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Breaking out of the jungle

After taking its first brave steps towards economic recovery, America seems to be wandering in an unfamiliar jungle—of mind-boggling budget deficits, interest rates that are still too high and crippling many industries, unemployment at its highest rate in 40 years, and voracious government spending that accounts for 24¢ out of every dollar of GNP.

In this time of crisis, the nation desperately needs to get its bearings again, and rechart a course which will put it back on the road to prosperity.

Let's again look at the map we were supposed to follow. The map is called ERTA—the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981—and the course it laid out was clear. Tax cuts would put over \$200 billion in individuals' pockets over three years, to spend or save. Tax incentives would encourage business to invest in new plant and equipment, and modernize old facilities. And the government pledged itself to fiscal responsibility by agreeing to cut taxes for three years and index future taxes to inflation, thus foregoing the aid of "bracket creep" to finance future profligate spending programs.

The ERTA map remains a trustworthy guide, despite enactment of \$98.3 billion in new taxes and other revenue-producing measures. We need, however, to reiterate some facts of life:

- As a basic principle, ERTA assumes that prosperity depends on stable economic growth. Only economic growth can provide

rising real incomes and more productive jobs, restore a mood of confidence in the future, and resolve conflicts within society.

- When investors, savers and consumers become convinced that government expenditures will be brought under control, fear of inflation will diminish, long-term interest rates—critical to industries like housing—will come down and the economy will begin to perk up.

- When the economy has begun to roll again, business will need to make massive investments to improve productivity—output per worker—which is the key to sustained economic growth. This will include construction of new plant, building of new transportation systems, and introduction of new technologies into the workplace.

What does this tell us about breaking out of the jungle?

It tells us that profitable business is the key. Because business provides the goods, pays the wages, provides for employees' security through pension plans, and pays taxes and dividends. If you clobber business, everybody suffers—either by paying higher prices for products, or by foregoing the better and more abundant products that result from investment in new plant and equipment, or by not having a job.

It tells us that government's responsibility is to provide the economic climate in which business can prosper. If our legislators grasp this idea firmly, we may yet get back on the path to prosperity.

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
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


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Editor's Comment

Ever since it was launched in 1976, the *Wilson Quarterly's* chief mission has been the same: to survey, select, and summarize the nation's latest scholarly ideas and information on matters of importance. Our goal has been to bridge the gap between the specialists, who usually speak only to one another, and a growing educated lay public, even as the specialists' findings percolate into scholarly publications and U.S. policy-making.

We are not in the news business. Yet in this issue of *WQ*, our scholarly contributors discuss two subjects that have been much in the headlines: the future of Israel and the revived debate over U.S. immigration policy.

Thirty-five years after its precarious establishment, the state of Israel is a very different place. Our emphasis here, as is usually the case, is not on recent events, e.g., the conflict in Lebanon, but on long-term trends—the evolution of the Jewish state, its Army, and its society.

As for America's "immigration problem," two scholars, one German and one American, describe past U.S. efforts to deal with it; they suggest how unlikely it is that this nation will resolve this recurring issue in a tidy way.

We do not pretend to cover every aspect of Israel or of immigration. Our accompanying Background Books essays are designed to note other viewpoints and more specialized reading. As always, we welcome readers' comments.

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
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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Disorder in the House

"The Dispersion of Authority in the House of Representatives" by Thomas E. Cavanagh, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1982/83), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-0148.

During the 1970s, a crop of eager newcomers dramatically overhauled the U.S. House of Representatives. The result, says Cavanagh, a Joint Center for Political Studies researcher, has been "institutional chaos."

Earlier, between 1863 and 1963, the House had become increasingly institutionalized: The average tenure of members rose from 1.75 to 5.65 terms; the proportion of freshmen dropped from 58.1 to 15.2 percent. Strong committee chairmen, appointed and reappointed solely on the basis of seniority, controlled the flow and content of legislation.

Beginning in the early 1970s, an influx of new members impatient with the seniority system revolutionized the House. They joined party leaders in a "top and bottom pincers movement" to undercut the committee chairmen, Cavanagh says. In 1975, three senior members were passed over for chairmanships, and within two years two powerful but scandal-tainted chairmen, Wayne Hays and Wilbur Mills, stepped down. Subcommittees, newly empowered to elect their own chairmen, proliferated—there were 146 by 1980. The Speaker of the House, meanwhile, wrested de facto control over majority party committee assignments from Mills's old Ways and Means Committee.

But the reforms overwhelmed the members, Cavanagh contends. Between 1956 and 1976, the number of hours the House spent in session doubled, and roll-call votes on the House floor increased eight-fold as the committee chairmen lost control of the legislative process. By 1977, an average of 33.5 committee and subcommittee meetings were held every day; 38 percent of the Congressmen had at least one schedule conflict daily. To cope with the increased work load, House committee staffs doubled, to a total of 1,959 between 1973 and 1979, and personal staff grew to nearly 10,000.

The new crush of business left legislators little time to work on legis-

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

lation in committee. As a result, committee authority declined: While only 26 (mostly unsuccessful) amendments to committee-backed appropriations bills were offered on the House floor in 1965, since 1974 the annual number has averaged 100, of which half are adopted.

Cavanagh sees "creeping paralysis" in the House. The obvious remedy: allowing the majority party leadership, particularly the Speaker, to reimpose order. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives is not pulling its full weight in Washington.

The Bureaucracy Wins Again

"Bureaucrats 2, Presidents 0" by Leonard Reed, in *Harper's* (Nov. 1982), Subscription Service Dept., P.O. Box 2620, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

President Jimmy Carter's 1978 Civil Service Reform Act was hailed as a major overhaul of the federal bureaucracy. But Reed, a *Washington Monthly* contributing editor, says the reforms have changed little.

The U.S. Civil Service, established under the 1883 Pendleton Act, has become an increasingly secure haven even for incompetent employees. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that federal workers have a "property right" in their jobs and cannot be dismissed without "due process"; dismissals can be appealed through many levels up to a federal appeals court. Although the 1978 law shortened the appeals process, firing "a single goof-off clerk," says Reed, could still take up to two years. In 1976, 3,500 of 2.5 million civil servants were sacked; in 1980, two years after the reform, only 2,632.

The 1978 law also established an Office of Special Counsel to protect "whistle blowers" against reprisals. But since June 1981, it has handled only four cases.

The centerpiece of Carter's 1978 reforms was the establishment of a Senior Executive Service (SES), then composed of 6,000 high-level bureaucrats who gave up tenured positions for what Carter called "the risks and rewards of competitive life." But the risks were never great, Reed contends. Only one SES employee has been dropped for poor performance, and those dismissed are guaranteed regular civil service jobs at their full SES salaries.

The SES salary scale, notes Reed, ranges from \$56,945 to \$67,200 (though temporarily capped at \$58,500), and each year one-fifth of the officials are eligible for bonuses of up to 20 percent. SES executives claim private sector salaries are higher, but in part because of generous federal pension plans, Reed says, few leave the government. Few even transfer from one government agency to another, although one of Carter's goals was to free senior administrators of ties to particular bureaucratic interests by regularly shifting them.

Reform of the bureaucracy is possible, Reed believes. But if Jimmy Carter could not succeed despite making the most determined effort of any President in recent years, he asks, who will?

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

*The President
and the Fed*

"Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s" by Nathaniel Beck, in *American Journal of Political Science* (Aug. 1982), University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, Tex. 78712.

The Federal Reserve Board is often accused of manipulating U.S. monetary policy to aid Presidents' re-election bids. Beck, a political scientist at the University of California at San Diego, disputes the charge.

Critics of the Fed, led by Yale's Edward Tufte and *Fortune* magazine's Sanford Rose, focus on increases in the money supply that stimulated the economy during President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign. But Beck argues that changes in the money supply are not a good test of the Fed's immediate intentions, since they are not directly under government control. A better indicator is the Federal Funds rate, the interest the Fed charges banks on overnight loans, which in turn directly influences commercial interest rates.

By this standard, Beck says, the Fed stimulated the economy between September 1971 and January 1972, when the rate dropped one-third of a point lower than normal. It varied little from the norm at other times between 1970 and 1974. And Beck argues that the unusual interlude can best be explained by Nixon's imposition of wage and price controls in



The members of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors. Front row (from left to right): Preston Martin, Paul Volker, Henry Wallich. Standing: J. Charles Partee, Nancy Teeters, Emmett Rice, Lyle Gramley.

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

August 1971. Interest rates escaped controls, and to fend off that possibility, the Fed moved on its own to keep rates low.

The accession of President Ford in 1974 was followed by a major shift in monetary policy. But there was little change at the Fed when Democrat Jimmy Carter replaced Ford. Even the post-Nixon shift was affected by the need to adapt to outside economic conditions: the 1973 abandonment of fixed international exchange rates and the 1973-74 OPEC oil price hikes.

Indeed, looking back to long-term money supply growth rates since the 1950s, Beck finds no partisan pattern in Fed policy. The highest growth rate occurred under Lyndon Johnson, followed by Kennedy, Nixon, Eisenhower, Carter, and Ford. But the Kennedy-era growth rate was only a half point higher than that under Nixon; the difference under Nixon and Ford was three-and-a-half points.

How the White House influences the Fed is difficult to determine. It may be, Beck says, that changing economic conditions, more than politics, determine how both view money policy.

Shutting Out the Public

“The Congressional Veto: Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control” by Robert S. Gilmour, in *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (Fall 1982), University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195.

As Congress passed more and more legislation during the 1970s, it delegated greater powers to federal agencies to clarify laws in rules and regulations. But it also granted itself the right to veto agency actions. Everybody has benefited, says Gilmour, a University of Connecticut political scientist, except the public.

During the 1970s, 555 veto provisions were attached to 335 pieces of federal legislation. And under such laws as the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the 1979 Education Act, *all* the regulations promulgated by some agencies are subject to congressional veto. A pending bill in Congress would subject every federal agency to such reviews.

Gilmour argues that congressional vetoes violate the Constitution's provision for a strict separation of the legislative and executive powers. Indeed, in January 1982, a federal circuit court of appeals declared unconstitutional the “one-house” veto by either the House or Senate. While the case is being appealed to the Supreme Court, Congress can still legislate “two-house” vetoes, empowering itself to reject regulations after 30, 60, or 90 legislative working days if both houses concur.

Moreover, Gilmour notes, the veto authority delays implementation of new laws. The Federal Elections Commission, for example, issued a set of rules in August 1976, but because Congress adjourned before the 30-day review period ended, they did not take effect until 1977.

A more serious objection, Gilmour believes, is that although public hearings are required when federal agencies formulate new regulations, Congress's veto power leads to “closed-door” negotiations be-

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

tween the agencies and Congressmen—or worse, their unelected aides.

The congressional veto also frustrates judicial review: If Congress fails to veto regulations over which it has power, the courts must assume that they fulfill the spirit of the law. But in fact, Congress actually looks at only a fraction of the regulations subject to its veto.

Ironically, says Gilmour, the legislative veto became popular as a way of ensuring that bureaucrats carry out the will of Congress. But by confusing executive and legislative authorities, Congress's veto power has diminished the government's accountability to the public.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Hope for Poland?

"Crisis in Poland" by Richard Spielman, in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1982/83), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

When Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland and suppressed the Solidarity trade union movement in December 1981, the Reagan administration responded with trade sanctions and harsh rhetoric. But the military takeover may have provided the United States with a historic opportunity to help liberalize Poland.

So argues Spielman, formerly of Yale's Center for Russian and East European Studies. The White House, he contends, mistakenly views Jaruzelski as a Soviet puppet and has misjudged the roots of the crisis.

During the 1970s, détente undermined the Communist Party in Poland. Unable to unite Polish society by mobilizing for confrontation with the West, the party touted material progress instead. Party First Secretary Edward Gierek relied heavily on Western bank loans to realize his goals. The new wealth "made possible a Party debauch of historic proportions," according to Spielman. "Détente does not liberalize ruling Leninist parties, it corrupts them."

The venality of party leaders angered both Solidarity and the Army. Indeed, Jaruzelski, an Army general, arrested Gierek and other party officials on the same day he declared martial law. "No individual—not even Solidarity leader Lech Walesa—has more seriously considered destroying a communist party in power," Spielman claims.

Jaruzelski is no friend of either the Polish Communist Party or Moscow. The general won only narrowly (by 104 to 79) the October 1981 vote that made him head of the party, and he sent the entire Polish Central Committee to the provinces the day before he imposed martial law to forestall organized party opposition.

Nor did Moscow benefit from Jaruzelski's move, which came when West Germany's chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was in East Germany for a meeting with that nation's party chairman, Erich Honecker. Had the Soviets been in control, Spielman says, they would have delayed the takeover to avoid embarrassing the West German leader.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Martial law, meanwhile, has paralyzed Poland's economy. Jaruzelski's advisers are pushing for market-oriented economic reforms modeled on the Hungarian system. Achieving them will require Waleasa's cooperation and Western economic help.


Poland already has the makings of "laissez-faire" communism: an independent Catholic Church, a private farm sector, a democratically oriented working class. Washington should tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric, Spielman argues, and offer Warsaw support. Liberalization is the best one can hope for in "post-Solidarity Poland."

*Is Victory
Obsolete?*

"The Ideology of Arms Control" by Wendell John Coats, Jr., in *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Summer 1982), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 541, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

To antinuclear activists, the United States appears to face a stark choice between peace and nuclear apocalypse. Coats, a Kenyon political scientist, contends that this view is a logical outcome of misguided U.S. policies since the early 1960s, when Washington abandoned the idea of achieving victory, even in conventional wars.

Under Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, Washington adopted the strategic doctrine of "mutual assured destruction." War would be prevented not by threatening to defeat the aggres-



Opponents of the Reagan administration's civil defense plans argue that efforts to protect the U.S. population against nuclear attack will actually increase the risk of war.

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FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

sor, but by ensuring that neither side could win. The chief goal of U.S. policy-makers became avoiding any move that might disturb the nuclear "balance of terror."

Moreover, the "ideology of arms control" was soon extended to conventional warfare, Coats says. To win the land war in Indochina, for example, would have invited Soviet or Chinese intervention, it was thought; field commanders were ordered instead to kill as many of the enemy as possible in South Vietnam to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table. Similarly, NATO plans for the conventional defense of Western Europe promise nothing more than a holding action. Reducing U.S. strategy to staging a contest in attrition, says Coats, debases the military profession and weakens the public's political resolve.

The arms-control mentality also influences U.S. strategic policies. Washington abandoned the B-1 bomber and scrapped antiballistic defenses during the 1970s in the belief that Moscow would find them provocative. Civil defense has never been seriously pursued, Coats says, because of the belief that "the ability to defend your population against nuclear attack is itself destabilizing." Out of the same fear, U.S. diplomats feel compelled not to leave the East-West negotiating table without achieving agreement, even on highly unfavorable terms. Unfortunately, Coats observes, the Soviets do not feel such pressures.

It is not victory itself, but the idea of long-term victory that is important, he says. Washington committed the United States to the Vietnam War, viewing the conflict as a technical exercise. Applying such an abstract calculus to the superpower confrontation and ignoring the human desire for loftier purposes, Coats warns, will erode the nation's will to persevere in its own defense. The eventual result: greater East-West instability or complete U.S. surrender.

"A technical solution to avoid war," he concludes, "can never replace a political solution to achieve peace."

Leaders Without Followers

"Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions"
by Robert W. Oldendick and Barbara Ann
Bardes, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall
1982), Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 52
Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Since the Vietnam War, America's Cold War consensus on foreign policy has dissolved. Not only is the public divided, but a substantial gap has opened between the views of ordinary folk and those of America's opinion leaders—politicians, scholars, journalists.

The two groups are not divided on every issue, note Oldendick and Bardes, political scientists at the University of Cincinnati and Loyola University, respectively. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1974 and 1978 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that the public and its leaders generally shared an "internationalist" orientation, favoring an active U.S. role in world affairs.

On military issues, however, the two groups parted company fre-

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quently. Both groups agreed by wide margins on the importance of the U.S. commitment to NATO and on the need at times to support foreign dictators. But "influentials" were twice as likely to support U.S. arms sales abroad; 64 percent of the public favored strong U.S. efforts to contain communism, while only 45 percent of the leaders did.

The authors also found the public more "chauvinistic" than its leaders. More than 88 percent of the public but only 26 percent of the leadership group believed America's "real concerns" lay at home. (Ironically, however, the public was twice as likely to favor strengthening international organizations such as the United Nations.) And while both groups heavily favored East-West détente, they differed on particular issues: Eighty-one percent of the leaders but only 46 percent of the public opposed restrictions on trade with Moscow.

"Opinion leaders," the authors conclude, do not appear to guide the public on foreign policy issues at all. And neither group responds to presidential leadership: Even as President Jimmy Carter stressed human rights and worldwide arms reductions after his election in 1976, both the public and elites turned more hawkish between 1974 and 1978. Support for human rights remained high but virtually unchanged.

The days of easy consensus on foreign policy are gone forever, the authors conclude. Any policy that comes from the White House is bound to find many vocal opponents.

High-Tech Warfare

"The Changing Face of Nonnuclear War" by Neville Brown, in *Survival* (Sept.-Oct. 1982), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London, WC2E 7NQ, United Kingdom.

Debates over the conventional defense of Europe evoke images of a World War II revival. Actually, nonnuclear war today would be far more destructive than anything seen before.

Brown, who teaches international security affairs at Britain's University of Birmingham, notes that technological advances, chiefly in computers, have revolutionized conventional firepower. While an American tank in 1945 had to fire its main gun 12 times to stand a 50 percent chance of hitting a moving target 2,000 meters away, today's precision guidance systems offer a similar chance with the first shot. Highly accurate air-to-ground missiles developed since the Vietnam War have cut the weight of explosives needed to destroy targets by 95 percent, vastly increasing the effectiveness of fighter-bombers.

Such improvements are the product of a tripling of computer efficiency between 1965 and 1980; by 1990, performance may increase by another 30 times over 1980 levels.

Brown worries that defense planners, while aware of such changes, have not grasped their significance. Knowing the technical capabilities of the machine gun before 1914 did not stop World War I military commanders from launching ill-fated mass assaults, he notes.

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Moreover, the new technology may overturn the widely accepted notion that increased firepower always favors the defense. Today's lethal weapons enable an attacker to blow up his opponent's fixed positions and destroy tanks and other targets far more easily than before. By increasing the incentive to strike first, such weapons destabilize the military balance and are a particular threat to NATO, whose defense lines are long and relatively lightly defended.

By 1990, Brown argues, conventional weapons will be even more deadly. NATO leaders will have to rethink their strategy and contemplate talks with Moscow to defuse the high-tech threat.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Japan's Edge

"What to Do About the U.S.-Japan Economic Conflict" by C. Fred Bergsten, in *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982), P.O. Box 2515, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

For the third time since 1970, a surge of Japanese imports has sorely strained relations between Washington and Tokyo. Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics, says the real cause is not sluggish American or aggressive Japanese industry, but misalignment of the yen-dollar exchange rate.

The first period of strain peaked in 1971-72, when the annual U.S. trade deficit with Japan reached \$3.5 billion. The deficit then declined, averaging \$1.5 billion until 1976-78, when it hit \$8 billion. After another dip, it climbed to \$16 billion in 1981 and may top \$20 billion in 1982.

None of the standard diagnoses of "the Japanese advantage"—Tokyo's support for high-technology industries, Japan's import barriers, lagging U.S. productivity growth—explains why U.S. trade deficits only get out of hand periodically, says Bergsten. He notes, however, that lopsided trade occurs whenever the dollar-yen exchange rate is unbalanced. When the dollar gets too strong, American goods cost more overseas; when the yen is undervalued, Japanese cars and televisions become cheaper for Americans.

After the 1971-72 trade crisis, the two nations realigned their currencies, pushing the yen's value up 20 percent. Trade stabilized in 1973. In 1976, Tokyo intervened in foreign exchange markets to prevent the yen from rising: Bilateral trade swung sharply in Japan's favor. Between late 1978 and April 1982, rising U.S. interest rates pushed the dollar up by 35 to 40 percent against the yen, again increasing U.S. imports of Japanese goods.

Bergsten says the domestic economic policies of the two nations are partly at fault. Tokyo's tight-fisted fiscal policies are depressing domestic economic growth, forcing Japanese manufacturers to look overseas.

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Huge U.S. budget deficits push up interest rates and the dollar's exchange rate. A policy "swap," Bergsten contends, is in order.

Over the long term, however, the international monetary system must be modified. While the fixed exchange rates in effect until 1971 cannot be reimposed, Bergsten says, a U.S.-Japan agreement to intervene in exchange markets to keep their currency values within a certain "target zone" would end the cycle of tensions over trade.

Are Unions Bouncing Back?

"The State of the Unions" by Bill Keller,
in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*
(Aug. 28 & Sept. 4, 1982), 1414 22nd St.
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

The decades-long decline in organized labor's strength continues, but union leaders today are beginning to revitalize their organizations.

Keller, a *Congressional Quarterly* reporter, notes that news is grim on the membership front: In 1945, unions represented one-third of all U.S. workers; today, fewer than 25 percent. And while membership rolls grew slowly in absolute numbers during most of those years, some data show they began to shrink in 1978. Workers' requests for union representation elections are down, and unions now win fewer than half of the votes held.

Conservative victories in the 1980 elections stung labor, but the AFL-CIO lobbyists managed a successful rear guard action in Washington. Not a single U.S. labor law has been changed since the election. Meanwhile AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and his colleagues, seeking to remobilize labor's 22 million members, are beginning to copy the political techniques of their foes in business and on the New Right.

Such changes are long overdue, says Keller. In 1974, union campaign committees outnumbered corporate political action committees by two-to-one; today, business groups hold a four-to-one edge. Labor even has trouble in its own house: More than 40 percent of union members disregarded their leaders' recommendations and voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980. In response, unions have beefed up their direct mail efforts. The AFL-CIO has set up a unit to monitor the opinions of its 15 million rank-and-file members. It has also established a \$2 million "media institute" to improve labor's public image.


Labor is forging formal ties to the Democratic Party: Four labor leaders have joined the party's executive committee, and 15 percent of the party's budget in 1981 came from labor's coffers. Moreover, unions are capitalizing again on their traditional "grassroots" strength—rounding up volunteers to stuff envelopes and man telephone banks during political campaigns—which business and New Right groups find hard to match.

Part of the change can be attributed to new leadership, notes Keller. Twenty-five of the 35 members of the AFL-CIO executive council have joined since 1977.

Ultimately, however, labor's revitalization efforts will depend on its

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The AFL-CIO's "Solidarity Day," which drew some 400,000 unionists and political sympathizers, was the first mass rally organized by the labor group in decades.



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ability to attract and keep more union members. John Dunlop, U.S. Secretary of Labor during the Ford administration, told Keller, "There is no modern industrial society that doesn't have a strong labor movement, and I don't think we're going to be the exception."

Orphan Drugs

"The Orphan Drug Game" by Judith Randal, in *Science* 82 (Sept. 1982), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Americans eagerly await the miracle drugs that will cure cancer and other widespread diseases. Meanwhile, writes Randal, a *Science* 82 contributing editor, many known remedies for more obscure ailments are not being produced. They are "orphaned" by the economics of the U.S. drug industry.

Drugs are orphaned by meager sales potential. Mapharsen, once the chief treatment for syphilis, can also cure pyuria, a rare bladder disorder. But because syphilis is treated with antibiotics today, drug companies no longer produce mapharsen. Other drugs never make it to the market in the first place, because the industry cannot justify the costs of development and testing: L-dopa, an essential treatment for the nation's 1.5 million victims of Parkinson's disease, was first synthesized in the early 1930s but was an orphan as late as 1970.

The drug industry blames the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) long and costly approval process. Testing new drugs for safety and effectiveness takes three to five years. Drug makers estimate the total cost of a new drug, including research and marketing, to be \$74 million. At that level, it is uneconomical to produce a medicine for fewer than two million users or less than \$3 million in annual sales. But the FDA puts the total cost at only \$7.3 million, saying the industry exaggerates the cost of research deadends and overhead.

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Other critics point out that the industry has dropped drugs (such as mapharsen) that require no further testing. And while the pharmaceutical industry is among the nation's highest earners, it rarely manufactures drugs derived from plant or animal sources, because they are unpatentable and therefore unprofitable.

Congress, meanwhile, is considering legislative remedies. The proposed Orphan Drug Act would ease clinical trial requirements, offer special tax credits, and grant seven-year exclusive sales rights for orphan drugs. Another bill would encourage the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to expand their drug research and development efforts. It was the NIH, working with the FDA, that finally brought L-dopa to the market in 1971. And the industry has created a commission to investigate orphan drugs and identify candidates for production.

But "no industry," says Randal, "can realistically be expected to behave so altruistically over the long haul." Ultimately, the federal government will have to adopt the orphan drugs.

After Three Mile Island

"Troubled Nuclear Power Tries to Recover" by Earl V. Anderson, in *Chemical & Engineering News* (Sept. 20, 1982), 1155
16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The future of nuclear power seems dim. But Anderson, senior editor of *Chemical & Engineering News*, says it is far too early to count it out.

The prospects for nuclear power looked most promising during the 1960s and early '70s when a seven percent annual rate of increase in demand for electricity prompted utility companies to order 218 new nuclear plants. But then growth in demand dropped by 50 percent; delays and cost overruns doubled construction costs during the 1970s; and the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island alarmed the public and led to heavier regulatory burdens.

Today, 73 commercial reactors supply 12 percent of the nation's electricity. And an additional 64 plants are scheduled to come on line by 1990, doubling the nation's nuclear capacity. But that is an optimistic estimate: 78 reactor orders have already been canceled since 1975, and the list is likely to grow. Not a single *new* reactor has been ordered since 1978. Moreover, the industry faces serious financial problems: Both interest rates and actual construction costs have jumped.

Yet Anderson believes that the industry can recover if and when the U.S. economy revives. Estimates of the annual growth in electricity demand for the 1980s average three to 3.5 percent. And the U.S. Department of Energy reckoned in 1982 that the price tags of new coal- and nuclear-fired plants will be virtually identical in 1995. If utilities are forced to rely on oil-fired plants to generate the required electricity, U.S. oil imports could rise by as much as 800,000 barrels per day, consumers' utility bills by eight percent.

Streamlining U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) procedures would also help. The NRC could preselect permissible building sites and

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combine the review processes for construction permits and operating licenses. Federal legislation encouraging standardized nuclear plant designs would make for quicker approvals.

None of this will matter, Anderson observes, if the public does not back nuclear power. The key issue is disposing of nuclear wastes; a proposal for a national waste management program is now before Congress. And a spotless safety record for several years will be required before the industry escapes the shadow of Three Mile Island.

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American Schools Lag Behind

"American Education: How Are We Doing?" by Barbara Lerner, in *The Public Interest* (Fall 1982), Subscription Dept., 20th & Northampton Sts., Easton, Pa. 18042.

"If the quality of schooling could be assessed by . . . resource allocation alone, America would lead the world," notes Lerner, an attorney and psychologist. In fact, U.S. students suffer an embarrassing education gap in comparison with students in other nations.

The United States spends more on education than any other country—7.7 percent of gross national product in 1973 compared to 4.4 percent for Sweden, the runner-up. It also has the world's highest student retention rate: Three-quarters of U.S. children finish 12th grade. Japan and Sweden follow with 70 and 65 percent. England and West Germany lag behind at under 20 percent.

