brigades, and over 300 women had agreed to terminate their pregnancies under urging from local cadres. An equal number of village women had not acceded to the cadres' demand, however, and the commune revolutionary committee had decided to move the meetings to the commune headquarters. . . .

From Sandhead Brigade there were 18 women, all from five to nine months pregnant, and many red-eyed from lack of sleep and crying. They sat listlessly on short plank benches arranged in a semicircle about the front of the room, where He Kaifeng, a commune cadre and Communist party member of many years' standing, explained the purpose of the meeting in no uncertain terms. "You are here because you have yet to 'think clear' about birth control, and you will remain here until you do. . . ."

Then he began to reason with the women about their concerns. "We know that you want a son in order to be secure in your old age. But remember that you are still young. As the country develops, it will create welfare programs. By the time you are old, you will not have to worry about who is going to support you. The government will support you." Speaking directly to the several women present who had brought along their girl children, he said, "You must remember that some girls can be as filial as boys. . . ."

Up to this point he had spoken in a persuasive, not unfriendly fashion, but then he heard one of the women mutter something about the Communist party to her neighbor, and his voice became loud and hard. "Don't say anything against the Communist party," he warned sternly. "It is very concerned about you. The party is not saying that you are not allowed to have children, just that two children are enough, and that it is best to have just one child. . . ."

Looking coldly around the room he said slowly and deliberately. "None of you has any choice in this matter. You must realize that your pregnancy affects everyone in the commune, and indeed affects everyone in the country." Then, visually calculating how far along the women in the room were, he went on to add, "The two of you who are eight or nine months pregnant will have a [caesarean-style abortion]; the rest of you will have a shot which will cause you to abort. . . ."

secured access to security materials during his field research; had traveled through an area closed to foreigners without proper documentation; and had been involved in removing antiquities from China." These activities led the Chinese to wonder whether Mosher was engaged in intelligence activity rather than field research.

At the same time, Prewitt wrote, Zhao "indicated that the Chinese would not be taking any further action. He did not recommend any specific action to us."

Yet the Chinese had already taken one step. The conversation with Zhao, Prewitt notes, came as background to continued discussions that the delegation was having with the Chinese regarding the recently announced decision to impose what Beijing called a "moratorium" on field research done by foreigners in China.

Answering Charges

In other words, following the allegations in the Mosher case, the Chinese had shut off further opportunities for Americans to do long-term field research. Myron Cohen of Columbia University, the next American anthropologist scheduled to conduct such research in China, would simply have to wait.

After the American delegation returned to the United States, Michel Oksenberg wrote to Steven Mosher on March 18, 1981, telling of Zhao's charges and requesting a detailed response.

Mosher replied on April 4 in a 13-page letter, indicating his wish to cooperate with the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies and his desire for a formal statement from the committee clearing him of the charges.

That was hardly the end of the matter. A month later, Steven Mosher did something that even he now acknowledges to have been unwise: He published, in the popular Taiwan magazine *Shibao zazhi*, an article criticizing mainland China's birth-control policy and describing the problems of implementing it that he had discovered while studying the production brigade in Guangdong Province.

Reality vs. Policy

Mosher showed how peasant members of China's collective farms depended for their security in old age not primarily on the collective, but on the sons they bore, sons who would stay in the family and care for their parents when the latter were no longer able to work. Moreover, more sons meant more workers per family and therefore more family income. Daughters, everyone assumed, would eventually marry and leave home to become members of their husbands' households.

Mosher's analysis demonstrated how the prevailing material circumstances of China's rural society inevitably produced resistance to Beijing's policy of limiting the size of families.

The article itself is a solid piece of research. The findings are important. But when Mosher published it in Taiwan in May 1981—under the name "Steven Westley" (his first and middle names)—it provoked a storm of protest in Beijing and back home. Most controversial about the article were the photographs that accompanied it, one of which showed a seven-and-one-half month pregnant woman with her body exposed, about to undergo an abortion. None of the photos concealed the identity of the villagers.

Moreover, the article was published in Taiwan, where anything



Birth-control posters usually depict the child in a one-child family as a girl, to counteract a Chinese preference for sons. Attitudes change slowly. In 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang urged Chinese to "resolutely condemn the criminal activities of female infanticide and maltreatment of mothers."

critical of practices on the mainland would inevitably be exploited for its propaganda value in the continuing political battle between the Guomindang government in Taipei and the Communist government in Beijing.

By publishing pictures of his respondents in the village, especially without taking care to disguise their identities, Mosher flouted the anthropologists' code of professional ethics.* That code, adopted by the council of the American Anthropological Association (AAA), reads in part: "In research, an anthropologist's paramount responsibility is to those he studies. When there is a conflict of interest, these individuals must come first. The anthropologist must do everything within his power to protect their physical, social, and psychological welfare and to honor their dignity and privacy."

G. William Skinner of Stanford's anthropology department quoted the AAA statement when he wrote to Mosher in June 1981 after seeing the article. "I am absolutely appalled at your irresponsibility and insensitivity," he wrote.

Skinner appreciated Mosher's "revulsion at the inhumane treatment of defenseless village women" and acknowledged the importance of an effort to arouse public opinion against abuse of Chinese peasants in the process of carrying out Beijing's birth-control policy. But, he concluded, by "publishing your article in a Taiwan journal you have undermined that objective; international observers will see your piece as designed to embarrass the PRC [People's Republic of China] government *politically*; it comes off as a political gambit not as a humanitarian protest. How could you be blind to this outcome?"

Three months later, in September 1981, Stanford University's anthropology department impaneled a

*The two most controversial of the pictures published by Mosher with the article—the one just cited and another depicting a tubal ligation—are reprinted in *Broken Earth*. In the English edition published in the United States, the faces in the two pictures are now blacked out. In the Chinese edition published in Taiwan, for reasons that remain unclear, they are not.

committee of three professors to investigate the accumulating charges against Mosher, and the committee chairman, Professor Jane Collier, sent letters requesting information from virtually everyone mentioned in the Chinese allegations. The anthropology department claims that it explicitly excluded Mosher's publication of the article in Taiwan from consideration in their proceedings, apparently because such consideration might be seen as a challenge to Mosher's academic freedom. And, as Collier put it, "students have a right to make mistakes."

Negative Consequences

As the Stanford committee's deliberations got under way, Kenneth Prewitt of the Social Science Research Council met once more in Beijing with Zhao. By then, the Chinese position had changed—become more forceful.

According to Prewitt's account, Zhao presented no new information about Mosher but said that the Chinese hoped that "the outcome of the Mosher case would not have negative consequences for the scholarly exchange program."

When pressed to elaborate, Zhao (according to Prewitt) "replied that the exchange program could be harmed if the American scholarly community took no action on what the Chinese regarded as improper behavior by Mosher. Here he made reference not only to Mosher's behavior while conducting field research, but also to the manner in which he chose to publish materials in Taiwan."

In February 1982, Zhao wrote directly to Stanford's Jane Collier. "We hope," he said,"that Stanford University will deal with the [Mosher] matter sternly and inform our academy of the results of its disposition."* There seemed to be little doubt that the Chinese wanted Mosher punished.

A year later, in February, Stanford's *ad hoc* investigating committee finished its labors. The anthropology department, after considering the committee's report and hearing Mosher's response to it, voted unanimously (11 to 0) to expel Mosher from its doctoral program.

The committee report, as noted above, has never been made public—purportedly for fear of endangering innocent third parties and violating Mosher's right to due process. Mosher, who has a copy of the report, likewise has not divulged its contents, and he is appealing the department's decision. Rejected in his first two appeals, he now has one last resort: a final appeal to Stanford President Donald Kennedy.

"Can Cohen Come?"

Ironically, if there was ever any expectation on the American side that, once Mosher was punished, the Chinese would once again permit American researchers to engage in long-term field research, that expectation has not been realized.

The cultural and educational affairs officer in the U.S. embassy in Beijing recalls that after the anthropology department at Stanford voted to drop Mosher from its program, he xeroxed the *International Herald Tribune* article reporting the Stanford decision, took it over to Zhao Fusan, and asked: "Can [Myron] Cohen come now?" The Chinese "were waiting for justice to be done," he says.

*The Stanford translation uses "severely" and Zhao prefers "seriously." The Chinese word is *yansu*. Both translations are possible. The one used here—"sternly"—comes from David Chu (editor and translator), *Sociology and Society in Contemporary China, 1979–1984* (1984).

"The right decision would help."

But it has not helped Myron Cohen, who is still waiting—apparently with little hope that he will finally be allowed to do the field work in China that he has been nominated by the American side to do.