But quantity does not translate into quality, Lerner says. Standardized tests administered in secondary schools in 21 countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) reveal a dismal American record. On 19 tests on subjects ranging from reading comprehension to chemistry, U.S. students as a group never took first or second place and finished last three times. When the scores of students from developing nations are excluded, American youngsters bring up the rear seven times. Overall, the mean U.S. score was closer to Thailand's than to any of the developed countries.

Defenders of American schools attribute U.S. students' lackluster performance to the fact that American schools encourage even the poorest students to complete their educations. But Lerner argues that such top performers as Japan and Sweden educate nearly as many of their children, yet have no need for such excuses. Moreover, while U.S. retention rates climbed until the late 1960s and then stabilized, scores on standardized examinations such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test continued to drop through the 1970s.

What accounts for the lower scores of U.S. students? The IEA tests

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yielded only one solid correlation with high achievement: larger homework assignments. (Another finding: The more parents help with homework, the lower their children's achievement.) And other studies show that homework levels, at least between 1960 and 1970, declined in the United States.

Lerner concludes that U.S. educators and parents do not demand enough of children. Since the advent of "open education" during the 1960s, she contends, standards for everything from school attendance to textbooks have been relaxed. Only with a return to basics and hard work—more homework, required courses, challenging texts—will the vast American investment in education begin to pay full dividends.

Philanthropy as Fashion

"The Fashion Among More Superior People: Charity and Social Change in Provincial New England, 1700-1740" by Christine Leigh Heyrman, in *American Quarterly* (Summer 1982), 303 Carnegie Hall, Univ. of Pa., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

If President Reagan's call for private philanthropy to take up more of the nation's social welfare burden succeeds, it will not be the first time in American history that charity has come into fashion.

According to Heyrman, a historian at the University of California at Irvine, the first New England Puritans viewed philanthropy as just one of many duties required in a Christian community. When the rise of a prosperous merchant elite near the beginning of the 18th century threatened to disrupt their religiously oriented society, Puritan ministers reacted protectively. Concerned that "the natural tendency of worldly possessions" was to mute "the demands of the soul," as John Barnard put it in 1712, they tried to mold the new merchant class to fit the old Puritan order.

The ministers' solution, says Heyrman, was to promote philanthropy as a special obligation of the wealthy. Clergymen took to their pulpits to advertise the personal benefits, in this world and the next, of giving to the poor. Philanthropic associations and charity schools flourished, organized by the energetic ministers.

But by accommodating the new merchant class, Heyrman contends, the clergymen unwittingly sanctified what they opposed. The language of Yankee entrepreneurship crept into Puritan sermons: Samuel Willard, urging charitable giving on his flock in 1726, declared, "We owe it to God, who is our Land-Lord, and it is part of the Quit-Rent which he expects of us." Moreover, the ministers promoted charity as a gauge of the giver's good breeding and social standing. "Gentle deeds maketh the Gentleman," Cotton Mather declared in 1690. Thomas Foxcroft was more explicit in drawing the parallel between fashion and charity 30 years later. "We shou'd get furnished with the Mantle of Christian Charity . . . answerable to our Stature and Figure."

The clergymen viewed the popularity of charity as evidence that they

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Cotton Mather (1663–1728) advised his fellow ministers to bring charity “more into Fashion” among Boston’s “more Superior People.”

From Selected Letters of Cotton Mather.
© 1971 by Louisiana State University Press.



had successfully preserved the old order. In fact, says Heyrman, charity itself had been transformed from a natural obligation that bound society together to a token of “noblesse oblige” that widened the psychological gap between rich and poor.

Setting the World’s Clocks

“The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective” by Eviatar Zerubavel, in *American Journal of Sociology* (July 1982), P.O. Box 37005, Chicago, Ill. 60637.

The mechanical clock was invented some 600 years ago, but until the late 19th century, people set their clocks to suit local notions of standard time. One hundred years ago, for example, the state of Wisconsin alone had 38 different local time zones. Uniform time standards were not adopted until the development of modern communications, industry, and transportation required them.

According to Zerubavel, a Columbia sociologist, punctuality was irrelevant in the days when mail and people moved by stagecoach. Most communities reckoned time by the position of the sun, resulting in a four minute difference for every degree of longitude. Britain led the way in standardizing time when the postal service decided in 1784 to run its coaches according to strict schedules, with each driver’s timepiece set to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). But it was not until British railroads adopted the standard in 1840 that the practice spread: Within 15 years, 98 percent of the public clocks in Britain were set to GMT.

Railroads also spurred acceptance of standardized time in the United States. Initially, each railroad adopted the time standard of its home city. Difficulties were quickly apparent: Buffalo’s train station, for example, set one clock at local time, one at New York City time, and one

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at Columbus, Ohio, time. In 1881, the industry adopted timetables dividing the United States into four one-hour time zones keyed to GMT. Three years later, 85 percent of America's larger towns and cities had conformed to the system. But it did not become mandatory until 1966.

Pressure for an *international* time system grew after the laying of the Atlantic telegraphic cable in 1866. At the 1884 International Meridian Conference, held in Washington under U.S. auspices, 25 nations agreed—over vehement French objections—to a system keyed to Britain's GMT. It divided the world into 24 zones, each 15 degrees of latitude wide. The Conference's resolutions were not binding. Holland did not conform to the system until 1940. And some nations still refrain from joining. The Ayatollah Khomeini, observing that some Muslim countries "are so influenced by the West that they have set their clocks according to European time," declared, "It's a nightmare."

Yet, Zerubavel notes, such exceptions show that the way we organize time promotes interdependence and rationalism. The real nightmare would be a world fragmented by different standards of time.

Defending Welfare

"Welfare Dependency: Fact or Myth" by Richard D. Coe, in *Challenge* (Sept.-Oct. 1982), 80 Business Park Dr., Armonk, N.Y. 10504.

Rising federal social welfare outlays since the 1960s, many critics contend, have only fostered welfare dependency. But Coe, a Notre Dame economist, argues that while many Americans occasionally use welfare as a last resort, long-term *dependency* has not increased.

Analyzing University of Michigan data on 12,563 people over the 10-year period between 1969 and 1978, Coe found that the number receiving some kind of welfare—Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income for the elderly poor—equaled around 10 percent of the group each year. But a "surprisingly large" 25 percent lived in households that received welfare at some time during 1969–78. No one, Coe notes, "is immune from an occasional bad year."

Moreover, nearly half (48.8 percent) of the recipients were short-term clients, receiving help in only one or two of the 10 years. About one-third needed help for three to seven years; only 17.5 percent were on the rolls for at least eight years.

Nor were recipients entirely dependent on welfare. Only 30 percent relied on it for half or more of their annual income. Nor were the heavily dependent recipients necessarily long-term clients: Only 1.9 percent of the whole group under study was dependent over the long term *and* for more than half its income.

This small group, divided almost equally between whites and blacks, was heavily populated by single women and their children, who composed 62.9 percent of its total number. Black mothers and children were disproportionately represented, accounting for over a third of the

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core group, but only 5.3 percent of the people in the survey. But Coe argues that race and sex discrimination, not the lure of welfare, is the cause. And while more than half of all black women in the entire survey group received welfare at some time, only 15 percent of black women became long-term dependents.

Coe disputes the belief of some critics that welfare does more to hurt the poor than help them. The basic function of the system is to help those experiencing temporary hard times to make ends meet. The existence of a small dependent population facing long odds in the marketplace, he contends, does not justify "the wholesale condemnation of the liberal welfare state."

PRESS & TELEVISION
***Journalists vs.
Businessmen***

"Media and Business Elites: Two Classes in Conflict?" by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, in *The Public Interest* (Fall 1982), Subscription Dept., 20th & Northampton Sts., Easton, Pa. 18042.

Little love is lost between America's top journalists and business executives. This conflict should surprise no one, say Rothman and Lichter, political scientists at Smith College and George Washington University, respectively. Not only are the two groups at odds on social and political issues, but each views the other as the most powerful group in America.

The differences emerged in the authors' survey of 240 "Big League" journalists (TV networks, the *New York Times*, etc.) and of *Fortune 500* top and middle level executives. The businessmen tended to embrace traditional morality far more than did the journalists. Nearly half the executives, for example, felt strongly that adultery is wrong, as opposed to 15 percent of the newsmen. Half the journalists, but only 12 percent of the businessmen, identified themselves as agnostics or atheists.

Media professionals were also more liberal on economic issues: 68 percent favored government redistribution of income, while only 29 percent of the executives did so. In addition, Rothman and Lichter found that 45 percent of the journalists—twice as many as the businessmen—believed that the U.S. legal system favors the wealthy. (Television personnel surveyed were far more liberal than their print media brethren.)

Differences in social background accounted for much of the business-media divergence, the authors say. Journalists had more "urban, secular, highly educated, and affluent upper-middle-class professional backgrounds" than did businessmen. They were more likely to have inherited wealth or to have attended a prestigious university; 12 percent of the journalists and 28 percent of the executives grew up in blue-collar families.

Underlying attitudes affected both groups' perceptions of reality. Most

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journalists and businessmen objectively summarized news stories. But when they were asked to concoct stories based solely on pictures, their latent political and social views surfaced. Even though two-thirds of the journalists felt that newsmen can (and should) be impartial, it is difficult, the authors argue, to guard against subjective judgments when making basic editorial decisions—which stories are important, what “angle” they should be given.

Their divergent views make journalists and businessmen natural antagonists, the authors suggest. But because journalists “help depict reality for the rest of society,” their biases take on special significance.

*A Prime-Time
TV Census*

“The World According to Television” by George Gerbner and Nancy Signorielli, in *American Demographics* (Oct. 1982) P.O. Box 68, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

Americans watch an average of over four hours of television daily, one-third of it during prime time. They see a world of adventure, melodrama, and fantasy. Gerbner and Signorielli, of the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Communications, add that even the population of these shows is a poor reflection of reality.

In an analysis of some 14,000 characters appearing in 878 prime-time entertainment shows from 1969 to 1981, they found that men, who make up 49 percent of the U.S. population, were 73 percent of the prime-time population. Nearly half the white men were between 35 and 50 years old—the “age of authority” on TV, the authors say—while nonwhite men tended to be younger. Blacks were underrepresented by 27 percent compared to the real world, Hispanics by 63 percent.



The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, which aired from 1952 to 1966, idealized family life. Today's shows depart from reality in other ways: Single white women appear more than twice as often as in real life.

Courtesy of Matury Foladare & Associates.
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Only 27 percent of the prime-time population was female. On children's programs, women were outnumbered four to one by men. Television women tended to be disproportionately young—one-third were in their twenties—and their marital status was left unclear in only 12 percent of the cases. Women also tended to age faster on television. More than 90 percent of the women over age 65 were portrayed as "elderly," the authors say, compared to 77 percent of over-65 males. While a majority of the real world's working women are married, on television they were not, and they were employed in traditional female jobs—nurses, secretaries, teachers.

Indeed, the overall occupational make-up of the television world was skewed. Two-thirds of the U.S. labor force is in blue-collar or service work, but professional, celebrity, and police characters dominated the prime-time airwaves. The heavy police population should come as no surprise: "Prime-time crime is at least ten times as rampant as in the real world," the authors report.

Television not only exaggerates real-world dangers, they say, but heightens feelings of "mistrust, vulnerability, and insecurity." White, middle-aged men have even more power on TV than they do in the real world, undermining female and black viewers' sense of opportunity.

Why worry? Gerbner and Signorielli believe that today, television programs, not parents, tell children how the world works.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

The Ethics of Snitching

"Undercover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration" by Sanford Levinson, in *The Hastings Center Report* (Aug. 1982), 360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706.

When Judas revealed Jesus' identity to the Romans, his conduct deserved only mild censure. But when he concealed at the Last Supper what he had done, he crossed far over into the realm of the unethical.

So says Levinson, a University of Texas law professor. He argues that there are not only two but three different kinds of informers, each posing different ethical dilemmas and legal questions. One type, the "snitch," betrays a friend without deceiving him. "It is unrealistic to expect that one's friends will never change their minds about a relationship," Levinson observes. The Supreme Court recognized this position in *Trammel v. United States* (1980) when it overturned the courtroom practice of allowing one spouse to prevent the other from testifying against him.

Levinson finds the other two kinds of informers—the friend who turns informer while feigning continued loyalty, and the spy who be-

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friends his victim under false pretenses—far more troubling. Deception, he argues, “is deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship, love, and trust. This use is morally equivalent to the decision to use violence; indeed it is a kind of torture.” For government to back it is an unconscionable invasion of privacy.

The Supreme Court, however, fails to distinguish among informers. Under the Fourth Amendment’s injunction against unlawful search and seizure, the Court bars wiretapping without a warrant, for example, but as Justice Potter Stewart put it in *Hoffa v. United States* (1966), “it denies protection to a wrongdoer with a misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”

Levinson believes the Court should require warrants for police undercover work. But he also favors relaxing the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination—particularly the doctrine that juries cannot regard a suspect’s silence as evidence against him—because it encourages police to seek evidence by devious means.

Such a change embodies risks, even if accompanied by new safeguards, Levinson concedes. But government must stop undermining “our individual privacy and ability to trust one another.”

Dilemma for Liberals?

“Putting Cruelty First” by Judith N. Shklar, in *Daedalus* (Summer 1982), American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1172 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02134.

While religious moralists condemn cruelty, they rank it well below such sins as the rejection of God in the hierarchy of evils. To call cruelty the greatest evil, as many thinkers in the liberal tradition do, is to view society without relation to a divine order.

Compared to some secular philosophies, the “cruelty first” ethic is humane, notes Shklar, a Harvard political scientist. But it also has its hazards, illustrated by two early advocates, essayist Michel de Montaigne (1532–92) and philosopher Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755).

Both Frenchmen were appalled by the arguments of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Italian political theoretician who instructed would-be rulers in *The Prince* (1513) that the end always justified the means. The two Frenchmen were, like Machiavelli, agnostics, but they viewed the cruelty of the Christian Spanish in the New World as “the triumph of Machiavellism by those who claimed to be its chief opponents,” Shklar says. Both lapsed into misanthropy. “We are not so wretched as we are vile,” Montaigne declared.

Seeking some human behavior to admire, the two thinkers ennobled the victim of cruelty for his fortitude and valor. But “learning how to die is hardly a social virtue,” Shklar comments. And, again with an eye on Spanish behavior in the New World, Montesquieu and Montaigne rejected the Europeans’ myth of their own natural superiority, often used to justify ruthless actions. But neither championed an egalitarian

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society—only curbs on rulers.

Indeed, their deep distrust of power—whether exercised by armies in the name of God or by a Machiavellian ruler—left Montaigne and Montesquieu with few solutions. Montaigne served briefly as mayor of Bordeaux and, Shklar says, “did as little as possible, a policy that he defended as the least harmful course.”

Montesquieu, somewhat more hopeful, believed politics and morals could be kept separate. It was possible, he thought, to change social behavior through laws, as the English had done, without altering individual morals. But even he joined Montaigne in his distrust of collective action and his reliance upon the distinction between public and private life as a bulwark against tyranny.

That separation stymies latter-day Machiavellians, Shklar suggests, but it also poses a philosophical dilemma for liberals who “put cruelty first” while seeking to use government power to impose social change.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Lies in the Laboratory

“Research Through Deception” by
Morton Hunt, in *The New York Times
Magazine* (Sept. 22, 1982), 229 West 43rd
St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Since the 1950s, social psychologists have gained valuable insights into human behavior, often by deceiving their human subjects in experiments. Their techniques have sparked a controversy over ethics that will not be resolved easily, says Hunt, a freelance writer.

By the late 1960s, 38 to 44 percent of social-psychological research included some form of deception. The sharpest criticism was prompted by Stanley Milgram’s 1963 Yale experiment in which “naive” subjects were ordered to administer what they thought were electrical shocks to unseen persons who answered questions incorrectly. The subjects followed orders, despite screams of agony from the supposed victims as the “voltage” increased. By showing how ordinary citizens react to authority, Milgram’s experiment seemed to help explain the mass obedience of the Germans under Hitler.

In 1971 and 1974, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) tightened standards for federally funded social-psychological research, requiring prior approval of deceptive practices by review boards. Guidelines were eased slightly in 1981, but not enough to still researchers’ complaints that their work was being impeded. Columbia professor Stanley Schachter, for example, has abandoned laboratory research. Schachter’s most famous experiment, conducted in 1962, involved placing a confederate among “naive” subjects who had been injected with adrenalin. The subjects, he noted, tended to follow the

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lead of the undrugged assistant in their reactions to the drug, suggesting that people need outside cues to identify their emotions. But Schachter doubts that such an experiment would be permitted today.

Most of its advocates, says Hunt, claim that deception has little or no ill effect on subjects and that it is justified by the results. Many subjects agree: 84 percent of Milgram's former subjects had no regrets over the 1963 experiment. But critics such as psychologist Thomas Murray contend that, even if deception causes no obvious damage, it "does wrong to the person it deprives of free choice."

But deception's proponents, like Princeton's John M. Darley, claim that "psychologists have an ethical responsibility to do research about processes that are socially important . . . which means that sometimes they have to keep their subjects in the dark."

No Easy Oil Substitutes

"Chemical Producers Look Beyond Petroleum" by Henry DeYoung, in *High Technology* (Sept.-Oct. 1982), 38 Commercial Wharf, Boston, Mass. 02110.

Despite the recent dip in oil prices, the \$175 billion U.S. chemical industry continues to search for petroleum substitutes. According to DeYoung, senior editor of *High Technology*, uncertainty over the future price of oil and other economic factors are slowing progress.

The chemical industry has used oil and gas as raw materials because they are rich in carbon, the basic building block of petrochemicals. Coal has the same potential but must first be converted to usable form. The Fischer-Tropsch coal conversion process that fueled Nazi Germany's war effort is the sole existing large-scale technology; only South Africa, rich in coal and without domestic oil deposits, has found it economical. In addition to producing 30 to 40 percent of South Africa's gasoline, coal conversion plants churn out 91,000 tons of ammonia and 92,000 tons of sulfur annually. Next year, a Tennessee company will open a new plant using a specialized technique to convert coal to acetic anhydride, a chemical used in film, plastics, and textiles.

But DeYoung cites difficulties that impede other such efforts: Expensive new technologies may not be competitive if oil prices stabilize; hard-to-transport coal must be available in large quantities (20,000 tons per day for an average plant); environmental regulations are strict.

Biomass conversion—breaking down plants and other organic matter—lags slightly behind coal technology. Some producers already ferment corn to produce ethanol; University of California researchers have developed a similar process for wood chips that will theoretically yield 10 million barrels of "biomass oil" annually.

The most promising area of biomass conversion—using recombinant DNA to synthesize enzymes to speed decomposition—is still in its infancy. Novo Biochemical is building a \$40 million plant in North Carolina to produce enzymes for corn fermentation. By the late 1980s, it may be economical to convert the resultant ethanol into ethylene, then into such chemicals as vinyl chloride and acrylonite. But bioen-

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gineers today do little industrial chemical research; they concentrate on more profitable experimental production of expensive drugs, such as interferon and insulin.

DeYoung says that production of chemicals through biotechnology is at least 10 years away. Barring a sudden breakthrough, the chemical industry will use few oil substitutes before the 1990s.

Behind Allergies

"Allergy" by Paul D. Buisseret, in *Scientific American* (Aug. 1982), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Allergy victims often curse the pollen, cats, or other allergens that trigger their suffering. But according to Buisseret, a Louisiana State University medical professor, allergies are better blamed on malfunctions in the body's immune system.

White blood cells called *T* or *B* lymphocytes begin the biochemical process that ends in sneezing, sniffles, or itching. The cells mistakenly react to the allergen just as they would to a disease-causing bacterium or other harmful material. In immediate hypersensitivity, the most common kind of allergic response, *B* lymphocytes quickly release millions of antibody molecules into the bloodstream—specific antibodies that are normally secreted only in response to tropical parasitic worms. (Delayed-reaction allergies involve other antibodies.)

The antibodies themselves cause no distress. They simply attach themselves to "mast" cells located mostly in the membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth, and in the skin, respiratory system, and intestines. But when the allergy sufferer next encounters the allergen, the response is immediate. By-passing the white blood cells, the allergen travels directly to the antibody-mast cell combination, which releases about 1,000 tiny granules that trigger that allergic response.

Why certain substances cause this "immunity gone wrong" and others do not remains a mystery. Nor are scientists certain why allergies plague some people and not others. Allergies do tend to run in families but seem to be activated by environmental factors. A Swedish study, for example, suggested that 18 percent of the population is genetically programmed for allergy, but fewer than half of these suffer the effects. A 1976 study of 72 children allergic to cow's milk suggests that one environmental factor, bottle-feeding, plays a crucial role in activating the allergy. Sixty percent of the children had at least one allergic parent and had been bottle fed; 26 percent had a family history of the allergy but had been breast fed; the remaining 14 percent had no such history but had been bottle fed.

Treatments for allergies "are all more or less imperfect," Buisseret notes. Injecting patients with small doses of the allergen sometimes "desensitizes" them but can be dangerous—and the reason it works is unknown. Aspirin combats intestinal allergies, again for unknown reasons. Scientists will not find a real cure for allergies until they discover what causes the trigger-happy immune response.

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
A Dry Spell for Rainmakers

"Cloud Seeding: One Success in 35 Years" by Richard A. Kerr, in *Science* (Aug. 6, 1982), 1515 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

Weather-modification specialists have been trying for 35 years to seed clouds to produce rain, achieving only one documented success. Now that researchers have overcome many earlier problems, writes Kerr, a *Science* staff writer, they face damaging federal budget cutbacks.

A General Electric scientist named Vincent Schaefer discovered by accident in 1946 that a piece of dry ice placed in a freezer would cause a mini-blizzard. The logical next step—squeezing rain out of stubborn clouds—has been a long time coming. The chief problem facing scientists is designing tests in which statistical techniques correct for natural increases in rainfall. A Colorado State University research team headed by Louis Grant, for example, seemed to be successful in boosting precipitation over a portion of the Rockies during a 1965–70 experiment. But there were also increases in areas next to the target zone.

Two groups of Israeli experiments, conducted in 1961–67 and 1969–75, produced the only confirmed increase in rainfall. In the first, Hebrew University of Jerusalem scientists seeded clouds over northern Israel with silver iodide. The chemical promotes freezing in high altitude water droplets, the first step in natural rainmaking. The result:



NCAR/NSF.

Sensor-packed airplanes, such as this Beechcraft, are used in cloud research, vital to future cloud seeding efforts.

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Rainfall increased by 15 percent in the target area. The second group of experiments confirmed the first, boosting rainfall by 13 percent with only a 2.8 percent probability that the change was due to chance.

The Israelis succeeded by employing sound statistical techniques and good insights into cloud behavior—they estimated that cloudtop temperatures should be between -15° and -20°C for seeding to work. But luck is still a factor in such experiments. A 1979–80 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation test was going well until the clouds suddenly evaporated.

Scientists today are slowly remedying shortcomings in their knowledge of clouds and use of statistics. Meanwhile, says Kerr, earlier failures have undermined federal budget-makers' confidence in the worth of future research. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will cease all work in the field in 1983; the Bureau of Reclamation will drop all but one of its experiments. Rainmakers during the next few years may be more concerned with wringing funds from Washington than wringing rain from clouds.

How to Save More Energy

“Improving Energy Efficiency: The Effectiveness of Government Action” by Eric Hirst, William Fulkerson, Roger Carlsmith, and Thomas Wilbanks, in *Energy Policy* (June 1982), Butterworth Scientific, P.O. Box 63, Burry St., Guilford, Surrey GU2 5BH U.K.

Steep price rises during the 1970s spurred consumers and industry to conserve energy. But market forces alone will not ensure efficient energy use, warn Hirst, Fulkerson, Carlsmith, and Wilbanks of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The Reagan administration prefers to rely on market forces to encourage conservation, but market prices do not always reflect “social costs,” the authors argue. The price of OPEC oil, for example, does not include the risk that reliance on the cartel poses to national security.

Only Washington, the authors argue, is equipped to compensate for such “market imperfections.” A federally sponsored 1981 study of 48 hospitals, for example, yielded 900 energy-saving suggestions that will cut fuel bills by 20 percent. Yet none of the hospitals could have afforded such research on its own. Similarly, individual homeowners have little information about alternative energy sources or about how much can be saved through conservation measures. And owners of rental housing, 33 percent of the nation's housing stock, have little incentive to conserve, since tenants usually pay their own utility bills. Federal information programs and efficiency standards, the authors argue, would remedy such deficiencies.

Washington should also take a more active role in research and development, they say. Industry produces enough heat as a byproduct of manufacturing to warm all the buildings in the United States. Yet no single company has a sufficient incentive to invest in the research

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needed to harness this wasted energy. The federal government can help more consumers pay for costly one-time conservation measures: A Tennessee Valley Authority loan program helped homeowners cut their heating costs by an average of 20 percent.

Indeed, Washington already has effective energy conservation programs in place—tax credits for energy-saving investments, grants to schools and other institutions for “retrofitting”—though the Reagan administration wants to curtail some. The authors estimate that in 1980, federal conservation outlays of \$1 billion yielded as much as \$10 billion in energy savings.

Now is the time to expand such efforts, they urge, not end them.

The Killer Bee Bugaboo

“Killer Bees: Cause for Alarm?” by Tineke Boddé, in *BioScience* (Sept. 1982), American Institute of Biological Sciences, 1401 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22209.

The slow northward migration of “killer bees” from South America has stirred public fears of a science fiction–style insect invasion. Actually, reports Boddé, a *BioScience* editor, the bees pose a far greater threat to agriculture than to people.

The “killer bees” are an accidental hybrid of the European honeybee and the fiercer African variety. During the 1950s, researchers in Brazil attempted to cross the two to adapt the European bees to a tropical climate. But in 1956, a beekeeper mistakenly released 26 swarms of the African bees, who created their own hybrid. Ever since, “Africanized” bees have moved north at a rate of 200 to 300 miles each year. The first will arrive in the Southern United States within six to 12 years. Northerners need not worry much: The bees probably will not survive in climates with fewer than 240 frost-free days annually.

The bees’ reputation is a product of their defensiveness: They react about 30 times faster than native honeybees to a disruption of a colony and deliver about 10 times as many stings to a trespasser. Yet deaths from bee stings in Venezuela, where much of the “killer bee” research has been conducted, do not exceed American levels.

Of greater concern is the effect of the new bees on honey production and pollination (and therefore fruit and vegetable crops). Honey collection in Venezuela dropped by 80 percent after the bees arrived there in 1975. One reason: Their African forebears adapted to longer tropical blooming seasons by storing less nectar. Their tendency to swarm and “abscond” (move) more often than native bees poses a management problem for beekeepers, which, combined with other undesirable traits, makes it harder to ensure pollination at commercial farms. U.S. crop losses could run as high as \$20 billion annually.

Meanwhile, researchers are not defenseless. Selective breeding, better bee management, and biological control techniques can minimize the impact of the “killer bees” arrival. “As for the citizens,” Boddé advises, “they should know they can outrun the bee.”

ARTS & LETTERS

***When Factories
Were Pretty***

"Moulding the Industrial Zone Aesthetic: 1880-1929" by John R. Stilgoe, in *The Journal of American Studies* (Apr. 1982), Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

In 1912, the English writer Arnold Bennett described "one of the finest and most poetical views" he had ever seen. It was Toledo, Ohio's "misty brown river flanked by a jungle of dark reddish and yellow chimneys and furnaces that covered it with shifting canopies of white steam and smoke."