The case of Steven Mosher, it should be clear, turns on more than the alleged deeds of one individual; just as clearly, more is at stake than the future of one individual's career. However the matter is resolved, the Mosher controversy sheds light on the problems inherent in conducting anthropological field research as well as the nature of academic exchanges between the United States and the People's Republic.

Closed Doors

To begin with, China is not by anyone's standards an open society. In theory, the system is a "dictatorship of the proletariat," one in which Communist party tutelage is designed to bring about the ultimate ideal of a communist society. The party controls the press, education, employment, and place of residence, as well as opportunities to assemble and to express opinions.

The party expects Chinese citizens not simply to comply passively with leadership directives, but also to take an active part in officially initiated programs. Those identified by the state as opponents or deviants may face a secretive and harsh police system that gives the individual no safeguards against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.

Chinese governments, Confucian or communist, have customarily sought to regulate foreign access to Chinese society and to curb foreign influence. Some attribute this trait to what they see as characteristic Chinese xenophobia; others ascribe it to a quite natural (given China's turbulent history) fear of foreign manipulation.

While party exhortations to guard against "capitalist restoration" may sound like just another slogan to a visiting American, to many Chinese they touch a sensitive nerve and evoke an unpleasant chapter in Chinese history. American researchers and teachers working in China today complain about being seen as spies, even though many of them find abhorrent any employment of scholars by American intelligence services.

To Americans, China is a country preoccupied with secrecy. Much of what in the United States is public information, readily available to citizen and foreigner alike, in China is classified *neibu*, or "restricted material." Telephone books, maps, newspapers, and academic articles and books having nothing to do with military or national security have regularly been classified *neibu*. At least one American scholar has found that he could not have access to a Chinese translation of an article that he himself wrote and published in the United States, because in China it had been classified *neibu*.

Catch-22

It is illegal for foreigners to have access to *neibu* or other classified materials except under certain conditions—and foreign scholars are often not aware of what those conditions are. This is because some of the laws and other regulations specifying the status and responsibilities of foreigners living in China are themselves classified documents.

Nonetheless, Chinese colleagues and local officials often give *neibu* materials to foreign scholars. They do so because much of the important professional literature in a

given discipline is published in restricted journals.

The generosity of these Chinese unquestionably advances the research of visiting foreign academics, and virtually all researchers who spend any time working in China are drawn into accepting *neibu* materials from their Chinese colleagues whether they are carrying out field research or simply working in a Chinese library doing archival research. But, as a result, they are made vulnerable to possible charges of breaking Chinese laws regarding classified materials, or even allegations of spying. Whether Steven Mosher was a victim (in part) of this Catch-22 is impossible to say. Certainly other Americans have been.*

Joint Projects

Another barrier encountered by foreign scholars is the quality of most disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in China, which falls far below Western standards. This is due in part to Mao Zedong's repeated attacks on intellectuals, particularly those who were Western-trained. As a result, some Chinese and Americans have argued that China must first develop its own humanities and social science disciplines before it can be expected to be willing to welcome foreign scholars in those fields. Understandably, some Chinese academics are reluctant to permit foreign researchers to investigate social questions in China—particularly if the studies are not part of a collaborative research project with Chinese scholars—before Chinese themselves have researched these problems. Some of the projects thus far that have been most welcomed by the Chinese have been joint American-Chinese ventures involving opportunities for Chinese researchers to be trained in modern social science techniques.

Two Pairs of Glasses

Clearly, Beijing is determined to get all it can out of the present policy of the opening to the West. The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, which administers the official exchange between the two countries, estimates that there are now some 12,000 Chinese academics (students, teachers, and researchers) studying in the United States, compared to only 300–400 Americans in China.

Moreover, there is a substantial difference in the access enjoyed by Chinese working at U.S. universities and research institutes compared with that granted Americans studying in China. Here, Chinese scholars are sometimes even invited to join U.S. research teams engaged in pioneering work; American scholars in China often have difficulty just getting access to library materials or arranging for an adviser in the appropriate department at a local university.

Major breakthroughs in achieving access for American scholars in China (for example, the opening of the Ming-Qing archives in Beijing and the Nationalist archives in Nanjing) have required White House in-

*For example, in May 1982, Lisa Wichser, an American teacher in China who is also a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Denver, was jailed and interrogated in Beijing for six days and then expelled from the country, charged with having violated Chinese law "by stealing China's secret information." Wichser had in her possession classified material dealing with Chinese agriculture, which was the subject of her dissertation, but the materials had not been stolen. They had been given to her by Chinese colleagues helping with her dissertation research. She and a young economist had applied to the government to be married. He and others have been detained since her deportation.

tervention.