Bennett was not alone in his admiration for such scenes. After 1880, American industry began moving from multistoried factories in city centers to sprawling one-story plants on the urban fringes. According to Stilgoe, a Harvard professor of landscape architecture, the shift inspired a popular new "industrial zone aesthetic."

An abundance of cheap land on the outskirts of America's big cities and in such industrial boom towns as Flint, Lansing, Peoria, Troy, and Poughkeepsie made it possible to build vast low-lying factories that were both efficient and "slow burning." Indeed, insurance companies helped spur the move by offering reduced fire insurance premiums for buildings meeting specific design requirements: few floors, flat roofs, little ornamentation.

The zones had instant appeal as monuments to industrial power. But soon articles in trade journals—*Factory*, *Industrial Management*—and in popular magazines—*Century*, *Harper's Weekly*—began to invest them with loftier virtues. Steam and clouds of black smoke came to symbolize prosperity and progress. Older, less fire-resistant structures were seen as not only old-fashioned but morally reprehensible. In 1889, writer Edward Atkinson dubbed the average older factory "a whited sepulchre well prepared for the cremation of the inmates."

Serious writers and artists turned their attention to the industrial zone, as did the photographers Arthur Stieglitz and Alvin Langdon Coburn. Novelist Sinclair Lewis celebrated his fictional city of Zenith's "high-colored, banging, exciting" industrial zone in *Babbitt* (1922). Proud factory owners commissioned stark line drawings and halftone prints to celebrate their accomplishments. Few artists paid attention to the workers who toiled amid these fantastic landscapes. "It is only when some stray bit of burning iron slips down inside a worker's collar that one realizes that these figures are human," wrote Waldon Fawcett in 1901.

After the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, says Stilgoe, the industrial zone aesthetic rapidly lost popularity. It still appealed to some painters, such as Reginald Marsh and John Cane, but for most Americans, the factories no longer seemed so pretty as one after another closed its doors.

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*The Strength
of Fiction*

"The State of the Art: Fiction and Its Audience" by Annie Dillard, in *The Massachusetts Review* (Spring 1982), Memorial Hall, Univ. of Mass., Amherst, Mass. 01003.

Writers often lament the fact that serious literature seldom makes the best-seller lists, and that the marketplace plays such a large role in setting standards for their craft. But Dillard, herself a novelist, finds a "certain grim felicity" in the audience's control over fiction.

Fiction's large public distinguishes it from all the other contemporary arts. Today's painting, for example, is controlled mainly by specialists. "No one would collar a man in the street to review a showing of a contemporary painter's work," Dillard observes. Art's popular audience today is found mainly at museums, not at commercial art galleries. Yet anybody can be a fiction "critic," and as a result the popular audience holds sway over the field. The need to engage readers obliges novelists to retain fiction's traditional features—dramatic plots, character development—though it inhibits experimentation. Dillard sees this in a largely positive light: "When the arts abandon the world as their subject matter, people abandon the arts."

Moreover, says Dillard, tradition even benefits fiction's innovators by giving them conventions to use as a springboard. Critics in the art world, having discarded older forms and ignored the audience, dictate that a "work of art is produced only at some sort of cutting edge of history." That leaves artists without a clear set of standards, Dillard says: If the "painter can do no wrong, he can also do no right."

Fiction is also free of the notion, common in the other arts, that a popular work is by definition bad. Dickens and Tolstoy enjoyed great popularity in their day, and serious writers such as John Updike and Gabriel García-Márquez occasionally make the best-seller lists today.

Dillard adds that the publishing industry's zeal in supplying the market with books of all kinds ensures a niche, however small, for less popular experimentalists. Yet she worries that literary innovators must rely upon a few publishers who print their novels mainly as a hobby.

Overall, she believes, fiction's large audience and freedom from "dictatorial experts" keep it "lively, loose, and at the same time rooted in its own traditions." No rarified art form, fiction thrives on crowds.

*The Death
of Modernism*


"Postmodern: Art and Culture in the 1980s" by Hilton Kramer, in *The New Criterion* (Sept. 1982), Foundation for Cultural Review, 460 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Beaux-Arts architecture, Art Deco, and other "bourgeois" styles long ago discredited by the modern art movement have recently enjoyed enthusiastic revivals at the hands of "postmodern" artists, architects, and others. Kramer, editor of *The New Criterion*, contends that the

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The Gothic features of Houston's new Republic-Bank building, designed by Philip Johnson and John Burgee, exemplify the postmodernist style.

Reprinted by permission of RepublicBank Houston.



trend reveals the bankruptcy of contemporary art.

Beginning around the turn of the century, modernists attacked the staid aesthetic of the cultural establishment. The revolt of artists such as Cézanne, Picasso, Mondrian, and Rothko, says Kramer, sprang from an "attitude of high seriousness" with a set of standards to match.

The avant-garde artists succeeded only too well. The establishment soon embraced them, institutionalizing their work in museums, publications, and schools. But the movement depended for its dynamism upon constant innovation and assault upon bourgeois values. Once it joined the establishment, it was denied its inspiration.

By the 1960s, modernism was exhausted. The first symptoms were trivial fads such as Andy Warhol's Pop art. "It was their freedom from modernist constraints—from modernist 'conscience'—that commended these styles to their new admirers," Kramer says.

The collapse of standards opened the door to the revival of once-scorned bourgeois art forms and to the triumph of Camp. Writes Kramer: "Camp confers legitimacy" on the object of its ridicule, and the public eagerly "accepts its jokes as the real thing." And Camp is not confined to painting; it pervades the works of composer John Cage, poet John Ashberry, novelist Donald Barthelme, and many others.

Ironically, says Kramer, the postmodernists have put modernism in "dramatic historical relief," thus revealing its complexities and importance. But the next movement in art, rather than leaning on modernism or celebrating the frivolous in defunct art forms, will have to discover a philosophy all its own.

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*Russia's Quiet
Muslims*

"Soviet Islam and World Revolution" by
Martha Brill Olcott, in *World Politics*
(July 1982), 3175 Princeton Pike, Law-
renceville, N.J. 08648.

Because the Soviet Union is home to some 40 million Muslims, many specialists argue that Moscow has reason to fear the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. But Olcott, a Colgate University political scientist, believes that the Kremlin sees the religious revival as an opportunity, not a problem.

In recent years, Moscow and its Muslim minority have reached a kind of accommodation. In part because of harsh repression during the 1920s and '30s, when mosques were closed and clergymen were arrested by the thousands, Islam in Russia remains potent chiefly as a set of rituals. By some estimates, 50 percent or more of the rural Muslim population continues to observe holy days and practice daily prayer. But only two seminaries are allowed to operate; the clergy, small and powerless, is controlled by Moscow's Muslim Religious Administration. "It is possible to be both an atheist and a 'Muslim,'" Olcott says, "because to claim to be a Muslim merely means that one is proud of having a Muslim heritage."

Thus, Moscow is willing to look the other way where Muslim worship is concerned. While active Christians are generally barred from Communist Party membership, for example, Muslims are not. Even in the sensitive Turkmenistan region, which borders both Iran and Afghanistan, a special tolerance prevails: Official government vehicles, for instance, sometimes ferry Muslim pilgrims to holy sites.

Soviet Muslims, who enjoy a higher standard of living and better education and health care than most of their Middle Eastern brethren, "seem relatively content," says Olcott. They receive little news of the Islamic revival abroad. And while a few Muslims in the Soviet army occupying Afghanistan did defect to the fundamentalist rebels, reports of unrest in the ranks are exaggerated: Others served as trusted advisers to the Soviet-backed regime.

Because Islamic fundamentalism poses no threat at home, Moscow is free to exploit it abroad. As Soviet writer G. Kerimov declared in a 1980 article: "Islam's rather flexible ideology makes it possible for it to be used by various political forces who sometimes pursue diametrically opposite goals." Thus, Moscow hailed Ayatollah Khomeini's victory over the Shah of Iran while denouncing other Iranian religious leaders for "reactionary" tendencies.

But the Soviet Union must overcome the legacy of Afghanistan before it will find any fast friends among radical Muslims overseas. For the fundamentalists, Olcott says, the invasion "remains proof of the basic antagonism between Islam and communism."

OTHER NATIONS

*Uncertainty
in Costa Rica*

"The Limits of Reform Development in Contemporary Costa Rica" by Juan M. Del Aguila, in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Aug. 1982), Box 24-8134, Univ. of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla. 33124.

Alone among Central American nations, Costa Rica has managed to avert civil strife and to sustain democratic institutions. Today, however, mounting economic woes imperil its long social peace.

Costa Rica enjoys the highest per capita gross domestic product (\$1,311) of any nation in the region and has a growing middle class. Ninety percent of its people are literate. And while extreme income disparities persist, says Del Aguila, an Emory political scientist, Costa Rica is not an oligarchical society.

Democratic institutions established after the 1948-49 "bourgeois revolution" have helped to preserve social peace. The electorate increased from 34 percent of the population in 1953 to 56 percent in 1982. National elections are hotly contested, providing a safety valve for social tensions. And unlike other Central American states, Costa Rica does not have a powerful conservative military establishment. The dominant social democratic Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN) has been free to expand the bureaucracy and social welfare programs.

But Costa Rica is paying a price for its generosity, Del Aguila says. The government's budget deficit has quintupled since 1974; interest payments on the public debt consumed 21 percent of export earnings in 1980. The government's debt to the world banking community grew more than 10 times between 1970 and 1980, to some \$2.6 billion. By



Francisco Amighetti, "Costa Rica." Courtesy of Museum of Modern Art of Latin America (OAS).

In 1978, 30 percent of Costa Rica's people labored on farms; more than half worked in the service sector, only 15 percent in industry.

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mid-1981, the inflation rate had reached 50 percent, unemployment more than seven percent, with another 25 percent of Costa Ricans working only part-time. Slow-growing industries cannot absorb the 35,000 people who enter the work force every year.

One cause of the country's problems is depressed world prices for coffee beans and bananas, which account for 55 percent of overseas sales. Thousands of refugees from its troubled neighbors—chiefly Nicaragua and El Salvador—have added to Costa Rica's burdens.

Yet Del Aguila says the economy could be revived if social spending were cut and government intervention in the economy curbed. President Luis Alberto Monge, elected this year on the PLN ticket, aims at nothing less. He may be Costa Rica's last best chance.

Finland's Cushion

"Koivisto's New Finland" by Andrew Boyd, in *The Economist* (Aug. 28, 1982), 515 Abbott Dr., Broomall, Pa. 19008.

Twenty years ago, Finland was a wintry country known chiefly for two exports: wood products and the workers it sent to other Scandinavian countries. Today, having turned to its advantage both its climate and its geography—its proximity to the Soviet Union—Finland has joined the front ranks of Europe's industrialized nations.

Neighboring Russia has always loomed large in the Finnish view of the world. The retirement last year of President Urho Kekkonen after 25 years momentarily threatened Helsinki's special postwar ties to Moscow. But Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto, who swept to victory without the Kremlin's blessing, quickly reaffirmed them. Indeed, says Boyd, an *Economist* editor, "Finns today seem more genuinely agreed than ever about the importance of maintaining the relationship."

A key reason is the thriving trade with the Soviets, the "red cushion" that protects Finland from fluctuations in the international economy. While the world shipping industry is in a slump, for example, the Finns are expanding shipyards to meet Soviet demand. Russia's share of its neighbors' exports has climbed in recent years to more than 24 percent—more than twice Finland's trade volume with Sweden, its second leading trading partner. The Finns buy 85 percent of their oil from the Soviets, but the recent drop in oil prices has caused gloom in Helsinki: Moscow relies on the earnings to buy Finnish goods.

All told, overseas sales now represent a hefty 28 percent of gross domestic product. Forest products account for 40 percent of the trade, down from 66 percent in 1965; meanwhile, paper-making machines and pulp mills have been added to the list of goods sold abroad. Adaptations to the harsh climate have also boosted industrial exports: Half the world's icebreakers are of Finnish manufacture, and a quarter of North Sea oil wells were drilled by Finnish-built rigs. As a result of these developments, Finnish labor no longer seeks work abroad. Unemployment last year stood at only 5.3 percent. Although inflation reached 10 percent, Finland seemed in better economic health than most other

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European countries.

The only clear threat to Finland's fortunes in the near future arises, paradoxically, from the growing strength of the finmark, which boosts export prices. Otherwise, Boyd concludes, Finland is more prosperous, democratic, and politically stable than ever.

Iran's Discontents

"Industrialization and Revolution in Iran: Forced Progress or Unmet Expectation?" by Norriss S. Hetherington, in *The Middle East Journal* (Summer 1982), 1761 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

When the Ayatollah Khomeini unseated the Shah of Iran in 1979, it seemed that Iranians had rejected their former leader's Western-style modernization goals. Actually, says Hetherington, a University of California research associate, it was the inefficiency and slowness of the Shah's program that turned his people against him.

The Iranian standard of living rose sharply after the first OPEC oil price hike in 1973. Per capita income jumped from \$180 annually in the early 1970s to as high as \$1,521 in 1975. The Shah grandiloquently declared that Iran would match West Germany's prosperity by 1983.

Material gains, though great, were not equally distributed. Between 1972 and 1975, the middle 40 percent of the population saw its share of national income decline from 31 to 26 percent, while the share of the top 20 percent grew from 57 percent to nearly 63 percent. Inflation, checked during the first years of prosperity, was out of control by the mid-1970s. The monthly rent for a house in Isfahan jumped from \$70 in 1973 to over \$500 in 1978.

Middle class professionals, who comprised 10 to 12 percent of the population by 1978, enjoyed little increase in status, though they supplied vital skills. Bazaar merchants suffered when, on the eve of the revolution, the Shah's government outlawed what it called profiteering in an effort to find scapegoats for inflation. These two groups, Hetherington says, provided much of Khomeini's support.

Governmental mismanagement exacerbated these difficulties. As foreign goods poured into Iran, the transportation system broke down. Merchant ships stood offshore for as long as five months waiting to unload. In 1974, the Shah doubled the number of trucks in Iran, but failed to upgrade roads, hire new drivers, or buy spare parts. Newly prosperous Iranians could not buy the things to which they felt entitled. The Shah's commitment to extend education also backfired: High school enrollment grew from 1.4 million in 1972 to 2.3 million in 1978. But existing colleges could admit only 10 percent of the graduates, creating another pool of discontent.

Many Iranians joined with the *mullahs* in opposing the Shah for lack of an alternative, Hetherington believes. Iran's religious leaders may soon have to contend with the same forces that toppled the Shah.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

“Retooling the American Work Force: Toward a National Training Strategy.”

Northeast-Midwest Institute, Box 37209, Washington, D.C. 20013. 50 pp. \$5.00.
Author: Pat Choate

Low capital investment, poor management, and a fading technological lead are often blamed for poor U.S. economic performance. Often overlooked is an obvious factor: the education and skills of American workers.

Choate, a senior analyst at TRW, Inc., notes that such neglect is not new. Improved labor quality accounts for only 10 to 14 percent of U.S. labor productivity gains since World War II.

Today's work force is ill prepared to adapt to technological changes. Despite massive outlays for public schools, 20 percent of adult Americans are functionally illiterate. Engineers and computer specialists are already in critically short supply. The average age of U.S. machinists is 58, but industry is training only one-quarter of the new machinists needed to take over as their elders retire. Industrial robots and other innovations will eliminate 10 to 15 million jobs throughout industry by the year 2000. New jobs will require more technical skills.

Business is partly to blame for the poor state of the U.S. work force. In 1981, U.S. firms spent \$3,000 per worker on new equipment, but only \$300 for on-the-job training.

Washington's efforts, meanwhile,

are poorly conceived and coordinated. In 1979, 12 federal job-training programs reached 11 percent of the work force, chiefly the poor. Little effort is made to retrain other workers or to upgrade skills. Existing programs are fragmented. In Virginia's Tidewater region, for example, 84 private and governmental organizations managed \$22.4 million in federal manpower funds in 1979.

Choate calls for a comprehensive national job-training policy. To encourage workers to upgrade their skills, he argues, Washington should provide low-interest loans for adult vocational education and tax credits to businesses for their own training programs. A 25 percent credit could cost Washington \$2.5 billion but boost business outlays by \$10 billion. Local vocational education programs could be "customized" to meet the needs of area businesses, following the example of South Carolina and Oklahoma.

The time is ripe to adopt such policies, Choate observes: All 12 existing federal programs will come up for renewal by 1984. If the opportunity is missed, he warns, the United States will pay in higher unemployment and slower productivity growth.

“Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning.”


Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 318 pp. \$24.95 cloth, \$9.95 paper.
Author: Richard K. Betts

Most of the world's major 20th-century conflicts have begun with surprise attacks. Yet national leaders

keep getting caught off guard.

After studying nine surprise attacks since 1940, Betts, a Brookings Institu-

The USS Arizona sinks at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The disaster spurred a top-to-bottom overhaul of U.S. intelligence services, yet Washington still failed to anticipate attacks by others on its friends and allies in later years.



National Archives.

tion Senior Fellow, argues that such campaigns succeed not because of shortcomings in the victim's intelligence services, but because leaders do not believe the evidence.

"Bolts from the blue" are rare. Yet warning signs are often ambiguous. U.S. specialists had numerous signals of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, for example, but could not pick them out from the "noise" of conflicting information, Betts says.

Even unambiguous signs are difficult to interpret. In 1941, for example, Stalin "knew" so well that Hitler would negotiate their differences that he refused to believe that his erstwhile ally would launch an invasion—even after Soviet cities were bombed. The Israeli high command's low opinion of the Egyptian military blinded it to Anwar Sadat's preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Even a series of aggressive moves can lull a defender into a false sense of security. Before invading the South in June 1950, North Korea staged border raids so frequently that repeated

alarms of something bigger were dismissed as cries of "Wolf!"

The difficulties of defending against a surprise attack are compounded in the case of NATO. A consensus among all the Allied political leaders that the Soviets were preparing to attack would be required before defenses could be mobilized—and the Allies might move too slowly, reluctant to provoke Moscow.

Ironically, the very reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent poses a problem for NATO. "If the Soviet Union ever does decide to strike," Betts observes, "Western leaders will find it very difficult to believe." Indeed, when the Soviets mobilized for their invasion of Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring" of 1968, NATO's top three commanders were away from their posts, convinced that a surprise attack was out of the question.

"Chipping away at vulnerability to surprise attack" is the best one can hope to do, Betts believes. Giving NATO military commanders greater authority to mobilize their forces and matching every Warsaw Pact practice

maneuver with a comparable NATO exercise would increase readiness. Establishing a Maginot-like defense line would free other NATO troops for a more effective mobile defense.

Such changes would at least reduce

the West's need to guess correctly about Moscow's intentions during a crisis, Betts concludes. But ultimately, a strong defense hinges upon leaders' ability to avoid making faulty assumptions or dismissing evidence.

"The Politics of Welfare: The New York City Experience."

Abt Books, 55 Wheeler St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138. 220 pp. \$22.00.

Author: Blanche Bernstein

During the long debate over welfare reform, specialists have argued over welfare policy without much worrying about its implementation.

In fact, says Bernstein, commissioner of New York City's Human Resources Administration (HRA) from 1978 to 1979, and a state welfare official from 1975 to 1978, the intentions of Congress and state legislatures "have frequently been substantially modified, if not perverted, through regulation, management, and judicial decisions."

Administrators, the courts, ethnic, community, and religious groups, and the social-work community—all influence how welfare policy is translated into practice.

Such groups have blocked simple reforms and helped cast welfare into "disrepute," Bernstein contends. While public opinion polls consistently show that 70 to 90 percent of Americans support welfare, just as many of them are dissatisfied with existing programs.

Welfare "cheats" are a key cause of public discontent, says Bernstein. A 1968-69 study by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare concluded that up to 30 percent of recipients were ineligible or receiving overpayments. Yet until the early 1970s, New York City's welfare administrators insisted that the number of "ineligibles" was below three percent. Mitchell Ginsberg, HRA commissioner

from 1966-70, told caseworkers that there were too many people eligible for welfare and *not* receiving it. He led efforts to halt investigations to confirm the eligibility of recipients.

Bernstein also faults welfare administrators for applying a double standard to their clients: The New York social-welfare community resisted efforts begun under a 1975 federal program to make absent fathers of welfare families pay child support, though such payments are expected as a matter of course from other fathers. Local judges also opposed the programs: A 1977 study showed the New York City courts ordered payroll deductions from fathers' paychecks in only three of 398 cases where fathers were in arrears.

Critics' predictions that the program was "doomed to failure" proved to be self-fulfilling. New York State, alone among nine top industrial states, spends more on its child support enforcement program than it collects.

Assuring "program integrity" and reducing welfare dependency should be the first goals of welfare reformers, Bernstein says. She also advocates expanding welfare for intact families, now provided by only 26 states, to counteract incentives for families to break up.

"The greatest income maintenance program which has ever been devised is the intact family," says Bernstein.

She argues that prevention of family breakup is "the most effective way" to end welfare dependency.

But further cuts in federal social

spending and continued intransigence by social-welfare interest groups, she adds, only make meaningful welfare reform more difficult.

WILSON CENTER PAPERS

Summaries of key reports given at recent Wilson Center meetings

"The State and America's Higher Civil Service."

Paper by Hugh Heclo, presented at a Wilson Center conference sponsored by the Wilson Center's American Society and Politics Program, October 23-24, 1982.

Michael J. Lacey, moderator

In Western Europe and Japan, powerful senior civil servants are a permanent feature of government. The United States, however, has no comparable "higher civil service."

Washington does have its French-style elite technocrats—in the U.S. Forest Service, the Justice Department's antitrust division. Parallels to the British administrative class can be found in the Foreign Service and the Office of Management and Budget.

Overseas, the higher civil service is rooted in a tradition of service dating back to the founding of the state, observes Heclo, a Harvard political scientist. The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, established no clear role for the nation's bureaucracy. The U.S. higher civil service is a conglomerate molded by external forces—personalities, politics, Congress.

President Carter's 1978 civil service reforms authorized creation of an 8,000-man Senior Executive Service. Unlike their European counterparts, relatively few of these Americans come from families devoted to public service (only nine percent had fathers in government service) or out of top-drawer families. And, unlike the

Europeans, the U.S. *career* bureaucrats usually stay in one agency and one program and serve as administrators, not as policy or political advisers.

But the United States is developing a distinct class of politically appointed "public careerists" who shuttle from high posts as aides and assistant secretaries in the federal government to universities, "public policy" think tanks, law firms, and back to Washington again. Half of President Reagan's top political appointees in 1981 had more than five years of previous Washington experience.

Public careerists perform the dual political-administrative functions that elite bureaucrats do in other lands, but without enjoying an institutional identity. The system as a whole, Heclo says, lacks central control: While this makes it more representative of the population, it also opens the door to opportunism and outside political influence.

Neither Congress nor the Presidents want to rely on a European-style, nonpartisan, merit-based senior bureaucracy. What we have instead in Washington are the "strengths and dangers of a democratic technocracy."

“Germany’s Role in Europe: Historical and Psychological Dimensions.”

Paper by Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Wilson Center’s International Security Studies Program, August 31, 1982.

Along with German antinuclear demonstrations, Bonn’s insistence on détente and on completion of the Siberian natural gas pipeline has roused fears in Washington that West Germany is moving away from the West. But Fritsch-Bournazel, Research Fellow at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, argues that Bonn’s independence is a direct result of its strong Western ties.

Because of its vulnerable position in the middle of Europe, Germany traditionally looked both east and west. After the unification of Germany in 1871, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck arranged a series of alliances to keep Germany’s neighbors from uniting against her. In 1922, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Moscow to preclude a West-Soviet pact.

Germany allied herself closely with the West only after World War II, when the Cold War posed a stark choice, Fritsch-Bournazel says. Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Bonn put aside hopes of reunifying East and West Germany and relied on Western military might as a counterweight to Moscow.

But the erection of the Berlin Wall

in August 1961 showed that the West was powerless to prevent the Soviets from working their will in Eastern Europe. And moves by John F. Kennedy and French President Charles de Gaulle to relax tensions with Moscow encouraged Bonn to reconsider its assumptions.

Ultimately, Washington led the way to détente beginning in the late 1960s, but without taking into account West Germany’s interests—eventual reunification of the two Germanys and greater permeability of the borders between Eastern and Western Europe. In response, Bonn edged towards the traditional German *mitteleuropa* foreign policy stance.

But that change was possible only because West Germany’s firm military and political ties to the Western alliance provided a hedge against Soviet power, Fritsch-Bournazel contends. Public opinion surveys show that more West Germans (74 percent) than French or Italians agree that it would be better to fight than accept Soviet domination. Eighty percent support continued NATO membership.

Bonn is not abandoning the Western alliance, she concludes, but building upon it to solve its unique problem.

“The Soldiers’ Plebiscite: Soviet Power and the Committee Revolution at the Front, October–November, 1917.”

Paper by Allan K. Wildman, presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, October 1, 1982.

During the autumn of 1917, the reins of the Russian Revolution passed from Menshevik to more radical Bolshevik hands, leading ultimately to the Soviet state.

While Bolshevik intellectuals led by

Lenin and Trotsky are usually credited with orchestrating the shift, Wildman, an Ohio State University historian, argues that the common foot soldiers of Russia’s seven-million-man army swung the balance within the military

to the Bolshevik side.

After the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917, several revolutionary factions established a coalition government in Petrograd under Aleksandr Kerenski, dominated by the Mensheviks and their allies. It was that government's decision to launch a July 1 offensive against Germany and Austro-Hungary that proved to be the Mensheviks' undoing, Wildman says.

The troops grew mutinous at the prospect of a fourth bloody World War I campaign short of supplies and food. The concerns of the average peasant-soldier, Wildman notes, were limited to his *mir*, or world—his village, family, and farm. The revolution meant liberation from the tsar and his oppressive system; it did not mean continuing to fight a losing war involving privations too great to justify any gain the soldier could imagine.

The army committees, established after the overthrow of the tsar as organs of revolutionary democracy, were dominated by Mensheviks. Better-educated and more nationalistic than the peasants, they tended to represent the central leadership in Petrograd to the troops, rather than vice versa. Committee members and army officers generally supported the war effort and solidarity with England and France; they sought to impose discipline on the restive troops.

The Mensheviks blamed the sol-

diers' discontent on Bolshevik activists, whom they tried to purge. But the infantrymen, caring little about the ideological struggle between the two factions, concluded that the Mensheviks "had fallen into the role of enforcers of old regime discipline," Wildman notes. To them, he observes, the only sensible interpretation of the continuation of the war was that it "was being fought in the interests of the bourgeoisie and the *pomeshchiki* (landowners)," as the Bolsheviks claimed.

The Mensheviks realized too late that the source of the soldiers' discontent was the war, not Bolshevik agitators. A few of the army committees issued antiwar proclamations. But beginning in mid-October, the soldiers elected increasing numbers of Bolsheviks to the army committees.

By the time the Bolsheviks staged their successful coup against the Petrograd government on November 6, 1917, one Russian field army was firmly in their hands; the others offered little resistance.

The peasant-soldiers, Wildman concludes, did not see the change in Petrograd as a victory for the Bolsheviks but merely as a fulfillment of the revolutionary slogan, "Land and Peace." The radicals triumphed less as a result of their own careful planning than as a consequence of the Mensheviks' blindness.



Marc Chagall, "Tribe of Levi," Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center, Jerusalem. Copyright by A.D.A.G.P., Paris, 1982.

Sketch by Marc Chagall for stained-glass window in Jerusalem depicting the priestly tribe of Levi. A dying Moses blessed the 12 tribes of Israel as they prepared to re-enter the Land of Canaan—sometime during the 13th century B.C. Then as now, security was a paramount consideration: Initial settlement was in the rugged eastern mountains, impervious to enemy chariots.