To some degree, the Mosher case has been both a cause of, and an excuse for, the recent setback to foreign field research in China. When I talked with Zhao last September, he described the U.S.–PRC academic exchanges as a "vulnerable relationship." He said that some people in China may not see the validity of field research done by foreigners, and that "people in the infrastructure are not prepared to respond to a very dynamic international relationship."

Zhao declared, however, that the present level of exchanges makes possible the development of mutual confidence and mutual understanding, and provides opportunities for Chinese to understand how social science research is done in other lands.

With regard to the Mosher case, Zhao said that Stanford in effect had three options: They could take the case seriously; they could decide that Mosher had done nothing wrong; or the investigation could drag on for a long time without a decisive conclusion. "Whatever would come out of the review would have its impact here," he asserted, and that "would involve the image of the whole academic community."

Asked about that impact—specifically, about whether Mosher's actions should be seen as having wrecked subsequent opportunities for other foreign scholars, or, alternatively, whether some Chinese were actually looking for an excuse to close down field research opportunities because they didn't want foreigners doing social science in China in the first place—he responded that it was probably a "combination of both." Zhao explained that, even without Mosher, there inevitably would have been other problems that would have prompted a policy review.

What kind of a future, then, do the Sino-American exchanges have? Let us look at the situation through two pairs of glasses.

The Chinese have one set of concerns. They suspect, for example, that one goal of the scholarly exchanges with the United States may be intelligence-gathering. Rightly or wrongly, the Mosher affair is

Families like this one, common in 1900, would today be deprived by Beijing of half their income—10 percent for each of five "excessive" children. The People's Daily *in 1952 opposed birth control, calling it "a way of slaughtering the Chinese people without drawing blood." Famine soon changed many minds.*

cited as a case in point. Obviously, *any* information gleaned about the social structure of the People's Republic of China will have broader implications. But Washington, at whatever level necessary, must make it clear to Beijing that academic exchanges are not being "penetrated" for this purpose.

Some American scholars go to China with a "hidden agenda," as if the objective were somehow to "help China modernize" or to "show China the way." Nothing could be more absurd, or more destined to failure. Chinese today, heirs to the longest continuous tradition known to mankind, and proud of it, will shape their own future, despite any American's missionary pretensions.

The function of the scholarly exchanges, as Kenneth Prewitt and Michel Oksenberg observe in a 1982 report, must be to achieve a solid understanding of the two countries. Other insights may result; that should not, however, be either the avowed or the covert rationale.

From the American point of view, some things have to change.

Whether or not the Chinese finally decide to publish a set of guidelines governing research by foreigners in China, Washington must insist that American scholars not be punished for violating laws and regulations that remain Chinese state secrets. The elimination of that Catch-22 must be a first priority. When Americans go to work in China, they must, of course, be prepared to live under the rules that the host government sets for them; but visitors have to know what the rules *are*.

As for the matter of reciprocity, if Beijing shows that it is either unwilling or unable to provide suitable arrangements for scholars sent to China under the exchange, then the American government should be prepared to limit the number of Chinese admitted to the United States. As Prewitt and Oksenberg argue, the exchange should not become an aid program.

Finally, with regard to the Mosher case, two observations seem appropriate.

First, no one who has not had access to the unpublished report or who does not know personally of Mosher's experience in China can determine whether Stanford's action to terminate him was justified. As long as neither party makes public the report, this will be the case. Moreover, if, after Mosher has exhausted his appeals at Stanford, he feels that he has not received just treatment, presumably he will sue. In the end, a court of law is perhaps the most appropriate forum in which to resolve this dispute. There, all of the evidence can be brought forward, and a judge or jury with no axe to grind will, it would be hoped, make a just decision.

Meanwhile, Mosher's work—his articles on birth control and female infanticide as well as his book, *Broken Earth*—is worthy of dispassionate consideration and review. Failure to attempt that assessment, even as the case against Mosher at Stanford remains unresolved, would simply show once again that Americans still can't "cope with the grays."

COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly *and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.*

The One That Got Away

Dr. Richard Restak's balanced article ["Psychiatry in America," *WQ*, Autumn 1983] missed the "big one." A study by the psychoanalytic Menninger Foundation showed that only 43 percent of patients, who underwent an average of 600 treatments, improved. Fourteen percent became *worse*, and 26 percent showed no change. (See O. F. Kernberg et al., *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, Jan. and Mar., 1972).