Israel

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." Zionist leaders, intent on regaining their ancient homeland in Palestine, cited that biblical injunction in rejecting Britain's offer (1903) to establish an "autonomous Jewish colony" in Uganda. Fixity of purpose paid off in the establishment of the new state in 1948. Yet today, 35 years later, Israeli society is divided as never before. Israel's economy is in disarray. Its Arab neighbors, Egypt aside, still harbor deep hatreds. No longer do the pioneer values of earlier days permeate national life—the proud austerity, the moral vision, the communal altruism. "Israeli society still treasures a Sleeping Beauty," the writer Amos Oz has noted. "Will the beauty wake?" Here historian Shlomo Avineri reflects on the nation's origins; political scientist Don Peretz surveys the current scene; and journalist Lawrence Meyer looks to the future.

THE ROOTS OF ZIONISM

by Shlomo Avineri

On May 14, 1948, as a bagpiper skirled "The Minstrel Boy," the British High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Alan Cunningham, left the Haifa dockside on a launch bound for the cruiser HMS *Euryalus*. The 26-year-old British Mandate over Palestine was due to end at midnight. On the same day, under white flags bearing a pale blue Star of David, David Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv proclaimed "the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called Israel." Those words marked the end of one chapter in Jewish history and the beginning of another.

With expiration of the British Mandate, Israel became the world's newest nation—but also a successor to one of civilization's most ancient polities. Three thousand years earlier, a Hebrew-speaking Israelite nation had inhabited the strip of hill and fertile plain along the southeast corner of the Mediterranean. A kingdom, with Jerusalem as its capital, arose around 1000 B.C. under David and Solomon. Though subjugated intermittently by invading Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks,

and Romans, the Jewish people also knew epochs of independence and imperial glory, of literary creativity and moral fervor.

The disastrous Jewish rebellion against the Roman Empire beginning in 66 A.D. marked a turning point. The Roman response was brutal; its goal was to erase the identity of the Jews as a nation. Jerusalem was captured and razed by Titus, son of the Emperor Vespasian. The temple on Mount Moriah was burned, most of the Jewish population was exiled, and the name of the country was changed to *Palaestina* after the coastal nation (by then extinct) of the Philistines.

Emancipation

Yet a distinct Jewish identity persisted in the Diaspora (Greek for "dispersion") despite the absence of a homeland. Jews reconstructed their lives around their families, their houses of learning and prayer, and the *kehilla*, the religious community. When Jews found themselves persecuted in any given country, they tended to move to another one. Over two millennia, the focus of Jewish life moved from the Mideast and the shores of the Mediterranean, which had been the original areas of Jewish dispersion, to Europe and later to America. By the mid-19th century, most of the world's 7.5 million Jews were concentrated in central and eastern Europe (especially Russia and Poland), the so-called Jewish Pale of Settlement.

While they continued in their prayers to hope for a return to Palestine, this hope was more passive than real, a yearning for otherworldly redemption. Jews might pray three times a day for the deliverance that would transform the world and transport them to Jerusalem, but they did not emigrate there; they could annually mourn the destruction of the Temple on *Tish'ah be-Av* and leave a brick over their door bare as a constant reminder of the desolation of Zion, but they did not move there. Even so, this link with the land of their forefathers, nebulous though it may have been, singled the Jews out from the communities in which they resided. It was because of this that Jews were considered by others—and considered themselves—not only a minority but a minority *in exile*.

Shlomo Avineri, 49, a former Guest Scholar at the Wilson Center, is professor of political science at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Born in Bielsko, Poland, he studied at the London School of Economics and received his Ph.D. from Hebrew University. He is the author of The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (1968), Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (1972), and The Making of Modern Zionism (1981).

"Next year in Jerusalem." The Passover prayer was fulfilled for some when Britain's Sir Moses Montefiore purchased farmland near the ancient capital in 1856 to encourage Jewish resettlement.



From *The New Jerusalem: Planning and Politics* by Arthur Kitcher, published by Thames and Hudson, Ltd. and the MIT Press, © 1973 Thames and Hudson, London.

In the medieval world, which defined itself predominantly in religious terms, a special identity was not difficult to maintain. To be sure, until the French Revolution, Jews in most Christian societies were excluded from public life. They could not hold public office, were excluded from the feudal bond of fealty, and were relegated to the society's periphery. If they accepted their marginal and subordinate position, however, they could in most cases survive and practice their religion. Outbursts of religious fanaticism and persecution did shatter Jewish life from time to time in one place or another. Jews were persecuted under the Visigoths and Byzantines, massacred during the Crusades, expelled from England, France, and then, traumatically, from Spain, forcibly converted in Portugal and Persia alike, made to wear distinctive clothes and barred from holding public offices in Christian Italy and Muslim Morocco. But during 2,000 years of exile, the Jews always managed to find safe haven *somewhere*, even if the price of safety was inferior social status—being in, but not of, the local society.

The egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment were supposed to change these conditions—to allow absorption of the Jews as individuals into the body politic. "No man should be molested for his beliefs, including religious beliefs, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law"—those words are contained in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* promulgated by the French National Assembly in August 1789. As a result of what would

come to be called the "Emancipation," discriminatory legislation was gradually repealed, first in western European countries and later (and less consistently) in eastern Europe. Schools and professions were opened to Jewish applicants. Throughout Europe, the 19th century witnessed an unprecedented amelioration in the status and position of the Jewish people.

The results were dramatic. If around 1815 the Jews had had little impact on European society, by 1900 it would be inconceivable to write the history of any aspect of European culture—politics, diplomacy, and finance, the arts and philosophy, medicine and science, literature and music—without mentioning the contributions of massive numbers of people of Jewish origin. A corollary (and indeed a condition) of this change was the exodus of Jews from the hinterland, from the *shtetls* of the Pale of Settlement and rural districts like Hesse and Alsace, to Europe's great cities. Prior to 1815, few European capitals had any significant Jewish population. On the eve of World War I, Berlin and Vienna, Budapest and Warsaw, and, to a lesser degree, London, Paris, and Odessa were home to large numbers of Jews. It could be said that no other group benefited as much from the industrial revolution, and from the ideas of the Enlightenment, as the Jews.

Nationalism and Identity

This was the new environment that produced Zionism, and that it should have done so is at first glance perplexing. Why did the quest for a national culture and for political sovereignty—and ultimately for a return to *Eretz Israel*—develop among the Jews precisely when European society seemed finally ready to shed its worst prejudices, to emancipate itself from overt religious bigotry, and to treat the Jews more or less as equals, as *citizens*?

The answer, ironically, is that the forces behind Emancipation gave rise to something else as well: Just as the ideas of the French Revolution were gaining acceptance, those same ideas encouraged the emergence of nationalism. New nationalisms were asserting themselves, and old nations, long dormant, were awakening. The emergence of modern Greece and its heroic struggle for independence against the Muslim Turks (1821–31) became a symbol for the new Age of Nations. The people of central and eastern Europe—Serbians, Germans, Italians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians—were rediscovering their roots, salvaging a national culture from half-forgotten memories and sometimes slim and disparate historical evidence. The pre-

sumption that the West was united in Christendom, shattered first by the Lutheran Reformation, was now finally stripped of the remnants of its credibility.

The newly emancipated and secularized Jews coming out of the ghettos all over Europe now faced a problem. While their ancestors had been clearly distinct, as orthodox Jews, from the surrounding Christian (or Muslim) society, what were *they*, once they had been accepted by Christians as equals? Could they be both Jewish *and* Polish or German or Russian? Were the Jews merely Germans (or whatever) of the Jewish—or “Mosaic”—faith? If they lost their Jewish faith, could they be viewed simply as Germans or Poles? Or did their Jewish ancestry, and the fact that they had been estranged from their own religion, make them slightly different from their non-Jewish neighbors? When French children learned in school that their ancestors were Gauls, could a Jewish child truly identify with Vercingetorix, and would his schoolmates truly view him as a descendant of the ancient Gauls?

These were not merely philosophical questions. They intruded on the daily life of every Jew. Take, for example, the case of a Jewish parent living in one of the centers of Jewish life in eastern Europe, in Wilno, once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and, in the 19th century, part of the Russian Empire. Imagine this parent wishing to give his children a good, modern, “European” education, and hence unwilling to send them to the orthodox Jewish *heder* and *yeshiva*. To what school should he send them?

Reviving a Language

The state school was, of course, Russian, inculcating in its students (in Russian) the values of Russian culture and heritage. But because most of the population in Wilno was Polish and was continually agitating for its political and cultural rights, there existed a Polish-language school as an alternative. The highly educated Baltic German minority in the region, proud of its own heritage, maintained a German-language school. And the newly awakened Lithuanian self-consciousness of the peasant population gave rise to the beginnings of a Lithuanian school system. So the Jewish parent hoping to burst out of his own “tribal” Jewish traditions and wishing to give his children a “general” education was really faced with the problem of choosing whether to give his children a Russian, Polish, German, or Lithuanian education.

No wonder then that he, and other Jewish parents in similar

A CHRONOLOGY, 1882-1982

1882-1903 First *aliyah*: 25,000 eastern European Jews emigrate to Palestine.

1897 Theodore Herzl organizes first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.

Theodor Herzl
(1860-1904)



1904-14 Second *aliyah*: 40,000 eastern European Jews emigrate to Palestine.

1909 First *kibbutz* (Deganya) established; Tel Aviv founded.

1917 Great Britain, in Balfour Declaration, supports creation in Palestine of "National Home" for the Jews.

1919-23 Third *aliyah*: 35,000 Jews emigrate to Palestine.

1919 *Ha'aretz*, first Hebrew newspaper in Palestine, begins publication.

1920 Founding of Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and Haganah (Jewish defense unit).



Eliezer Ben-Yehuda
(1858-1922)

1923 League of Nations confirms British Mandate over Palestine.

1924-28 Fourth *aliyah*: 67,000 Jews, mostly middle-class Poles, go to Palestine.

1925 Hebrew University opens in Jerusalem.

1929-39 Fifth *aliyah*: 250,000 Jews, one-quarter of them refugees from Nazi Germany, pour into Palestine.

1932 *Jerusalem Post* founded.

1936 Arab riots and strikes protest growing Jewish population.

1938 Philosopher-theologian Martin Buber emigrates to Palestine.

1939 Great Britain issues White Paper on Palestine, curbing Jewish immigration and land purchase.

1941 First Nazi death camp (Chelmno) established in Poland; in Palestine, creation of Palmach, the permanently mobilized striking force of the Haganah.



From *The Auschwitz Album A Book Based Upon an Album Discovered by a Concentration Camp Survivor, Lili Meier.*
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Jewish inmates at Auschwitz

1945 Germany surrenders; estimated Jewish death camp victims: 5,820,000.

1946 Irgun, Jewish military underground, plants bomb in Jerusalem's King David Hotel, killing 100.

1947 Arabs oppose UN plan to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states; discovery of Dead Sea scrolls.

1948 State of Israel comes into existence (May 14); total Jewish population is 650,000; Arab neighbors invade new nation.

1949 First Knesset (parliament) convenes, David Ben-Gurion is Prime Minister; armistice agreements signed on Rhodes, between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria; Jerusalem divided.

1951 Jewish migration to Israel since independence: 684,000.

David Ben-Gurion
(1886-1973)



1955 Arab terrorists (Fedayeen) step up attacks on Israeli settlements.

1956 Suez Crisis: Egypt nationalizes canal and closes it to Israeli shipping; Israel invades Gaza and Sinai as French and British land at Port Said, then withdraw under U.S. pressure.

1962 Adolf Eichmann, former operations officer in the Reich Security Head Office, hanged in Israel for war crimes.

1964 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created at first Arab summit conference in Cairo, Egypt.

1966 Total U.S. military aid to Israel since independence: \$47 million; poet Shmuel Yosef Agnon awarded Nobel Prize for Literature.



Golda Meir
(1898-1978)

Wide World Photos
(Associated Press).

1967 Six Day War (June 6-11): Israel launches pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, gaining control of the Sinai, Gaza, Golan Heights, and West Bank; Jerusalem reunited.

1968 First Israeli settlement on occupied West Bank established at Kefar-Etzion.

1969 Golda Meir succeeds Levi Eshkol as Prime Minister.

1970 PLO, during "Black September," driven out of Jordan into southern Lebanon.

1972 PLO terrorists kill 11 Israeli athletes at Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany. Total Israeli population: three million, of whom one-sixth are non-Jews.

1973 Syria and Egypt attack Israel on

two fronts (Oct. 6); after initial reversals, Israelis threaten Damascus and push across Suez Canal; OPEC oil embargo begins.

1974 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" yields disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, Syria; Yitzhak Rabin becomes Prime Minister. At Rabat, Arab leaders declare PLO sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

1976 Israeli commandos free 110 airline passengers held hostage by Palestinian terrorists at Entebbe Airport in Uganda; Syria occupies strife-torn Lebanon.

1977 Likud coalition leader Menachem Begin becomes Prime Minister, ending dominance of Labor Party; Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visits Jerusalem.

1978 Israel invades southern Lebanon to root out Palestinian guerrillas; UN buffer zone created. At Camp David with President Jimmy Carter (Sept. 5-17), President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin agree to conclude peace treaty within three months; Sadat and Begin awarded Nobel Prize.

1979 Knesset approves Israel-Egypt peace treaty; Israeli inflation rate: 111.4 percent.

1980 Israel begins phased withdrawal from Sinai; second invasion of Lebanon provoked by renewed terrorist attacks.

1981 Israeli air force destroys \$275 million Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad; Knesset votes annexation of Golan Heights.

1982 Israel again invades Lebanon, routing Palestinians and Syrians; siege of Beirut ensues, resulting in evacuation of PLO supervised by Italian, French, and American troops; massacre of civilians by Christian Phalangists.



Wide World Photos (Associated Press).

Camp David agreements, September 17, 1978

situations all over central and eastern Europe, began to think that perhaps the way out of the dilemma should be to give their children a modern *Jewish* education. Thus, we see secular Jewish schools established in the 19th century, modeled on the German gymnasium, but teaching Jewish history and Hebrew literature.

The revival of national languages and vernaculars in central and eastern Europe contributed to a Hebrew linguistic renaissance in the 19th century. Down through the ages, Hebrew had continued to function as a kind of "Jewish Latin"—a common language of prayer, theological writing, and learned discourse. Now attempts were being made to write stories and poems and feuilletons in Hebrew—a development that was anathema to some rabbis, who saw in it a desecration of the Holy Tongue. Romantic novels set in biblical times, in which kings commanded and shepherds sang in the language of the prophets, began to appear. The Hebrew Haskala or Enlightenment was born, and the most famous of its writers was Lithuanian-born Abraham Mapu (1808–67), whose two novels, *Ahavat Zion* ("The Love of Zion") and *Ashmat Shomron* ("The Guilt of Samaria"), became the most popular Hebrew novels of the period.

A Sense of History

Urbanization, education, and improved means of communication (the telegraph, the modern printing press, the railroad) gave impetus to the Hebrew language revival. So long as Europe's Jewish communities, separated by distance, were out of touch with one another, the need for a common language was not acutely felt. Conditions also varied greatly from one country to another; there was little sense that the Jewish people faced common problems. That all changed, however, as Jews began to travel, to publish, to congregate in cities. When attempts were made by Jewish modernizers, most of them secularized intellectuals, to found Jewish periodicals, they soon realized that, if they wished to reach a universal Jewish public, only Hebrew could transcend political frontiers and cultural barriers.

Historical research flourished as well. Between 1853 and 1876, a German-Jewish scholar, Heinrich Graetz, published his *Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, an 11-volume history of the Jewish people that was soon translated into many languages. Orthodox Judaism, like early Christianity, cared little for the precise recording of events: Revelation, not history, was what really mattered. But now, in the volumes of Graetz, modern educated Jews had before them,

for the first time, a body of scholarship about their own roots.

Whatever the achievements of the Haskala, and they were considerable, one Jewish scholar at the time, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (1858–1922), complained of what he perceived to be inferiority in the quality of the Hebrew literature in eastern Europe. The reason for that, he argued, was that while a lot of people were *writing* in Hebrew, no one was really *speaking* it. (Could one imagine writing modern poetry in Latin?) A first-rate Hebrew literature, Ben-Yehuda argued, would be able to thrive only if Hebrew became a medium of daily intercourse rather than an intellectual *jeu d'esprit*.

Returning to Zion

For obvious reasons, Jews living as a minority in non-Jewish societies would never be able to develop Hebrew as a language of daily life. Only in one place could a Hebrew-speaking population emerge—in Palestine. As Ben-Yehuda put it: "We will be able to revive the Hebrew tongue only in a country in which the number of Hebrew inhabitants exceeds the number of Gentiles. There, let us increase the number of Jews in our desolate land; let the remnants of our people return to the Land of their ancestors; *let us revive the nation and its tongue will be revived too.*"

True to his convictions, in 1881 Ben-Yehuda emigrated to Jerusalem. There he prepared the first modern dictionary of the Hebrew language and coined many new words. Until the work of Ben-Yehuda and his successors brought Hebrew up to date, the language had lacked such terms as *statistician*, *oxygen*, *artillery*, *traffic light*, *philatelist*, *cinema*, and thousands more. The absence of even common words greatly constrained the first generations of Hebrew writers. Commenting on the works of Russian-born Peretz Smolenskin (1842–85), a novelist-publicist who composed in Hebrew, Ben-Yehuda once observed: "Has any of the readers ever felt that in all of the circumstances of the different events that this very capable author brought into his stories, he never mentioned for example the simple common act of tickling?" In Hebrew, there was no word for it.

The first Zionist thinkers were troubled not only by the precariousness of Jewish life and by the contradictions inherent in Jewish existence in a modern, secularized world. They also deplored a further anomaly of Jewish life in the Diaspora—the skewed Jewish social structure. Most Jews in 19th- and 20th-century Europe could be found in various strata of the middle classes. There hardly existed a Jewish proletariat, and there was



Swindlers like the one at left (the 1885 drawing is from a Hebrew newspaper) profited from the first Jewish migration to Palestine. According to the paper, the man was "collecting money for the Jewish settlement 'the Seed of Israel' in Gaza. This settlement never existed."

virtually no Jewish peasantry. Modernizing Jewish life—*normalizing* it—would mean having more Jews involved in primary production, in agriculture, in industry. But how could such a transformation occur under European conditions? Obviously, it could not. A return to the land would be possible only if it went together with the Return to the Land—so argued members of the associations of Hovevei Zion ("Lovers of Zion") that sprang up all over eastern Europe during the 1880s and 1890s and were instrumental in helping set up the first Jewish villages in Palestine.

This was a tremendous (and unique) social revolution. Middle-class Jewish students and ex-merchants were not only leaving Europe for the Land of Israel; they were also deliberately aiming at becoming peasants and workers. Of all the great migration waves of the 19th and 20th centuries—of Italians, Germans, Irish, Slavs—the only one that had a conscious and articulate ideology of *downward* mobility was the Zionist immigration to Palestine. This ideology was sustained by the important socialist wing of the Zionist movement. As writers like Moses Hess foresaw, a Zionist commonwealth would be based on public ownership of the land and of the means of production, which would be organized on cooperative and collective lines. Many came to see Zionism and socialism not as two separate elements that might be welded together but as two sides of the same coin. Such ideas found ready expression in Palestine in a variety of institutions—*kibbutzim* and *moshavim*, various cooperative and collective industries, the paternal labor federation

Histadrut—aimed at bringing about radical social change.

The cultural and linguistic revival in central and eastern Europe—not the outbreaks of anti-Semitism in late 19th-century Europe—paved the way for the idea of a return to the cradle of the Jewish people. To be sure, the Russian *pogroms* and the anti-Semitic policies of the tsarist government prompted almost three million Jews to emigrate between 1882 and 1914. But fewer than one percent of these immigrants went to Palestine. Most went to America. The fact that an avant-garde minority opted for a return to the Land of Israel cannot be explained just by the *push* which drove them out of Europe. There was also a *pull*. Those who went to America were attracted by the promise of personal liberty and advancement. Those who went to Palestine had a vision of a national and social renaissance. Upon arriving, many of them shed their European names. (Ben-Yehuda—"Son of Judah"—was originally named Perlman.) Others went to the length of exchanging their European clothes for Arab *abayahs* and *kefiyas*. Snapshots of early Jewish immigrants to Palestine show groups of people who could be mistaken for bedouins if one were to judge from their clothing.

'If You Will It . . .'

Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), the Viennese journalist and playwright, is generally considered to be the founder of modern, political Zionism. It was certainly due to his efforts that the first Zionist Congress was convened in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, and the World Zionist Organization established. (The Zionist Organization would be responsible for coordinating Jewish emigration from Europe to Palestine.) Herzl's memorable words, scribbled in his diary after the Congress, were given prophetic significance after the founding of Israel in 1948: "In Basel," he wrote, "I have founded the Jewish state. Were I to state this publicly today, the answer would be a general outburst of laughter. But in five years, in *fifty* years, everyone will acknowledge this."

Viewed in historical perspective, however, Herzl's effort was nothing more than the culmination of earlier efforts, undertaken by many individuals and groups. Herzl's idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine had been voiced by people like Hess and Leon Pinsker, whose pamphlet, *Autoemancipation*, published in 1882, was perhaps the most far-reaching critique of the failure of Emancipation to solve the twin problems of Jewish security and identity. Jewish villages were established in Palestine decades before Herzl took up the cause.

What Herzl added to these efforts was not simply organization and direction. Owing to his public-relations acumen, Herzl was also able to bring the quest for Jewish national consciousness to world attention. What had hitherto been discussed in obscure Hebrew journals in Odessa and Warsaw now became front-page news. What motley groups of unemployed Jewish intellectuals had been arguing about in obscure discussion groups in eastern European *shtetls* now became fashionable talk in cultured salons in central and western Europe.

Every movement needs such a person—the *grand simplificateur*, the popularizer, if not vulgarizer, of a complex idea. While Herzl's two books—the programmatic *Jewish State* (1896) and the utopian novel *Old-New Land* (1902), both written in German but widely translated—became best sellers and spread the Zionist gospel, most of Herzl's ideas were neither new nor particularly profound. But he was blessed with the gift of tongues, the light pen of the trained journalist, the ability to coin the catchy phrase (“If you will it, it will not be a fable”) and to strike the dramatic pose. Even his appearance—the combination of a well-bred Victorian gentleman (top hat, white gloves) with the visage of an exotic prophet from the Middle East—greatly contributed to his success.

The Balfour Declaration

The beginnings of the Jewish resettlement of Palestine (financed by such groups as Hovevei Zion and by Jewish philanthropists like Baron Edmond de Rothschild in Paris) were very modest, and it must have been the minuscule scale that was responsible for the initially mild reaction of the local Arab population. Few Arabs in pre-1914 Palestine (then part of the decaying Ottoman Empire) were sensitized to the stirrings of modern nationalism. Moreover, Palestine had always had a relatively high proportion of non-Muslim inhabitants due to its Judeo-Christian associations. By the mid-19th century, for example, Jews—largely pious, ultraorthodox Jews who had trickled in to live and die in the Holy Land—were already a majority in Jerusalem. As Karl Marx reported in an article published on March 18, 1854, in the *New York Daily Tribune*, “the sedentary population of Jerusalem numbers about 15,500 souls, of whom 4,000 are Mussulmans and 8,000 Jews.”

When the first tentative moves of Arab nationalists surfaced during the 1880s, they were naturally aimed at overthrowing the oppressive Ottoman regime. The existence of a few Jewish agricultural villages in Palestine was not then considered a



major issue. Before the outbreak of World War I, the Jewish population in the Turkish provinces which made up Palestine was only about 100,000, out of a general population of about 800,000. Until 1917, the whole Zionist enterprise remained relatively minor in scale.

In 1917, Great Britain, looking for friends in the war against Germany and its Turkish allies, helped and encouraged the Arabs in the Levant to rebel against the Turks. In a similar effort to rouse support, Britain declared in 1917 that "His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people." This statement, known as the Balfour Declaration, was later endorsed by the League of Nations when it granted Great Britain a Mandate over Palestine in 1923 and directed Britain to encourage "close settlement of Jews upon the land." In actuality, the Mandatory Administration, trying to steer a middle course between conflicting claims, ultimately pursued an erratic course. As Arab riots, strikes, and terrorist attacks proliferated during the 1920s and '30s in response to continued Jewish immigration, the British took steps to limit the inflow and restrict land sales to Jews. Even so, the Jewish population in Palestine by the mid-1930s had surpassed one-half million.

Unfinished Business

In 1947, with the grim memory of World War II and the Holocaust still vivid, and following the influx of hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Europe, the United Nations General Assembly proposed the partition of the British Mandatory territory into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish community in Palestine accepted this truncated homeland. The Arabs of Palestine and in the surrounding Arab states did not. Within hours of David Ben-Gurion's proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948, troops from seven Arab nations attacked the new nation. The Israeli Defense Force stood its ground. The clash of Jewish and Arab nationalisms has not yet been resolved, although the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt is no doubt a first step in the right direction.

By any conventional standards, Zionism has been a success story. A Jewish state has been established in part of what was the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people. It has integrated, albeit not always with total success, emigrants and refugees from more than 70 countries, half of them fleeing from Arab nations—Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt—where Jewish life had become intolerable. And Hebrew

has been revived as a modern language. Theodore Herzl once remarked that the Jews returning to their ancestral land would not return to their ancestral tongue: "Who among us," he asked, "can ask for a railway ticket in Hebrew?" Israeli railways are nothing to write home about, but El Al pilots communicate with ground control at Ben-Gurion Airport in Hebrew, just as Israeli children bicker with one another and Israeli scientists discuss their latest discoveries in the language of the prophets.

More important, Israel has become the public focus of Jewish existence. In the pre-Emancipation period, as I have noted, religion and the *kehilla* played this role; being Jewish entailed being a member of a community. Emancipation changed all that, but the State of Israel has put the public dimension back into Jewish life around the world. Without this having ever been defined or decided upon, the fact remains that to be Jewish today means feeling some link with Israel. That link was forged at first by concern among Jews for the new nation's very survival, threatened in four wars. In the long run, however, it can only be maintained by the *content* of Jewish life in Israel, by the cultivation of qualities there that do not exist in the Diaspora.

The founders of the revolutionary Zionist society in Israel realized from the very beginning that independence, sovereignty, and self-determination involve not only a flag, ambassadors, and the pomp and circumstance of state occasions. Independence means first of all the existence—or creation—of a social and economic infrastructure to sustain a more or less self-supporting society. The question for the founders of Zionism never was only how many Jews would live in the Jewish state and what its boundaries were going to be. It was also the quality of life and the kind of society they would establish. This is the unfinished business of the Zionist revolution.



A DIFFERENT PLACE

by Don Peretz

When Palestine's Jewish community, the Yishuv, was suddenly transformed into a Jewish state in 1948, most of its 650,000 people resembled those of the old eastern European *shtetls* in language and physical appearance, in tastes and outlook on life. But Palestine did not *look* like Poland or Romania or western Russia.

In place of wooded mountains, fertile plains, and broad rivers the first Jewish settlers had found bare, rugged hills, a few valleys, a swamp-infested coastal plain, and a vascular system of dry wadis, which ran with water only during the winter months; coaxing the desert into life took decades. Tel Aviv (which the Yishuv boasted was the largest all-Jewish city in the world) was a suburb perched on sand dunes north of Yafo. With its stucco-and-tile architecture, the town in 1948 felt less like Wilno or Pinsk than like Malaga or Beirut. Dress was informal, as it still is. The Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, a native of Plonsk (then in Russia), wore a necktie when he proclaimed Israel's independence but almost never thereafter. A tie is referred to even today as a *dag ma'luach*, a herring.

As in the *shtetls*, everyone seemed to know everyone else. To call a fellow Jew *adon* ("Mr.") was almost insulting. Much preferred was *haver* ("comrade, friend"). Rather than a mere nation, the Yishuv seemed to be a large, self-centered Jewish town where doors were left unlocked and children played in the streets under every adult's protective gaze.


Most Jews belonged to the Histadrut, the labor federation that Ben-Gurion had helped to found in 1920. The Histadrut was much more than just a trade union, though it would come to embrace more than 40 labor organizations representing, among other groups, actors, lifeguards, psychologists, and the craftsmen in Israel's diamond-finishing industry. The Histadrut also provided cradle-to-grave social security and medical care. It sponsored clubs for young people and old. It staged political rallies for voters, a plurality of whom would cast their ballots for Mapai, anchor party of the Labor Alignment and ruled, like the Histadrut, by an elite of labor-Zionist "founding fathers." The start-up capital for some of the Yishuv's most important agricultural and commercial ventures came from Histadrut-run enterprises—Bank ha-Po'alim, the Workers' Bank; the agricultural cooperative Nir; and Solel Boneh, a mammoth engineering

and construction combine.

The activities of the labor federation, in sum, cut across the entire social and economic structure of the Yishuv, serving in a way as a catalyst for transformation of the Jewish community into the Jewish state.

Every Jew in Palestine had a sense of mission, a feeling of destiny, in 1948. Israel was not just "another country" but a gallant experiment in democracy, socialism, nationalism. The mood was embodied in the person of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the "Old Man," whose identity card listed his occupation simply as "agricultural worker." Ben-Gurion, his balding head fringed with a halo of wild white hair, assigned a messianic role to his people and laid down a creed for his country. It would not, he proclaimed, "recognize idols of gold and silver; it does not accept the robbery of the poor, the oppression of peoples, the lifting up of swords by nation against nation or the study of war. . . . It looks forward to the day when nations will cease to do evil."

This vision appealed to Jews everywhere. Of course, then as now, Israel confronted the implacable hostility of Arab neighbors. But domestically there was much to admire in the confusing, seemingly ill fitting, yet somehow workable amalgam of



Life on a kibbutz, by Israeli artist Joel Rohr. Much of the early 20th-century Yishuv inhabited scores of struggling farming settlements, reflecting the desire of Zionist pioneers to "return to the land." Today, agriculture accounts for only 11 percent of Israel's GNP.

From Village Paintings of Israel by Joel Rohr.

public and private institutions, of urban and rural lifestyles, of socialistic and capitalistic values.

The central government ran the railroads, the communications industry, and the major development projects, as it does now, but there was room for individual initiative, and family businesses account even today for a majority of Israeli companies, including such established firms as the Moshevitz family's Elite candy empire. The Histadrut, functioning as both management and labor union, helped put to work thousands of new arrivals from eastern Europe—many of them skilled workers—in its own factories, banks, and hotels. After government, the Histadrut remains the nation's single largest employer, with some 250,000 people on its payroll.

Strangers to Zionism

Although Israeli agriculture was and continues to be predominantly a matter of small family farms (average size: seven acres), the collective *kibbutzim* prospered, as did the hundreds of less spartan *moshavim*—both institutions striking an emotional chord abroad. It was above all the *kibbutzim*, with their regimentation and communal ethic, that had made possible the reintroduction of efficient agriculture in Palestine. Israel's farms today produce many of the citrus fruits now found in supermarkets throughout Western Europe, the avocados, the fresh flowers that have ended Holland's horticultural hegemony.

From the outset, Diaspora Jews lent a helping hand. Even during the Mandate, Jews outside of Palestine, mostly Americans, had contributed large sums to sustain the Yishuv, to found and fund charitable organizations such as Boys Town Jerusalem or *Magen David Adom* (Israel's Red Cross—though symbolized by a red Star of David). The effort launched in 1938 by the United Palestine (later Israel) Appeal was augmented in 1951 by the Israel bond drives, and by the mid-1950s Israeli bonds were providing almost one-half of the country's development budget.

It has been said that a nation's vices are the excess of its virtues. Israel's virtues—its optimism and determination, its concern for its own—were fully unleashed only after independence. In 1950, in one of its first acts, the Knesset or Parliament

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passed the famous Law of Return, stating that "every Jew has the right to come to this country." There followed the "ingathering of the exiles." The exiles now were not the familiar eastern Europeans, who had been repopulating Palestine since the 1880s, but the "forgotten" Jews of North Africa and the Middle East. These Jews had not tasted Emancipation or heard of Zionism, and they were uneasy with even the moderate socialism of Israel's establishment. They arrived from the ghettos of the Arab states—650,000 of them by 1964—importing along with their curious clothes and mementos a conservative, pre-Zionist notion of what a Jewish state should be.

Initially, the new immigrants were housed in supposedly temporary sites—first in tents, later in crowded, barrack-like encampments known as *ma'abarot* ("transition camps"). But all too often the transition took years instead of months. Many of the *ma'abarot* evolved into "development towns," where the non-European Jews were effectively isolated from the mainstream of Israeli life. Other immigrants were moved into the abandoned Arab quarters—soon to be slums if not slums already—inside or adjoining the three big urban centers of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa.

A Rift of Tongues

Rather abruptly, the compact physical and cultural homogeneity of the prestate Yishuv, its demographic cohesion, its virtually one-class (and hence classless) social structure began to disappear. The "Orientals," as the North African and Middle Eastern Jews were commonly called (they are also known as Sephardim, and more properly as Afro-Asians) became Israel's *lumpenproletariat*. In looks, dress, diet, speech, and education they differed from their European (or Ashkenazic) countrymen. Their arrival made Israel the only nation in the Middle East during the 1950s whose literacy rate declined. They disdained the gefilte fish, the borscht, and the kreplach of the immigrants from the old Pale of Settlement, preferring the kebab and couscous of Baghdad, Damascus, and Casablanca. Among the Ashkenazim, Yiddish was the mother tongue used at home, but the first language of the Orientals was usually Arabic. (Ironically, Arabic but not Yiddish was recognized by law as one of Israel's two official languages, the other being Hebrew—the language of public life and "more equal" by far.) By 1970, the Orientals, with a high birthrate, constituted the majority of Israel's Jewish population.

The challenge represented by the influx of immigrants dur-

A PEOPLE'S ARMY

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) was created in 1948, and it has served ever since as the guarantor of Israel's security. Unlike other Mideastern armies, it was not built around a core of former colonial regiments; instead, it drew from (and superseded) existing underground units, primarily the Haganah. Unlike other regional armed forces, the IDF imported no doctrine and few foreign advisers, preferring to adapt the art of war to Israel's unique circumstances. After many false starts, considerable confusion, and endless disagreements, the Israelis taught themselves everything from the techniques of aerial dogfighting to strategy and tactics. As former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman once wrote, "We mustn't ape others. . . . What counts is your originality, your improvisation, and your inventiveness."



The IDF has been tested now in five major conflicts: the War of Independence (1948–49), Suez (1956), the Six Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), and the Lebanese "operation" (1982). Even when intelligence evaluation or strategy has failed, as in 1973, the IDF has shown itself to be quick to recoup, flexible and daring. Today, the Israeli Air Force, chief claimant on the defense budget, dominates area skies; the ground troops are unsurpassed in the Mideast.

For Israel, military pre-eminence has been a necessity, not a luxury, and it exacts a high price. The Israelis must always overcome three basic liabilities:

Manpower With a Jewish population of only 3.3 million, Israel is enveloped by hostile states with a combined population of 60 million. The Israelis "equalized" this disparity in two ways: by emphasizing *qualitative* superiority in training and weaponry; and, in effect, by conscripting the entire country, creating a "people's army." All males from age 18 to 29 must serve in the armed forces for three years, all unmarried women for two (though they are barred from combat zones). Men remain in the reserves until age 55 (women until 39, unless married) and are called up each year for intensive training—always with the same unit. Thus, while the IDF in peacetime comprises some 120,000 conscripts and 52,000 "regular army" personnel, mostly career officers and technicians, it can mobilize a fighting force of 400,000 within 48 hours. (Israel's nearly 600,00 Arab citizens, with the exception of the Druze community,

ing the 1950s was not only cultural but also economic. The strong emphasis of labor-Zionism on farming—*Kivush avoda*, *kivush adama* ("conquest of labor, conquest of land"), to quote an early slogan—was a driving force during the British Mandate, but it lost much of its relevance after 1948, as Israel's lead-

are not eligible for service.) Former Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin described every Israeli civilian as "a soldier on 11 months' leave."

Money In solving its manpower problem, Israel escalated the cost of any extended military campaign: Full mobilization drains the civilian economy of its work force—not to mention its trucks, tractors, and bulldozers. In terms of actual outlays, the price of "preparedness" is sobering. Most of its arsenal Israel must buy abroad—the F-15 and F-16 fighters, the HAWK missiles, the armored personnel carriers. As a percentage of GNP, Israel quintuples U.S. defense spending. The government has been able to cut some corners, however. Thus, the Israelis are adept at reconditioning obsolete weaponry—turning old Sherman tanks into mobile artillery platforms, for example. And like the Japanese, they have demonstrated a knack for copying the technology of others (e.g., the Kfir jet fighter, adapted from the French Mirage, and the Shafrir air-to-air missile, adapted from the American Sidewinder). The government-controlled Israel Aircraft Industry has also produced sophisticated missile boats and transport planes, and deployment of the innovative Merkava tank has begun. Until recently, Israel was barred by the United States from selling Kfir jets abroad (they are powered by General Electric engines), but the country does a brisk trade of as much as \$1 billion a year in small arms and military hardware. As an export item, weapons are surpassed only by diamonds.

Geography Israel's size, shape, and location do not forgive generals' mistakes. The country has a 115-mile Mediterranean coastline but in places is no wider than 15 miles. Most of Israel's industrial plant is clustered in the crowded, vulnerable, Tel Aviv-Haifa strip, within three minutes by jet fighter of the Jordanian border. Israel must therefore rely on its well-developed intelligence network for at least 48 hours' warning of impending attack in order to mobilize and deploy. It must also count on the air force to keep Israeli skies clear. And it must carry the war to the enemy. Densely settled and lacking "strategic depth," Israel cannot afford to trade space for time. These requirements have prompted a continual and intense debate over tactics—with sometimes mixed results. General Israel Tal's "all-tank" theory of armored warfare (using fast tank "wedges" without accompanying infantry) proved brilliantly successful in the open desert against Egypt in 1967. But the "static" defense of the Sinai had disastrous results in 1973. The Egyptians quickly breached the fortified "Bar-Lev line," isolating and ultimately overrunning all but one of the 20 Israeli strong points along the Suez Canal.

ers faced the task of creating jobs for the newcomers.

Palestine boasted a respectable industrial base even during the 1930s, concentrated mostly in metal-working, textiles, chemicals. But after independence, the industrial sector, engorged with money from government and the Histadrut, ex-

panded quickly. Between 1952 and 1972, Israel experienced a 350 percent increase in industrial investment, an increase of 1,100 percent in industrial exports, and a rise of nearly 500 percent in the value of industrial output. GNP leapt upwards by an average of 10 percent annually during the 1950s, a rate of growth exceeded only in Japan and Taiwan.

Inevitably, "the land" lost much of its glamor. While agricultural productivity has increased tenfold since 1948, thanks to a "green revolution" spearheaded by such entities as the Volcani Institute, less than seven percent of Israel's labor force—75,000 people all told, one-fifth of them Arabs—is now employed in agriculture. Less than three percent of the population today lives on a *kibbutz*, long perceived by Diaspora Jews as the symbol of Zionist life in Israel. Many of the collectives have switched from farming to manufacturing. For lack of other recruits, some *kibbutzim* have had to hire Arab laborers.

The sudden transformation of Israel's economy is evident in the upward thrust of skyscrapers in Tel Aviv, which remains the nation's financial and publishing center and the heart of "cosmopolitan" Israel—though the seat of government is actually Jerusalem. It is evident in the Ruhr-like sprawl of workshops, industrial dumps, and factories around Haifa, the once-leisurely port city built on the slopes of Mount Carmel, bearded with smog. And it is evident, too, in Israeli lifestyles.

American Dollars

The simple life is no longer virtuous, or at least not fashionable. There now exists not only an "underclass" and an apartment-dwelling middle class but a suburban upper class and not a few millionaires (many of whom made fortunes after the 1967 war in construction of the ill-fated, \$500 million Bar-Lev defense line along the Suez Canal's eastern bank). Israel's well-to-do frequent cabarets, tee-up at country clubs, and take yearly jaunts abroad. The old-timers in their wrinkled khaki would shudder to learn that Israeli *haute couture* is big business; sales of leather-wear, bathing suits, and other apparel bring more than \$170 million a year into the country.

Israel did not deliberately set out to become what it has become. Indeed, for a variety of obvious reasons, the nation has seldom been free to chart its own course. Smaller than Massachusetts, it is constrained physically. It is endowed with little naturally fertile land and few mineral resources. Its trading partners are far away, its enemies are not. Time and again, its leaders have had to choose between the bad and the less bad. In

some respects, the Yishuv as a community enjoyed more independence under Britain's military rule than it has any time since—freedom, at any rate, from war, from trade deficits, from inflation; freedom to define itself; freedom, too, from the sometimes irritating concern and unwelcome influence of the United States, the source since 1948 of some \$23 billion in official military and economic aid (mostly low-interest loans) and of perhaps \$600 million a year in contributions by individuals.

In 1948, the Israelis accepted the partition of Palestine because the alternative was worse. To protect themselves they accepted creation of a large Israel Defense Force—the current ratio of soldiers to civilians in this country of fewer than four million, one to 22, is by far the highest in the world. Again, the alternative was worse. Because the costs of defense were so high, the Israelis resigned themselves to a state of perpetual debt—and to an inflation rate that eventually crept into triple digits.

'I'm All Right, Jack'

Israel's inflation, of course, has many causes—lucrative wage contracts won by the Histadrut being one of them. British-style "I'm all right, Jack" attitudes among labor unions have resulted in a comfortable standard of living for most workers, but the high rates of productivity that might have offset high living have not been forthcoming. (The average American worker, no Stakhanovite, has an annual output of some \$24,200 compared to the Israeli's \$14,300.) With expansion of the service sector—transportation, communications, education, and so on—only 33 percent of the Israeli labor force is engaged in goods-producing work of any kind. Also fueling inflation are Israel's generous social programs—maternity grants, allowances for large families, health insurance—and the government's Keynesian attempts to ensure "full" employment.

But the prime cause of rising prices, most economists agree, has been the defense burden. Military spending increased 1,600 percent between 1952 and 1966. By 1962, the inflation rate was 18 percent, prompting Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's government to decree "austerity" and ease the country into a recession. Yet in 1971, inflation was back to 12 percent as massive transfers of Soviet weaponry to Israel's Arab foes, in the wake of the Six Day War, spurred the Knesset to boost annual defense outlays to \$1.5 billion. Then came the Yom Kippur War in 1973. By 1980, inflation was running well above 100 percent.

A unique feature of inflation in Israel is that so many Israelis are protected against it; despite the erosion of the economy,


ASHKENAZIM VS. SEPHARDIM: A CLASH OF CULTURES

	Israeli-born Jews	Asian/African- born Jews	European/American- born Jews
FAMILY SIZE			
Percent of parents who have:			
4 or more children	17.4%	46.2%	17.9%
2-3	67.9	46.4	64.8
1 only	14.7	7.3	17.4
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT			
Percent who have attended:			
graduate school	13.1	3.9	17.9
university	8.8	3.7	6.7
high school	27.7	15.4	25.9
grade school	11.8	37.8	30.6
no school	0.5	19.3	2.4
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE			
Percent of welfare recipients who are:	10.37	61.74	27.89

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1981 and 1979.

The political, economic, and cultural differences separating Sephardic Israelis born in Asia or Africa and Ashkenazic Israelis born in Europe and America (above) are so large that some commentators speak of the "two Israels." Not all of the Sephardic immigrants have done poorly, however. The Yemeni Jews along with the Iraqis and Iranians have generally fared well; the Moroccans, concentrated in urban slums, have done poorly and account for much of the surge in street crime (which between 1960 and 1970 alone rose by 800 percent). Intermarriage between Ashkenazim and Sephardim is common, however, and some Israelis believe the problem of social cleavage will ultimately be solved "in bed." Israel's economic woes (right) include high inflation, sluggish industrial growth, and a worsening trade balance. High levels of defense spending are a prime culprit. The 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example, cost \$7 billion—equivalent then to one full year's GNP. Israel's arms purchases and civilian imports are financed largely by loans (debt service consumes more than one-third of the national budget) and aid from the United States.

THE ISRAELI ECONOMY: SELECTED INDICES



ISRAEL'S 1982 BUDGET

\$15.8 billion

Total debt repayment
28.8%

Health and welfare
5.2%

Other
17.9%

Interest payments
(domestic loans)
14.9%

Defense
27.4%

Education
and culture
5.8%

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1981; International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, 1981; Economic Department, Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.

they can continue to pay exorbitant prices for TV sets, (owned by 90 percent of all Israelis), washing machines (70 percent), and refrigerators (97 percent). One reason is widespread tax evasion and a flourishing "underground" cash economy. Another is the Histadrut, to which 90 percent of all Israeli wage-earners belong. As a result of its collective bargaining over the years, the Histadrut has managed to introduce widespread "indexation"—linking wages to jumps in the Consumer Price Index. Personal savings, meanwhile, are protected through a variety of ingenious schemes guaranteed to outpace rising prices. All of this, needless to say, amounts to treating the symptoms while feeding the underlying disease. But the origins of the disease lie in Israel's concern over physical survival.

Comparing Notes

It is difficult for outsiders to appreciate how much of Israeli life has been shaped by the fact that the country cannot take its future existence for granted. Builders, deliverymen, and farmers know that their vehicles and heavy equipment may be requisitioned at any time. Reserve duty takes a month every year out of the life of almost all able-bodied Israeli males (*see box*). Censorship of press reports on military matters is routine, and it does not always stop there. A "total news blackout" was imposed by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon when Israeli settlers in the Sinai were forcibly evicted in April 1982.

Some aspects of the defense burden are undoubtedly positive. Because military service is nearly universal—a rite of passage eliciting both grumbling and pride—the Israel Defense Force (IDF) is a strong cohesive factor in a nation that now badly needs one. For many indigent Sephardim, a hitch in the IDF can mean a few more years of technical training or perhaps even a career, though prejudice remains. (Noting the sharp increase in Oriental recruits, former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan once exclaimed: "But who will fly the airplanes?") The Israel Defense Force transcends class, generational, and ideological lines. On Friday evenings, the "social" night in Israel, the army is often a topic of conversation. People trade gossip and argue over tactics. Fathers and sons compare notes, debating, say, the merits of the old Uzi submachine gun, now out of production, versus those of the adaptable new Galil assault rifle, a prime export item.

Israel's burgeoning high-technology sector, of which the Galil is a profitable manifestation, is the late-in-life child of industrialization. It barely existed during the late 1950s, and it was nurtured in its infancy by those in the Labor Party who

realized that Israel's mounting arms outlays left the nation with a simple choice: to go bankrupt buying tanks, aircraft, missiles, and small arms from abroad, or to recoup part of the loss by manufacturing some of those items itself.

Ben-Gurion rationalized this further step away from the "drain the swamp, till the land" ideal he had once espoused, arguing that "pioneering" could also mean opening an electronics plant or pharmaceutical company. He was opposed bitterly by many in his own party. But throughout the 1960s, new high-tech industrial conglomerates appeared or expanded—the Israel Aircraft Industry, for example; innovative smaller firms proliferated and prospered. Between 1970 and 1978, exports of sophisticated electronics alone—e.g., word processors, medical equipment, solar energy systems—grew tenfold.

Much of the impetus came from the Six Day War. In the eyes of many, Israel's lightning victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 signaled that the Jewish state at last had "arrived." Companies such as ITT, RCA, IBM, Allied Chemical, and Motorola substantially increased their investments in Israel. This massive influx of capital created a new elite of well-connected, well-heeled Israelis who took their place alongside the old establishment—the political parties, the Histadrut, the *kibbutz* organizations, the armed forces.

"We have no 'poor whites'," Israel's first President, Chaim Weizmann, wrote in 1947, "and we also have no feudal landlords." But by the early 1970s, Israel no longer looked like Weizmann's Palestine. The Jewish population was far more heterogeneous than anyone had anticipated, and wealth was far less equally distributed. As a result of the Six Day War, Israel had also taken aboard large numbers of Palestinian and Syrian Arabs in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights—1.2 million at last count, not including the 600,000 Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and who have long been considered by Jews to be a "problem" in their own right.* The shift in economic emphasis, meanwhile, from farm to factory, from rural pioneer to urban scientist and technocrat, had been disorienting.

*Since the first election in 1949, Israel's Arab citizens have been permitted to vote and they enjoy, at least theoretically, the right to most employment opportunities and government benefits. Few hold positions of power. Yet the social and economic gains made by Israeli Arabs have been impressive. Life expectancy rose from 52 to 72 years between 1948 and 1978. In 1948, almost no Arab village had electricity; three-quarters did 30 years later. But Arabs lag considerably behind their Jewish compatriots in education, as they do in income. There are no independent Arab political parties as such, but Rakah, one of Israel's two Communist parties, attracts considerable Arab support. Long quiescent politically, Israeli Arabs have become increasingly nationalistic since the Six Day War. Eighty percent of them now favor creation of a Palestinian state, according to a recent poll.

There was still a solid minority of Israelis who cherished the network of institutions (and the ethos underlying them) that Ben-Gurion and others had set into place before independence. But Ben-Gurion died in 1973, and his Labor Alignment had by then been losing electoral support for more than a decade—beset by defections, by public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the costly 1973 Yom Kippur War, by labor unrest that seemed increasingly to tie the economy in knots, and by a wave of political scandals. (Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, hero of the 1967 war, was himself forced to resign in 1977 after it was discovered that his wife maintained an illegal foreign bank account.) The Israeli population, moreover, was becoming younger: During the 1970s, a majority was under 30 years of age, and among young Israelis public opinion surveys revealed widespread unease and, as elsewhere, “alienation.”

Symptomatic was the steady decline in immigration to Israel throughout the 1970s and the steady increase in emigration from Israel. As many as 500,000 ex-Israelis now live in North America alone, with large concentrations in Los Angeles and New York. Many of those who have chosen to leave have been native-born Israelis (Sabras), former Army officers, even *kibbutz* members. Menachem Begin raised this issue in the Knesset in 1976, a year before the triumph of his Likud coalition. Since independence, he pointed out, “we have lost four divisions or a dozen brigades, which represents a real bloodletting.” In 1981, the government reported a net emigration of 20,000 Jews, more than enough, under Israel’s electoral system, to elect a candidate to the Knesset.

A Political Potpourri

With its multiparty system, Israel is an extreme case of parliamentary democracy. In contrast to the British model, candidates do not compete in winner-take-all contests in individual districts but instead run in the country at large—with the 120 seats in the Knesset divided proportionately among all parties that have garnered at least one percent of the vote. There is thus no lack of political parties in Israel. About 30 vied in the last election, nine currently have seats in parliament, and five are part of the current Likud coalition government. *Every* government Israel has ever had has been a coalition affair and no political party has ever won a majority of the votes cast.

This system, dreamed up by Zionist idealists before World War I, is widely condemned but also widely regarded as permanent in a nation that has never been able to agree even on a

constitution. The upshot is that small parties like Shinui or Poale Agudat Israel are at times in a position to exert inordinate influence. The National Religious Party (NPR) has never won more than 15 seats in the Knesset, but it has been a part of almost every government since 1948, and on religious questions—the Kosher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, the Pork Prohibition Law, the Who is a Jew Amendment—its word has been law.*

Going Soft

In a faction-ridden system such as Israel's, it is sometimes difficult to discern ideological shifts from year to year. But a fundamental shift clearly occurred in 1977 when Menachem Begin's Likud bloc (consisting of his Herut or Freedom Party, the former Liberal Party, the Land of Israel movement, and some dissident Laborites) formed a coalition with the NPR and other parties to finally rout the Labor Alignment. Likud's umbrella covered a diverse constituency: ultranationalists, big industrialists, private farmers, most Orientals, and many Orthodox Jews. Its outlook was capitalist, not socialist. And it hoped to fill the ideological vacuum created by the decay of labor-Zionism with a call for reestablishment of Israel's "biblical" frontiers—at the very least Judea and Samaria (the West Bank, occupied by Israel in 1967) but defined by some to include Jordan and conceived by others to stretch as far as the Euphrates.

This biblical approach to Israeli territory is epitomized by the Gush Emunim, the "Bloc of the Faithful," formed after the 1973 war. The influence of the Gush spread quickly, finding adherents in Begin's Herut movement and elsewhere. Gush Emunim's stance is simply put: "Every piece of our land is holy—a gift from God." An unusually high percentage of the Gush are Orthodox Jewish immigrants from the United States. Most are Ashkenazim. Few wear the black coat, fur hat, or long side locks seen among Jerusalem's most militant Orthodox. Contending that Israel has gone soft morally and economically—becoming an "international schnorrer"—they prescribe a remedy called *hitnahalut*, which amounts to a


*Israel is technically a secular state, but Jewish holidays are also national holidays and the Jewish Sabbath, Saturday, is the day of rest; all interurban public transport ceases and El Al jets do not fly (a recent victory won by the religious parties). Marriage and divorce are matters for the Jewish (or Christian, or Muslim) clerical hierarchies; neither can be accomplished by civil authorities. While many of the American immigrants are not Orthodox but Reform or Conservative Jews, their rabbis are not officially recognized in Israel—a sore point between the American Jewish community and the Jewish state. Because religious parties hold the balance of power in the Knesset, it is likely that Israeli law will become more rather than less Orthodox, despite the uneasiness or opposition of many Israelis.

ISRAELI SELF-PORTRAITS




Ze'ev/Ha'aretz/1982.

Prime Minister
Menachem Begin



Klas/Migvan.

Censorship



From To Jerusalem with Love by Eliahu
Schwartz, © Y. Marcus & Co., Ltd., Jerusalem.



*"East is East
and West is West"*

*From To Jerusalem with Love by Eliahu
Schwartz. © Y. Marcus & Co., Ltd., Jerusalem.*

*The Lebanon War
displaces World Cup
soccer: "I'm missing
Paolo Rossi."*

Ze'ev/Ha'aretz/1982.



*Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon*

Ze'ev/Ha'aretz/1982.



combination of frontier settlement and messianism, requiring Jews to establish themselves in all of Greater Israel as a cultural imperative and religious obligation.

Gush volunteers have set up dozens of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, at first opposed but now winked at by a government that, since 1967, has itself established more than 100 settlements on the West Bank. They frequently resort to stealth, infiltrating Arab areas in the middle of the night. Recently, 18 Gush families reoccupied the old Jewish quarter—abandoned after rioting in 1929 that left 67 Jews dead—in the center of Hebron, an Arab town of 70,000 south of Jerusalem.

The Peace Now movement occupies the other end of the political spectrum. It, too, was formed after the costly 1973 war, and its position is also simply stated: "Peace is greater than Greater Israel." Peace Now commands a considerable following among students, *kibbutzniks*, and big-city socialists. Its power peaked during the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and ever since has been on the wane, although it was able to mount several large demonstrations protesting Israel's recent invasion of Lebanon. The political party whose program embodied Peace Now principles, Shelli, lost both of its seats in the Knesset in the last elections.