Frank B. McMahon
Chesterfield, Missouri

Psychotherapy Plus

Like so many things, American psychiatry changed dramatically at the end of the Second World War. Psychiatry was flush with the successes of treating war neuroses; the federal government recognized the mentally ill as a national problem; the new National Institute of Mental Health trained large numbers of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals. Psychiatry had a coherent theory—psychoanalytic—that could explain the mind. And many of Europe's brightest transplanted practitioners, as well as our own, found psychoanalysis attractive. While psychoanalysis was seductively comprehensive, psychiatry had little else to offer then (some electroconvulsive therapy and perhaps insulin coma) that proved efficacious.

By the mid-1950s, however, the new biology that was changing the rest of medicine was setting psychiatry on a revolutionary course. This new direction did not come from a single coherent theory, such as Freud's. It came from questions raised by investigators who tried to establish facts first.

Medications were discovered that decrease the impact of schizophrenia (antipsychotics such as Thorazine), raise the mood of the depressed (antidepressants such as Elavil and Parnate), flatten the mood swings of the manic-depressive (lithium), and decrease anxiety (antianxiety drugs such as Valium). The antipsychotics allowed many schizophrenic patients to live near-normal lives, and lithium probably saved the nation over four billion dollars in hospitalization costs during its first 10 years of use.

The discovery of these medications, which so profoundly influence psychiatric treatment, has given psychiatrists and others who study the brain a powerful tool. These medications are thought to work at the synapse, or the chemical bridge that allows 50 to 100 billion neurons in our brains to talk to each other. This small junction is the Achilles heel of the brain: It appears to be altered in major psychiatric disorders.

Dr. Restak is correct that "biologism" has shifted the direction of psychiatry. Biologism has given psychiatry the ability to treat patients effectively. Still, psychotherapy (not specifically analytic psychotherapy), through careful research, has been shown to work in a variety of conditions. In combination with medications, psychotherapy has decreased the morbidity of both schizophrenia and depression, although it is yet unclear whether one form of psychotherapy works better than another, who uses it best, or even which patients make the most of it. Psychiatrists' current task is to learn how to improve both the biological and, when appropriate, social-psychological preventions and treatments.

Richard J. Wyatt, M.D.
Chief, Adult Psychiatry
National Institute of Mental Health
Washington, D.C.

The Soviets: Déjà Vu

As I discovered during my service in the Soviet Union 26 years ago, nothing is more difficult than seeing the world

through the eyes of a Soviet citizen ["The Soviets" *WQ*, Autumn 1983]. It takes a certain expertise and sensitivity. I saw the lines of people that Walter Reich saw, but he understood their pervasive meaning beyond mere inconvenience.

After a quarter of a century, how much some things seem the same. During the 1960s, I witnessed the cumbersome effort to eliminate the "cult of personality" associated with Stalin, only to see "collective leadership" swiftly eroded and the orchestration of a Khrushchev cult. When Dr. Reich wonders whether Andropov will become the object of a "similar process of sanctification," I feel like saying that this is where I came in. So with rock music and the current literature. One better understands Soviet society by understanding its escape valves.

Daniel Schorr
Washington, D.C.

Editor's Note

Re "Pluses and Minuses for Women" [*WQ*, Autumn 1983, p. 19]:

Readers have questioned the statement: "Women now head one in three households (41 percent of black families, 12 percent of white families)."

Seeking brevity, the *Quarterly* created confusion. To demographers, a "household" and a "family" are not the same. There are two kinds of households: families, composed of two or more related people who live together, and "nonfamilies," including unmarried, divorced, and widowed people living alone. Moreover, the total number of households cannot be calculated using figures for blacks and whites alone. The U.S. population also includes Hispanics, Orientals, Native Americans, and other minorities.

Correction

The essay on psychiatry by Richard M. Restak contained two errors, both the responsibility of the editors. The sentence reading "one out of six psychiatrists . . . dies a suicide" (p. 99) should have read "one out of six physicians who dies a suicide is a psychiatrist." A quotation from Socrates, "the unexamined life is not worth living" (p. 122), was misattributed to Henry David Thoreau. The *Quarterly* regrets both errors.

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(signed) Peter Braestrup, *Editor*

MISSING SOMETHING?

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