Beginomics

The 1981 balloting, in which Begin's Likud increased its share of the vote to 37 percent, caught many commentators—and the Reagan administration—by surprise and served to highlight the conservative trend in Israeli politics.

The worsening state of the economy seems to have swayed few voters. Inflation had passed the 100 percent mark in 1979, and it stayed there for two more years. The peace treaty with Egypt signed in 1979 had proved costly; among other things, Israel now has to pay \$2 billion annually for new imports necessitated by loss of the Sinai oil fields. Despite the government's hope that Israel would one day be able to export its way out of the economic doldrums, the chronic annual trade deficit continued to hover around \$3 billion.

In February 1981, four months before the June voting, the government's third Finance Minister in four years, Yoram Aridor, introduced a quasi-supply-side economic scheme, cutting taxes and spending, and freezing government employment. What effect this will have in the long term remains in doubt. In the short term, the Begin government's decision in the months before the election to borrow heavily from private banks—in

order to subsidize further and in fact reduce the price of milk, eggs, soft drinks, air conditioners, motor bikes, and other items—may have helped, as MIT's Bernard Avishai put it, "to contrive an illusion of prosperity."

The most decisive change in outlook, as gleaned from the 1981 election returns, seems to have occurred in the military, once a bastion of the old labor-Zionist ideals. A 1972 survey of retired senior officers found 57 percent willing to make territorial concessions on the West Bank; they displayed liberal attitudes on such matters as civil marriage. Yet in 1981, Likud received far more support from soldiers—46 percent of their vote—than it did from the public at large. The shift is reflected in the army's leadership: Begin's Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, and the Chief of Staff, General Rafael Eytan, both sympathize openly with Gush Emunim.

Back to Basics?

The same trend was apparent among the Sephardim, 60 percent of whom backed Begin in 1981. During the Ben-Gurion era, Labor wooed the Oriental Jews, successfully winning their support in political campaigns. With Ben-Gurion's disappearance, Begin gradually replaced the "Old Man" as father figure, prophet, and fiery-tongued critic of the Ashkenazic establishment. While Oriental Jews have slowly been narrowing the economic gap with the Ashkenazim, the income differential is still equivalent to that between whites and blacks in the United States. Orientals account for only 10 percent of university students. They deeply resent paternalism and "tokenism" and now identify Labor with both.

The fact that Israel's ideological cleavage is increasingly an ethnic cleavage has many people worried about the future of democracy in Israel. There had always been those who, like Rabbi Moshe Levinger, one of the founders of the Gush and now one of the Jewish residents of Hebron, believed that "the Jewish national renaissance is more important than democracy." But alienation from the electoral process seems of late to have become far more pervasive, particularly among Jews from Arab states whose first taste of true democracy was in Israel.

In a survey released before the 1981 voting by Dahaf, one of Israel's principal polling organizations, 31 percent of Jewish respondents were in favor of abolishing political parties; 55 percent supported restrictions on press freedom; and 21 percent said they would prefer an undemocratic government with "acceptable" policies to a democratic one with "unacceptable"

policies (20 percent were undecided). Two weeks before the election, the *Jerusalem Post*, alarmed at what some see as "Peronist" tendencies in the electorate, warned that "a not inconsiderable segment of the population takes a dim view of the country's system of democracy, and would be happy to see it scrapped and replaced with an authoritarian, 'strong-man' regime."

It has never required a strenuous act of will, during Israel's short history, to view with alarm the nation's future prospects. That, ironically, is one reason why Western visitors have found so much to admire in the Israelis themselves: not because they have turned their nation into a Levantine version of prosperous, multiethnic Switzerland, which is hardly the case, but because they remain a high-spirited people despite their saga of chronic, sometimes self-inflicted, difficulties. Faced with catastrophe, they have time and again managed to find its exposed flank and ward off the unthinkable. So it is, perhaps, today. There are signs, for example, that the Labor Party is serious about reform—and about building bridges to the Oriental Jews. There are signs, too, that Israelis are becoming less willing to tolerate a chaotic regime of single-interest parties: In 1981, many small factions lost Knesset seats as voters moved in large numbers to back major parties instead.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, its inconclusive victory, the months-long Israeli occupation, and the massacre of Palestinian refugees in Beirut by Lebanese Christian Phalangists under Israeli eyes—all of this has prompted a great deal of vocal soul-searching among Israelis. Whatever the military merits of the operation, it has forced everyone to confront the basics once again: the nature of the Jewish state, the price to be put on peace, the road Israel has traveled since 1948. With all of the other problems Israel must face, it may be that, in 1983, an ounce of perspective will be worth a pound of cure.

INTO THE BREACH?

by Lawrence Meyer

Thirty-five years have passed since the establishment of the State of Israel. The novelty of a Jewish state has long since worn off. The world has become accustomed to its existence, and the memory of the reasons for its creation is fading.

Theodor Herzl believed that a Jewish state would end the anomalous position of Jews in the world. The wonder and elation that Jews once felt at seeing Jewish policemen, farmers, laborers, soldiers, pilots, porters, and waiters working in their own country have largely disappeared. In this respect, Israel has fulfilled Herzl's dream of making the Jews a "normal" people. Israel has Jewish scientists and criminals, Jewish professors and prostitutes, Jewish soldiers and statesmen, Jewish tax collectors, Jewish soccer and movie stars. A whole generation of Israelis has grown up without experiencing the humiliations of anti-Semitism. "When I hear the phrase 'dirty Jew,'" an Israeli once told me, "my first impulse is to think I need a shower."

For purposes of comparison and perspective, it is useful to remember that Israel is roughly at that point in her history where the United States was when Andrew Jackson occupied the White House. Socially, economically, and politically, Israel is still grappling with difficulties that have confronted the state since its inception. These problems, however serious, are relatively minor when viewed against the malaise and lost sense of purpose that have afflicted Israelis during the past decade. The failure of Israel's recent leaders to articulate any sort of national vision, the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society, the shift from group to individual values—all of these changes have stirred unease among a people who once took strength from the idea that they were part of an historic, even spiritual, adventure.

No longer do the Israelis perceive themselves as bold pioneers, braving poverty and adversity as they settled the land and made the desert bloom. The idealism, self-sacrifice, and abstemious living that marked the nation's early years have been displaced in a new generation by consumerism and a proclivity toward "looking out for No. 1." Far from being independent and self-sufficient (as David Ben-Gurion and other Zionists had hoped it would become), Israel today must rely on the largesse of the United States—not for economic development

but to underwrite the very comfortable standard of living the nation could otherwise not afford. In a way, the life of Israel parallels that of her greatest ruler, King David, who rose from humble poet and shepherd to great warrior and conqueror of Jerusalem, and then succumbed to the temptations of the flesh.

The Jewish state was created, among other reasons, to restore the Jewish people to the family of nations. Here, too, the results after three decades have been disappointing. The image of Israel as a just and humane society has lately given way to a more dismal perception of the country—both at home and abroad—as an occupier and oppressor, denying to Palestinian Arabs what Israeli Jews so passionately sought for themselves. Israel has thus become more and more isolated in the world community.

Sensing their isolation, the Israelis have begun to view themselves as pariahs, concluding with some justice that whatever good they may do is deemed irrelevant while even the smallest ill is judged with merciless scrupulosity. "Where Israel is concerned, the world swells with moral consciousness," novelist Saul Bellow has written. "What Switzerland is to winter holidays and the Dalmatian coast to summer tourists, Israel and the Palestinians are to the West's need for justice—a sort of moral resort area." The nation's response has been to harden its position, to assume a pugnacious stance.

Without a doubt, the world Israel inhabits today is far less hopeful and expectant than it was in the era after World War II when the state was established. But the change of outlook within Israel cannot be attributed merely to the "end of innocence." For all of the fresh-faced optimism of Israel during its early years, the Israelis had already learned firsthand, in a bitter war for independence that followed the greatest slaughter of a single people in history, what sort of world they lived in. Still, Israel held out the promise that, in its dealings with its neighbors and with its own citizens, it could tread a path between meekness and arrogance, irresolution and intransigence. As the Israeli intellectual Yehoshafat Harkabi has written, until the heady triumph of the Six Day War in 1967 "Israel insisted on

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Olive Trees, by Israeli artist Aharon Halevy.

keeping to the realistic, middle way, taking pride in its capabilities but never losing sight of its limitations. That is why it accepted partition [in 1948], and when there was no way out even retreat. Its leaders were fully aware of the dangers of rising above reality and losing touch with it."

The question that arises today is whether Israel is still determined to pursue that middle course. The question is not rhetorical. Although the fact is not fully appreciated by the world outside, Israel *has* paid a considerable price—economically and psychologically, if not strategically—to secure peace with Egypt. In their own minds, Israelis see themselves taking a large, calculated risk in order to accomplish their ultimate goal: achieving peace with their neighbors.

Yet the sense of a transcending higher purpose that once motivated Israel seems to be succumbing to a simple urge for territorial possession. Dressing that urge up in historical-religious verbiage, as the present government has done, cannot disguise Israel's apparent intention to impose her will and rule on more than one million reluctant subjects. Whether Israelis have fully reckoned the cost of this enterprise is not clear. "When the white man turns tyrant," George Orwell wrote of his own experience with colonialism, "it is his own freedom he destroys. . . . For it is the condition of his rule that he shall spend

his life in trying to impress the 'natives,' and so in every crisis he has got to do what the 'natives' expect of him. He wears a mask, and his face grows to fit it."

The other nations of the Middle East, of course, indulge in rhetoric and actions far more severe and extreme than anything Israel says or does. But Israel alone among the countries of the region is a member of the family of Western democracies—democracies that were present at Israel's creation and from which Israel now risks estrangement. In an odd way, some Israelis may welcome that prospect; among a broad section of the populace a kind of bunker mentality has already set in. In place of the values shared by the leaders of the prestate and early poststate era—in place of Ben-Gurion's vision of Israel as a "light unto the nations"—one finds increasingly a narrow nationalism, a new tribalism.

The notion of a fortress Israel, though appealing to some, raises the possibility also of seige and obliteration. Such an eventuality is not without historical precedent. In the first century A.D., the Jewish people in Israel revolted against the Romans. The rebellion was put down. Fleeing Jerusalem after its fall and the destruction of the Second Temple, almost 1,000 religious zealots made their way to the mountaintop fortress of Masada where they managed to keep a Roman army at bay for more than a year. Finally, faced with defeat, capture, and slavery or death, they elected to commit mass suicide. In all, 960 men, women, and children perished.

As an inspiration to an infant country fighting for its very life, the legend of Masada served Israel well. But different times call for different responses. There is also virtue in survival, in distinguishing between the essential and the desirable, in rejoicing in history rather than seeking to repeat it. Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first President, composed this parting admonition on his deathbed: "We are a small people," he said, "but a great people. An ugly and yet a beautiful people. A creative and a destructive people. A people in whom genius and folly are equally commingled. We are an impetuous people who time and again repudiated and wrecked what our ancestors built. For God's sake, let us not allow the breach in the wall to swallow us."

BACKGROUND BOOKS

ISRAEL

"Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will show thee."

Abraham, an elderly and wealthy resident of Ur (it is thought) in Sumer, did as the Lord bade him, arriving after a time in the Land of Canaan. His descendants fled to Egypt, driven by famine, but after many centuries they returned, taking the Promised Land by force.

The saga of the Israelites from Abraham's era (c. 2000 B.C.) through the Exodus and Babylonian captivity to the successful revolt of the Maccabees against the Greek Seleucid rulers of Palestine in 168 B.C. is recounted in **The Pentateuch and Haftorahs** (Soncino, 1950; rev. ed., 1960), more commonly known as the Old Testament. To the surprise of some, much modern research vouches for the essential "historicity" of the Bible; contemporary Israelis have invested heavily in archeological research—to demonstrate, as diplomat Abba Eban once put it, that Israel "is not a new synthetic nation writing its history on a clean slate."

Yet the slate has often been partially erased. Pompey captured Judea in 63 B.C., ending a century of de facto Jewish independence. The Israelites chafed under Roman rule. The massive revolt of 66–70 A.D. was the focus of Flavius Josephus's **Wars of the Jews** (Peter Smith, 1959, cloth; Penguin, 1959, paper). Josephus, a Romanized Jew, probably intended his book to discourage further outbreaks of the kind that had led to the loss of one million Jewish lives.

But the Jews rose up again in 118 A.D.—and then once more in 132 A.D.,

after Emperor Hadrian announced plans to rebuild Jerusalem as a paganized Roman city. The Romans finally overcame the rebels led by Simeon Bar Kokhba after a tough, three-year war. Most of the remaining Jews in Palestine were massacred, enslaved, or expelled.

Books describing the return of the Jews to Palestine are, as the Bible says of Abraham's descendants, "numberless as the stars in the sky." They include broad historical surveys, such as Martin Gilbert's **Exile and Return** (2 vols., Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978, out of print); authoritative and balanced treatments of the Mandate, notably J. C. Hurewitz's **The Struggle for Palestine** (Greenwood, 1968, cloth; Schocken, 1976, paper) and Christopher Sykes's lively **Crossroads to Israel** (Ind. Univ., 1973, paper); reminiscences, including **Trial and Error** (Greenwood, 1972), the autobiography of Israel's first President, Chaim Weizmann; collections of speeches and essays, such as David Ben-Gurion's **Rebirth and Destiny of Israel** (Philosophical Library, 1954); and experiments in "historical journalism" like Amos Elon's engaging **The Israelis: Founders and Sons** (Holt, 1971, cloth; Bantam, 1972, paper, out of print).

Palestine proved disappointing. As they disembarked at Yafo, Elon writes, "many arrivals recorded their shock at the Oriental confusion, the noise and the squalor . . . its filthy bazaars, its thoroughly corrupt Turkish administration, its swarms of sore-eyed children, money-changers, peddlars, beggars, flies."

One of the better short introduc-

tions to the birth of Zionism, the mass migration (*aliyah*) of Jews to Palestine, and the social organization of the struggling Jewish community there prior to 1948 is **The Modern History of Israel** (Praeger, 1975, out of print) by Noah Lucas.

Among enlightened European Jews of the 19th century, the notion of socialism as a means of Jewish emancipation predated (and long precluded) serious talk of return to the ancient homeland. A socialist impulse persisted as Zionism gained momentum after the 1880s.

But the socialist-Zionist vision remained only a vision until the arrival in Palestine, during the second *aliyah* (1904–14), of a small group of hard-headed pioneers, who were not café ideologues but pragmatic rebels and ardent nationalists. They were led by such men as David Ben-Gurion (who in 1920, with Berl Katznelson, would found the Histadrut, Israel's labor federation) and the charismatic Russian émigré A. D. Gordon.

Faced, Lucas writes, with an already entrenched class of Jewish landowners from the 1882 migration, Gordon took a group of followers north on foot to the Galilee. There the Gordonites established a network of *ktzuva*, small agricultural units dedicated to self-sufficiency and cooperative trading. These were the forerunners of the *kibbutzim*.

For all their common sense, Lucas concludes, the early settlers of Palestine suffered from some blind spots—especially where the indigenous population was concerned. “The vital illusion beclouding Zionist contemplation of the Arabs,” he writes, “was that well-timed compromises or well-worded gestures of moderation would, by overcoming piecemeal the particular instances of Arab opposition, suffice

to resolve the problems of the relations between the two peoples.”

Combining sharp wit and poetic flair with an acute understanding of international affairs, Arthur Koestler, in **Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917–1949** (New York: Macmillan, 1949, out of print), places much of the blame for the enduring conflict in the Middle East on Great Britain. In essence, he writes, Britain made promises in the Balfour Declaration to both Jews and Arabs that it simply could not keep—on the one hand, creation of a “national home” for the Jewish people; on the other, protection of the “civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”

Arab terrorists raided Jewish settlements right under British noses; the Jewish underground, the Haganah and the Irgun, fought back. When the British, preoccupied by withdrawal from India, vacated Palestine in 1948, they made no provision for legal administration or peacekeeping forces in the territory.

“The whole plan and manner of this unprecedented abandonment of a country,” Koestler argues, “after a long period of international trusteeship, with no authorized security forces in any area, could produce no other foreseeable result than to set that country, and *ipso facto* the whole Middle East, ‘afame.’”

So it did—and has. For more than a year following proclamation of the state in 1948, the Israelis, their manpower stretched to the limit, held off invading armies from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, spearheaded by Jordan's elite Arab Legion. After the UN cease-fire of June 11, 1949, the Israelis, having lost 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians, vowed never again to be caught unprepared.

"Of the many ironies of Israeli life," write Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, in **The Israeli Army** (Harper, 1975, out of print), "none is more significant than the sharp contrast between the near-pacifism of the founding fathers and the military preoccupation of modern Israel." During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, they note, Israel sent into battle the third largest tank force and the sixth largest air force in the Western world. A good supplement to Luttwak and Horowitz is Ze'ev Schiff's profusely illustrated **A History of the Israeli Army** (trans. and ed. by Raphael Rothstein, Straight Arrow Books, 1974).

One of the basic characteristics of Israeli society today is its class stratification—the subject of Sammy Smooha's **Israel: Pluralism and Conflict** (Univ. of Calif., 1978).

There exist, he contends, four levels: "The disenfranchised Palestinian Arabs rank at the bottom, the subordinate Arab minority occupy the next lower layer, the disadvantaged Oriental majority take an intermediate position, and . . . the superior Ashkenazi minority outdistance all the non-European groups." Lawrence Meyer, though echoing Smooha's findings, provides a far more comprehensive picture of modern Israeli society in his vivid survey **Israel Now: Portrait of a Troubled Land** (Delacorte, 1982).

Despite domestic tensions between Jews and Jews, and between Jews and Arabs, the Israeli government has had somewhat better luck moderating differences at home than it has in its dealings abroad. While the United States remains Israel's only steadfast (if not always uncritical) friend, Nadav Safran explains in

Israel: The Embattled Ally (Harvard, 1978, cloth & paper), some Israelis find the intimacy of the relationship disquieting. There is, he observes, "a sense of the American 'presence' in every corner of Israeli life. There is hardly an important educational, cultural, scientific, or philanthropic institution today which is not supported in some significant way by American Jewish (as well as governmental) aid." Reminders are everywhere. On the doors of Israeli ambulances, one may find such inscriptions as "Donated by Feigenblat & Blumenkohl, New York."

A more complex association is that of the Israelis and the Egyptians. Howard M. Sachar recounts the parallel emergence of both **Egypt and Israel** (Marek, 1982) from colonialism and traces their "mutual search for political identity"—culminating with the Camp David agreements in 1978. Sachar is the author of several outstanding works on the Jewish state, notably **A History of Israel** (Knopf, 1976, paper only) and **Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel** (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1961); his writing is lucid and often anecdotal.

Sachar regards Israel's rapprochement with Egypt as grounds for guarded optimism. But there are still many Jews and Arabs whose philosophy was best expressed by a character in **The Bridal Canopy** (trans. by I. M. Lask, Doubleday, 1st ed., 1937; Schocken, 1967, paper), a novel by Israeli Nobel laureate S. Y. Agnon: "If there's a chance that when I begin treating [a stranger] in friendly fashion I'll have to finish by kicking him, it's better to kick him to begin with and then he won't trouble me any more at all."

History:

CHANGING FRONTIERS

One important measure of a nation's cultural health is its tradition of historical inquiry. From colonial times, with the first accounts of English settlements, to the 20th century, with unflinching examinations of our most cherished institutions, American historical writing has brimmed with energy, imagination, and controversy. John Barker, a practitioner of the craft, here explains how some of the great historians have variously interpreted the American past and, in doing so, given us a sense of national identity and purpose—even in troubled times.



by John Barker

Native American Indian tribes had their own histories, which they searched to explain the European's arrival, but history conceived as an inquiry starts in America with Western man's attempt to describe his first sight of the new continent, so striking to him in his cultural isolation. The early Spanish reports spread the news of islands different from anything in Europe, luxuriant, extraordinarily rich in exotic animals, plants, and minerals. The simple life of the inhabitants recalled to Europeans the life of a golden age which Latin poets had portrayed.

"In the beginning all the world was America," wrote the English philosopher John Locke, nearly two centuries after Columbus's landfall, and a sense of wonder continued to characterize the European response to the New World.

When the Spanish, French, and English settled in the continent's northern half, they brought their European heritage with them; since the English colonial experiment was ultimately the most successful in forming the United States, the English origins of an American national historiography hold our attention. The first account of English settlement was John Smith's *A True Relation . . .* (1608), chronicling the first year of the Virginia Company's plantation, a brief work he later expanded into *The Generall Historie of Virginia*. Smith frankly recorded the settlers' difficulties, their starvation, and their hostile encounters with

Indians—though the story of how his life was saved by Pocahontas may be a fabrication—but he ended both his books on a note of mercantile optimism. His works anticipated numerous similar tracts, promotional histories really, written by Englishmen and published in England, arguing from the record why a particular colony offered most chance of gain to its investors.

Though America does not have Europe's depth of historical background, it has a rich heritage of its own thought on leading historical issues. The Puritans of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, convinced that God had sent them on an errand into the wilderness, self-consciously justified their emigration in light of biblical teaching and the events of the Reformation: Their mission to plant a "city of God" would further reveal God's guidance of his elect.

But when governors and divines like William Bradford and Cotton Mather wrote the history of their colony, they valued history for reasons of classical humanism besides those of Augustinian Christianity. They read and followed the models of Thucydides, Plutarch, and Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World*, as well as John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments of the Christian Martyrs*. Puritan historical thought, with its respect for accuracy and learning, with its capacity for self-analysis and public defense, with its sense of a large argument, gave future American historical writing some of its finest qualities.

The Enlightenment came to the American colonies both from Europe and from the colonies' own resources, when, as in Benjamin Franklin's case, Puritan religion was shed but certain Puritan habits and humanistic attributes were kept. American historians began to apply rationalist standards to their studies, but whereas Voltaire urged men to select from the past to build a better future, American society—as Voltaire himself observed of Pennsylvania—had already through design or circumstances abandoned many evils which the philosophes attacked. Free of aristocracy, feudalism, bishops, and luxury—free, indeed, of the dark European past—Americans visibly lived in an immense, wild Eden, mastering nature and prospering. When the Revolution occurred, some of the ablest historians were Tories (conspicuously Thomas Hutchinson), being respectful of tradition, but the leading American patriots conceived the Revolution to be a moral and political struggle in Enlightenment terms as well as a legal and cultural search for identity. When it succeeded, it provided clear proof of the power of man's agency in human affairs and of secular progress. In 1782, Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, a French surveyor who once settled in New York State, a self-described "farmer of feelings," posed the question that in

spirit has governed American national historical inquiry ever since: "What then is the American, this new man?"

The attempts of American historians to answer this question begin after the Revolution with the topic of the Revolution itself. Americans had as yet no national history told by themselves, only local histories in which colonies pressed their claims against England and sometimes against each other. Biographies of leading revolutionaries, especially of George Washington, partly met this need, and "Parson" Weems's imaginative anecdotes, notably the cherry-tree story, taught virtues appropriate to republican citizens.



Nevertheless, the greater want, the surviving Founding Fathers lamented, was for a large-scale record and analysis of the Revolution as a whole, explaining its origins, course, and significance for mankind. The sources for such a work were scattered throughout the 13 states; many were naturally in England. The gathering and publication of indispensable documents slowly proceeded, assisted by the growing national spirit after the War of 1812. The ambitions and labor finally bore fruit when the first volume of George Bancroft's *History of the United States* appeared in 1834.

Born in Massachusetts in 1800, the son of a Unitarian clergyman, Bancroft had studied at German universities after graduating from Harvard, and encountered there Johann Herder's and G.W.F. Hegel's philosophies and the new scientific methods of German historians. Returning to America he was briefly an educator, but, becoming a Jacksonian Democrat, he embarked on a long, distinguished career in public life, which included serving as minister to London and later Berlin. Universally acknowledged in his lifetime as America's greatest historian, he died in 1891. His 12-volume *History*, which finally reached from America's discovery to the adoption of the Constitution, owes much to German thought.

History taught that freedom was unfolding in the world

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under divine guidance, Bancroft believed; the vanguard of this movement, however, could not be Prussia—as Hegel had indicated—but was clearly the United States, where all men enjoyed liberty under a democratic government and the voice of the people was acknowledged as the voice of God. Taking Herder's idea that nations developed organically, Bancroft saw the seeds of the American genius lying in Germany and continuously growing by way of England, and New England. "The spirit of the colonies demanded freedom from the beginning," he wrote. Bancroft oversimplified the colonial story and indulged in flights of language, but despite his faults, by introducing both German techniques of study and nationalist concepts to the United States, he brought order and life to the Revolution's widespread records. He also gave Americans a firm sense of foreordained destiny and a confidence that their history, though brief compared to Europe's, was nonetheless unparalleled.

Francis Parkman, who lived from 1823 to 1893, further developed parts of Bancroft's central theme. A Bostonian—like many 19th-century American historians—he planned early to take the conflict between France and England for the mastery of North America as his subject. Braving physical hardship and seeking firsthand exposure to the frontier, he traveled west as a young man and lived among the Sioux, an experience on which he drew for his first two books, *The Oregon Trail* and *The Conspiracy of Pontiac*. In 1865, he began to publish his seven-volume study of his chosen topic, in which he ranged the absolutism of New France against the liberty of New England.

Parkman saw his whole story as a struggle between titanic forces, in which heroic individuals (not the common man) controlled each colony's destiny—a view for which he had most scope for expression in *Montcalm and Wolfe*. The Indian, who was no noble savage to him, and the French—feudal, monarchist, and Catholic—were inferior to the Protestant Anglo-Saxons, though Parkman admired individual Frenchmen, notably the explorers Samuel de Champlain and the Comte de Frontenac, and the Jesuit missionaries. "A happier calamity never befell a people than the conquest of Canada by British arms," he wrote. His characterization of the pioneer American, virile, living a life of action in the open air, in contrast to Boston's "Brahmin" class, living in comfort on inherited wealth, won many admirers, among them Theodore Roosevelt.

Parkman's distrust of the common man and his call for a reinvigorated elite illustrate that a problem existed—which American historians still share—in assessing America's advance. How could the commonly accepted signs of modern

progress—the vigorous democracy, the railroads, the North's industrialization, the furious growth of new cities in the West—be reconciled with Thomas Jefferson's firm belief that the community of yeoman farmers with which the United States began represented conditions close to perfection?

The ideas of 19th-century American historians were faced with yet a further challenge. The Civil War was both a breakdown of America's "perfect" political system, and, with its four years of bloodshed and devastation, a blow to Americans' faith in progress. In the years before the war, local historians, especially Southerners, reacted against the broad national history Bancroft and others had devised, and defended the interests of their states and regions against the federal government and New England's claim to superiority. Now the war itself, and the period of Reconstruction afterwards, were strong incentives to historical thinking in North and South alike, raising issues of causation, politics, morality, and the authentic theme of the American story. The Civil War is still the leading topic of American historiography, demonstrating like perhaps no other event the discord between national ideals and realities.

The same problem of possible national decline intrigued Henry Adams (1838–1918). Born into a family which had given the United States two Presidents, he studied at Harvard and briefly at Berlin, then acted as secretary to his father, who was minister to England during the Civil War. After teaching at Harvard for seven years, he moved to Washington and lived independently, writing and traveling. Adams's most ambitious work, his nine-volume *History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison*, was mainly chronological, but it began and ended by stressing the American national character as the key to interpreting American political history. The evidence suggested to Adams that between 1800 and 1815 the essential American character had become fixed. This character was both visionary and practical, libertarian, secular, and progressive, "a new variety of man." History's chief interest in the United States thenceforward was "to know what kind of people these millions were to be."

In his concern to understand American history, Adams proposed an exact science of history in which the rise of the American empire and the fall of Rome could both be explained by stages of progress analogous to physical laws. Since all energy reaches a peak and declines, "social energy," he argued, must adhere to this scheme. Man had been fired in different eras by different sources of force, but by 1815 the pattern of America's future growth seemed established. But if the national character

should ever become sluggish, "the inertia of several hundred million people, all formed in a similar social mould, was as likely to stifle energy as to stimulate evolution."

To some extent Henry Adams provides a link between two types of American historian, for the figures we have reviewed so far have all primarily been amateurs—magistrates, clergymen, politicians, or wealthy patricians—and they have all come from the East. In the late 19th century, however, the amateur historian in America lost prestige, as he did in Europe, to the university-based historian who had been professionally trained. These new men were critical of the Romantic nationalists' broad view and novelistic treatment of the American past, though they did not completely discard their predecessors' beliefs, some of which were now reinforced for them by the Darwinian theory of evolution. Instead, they sought limited topics, and by producing detailed monographs referring to all available materials, they claimed that they worked according to the principles of scientific research. Their combined studies, they believed, would enable historians to generalize accurately about the nation.



Herbert Baxter Adams, who helped found the American Historical Association in 1884, led historical thinking on the subject of the American character's uniqueness. Studying institutions comparatively like a philologist studying languages, he analyzed the government of selected New England towns, and he concluded from his research that the "germs" of American democracy lay in the councils of Germanic tribes once described by the Roman historian Tacitus. Out of these primitive councils in forests had evolved the parliamentary system, religious reformation, and the popular revolutions distinctive of all Anglo-Saxon peoples, "the ideas which have formed Germany and Holland, England and New England, the *United States*." "It is just as improbable that free local institutions should spring up without a germ along American shores," wrote Adams, "as that English wheat should have grown here without planting." To Adams, therefore, the influence of Europe and of the Eastern seaboard upon America's development was supreme. In 1893, however, his "germ theory" was radically challenged by a young historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, who proposed instead a "frontier hypothesis."

Turner was born in 1861 in Portage, Wisconsin, the son of a journalist. Describing his boyhood there, he wrote: "I have

poled down the Wisconsin [River] in a dugout with Indian guides . . . through virgin forests of balsam firs, seeing deer in the river . . . feeling that I belonged to it all." He also once saw a lynched man hanging from a tree, and witnessed gangs of Irish raftsmen taking over the town on wild sprees. These memories of Portage as a place where pioneers and Indians mingled on the edge of the wilderness stayed with him.

After his undergraduate work at the University of Wisconsin, Turner, who aimed to be a professional historian, went to Johns Hopkins for graduate training. Encountering the "germ theory" from Adams himself, he soon rejected the belief that democracy was carried to America by immigrants; it conflicted with what he knew from his own life in the Midwest. "The Frontier theory was pretty much a *reaction* from that due to my indignation," he later admitted. Returning to the University of Wisconsin in 1890 with a doctorate, having chosen the frontier as his field of special study, Turner began to express his ideas in his teaching. Two early papers reveal the direction of his thought, but neither was as provocative as his paper, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," which he delivered before the American Historical Association at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893.

"Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West," Turner wrote. "The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development." In the East, familiar institutions had evolved in a limited area, but on the continually advancing frontier line, American social development continually began over again. "The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization," he stated. "The wilderness masters the colonist":

He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs . . . here is a new product that is American.

As the frontier moved from the Atlantic to the Blue Ridge, to the Mississippi valley, to the Rockies, to the Pacific, social and political life had grown less complex and more distinctly American. There were actually several frontiers in each area—the trader's, the rancher's, the miner's—and each line of settlement was affected by different attractions—geological conditions, the

Indian trade, good cattle ranges, army posts, good soils. "Sections" rather than states came into existence from the relations among the several geographic regions. The society within each section adapted to the particular physical and social environment, and the interacting sections created the American national spirit.

And what, Turner asked, was the impact of the frontier on the East and on the Old World? The frontier promoted the formation of a composite American nationality; it was a melting pot where immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, "English in neither nationality nor characteristics." The frontier's advance also decreased America's dependence on England for supplies. After the Revolution, "the legislation which most developed the powers of the national government, and played the largest part in its activity, was conditioned on the frontier." The Louisiana Purchase, and most national political action regarding land, tariff, and other internal improvements, resulted from frontier needs and demands. The frontier made the American population as a whole more mobile, altering life in the East and even the Old World. The most important effect of the frontier, however, was the furtherance of democracy in America and in Europe.

"He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased," Turner wrote. "Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise. But never again will such gifts of free land offer themselves." The ever-retreating frontier had been to the United States and more remotely to Europe what the Mediterranean Sea once was to the Greeks, offering new experiences and calling out new institutions and activities. "And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history."

Turner's paper at first received scant attention, but by 1900, after he and his students had propagated its theme, the "frontier hypothesis" had defeated the "germ theory" to become the prevailing view of American history until Turner's death in 1932.

Turner's thesis, often overstated by his disciples, has had many critics since the 1930s. His poetic language and loose terminology obscure his argument, the very words "frontier" and "West" never being made explicit, and statistical evidence shows that the land was not free for most settlers; they bought it from speculators. Turner ignored the coastal frontier; the pro-

cession through Cumberland Gap was less orderly than he believed, and the pioneer's life was more social. Cities attracted population too, from Europe and from within America, and in times of economic depression the frontier did not act as the discontented population's "safety valve"; migration to it demonstrably decreased. Eastern influence on the West remained strong in matters of government, religion, and cultural and educational ideals; in fact, the frontier encouraged some of the American character's less attractive features, such as lawlessness, wastefulness, careless self-confidence, and ruthlessness toward nature and other peoples. And, if the frontier formed the settler so much, as Turner claimed, why did not an identical way of life develop on other frontiers—in Canada, Australia, Siberia, or South Africa?

Turner's critics have charged him with seeing the frontier as the sole cause of the American identity, though he himself insisted that it was only one aspect of the truth. In the view of Marxist historians, Turner ignores the class struggle and the growth of industries and towns. In its crudest form, it perpetuates myths of the West and reduces American history to the story of cowboys and Indians. But despite these and other objections, it is widely assumed today to be correct in its major assumption—that free land has defined the American experience, and it has proved to be by far the most fertile explanation of the history of the United States.



Turner, though conservative in spirit, was nonetheless one of the Progressive historians who, like the broad Progressive movement in contemporary politics, viewed the American experience in the tradition of democratic reform. Charles Beard, however, whose reputation rose as Turner's fell, was a left-wing Progressive, an activist, and a prolific and versatile author. Beard, born in Indiana in 1874, was impressed in youth by Populist doctrines, and, while studying at Oxford, he lectured on the Industrial Revolution to workingmen.

Appointed to the faculty of Columbia University in 1904, he taught both history and politics. With a colleague, James Harvey Robinson, he announced a fresh approach to history, which they called "the new history." A response to the rapid rise of the social sciences, it sought to cover all aspects of human affairs and make history useful. Beard's interpretation of American history was not as original as Turner's, but it has been almost as

influential. The chief purpose of his research and writing was to relate economic interests and politics, taking as his guide James Madison's theory of party conflict stated in the 10th of the *Federalist Papers*. Dismissing other historical schools, Beard proposed the "theory of economic determinism" as a new means of understanding American history.

During his career, Beard applied this theory in non-Marxist form to four important historical events. In his first, most hotly debated book, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), he statistically reviewed the amount and the geographical distribution of money and public securities held by members of the Constitutional Convention. He found that the Convention was composed of leading property holders, not selfless patriots, who had excluded from their meeting representatives of the propertyless mass of the American population. The resulting Constitution was "an economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to identical interests in the country at large." In 1915, Beard published *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*, and argued that political parties in the United States arose from the contest between the capitalist and the democratic pioneer.

After resigning from Columbia in 1917 in defense of academic freedom, Beard coauthored *The Rise of American Civilization* (1927) with his wife Mary. The book reached a large popular audience. Taking a comprehensive view of the American past up to the present, the Beards reinterpreted it largely in terms of America's economic growth and the interests of specific groups. England's search for trade and profits had laid the structural base, the colonists had started their own business enterprises, and an energetic minority of merchants had planned and accomplished the Revolution. The hinge of American history, though, was not the winning of independence but the mid-19th-century transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, a deep-running change which culminated in the Civil War.

The war, really a class struggle between Northern merchants and industrialists and the Southern planting aristocracy, was "a Second American Revolution and in a strict sense, the First," a genuine social revolution in which "the fighting was a fleeting incident." Northern capitalism triumphed, only to be challenged in the opening 20th century by new forces making for social democracy. Finally, Beard's concern in his later years to link foreign affairs and domestic policies led to his writing *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (which appeared

just before his death in 1948). In this controversial work, Beard, an isolationist, accused Roosevelt of deliberately leading the United States into war in pursuit of his personal power. Though Beard's findings have since been largely disproved (sometimes from information unavailable to him), his insights stimulated a new generation of scholars to explore and quantify the social and economic evidence of the American past. *The Rise of American Civilization* is also the last major attempt to give all American history a coherent theme or direction.



Americans have seldom been deeply attached to the past, despite its importance to the Puritans and the Founding Fathers. Many immigrated to flee from their own history, and most have charted their lives by the future, partly because, in Emerson's phrase (which Turner copied), "America is another word for Opportunity." Nevertheless, in 20th-century America—and in the Western world—the breadth and freedom of opportunity has narrowed, the effect, according to the American historian Walter Prescott Webb, of the closing of the Great Frontier.

Writing in 1952, Webb argued that the American frontier Turner described was only a fragment of the vast vacant lands in North and South America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand which began opening up to the European "metropolis" about the year 1500. The first impact on Europe was mainly economic—a sudden excess of land and capital for division among a relatively fixed number of people. The spectacular business boom that followed favored those institutions and ideas adapted to a dynamic and prosperous society, and, especially on the frontier itself, society recrystallized under new conditions which gave the individual a time of maximum freedom. The waves of new wealth in succession led Western man to consider the boom the normal state, but about 1900 the Great Frontier closed down across the globe, the magnificent windfall ended, and, because the boom was a "frontier boom," it is unrepeatable.

Any new, comparable boom will be quite different in form and consequences, and as yet none of the so-called new frontiers has materialized. No Columbus has come in from one of these voyages bringing continents and oceans, gold or silver, or grass or forest to the common man. "If the frontier is gone," Webb concluded, "we should have the courage and honesty to recognize the fact, cease to cry for what we have lost, and devote our

energy to finding solutions to the problems that now face a frontierless society."

This, I suggest, is the context in which American history, Western history, the Western idea of history itself, should now be reassessed. In the United States, the physical frontier ended in 1890, but the old sense of human possibility it fostered lasted until about 1970, and then the end came in agony. It quickly followed the Kennedy years, when many Americans had welcomed a young President's call to be new pioneers on a "New Frontier" of unfulfilled hopes. History's theme then stood forth as advancing reason and liberty, its contents to be analyzed with detached intelligence, but the unfolding Vietnam War, a war abroad but also a rending of American society, produced instead a sharp sense of human limits. It denied Americans their expected "Great Society," and it shook their faith in their country's fundamental innocence, their trust in its energy, and their hope that, alone among nations, the United States would escape a tragic fate. The war's diverse events revealed that, although the American story had often been told, the true perspective on that story was uncertain.

Such crises herald new histories to replace the old, unsettled views. They force new questions while events are still vivid, and current American questions converge once more upon the "new man's" actual nature. Until the next major American history arrives, Americans will have no modern idea of their whole history, only the ideas previous generations gave them. A new American history, however, affects the world. When any historic nation reinterprets itself, the result affects the rest; sometimes a national experience can help explain the history of mankind. Eighteenth-century Europe, in its expanding circumstances, challenged the historian to sustain "progressive" man. As the approaching 21st century brings the world more knowledge and different human possibilities, its challenge—and its disputed prize—is man's redefinition in another light.





Immigration

"The history of every country," wrote novelist Willa Cather, "begins in the heart of a man or a woman." In America's case, those men and women were immigrants. The first newcomers were Asian nomads who crossed the Bering Sea "land bridge" into North America. Unlike subsequent arrivals, they met no opposition. Americans have long been of two minds about immigrants, proud of the nation's claim to be the "asylum of mankind" yet suspicious, even fearful, of the new arrivals in their midst. Here, historian Willi Paul Adams traces shifting attitudes toward immigration since the days of the Founding Fathers; political scientist Aaron Segal surveys the latest entrants—Mexicans, Cubans, Haitians, Vietnamese—and the debate they have sparked on Capitol Hill and elsewhere.

A DUBIOUS HOST

by Willi Paul Adams

The enduring image of America as a "melting pot" was stamped on the national consciousness by the English Zionist Israel Zangwill in 1908, when his simple-minded melodrama, *The Melting Pot*, opened in Washington and New York. The play featured two Russian immigrants, a Jew, and a Christian, who found love and happiness in America—America, "God's crucible, the great melting pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming!" Expertly larded with bathos and cliché, the play was an immediate hit.

Zangwill's play assured immigrants that Yes, in America the closest ties were possible even between persons whose parents in Europe had confronted each other as murderer and victim. To home-grown Americans, it affirmed the idealistic tradition of the United States as a safe harbor for freedom-seeking refugees, who would repay trust and freedom with loyalty and hard work. "Restrictionists" such as Henry Pratt Fairchild winced at the mass appeal of Zangwill's metaphor. "It swept over this country and other countries like wildfire. It

calmed the rising tide of misgiving. . . . America was a Melting-Pot, the apparent evidences of national disintegration were illusions, and that settled it." At a time when thousands of immigrants, most of them poor, few of them able to speak English, were pouring into the United States every day, there was considerable sentiment in favor of slamming the doors shut.

'Useful Artificers' Only

Between Zangwill's optimism and Fairchild's fears lies the basic ambivalence that has bedeviled American thinking about immigration since colonial times. The steady influx of foreigners has set, variously, Protestants against Catholics against Jews, employers against job-seekers, workers against workers, neighborhoods against neighborhoods, generations against generations. It has produced an ever-changing roster of ethnic winners and losers. Sudden surges of immigration have prompted worries over the preservation of a (mythical?) "national character" — and calls for acceptance of (divisive?) "cultural pluralism." The phenomenon has appealed at once to Americans' most idealistic cosmopolitanism and most self-seeking isolationism. A conflict of values was paradoxical but unavoidable: Every newcomer could be regarded as live testimony to the superiority of America, but he also contributed to growing fears about the continuation of that superiority and about the strength of the nation's identity and its social order.

Migration, of course, has always been a large part of what America is all about. Between 1720 and 1770, an estimated 270,000 settlers arrived from Europe, mostly from the British Isles and Germany; during the entire English colonial period (1607–1776), more than a million newcomers arrived. The colonists encouraged continued in-migration to promote the opening of new territory, the development of local industries and the expansion of trade. When British colonial administrators, after the Seven Years' War, began to sense the growing self-

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
E PLURIBUS UNUM?

If Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin had had their way, the United States would have a "Great Seal" that reflects the American people's diverse national origins.

Hours after the signing of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress picked the trio as a committee to propose a design for a seal for the new nation.

The committee consulted a Philadelphia painter, Eugène Pierre du Simitière. According to Adams, du Simitière suggested that the seal bear "the arms of the several nations from whence America has been peopled, as English, Scotch, Irish, Dutch, German, etc., each in a shield." And indeed, the committee's proposed design, submitted to the Congress in August, featured a shield that was divided into six parts, each with its own ethnic emblem: "a Rose . . . for England," "a Harp . . . for Ireland," "a Thistle proper for Scotland," "a Flower de Luce . . . for France," "the Imperial Eagle . . . for Germany," and "the Belgic Lion . . . for Holland." Among the seal's other elements: a motto, "E Pluribus Unum" ("Out of Many, One").

Congress, however, took no action. Finally—two more committees and nearly six years later—on June 20, 1782, it approved a design. The Great Seal (to be impressed on documents signed by the President) now featured an American eagle clutching an olive branch in one talon, arrows in the other, and upon its breast, a shield with 13 stripes. The motto, "E Pluribus Unum," remained, but it referred now to the states in the union—not to "the several nations from whence America has been peopled."



confidence of colonial leaders, they warned against further uncontrolled immigration from the Old World. London's Proclamation Line of 1763 diminished the appeal of an arduous trans-Atlantic voyage by forbidding land-hungry colonists to settle beyond the Alleghenies. When the Declaration of Independence was drafted, it charged, among other grievances, that George III had "endeavoured to prevent the population of these states."

The makers of the American Revolution did not, however, celebrate ethnic diversity. Benjamin Franklin had warned as early as 1751 that Pennsylvania, a colony founded by Englishmen, was in danger of becoming a colony of aliens. The Germans, he feared, "will shortly become so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them." Less than three decades later, in the contest with Britain, unity and cohesion were essential.

Even after Independence, the Founding Fathers accepted but did not actively encourage immigration lest the virtues of the new Republic of the free and equal be jeopardized by the addition to its citizenry of politically immature subjects of European princes. "Are there no inconveniences to be thrown into the scale against the advantage expected from a multiplication of numbers by the importation of foreigners?" asked Thomas Jefferson in 1782. He doubted the wisdom of employing "extraordinary encouragements" to attract the European masses to America. Still, as for "useful artificers," Jefferson advised, "spare no expense in obtaining them." And once immigrants were in America, he considered them entitled to all the rights of citizenship.

A Pox on Ethnicity

Jefferson's attitude was fairly typical of those of men in responsible public positions in the young Republic, as distinct from such intellectual individualists as Thomas Paine, who envisioned America as "the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe." Alexander Hamilton, in many respects Jefferson's adversary, did not differ with him on the immigration question. When Hamilton developed his plans for disposing of public lands in the West, he rejected the idea of a special "family grant" to attract immigrants. Nor did Hamilton think much of the suggestion that the fledgling U.S. Navy should transport English and Irish workers who could not afford to pay for their passage. One of the consequences was that the practice of indentured servitude—by which thousands bought passage to America by agreeing to work as servants here for two to seven years—persisted into the second decade of the 19th century.

The idea of America as "the asylum of mankind" remained nevertheless a durable part of the American founding myth. But that notion was firmly linked to something else: a conviction that American society was a model for the whole world. Newcomers found that their hosts harbored strong sentiments of national superiority; all were expected to leave the inferior Old World behind and, as Americans rather than as Europeans in exile, to join in building the New. The successful creation of the nation-state, its political evolution under a federal system, and the rise, within a few decades, of the United States as the dominant power in North America, meant to America's leaders, regardless of their political affiliations, that North America was no longer open to the colonizing experiments of European pow-

ers. It had been decided, once and for all, that besides British-dominated Canada, there could be only one other nation-state north of the Rio Grande. And there was to be no second Quebec, no new ethnic enclave threatening the unity and stability of the nation.

The level of immigration in the decades after Independence remained modest. According to recent estimates, the average annual influx during the late 1780s was about 6,000 persons. After 1790, it rose to around 10,000, but during the Napoleonic Wars it declined to about 3,000. Altogether, some 250,000 immigrants are believed to have arrived in the United States between 1783 and 1815. Of the nation's 3.9 million inhabitants in 1790, about 60 percent are estimated to have been of English stock. Perhaps nine percent were of Irish ancestry, nine percent German, eight percent Scottish, three percent Dutch, less than two percent French, and less than one percent Swedish.

During the second half of the 1790s, John Adams and the Federalists strongly differed with the Jeffersonian Republicans. Many matters were at issue. The Federalists resented immigrants, especially as potential voters. A new influx of politically active, radically democratic Englishmen and Irishmen, and of a very mixed group of Frenchmen (aristocrats, alleged Jacobins, and planters fleeing the slave revolt in Haiti) caused the Federalists finally to lose their nerve. The result, in 1798, was the Alien and Sedition Acts, designed by Congress in part to curb quick naturalization of immigrants. Nevertheless, the immigrant vote may have proved decisive in Thomas Jefferson's victory over John Adams, the incumbent President, in the presidential election of 1800. A Federalist broadside from 1810 suggests that Adams's party soon learned to sing a different tune:

Come Dutch and Yankees, Irish, Scot
with intermixed relation;
From where we come, it matters not;
We all make, now, one nation.

Ethnic politics had arrived on the national scene. But "Anglo-conformity" (to use a 20th-century sociological term) remained the standard that immigrants ultimately had to embrace. The Indians, along with the free and enslaved Africans, presented problems whose solutions already required more tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and racial diversity than most European Americans were able to muster. There was no wish to confuse the situation further. Not "ethnic diversity," but "Constitution," "nation," "race," and "Protestantism" as an integral part of the American national identity became the principal cer-

tainties in American public discourse.

The United States's territorial expansion in the first half of the 19th century, its industrialization and urbanization, and continued immigration, were perceived by many an editor and politician not only as signs of success and healthy growth but also on occasion as potential threats to an established order, as severe tests of the American system. The relative success of the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic "Know Nothing" movement of the 1840s and '50s showed how widespread the feeling of insecurity was. Then, of course, came the main event—a war waged by the North for the preservation of national unity.

The Civil War accomplished many things, but it did not prompt Americans to make an about-face: to begin encouraging various immigrant groups to cherish and develop their unique ethnic traits. Rather the reverse. Indeed, by the 1880s, the picture from a nativist point of view was rather grim. Dislocations caused by fierce competition in the world market for agricultural products and slow industrialization in southern and eastern Europe resulted in the immigration to America of a new wave of economic refugees. They came in the millions, often wearing "peculiar" national dress, speaking "strange" tongues, and crowding into the immigrant ghettos of many American cities. During the four decades after 1880, more than 18 million immigrants entered the United States, and the U.S. population more than doubled, from 50 to 105 million. The proportion of southern and eastern Europeans among the new arrivals—Italians, Greeks, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians, Lithuanians, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Romanians, and, among them, a significant segment of eastern Europe's Jewish population—rose from a scant 10 percent in 1882 to 75 percent in 1907. By 1920, fully one-third of the U.S. population consisted of immigrants, children of immigrants, and children with one foreign-born parent.

Immigration (even immigration of Protestant northern

In this 1926 Washington's Birthday photo, 19 New York City schoolgirls show that, despite their 19 different nationalities, their loyalty is undivided.



Europeans) was viewed now with anger and alarm. If the number of articles on a particular question published in magazines may be taken as an indicator of public interest, then public interest was considerable: Almost 1,500 articles for the period 1882–1930 are listed under the headings “Immigrants” and “Immigration” in the relevant indices of American periodical literature. The worries over the influx of foreigners reached hysterical proportions during World War I, before subsiding during the late 1920s as the restrictive Quota Act of 1924 began taking effect and subsiding further as the Great Depression set in.

The most influential document produced during this round of the immigration debate was the 42-volume report of the U.S. Immigration Commission headed by Senator William Dillingham (R.-Vt.). Published in 1911 after three-and-a-half years of hearings and evaluations, the Dillingham report consisted mostly of statistics. The commission described the immigrants’ ethnic origins and distribution by ethnic group in various industries and between city and country. The commission also dug up data on immigrants’ family structure, literacy, knowledge of English, the school attendance of their children, and their crime rates—and, in a particularly sensational finding, the changes in bodily form of the immigrants’ children and grandchildren. The patina of objectivity provided by the commission’s statistics, however, scarcely concealed a profound unease. Could the nation absorb new immigrants without creating permanent ethnic ghettos in Cleveland, Chicago, Boston, Pittsburgh, and other big cities? Could the newcomers acquire the language and technical skills necessary to become part of a modern industrial society? The immigrants, the commissioners feared, endangered the American standard of living by their willingness to accept conditions of labor (e.g., long, dangerous hours for low pay) against which American trade unions and social reformers were fighting a fierce battle.

Dillingham and company effectively rejected the notion of



U.P.I.

THE REVOLVING DOOR

The influx of foreigners to the United States has stirred much debate. Far less noticed is the substantial emigration of aliens and even citizens *from* the United States.

Of the 3.4 million immigrants legally admitted during the 1960s, some 619,000 (according to U.S. Census Bureau demographers Robert Warren and Jennifer Marks) left before the decade was out. Another 521,000 foreign-born persons also departed. Thus, 1.14 million immigrants and former immigrants exited during the 60s—one-third the number that entered. A similar pattern existed between 1908 and 1957 (when the Immigration and Naturalization Service stopped counting the emigration of aliens): 15.7 million immigrants came—and at least 4.8 million (30.6 percent) went. Some who had accumulated savings left in triumph, but many went back home in despair. Edward Corsi, FDR's immigration commissioner, recalled how even before his mother's return to Italy, she and her husband had realized that "America had failed to offer its pot of gold. It had offered instead suffering, privations, and defeat."

During 1969–74, the largest numbers of alien emigrants had been born in Mexico (an annual average of 16,100) and Canada (14,000). Other "top" countries: Italy, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Jamaica, Greece, Haiti, the Philippines, and China.

U.S. citizens also emigrate, for various reasons. During the Vietnam War, thousands of American youths fled to Canada to avoid military service. All told, on the basis of data from foreign countries, some 385,468 U.S. citizens emigrated during the 1960s, with Canada (164,310) and Australia (63,474) the most popular destinations.

America as the asylum of mankind. "While the American people, as in the past, welcome the oppressed of other lands," the commissioners declared, "care should be taken that immigration be such both in quality and in quantity as not to make too difficult the process of assimilation." Least desirable, decided the commission, were unskilled bachelors, who intended to return to Europe after a season's work in the United States. Immigrants with young children who attended U.S. public schools, by contrast, tended to be assimilated relatively rapidly.

Underlying the commission's views was the widely shared assumption that America was a fully developed national community, of which immigrants had only to become part. The United States was a nation like other nations, possessing, for instance, but one national language—no matter how many different tongues could be heard in the streets of New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.

Requiring immigrants to become unreserved members of

the mature body of free citizens was a logical outgrowth of the voluntaristic "social contract" thinking that had predominated in America ever since the 17th century. American tradition did not allow for permanently foreign elements within the "body" of the people. Immigrants from Asia, the commissioners judged, had shown by their refusal to assimilate that they did not intend ever to become American; therefore, the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and other measures which barred further immigration from Asia were justified. Those Europeans who failed to learn how to read and write even their native language or to acquire the skills of a craft, the commissioners suspected, would become more of a burden than an asset to American society. Hence, the commissioners recommended the adoption of a literacy test (enacted by Congress in 1917 over President Woodrow Wilson's veto) as a prerequisite to entry, and the exclusion of unskilled laborers. The commissioners also urged annual quotas by "race" such as were later imposed in 1921, 1924, and 1927.*

The Dillingham commission's notions about immigration, on the whole, echoed those of most Americans—as the laws of the following decades attest. The commission's position was more chauvinistic than crudely racist, more restrictionist than isolationist, and uncompromisingly assimilationist.

Reblending the Stocks

Yet grotesquely racist arguments *did* play an important part in public discussion. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a leading restrictionist, argued in 1904 that the best "amalgamation" of "stocks" had already been achieved in centuries past: the combination of Saxons, Angles and Jutes, along with Normans and Celts, to form one "English race." "The process in the New World," explained the Boston Republican, "was merely a reblending of the old stocks." The influx of different immigrants since 1880, Lodge warned, endangered the

*Taking note of the various, mostly contradictory, anthropological schemes of racial classification, the commission in its *Dictionary of Races or Peoples* relied mainly on language-based categories. About the English "race," the *Dictionary* stated that it was "a very composite product" by linguistic as well as physical criteria. As for the "German race," the *Dictionary* noted that it did not exist, if a definition were based on purely physical characteristics. (Among the Germans, it declared, were to be found "some of the broadest-headed men in Europe" as well as "some of the longest-headed.") The report thus eschewed the crudest form of pseudo-biological racism that undergirded many arguments in favor of immigration restriction. In deciding whether to classify Jewish immigrants according to the countries they were leaving, or as one racial group, the commission pragmatically accepted the majority opinion among Jewish scholars who were asked for advice, and grouped all Jews together.

superior quality of the blend.

After Israel Zangwill's theatrical triumph of 1908, racists sought to conscript the melting-pot image into their parade of alarums. "If the Melting Pot is allowed to boil without control," asserted amateur anthropologist and historian Madison Grant in 1916, "the type of native American of colonial descent will become as extinct as the Athenian of the age of Pericles and the Viking of the days of Rollo." Popular discussion of immigration throughout this period took for granted the existence of fixed, inherited "racial" characteristics. Thus, a University of Nebraska sociologist, Edward Ross, declared in 1901, "When peoples and races meet there is a silent struggle to determine *which* shall do the assimilating," and he warned against the possibility of "race suicide."

'Americanization Day'

But most U.S. sociologists before World War I seem to have been confident of American society's assimilative powers. They looked at fiercer struggles between nations and nationality groups elsewhere in the world, and judged America relatively successful by comparison. Sarah Simons, a Washington, D.C., sociologist, in 1901 even advanced a distinction between "democratic" assimilation (i.e., what was happening in the United States) and "aristocratic" assimilation (i.e., the repressive measures taken by European governments against ethnic minorities, such as the Germanizing campaign against the Danes in Schleswig and the various Russification programs of the tsars).

Sociologists also contrasted the southern and eastern European immigrants with three racial groups in America—the Chinese, the Indians, and the blacks—and concluded that the U.S. system had already dealt with its severest challenges. The United States had excluded Chinese unskilled laborers by law since 1882, and rightly, argued Simons and her mentor, Columbia sociologist Richmond Mayo Smith. The Indians continued to pose a "problem" but certainly no threat to the social order. As for the Afro-Americans, biological "amalgamation" was never to be expected; yet the progress blacks had made since Emancipation led Simons to conclude that a "partial assimilation" had occurred. Eventually, she was sure, there would be "approximate" assimilation.

With the advent of World War I, however, confidence in the melting pot's efficacy was shaken. So-called hundred-percent patriots viewed any objections to U.S. support for Britain and

France or, later, to America's entry into the war as nothing short of treason. The chauvinistic elements of the German-American press, hailing the Kaiser's early triumphs over the Allies, scarcely eased Anglophiles' suspicions. Indeed, hysteria was spread by publishers and orators. Beginning in 1915, not only German-Americans but all "hyphenate" Americans were widely suspected of being disloyal and potential spies and saboteurs.

The 1917-18 war effort left no room for any "un-American" attachment to an ethnic subculture. American nationalism proved far stronger than the appeals of intellectuals such as antiwar essayist Randolph Bourne for a "transnational" American society. Shortly after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, President Woodrow Wilson advised a group of newly naturalized citizens: "A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American." Former President Theodore Roosevelt, to whom the 1914 edition of *The Melting Pot* was dedicated, and other hundred-percenters were much distressed when it was disclosed that one-fourth of the Army's recruits in 1917 and 1918 could not read English, and that of the 105 million inhabitants of the United States in 1918, five million could not speak it.



The Last Yankee, an 1888 cartoon by a British immigrant, expressed nativists' fears that strange newcomers endangered the "race" of true Americans, the Anglo-Saxons.

Library of Congress.

The Great War spurred the growth of an "Americanization" movement that had been born in the 1900s. (The first "Americanization Day" was celebrated on July 4, 1915.) The loosely organized movement aimed, through intensive adult education programs, to solve the language problem, the (largely imaginary) loyalty problem, and a medley of social problems, too (e.g., substandard diets and housing). The programs were mainly administered by private organizations, including the YMCA, churches, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and such self-help groups as the Hebrew Educational Society of Brooklyn and the Society for Italian Immigrants. Prominent businessmen, notably Henry Ford, helped by allowing Americanization classes to be held in their factories.

Another Switzerland?

The movement was encouraged and partly funded by the federal and state governments. The U.S. Department of the Interior published an *Americanization Bulletin* during 1918 and 1919. "We are fashioning a new people," proclaimed Interior Secretary Franklin Lane. "We are doing the unprecedented thing in saying that Slav, Teuton, Celt, and the other races that make up the civilized world are capable of being blended here." The Americanization movement, indeed, was founded on the "melting-pot" concept, although the Interior Department's Americanization Office favored the less vivid term "blend." A committee of specialists had advised federal officials in 1919 that "to the native-born American the term [melting pot] has no unpleasant meaning, but to the foreign-born . . . it suggests the kind of melting down which means to them the sacrifice of their native culture and character."

After the war, the Americanization movement was first overshadowed by the Red scare, then weakened by the recession in 1921 that undermined its financial support. Passage of the first quota law that same year made the need for an Americanization crusade seem less urgent. By then, many states had passed laws to promote the education of adult immigrants.

The first comprehensive sociological analysis of the immigration question—including a look back at the wartime experience—was also published in 1921. In *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Robert Park and Herbert Miller criticized the Americanization movement for having been overly aggressive. Assimilation of the third generation, they argued, was all but inevitable in a society so clearly defined as the United States. Americans needed only to show some tolerance while the pro-


cess took place—tolerance of all sorts of immigrant organizations and of the use of languages other than English.

Whereas Park and Miller deemed “cultural pluralism” a transitory stage, a few young liberal intellectuals thought America should embrace it as an ideal. One of them, philosopher Horace M. Kallen, a founder of the New School for Social Research in New York and the son of a rabbi from Germany, in fact coined the term “cultural pluralism” in 1924. Immigrants, he observed, “may change their clothes, their politics, their wives, their religion, their philosophies, to a greater or lesser extent: they cannot change their grandfathers.” Kallen urged the United States to become “a federation or commonwealth of nationalities” roughly on the model of Switzerland.

He did not find many sympathizers. The majority of Americans and their elected representatives took a less idealistic view. In three separate pieces of legislation passed by the U.S. Congress during the 1920s, they decided not to take chances and determined that from 1927 on, the annual number of immigrants from Europe was to be limited to a bit over 150,000. Only immigration from Canada and Latin America would be unrestricted. The 150,000 places, moreover, were to be allotted according to national quotas: e.g., 65,000 for Great Britain, 30,000 for Germany, 17,000 for Ireland—but only 6,500 for Poland, 5,800 for Italy, and 377 for Romania. This policy of giving prospective immigrants vastly unequal welcomes depending on their national origins persisted until 1965. Even Jews trying to escape the Nazis had to wait for quota slots. Only with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 did the loosening of the national-origins quota system begin, and only with the 1965 Immigration Act did it finally come to an end.


The United States continues to be the most attractive destination for emigrants. But there is no going back to the lost era of unrestricted migration. That epoch in world history has ended, and the trend toward strict control of the movement of populations is now universal. The questions today are: How strict? And how to exercise control?

IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, by decade, 1821-1979



During the 1970s, the U.S. Spanish-origin population increased by 60 percent to 14.6 million. The black population, meanwhile, grew by only 17 percent—to 26.5 million. The number of Asians and Pacific Islanders rose from 1.5 million to 3.5 million—one-third of them living in California.

IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES, by region of birth, 1820-1979



THE HALF-OPEN DOOR

by Aaron Segal

Some Americans may jeer at such sentiments, but there are foreigners aplenty who still regard the United States, in Ronald Reagan's words, as an "island of freedom," a land placed here by "divine Providence" as a "refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe free." And if not to breathe free, then to make an honest buck.

In 1980, more than 1.25 million foreigners took up residence in the United States, a number that matches the record levels reached in the decade before World War I. These days, however, most of those seeking to enter the United States come from Latin America, the Caribbean, the Far East, and Indochina, rather than from southern and eastern Europe. Some of the newcomers are refugees. And many have entered illegally—crossing a river into Texas, beaching a boat on the Florida sands, obtaining a tourist visa and then staying here beyond the allotted time. While the United States has always harbored *some* illegal aliens, the scale today is unprecedented, involving perhaps 3.5 to five million individuals at any given moment.

Where immigration is concerned, there has long existed a conflict in the United States between (at its emotional extremes) the starry-eyed idealists and the hard-hearted xenophobes, between the Pollyannas and the Chicken Littles. Does the current wave of new arrivals represent a serious threat? Is the situation out of control?

Some Americans clearly think so. "In the 19th century," former Ambassador Clare Booth Luce observed last year, "the United States absorbed 40 million immigrants. But the vast majority were of a fundamental [European] culture, and they were all white." Some educators and sociologists see the United States becoming a bilingual society, with all the attendant problems of national cohesion one finds in bilingual Belgium or Canada. Law enforcement officers worry that the U.S. border has become dangerously porous.

Above all, with an unemployment rate now topping 10 percent for the first time since the Great Depression, there is resentment among American workers, particularly among low-income, unskilled workers, over the competition for jobs. Debate on immigration has historically coincided with periods of high unemployment and recession. Today, demands to restrict foreign labor parallel demands for protection against imported au-



Bill Frakes/Miami Herald-Black Star.

Exhausted after an 850-mile trip in a crowded boat, a Haitian reaches shore near Miami in 1980, hoping he has left poverty behind.

tomobiles and steel. With restrictionists as with protectionists, what counts is the economic pinch now and in the future, not devotion to abstract ideals.

Citing one estimate that immigration at present rates would add 35 million people to the U.S. population by the year 2000, Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky warned in 1981: "Those 35 million people will need land, water, energy, and food. Where are we going to find those resources unless we ask our citizens to sacrifice more?" Many legislators on Capitol Hill have been asking similar questions. Indeed, the Senate, by an overwhelming margin, has already passed a measure that, if signed into law, would represent the first major overhaul of American immigration policy in nearly two decades.

Widespread unease over immigration did not appear overnight. Its advance has come by increments, responding to events, media coverage, and perceived trends. Immigration first attracted significant public attention during the mid-1960s when, in the wake of new restrictions placed on their entry, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans who once might legally have entered the United States began crossing the Rio Grande *illeg-*

ally in search of temporary work. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, with a 1,950-mile southern border to patrol, has a force of 2,700—less manpower than the Philadelphia police department can muster—and was capable of apprehending and repatriating only a small fraction of entrants. By the early 1970s, some demographers were predicting that, within 15 years, persons of Hispanic origin would surpass blacks to become the largest minority group in the United States. Contrary to popular belief, this surge, the researchers said, would occur almost entirely as a result of natural increase among the many Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans already U.S. citizens.

Dumping Ground

Then, in 1975, came the fall of South Vietnam, a moment etched in the collective memory by a photograph of the last evacuation by helicopter of Americans and Vietnamese from the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon. In subsequent months, scores of thousands of Vietnamese were transplanted to the United States. Some Americans saw them (wrongly, in most cases) as undesirables and probable long-term economic burdens. "They are out of their environment," a Los Angeles carpenter told the *New York Times* in 1975. "They can't speak English and they will be on welfare before they get off the airplane. And who pays for that? We do." The first group of Vietnamese refugees was soon followed by a second—the Vietnamese "boat people"—and, as war and repression in Indochina continued, by thousands of Cambodians and Laotians.

By the late 1970s, Americans had begun noticing another influx of "boat people"—Haitians this time, beaching their leaky craft on Florida's shores. Soon they were arriving at the rate of 15,000 a year. Then came the Cubans, 125,000 of them, ferried Dunkirk-style by a flotilla of American small craft to Key West, Florida, from the Cuban port of Mariel. President Jimmy Carter refused to halt the 23-week sealift by force. Ultimately, many Americans came to believe that Fidel Castro had tricked Washington into accepting Cuba's outcasts—including, as it turned out, nearly 2,000 convicted criminals. Actually, most of

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the Mariel Cubans were not selected by the regime but opted on their own to leave. Nevertheless, the Key West–Mariel sealift served to buttress the contention that the United States was being played for a sucker.

Roger Conner, executive director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, commented in 1982 that the Mariel incident "was to us what the Santa Barbara oil spill was to the environmental movement in the 1960s. The impression was created that America was being overwhelmed. Our humanitarian instincts remain intact, but we also fear that the U.S. is becoming a dumping ground for the world's poor."

There is no denying the power of the images that have flashed into American living rooms of late. Thus, the bobbing armada off Key West disappeared from TV screens only to be replaced by scenes of Cubans rioting at federal detention centers or scrounging for handouts on Miami streets. Soon afterwards came grisly pictures of Salvadorans dead of thirst and exposure in the vast Arizona desert just north of Mexico. Such reports, accurate enough in themselves, cannot help but create, when taken together, a distorted impression of most immigration. Let us consider a recent year—1980—and look at who entered the United States and how.

'Special Entrants'

There is, first of all, a ceiling on the number of immigrant visas that the government may legally issue each year. The Immigration Act of 1965 set the limit at 290,000, but a recent amendment lowered it to 270,000. Preference is given to professionals and skilled workers. In 1980, every one of the 290,000 places was taken, often by people who had spent years on a waiting list.

No limits apply to close relatives of U.S. citizens, who are admitted to the country automatically. In 1980, 151,000 of these spouses, children, and parents (not siblings, cousins, or in-laws) entered the United States.

Beginning with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Congress has made special provision for refugees. Thus, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allowed some 200,000 individuals, mostly Europeans whose lives had been shattered by war and the advent of Communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, to immigrate to the United States, regardless of the discriminatory national-origin quotas then in effect. In subsequent years, the United States has taken in millions of such persons. The Refugee Act of 1980 defines a refugee

NEW ARRIVALS: FROM THE SOUTH

Of the 7.5 million legal immigrants who took up residence in the United States between 1960 and 1979, some 25 percent came from the Caribbean and Latin America (excluding Mexico). The most prominent groups included:

Cubans: The 1980 census reported more than 800,000 persons of Cuban origin or extraction in the United States, more than 85 percent of them concentrated in four states—Florida, New Jersey, New York, and California, with the largest number (470,000) in Florida. During the decade after Fidel Castro's victory in 1959, more than 445,000 Cubans fled to the United States. Many were admitted as political refugees. By and large these Cubans were well educated; many had visited the United States before. With their savings and their entrepreneurial skills, they transformed Miami into a center of Cuban exile culture and the bilingual "capital of the Caribbean." By 1980, the former refugees and their offspring could boast per capita incomes and educational levels almost on a par with the national average.

The saga of the 125,000 "Mariel refugees" of 1980, however, is quite different. Most of these folk were young, semiskilled, and unfamiliar with American ways. And all told, they have thus far had a rough time of it, afflicted by joblessness, cutbacks in federal aid, and the antipathies of some Floridians. Blacks' resentment over the arrival of still more Cubans helped fuel three days of rioting that left 18 dead in Miami's largely black Liberty City section in 1980.

West Indians: Making up the largest group of blacks to migrate voluntarily to the United States, West Indians (and their descendants) have typically been high achievers, significantly outpacing native-born blacks in income, education, and occupational status. Perhaps because blacks in the British West Indies were able to gain experience in local commerce and bureaucracy long denied to blacks in the United States, Americans of West Indian ancestry have accounted for a disproportionately large share of U.S. black leadership.

The initial migration of West Indians to the United States occurred during the first three decades of this century. A second wave gathered force during the 1950s and '60s as a result of population pressures in Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and the rest of the West Indies. Thanks to a restrictive British immigration law enacted in 1962 and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act, this wave finally

as anyone outside of his country who is unwilling or unable to return because of persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecution" on account of race, religion, nationality, or politics. In 1980, 232,000 refugees entered the United States, most of them Indochinese, but also a significant number of Soviet Jews and

"broke." Legal West Indian arrivals alone increased to over 25,000 annually by 1970 and to over 74,000 in 1979.

Dominicans: Dictator Rafael Trujillo (1891–1961) drastically curbed emigration during his 30-year reign over the Dominican Republic. After his death, legal and illegal entry of Dominicans to the United States became commonplace. While only 756 Dominicans immigrated officially in 1960, 13,081 did so in 1975. In addition, large numbers of Dominicans (almost 70,000 in 1975) have come to the United States as temporary visitors. Many of them, predictably, overstay their visas. In all, more than 300,000 Dominicans now live in the United States. Like others from the Western Hemisphere, many Dominicans like to alternate between living and working at home and living and working in the United States.

Haitians: "We are not thieves, we are not murderers, why are they keeping us here?" asked one of the 2,177 Haitians being detained in early 1982 at one of 17 U.S. locations. The answer: The Reagan administration refused to regard the Haitians as political refugees from Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc") Duvalier's regime; in Washington's view, they were merely fleeing poverty and so were illegal aliens. The poorest Haitians arrive by boat on Florida beaches. The U.S. Coast Guard was granted permission in 1981 by the government in Port-au-Prince to intercept such "boat people" in Haitian waters. This has resulted in a sharp drop in illegal entries. Even so, the number of Haitians here is believed to be upwards of 300,000, of whom half entered legally. Most hold low-paying factory and maintenance jobs, although there also exists a small professional class. In America, Haitians are set apart by their Creole language and culture from U.S. blacks and Hispanics.

Colombians: The 1970 census found 85,000 Colombians in the United States. During the next decade, 71,000 arrived—more than from any other country in South America, and half again as many as from Ecuador, which had the next highest total. Counting illegal immigrants, the total population of Colombians here may be more than 350,000. They are concentrated in New York City, many inhabiting Queens' Jackson Heights section, which they have renamed Chapinerito after a prosperous suburb of Bogota. Like the Cubans—and unlike other Hispanic groups—the Colombians here tend to be well educated. Most Colombian families in the United States have at least one wage earner, and many have two; very few have none. Between 1960 and 1970, the welfare rate in Jackson Heights rose by less than one percent.

Armenians. And these, like most of America's refugees, have been admitted in an orderly way after having been screened and, before that, given temporary asylum elsewhere.

The refugee figure for 1980 does not include the 135,000 Cubans and Haitians who arrived, uninvited, that same year.

They were given the designation "special entrants," reflecting the confusion in Washington over just how to deal with them. These special entrants accounted for only about one-sixth of all legal immigration to the United States in 1980 but for a disproportionate share of public attention. To put the arrival of these 135,000 impoverished Cubans and Haitians into some perspective, one might consider that Pakistan, with a population one-third that of the United States and a land area the size of Texas, has taken in 2.6 million displaced Afghans since 1978. The principal "dumping ground" for the world's poor remains the poor nations of the world.

Heavy Traffic

All told, slightly more than 800,000 people in 1980 were officially granted permission to take up residence in the United States. In addition, of course, perhaps as many as a half-million others, mainly Mexicans but also including Dominicans, Haitians, Colombians, and others, came into the country illegally. These illegal aliens are a difficult group to assess. They lead clandestine lives and travel frequently back to their native lands. It is often assumed in public debate that their presence is a net liability. In fact, as we shall see, there is much evidence that this is not the case.

Ironically, the "problem" of illegal aliens was, in certain respects, legislated into existence. Congress took the first step in 1964 by abolishing the Bracero Program, launched in 1942 to ease a U.S. farm labor shortage caused by World War II. Under the program, Mexican field hands or *braceros*—more than 400,000 of them annually by the late 1950s—were allowed temporarily into the United States to pick crops in Texas, California, Arizona, and other needy states. With the Bracero Program's end, these seasonal "guest workers" stood to lose a prime source of income—if, that is, they obeyed the law. While it was a crime to enter the United States illegally (punished usually by deportation), it was not a crime, under the terms of the "Texas proviso," for American employers to hire illegal aliens.* North-bound traffic therefore remained heavy.

In 1965, taking step two, Congress enacted and President Lyndon Johnson signed a comprehensive new immigration bill, one that, in Johnson's words, "corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American nation." Under the old national-origins quota system devised during the 1920s, immi-

*The specific exemption for employers from the legal proscriptions on harboring illegals was included in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act at the behest of Texas farmers.



New Jersey State Museum Collection, Trenton. © Estate of Ben Shahn.

An Immigrant Family (1941) is sympathetically portrayed by Ben Shahn. The artist was eight when his own family came to the United States from Lithuania in 1906, part of a mass exodus.

gration from the Western Hemisphere had been unrestricted and annual quotas for northern European nations had been deliberately set high; immigration by Asians, Africans, and other unwanted groups had been not only discouraged but effectively prohibited. The 1965 law scrapped this system, with the result that immigration to the United States by Asians increased from an average of only 21,000 a year during the early 1960s to more than 150,000 annually, not including refugees. It also placed a cap of 120,000 on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. And the Immigration Act required prospective entrants to show that they had been offered jobs in the United States at the wage rates prevailing in the communities where they proposed to settle. All of these restrictions provided a further inducement to illegal entry.

In 1976—step three—the law was modified again. This time, every country was given a maximum quota of 20,000, even as an overall hemispheric ceiling remained in place. Mexico, which had been sending 40,000 legal immigrants to the United States every year, suddenly saw its quota cut in half. Other nations, particularly in the Caribbean, faced the same problem.

Congress could revise U.S. immigration laws, but it could

NEW ARRIVALS: FROM ASIA

Rivalling in number the Latin Americans as newcomers to America's shores have been Asians, accounting for 24 percent of immigrant visas granted between 1960 and 1979. The most important groups include:

Chinese: Not until 1943, with Nationalist China a wartime ally, did the United States repeal the racist and restrictionist Chinese Exclusion Acts. And it was not until 1965, when the new Immigration Act abolished the old national-origins quota system, that legal discrimination against prospective Chinese entrants finally ceased. The predictable result: a sudden influx of Chinese, 151,000 of them between 1970 and 1979. The newcomers, mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, have settled in the Chinatowns of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York.

These communities were ill prepared to absorb the Chinese immigrants, many of whom are now crowded into tenements. Those unfamiliar with English have often been exploited and underpaid in Chinatown restaurants and sweatshops. Unemployment has been a problem, too. Even so, one can look to the past. As discrimination eased after World War II, large numbers of Chinese-Americans moved beyond the Chinatowns. By 1970, the proportion of Chinese-American males in professional and managerial occupations—40 percent—was higher than that of any other ethnic group in the United States. The recent immigrants, or their children, may follow in these footsteps.

Filipinos: The number of entrants from the Philippines had been running at around 3,000 a year during the early 1960s, but the 1965 Immigration Act prompted a dramatic increase. Within a decade, some 276,000 legal Filipino immigrants entered the United States. More than two-thirds were professionals or skilled workers. Dentists, doctors, and pharmacists usually had to work at blue-collar jobs until they could get licensed. But nurses, whose training in the Philippines was similar to that given in the United States, had far less difficulty. In 1968, one-third of all licenses issued to foreign nurses was granted to Filipinos. There are more than 770,000 Filipinos in the United States.

Koreans: Nine out of 10 of the roughly 350,000 South Koreans now living in the United States have been here for fewer than 15 years. Again, it was the 1965 Immigration Act that made the difference. Well-educated, many of them teachers, professionals, and ad-

not change the underlying realities: on the one hand, a rapidly growing number of people in neighboring lands looking for work; and, on the other, farmers, restaurateurs, small manufacturers, and ranchers in the United States willing to provide it. With legal roads to immigration narrowing, the inevitable re-

ministrators, these new immigrants have settled mainly in Los Angeles, New York City, Washington, D.C., and a few other major cities. Los Angeles's Korean population in 10 years mushroomed from 5,000 to over 150,000. There, the Koreans have moved into, and revitalized, a decaying neighborhood just west of downtown—now known as Little Korea. All in all, the Korean immigrants appear to be writing a "success story" in the classic American immigrant tradition.

Indians: The 1965 Immigration Act not only eliminated the national-origins quota system but also gave preference to professionals and their families. During the next 10 years, nearly 46,000 Indian scientists, engineers, professors, teachers, physicians, and businessmen—along with 47,000 wives and children—came to the United States. So great was the "brain drain" that, to stem the outflow, the Indian government was forced to upgrade some professional salaries (and work environments). The legal Indian population in the United States had grown to more than 360,000 by 1980, with large concentrations on the West Coast, in Chicago and New York City, and in various university towns. Urban, educated, and fluent in English, the Indian immigrants have built new lives here with relative ease.

Indochinese: The first wave of nearly 130,000 Indochinese (mostly Vietnamese) refugees reached the United States in the spring of 1975. Most of these had been among South Vietnam's upper crust—officers, doctors, lawyers, senior civil servants. Many spoke and read some English. After acquiring "sponsors" (typically in California, Texas, Pennsylvania or the Washington, D.C., area), these Vietnamese have generally done well. They have opened restaurants, grocery stores, and other small businesses, and fostered their children's education in U.S. schools with marked success.

But the more than 510,000 Indochinese refugees (including many Laotians and Cambodians) who have arrived in the later waves of "boat people"—many of them uneducated farmers and fishermen—are another story. Seven out of 10 are on welfare or receive special federal benefits—to the annoyance of other low-income city-dwellers, who also resent the competition for jobs and public housing. In some places, ethnic tensions run high. A conflict over fishing rights in Seadrift, Texas, in 1979, for instance, led to the murder of an American and the retaliatory torching of Vietnamese trawlers. The continuing recession and aid cutbacks have worsened the plight of the most recent group of Indochinese refugees.

sult, as the Population Council's Charles B. Keely noted in 1982, was "a large immediate increase in illegal migration."

Precisely what impact illegal aliens are having on American society, and on the nation's economy, is a matter of controversy. The evidence, consisting of anecdote, impression, and limited

sociological surveys, often makes generalization unreliable. However, about the largest (and most scrutinized) group of "undocumented workers" in the United States, the Mexicans, some tentative conclusions may be drawn.

The Mexicans who enter the United States illegally are quite distinct from those who do so as legal immigrants. The latter tend to be lower-middle-class, modestly educated natives of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and the other states of northern Mexico. They are very upwardly mobile. Upon arriving in the United States, they settle initially in the Mexican-American neighborhoods that now dot—or envelop—nearly every city in the American Southwest, not to mention Denver, Chicago, and Milwaukee. Relying on hard work and family unity to ensure success, they are quick to learn English and insist on English, the language of opportunity, for their children.

By contrast, illegal aliens are predominantly young (under 30), single males with little or no formal education. Many of them hail from the impoverished villages of Mexico's semiarid Central Highlands, where cyclical migration to and from the United States is a tradition that goes back three generations. Typically, they take jobs as construction laborers, dishwashers, and factory workers. Though low-paying by American standards, notes the University of California's Wayne Cornelius, "the vast majority of the jobs now held by Mexican migrants—even the illegals—pay at least the minimum wage and usually a good deal more." Most Mexicans send a high proportion of their earnings home—an estimated \$3 billion in 1979.

Jobs Unwanted

The effects of illegal aliens on the U.S. economy are a mixture of good and bad. The illegals eat, drink, pay rent, and seek entertainment like everyone else, and therefore pump money into the local community. But the available evidence also suggests that they have displaced some U.S. citizens from jobs; in communities where they predominate, they may also hold down general wage levels. On the other hand, many illegals are taking jobs that Americans, grown accustomed to certain working conditions and levels of wage (and welfare) benefits, simply will not accept. Thus, as a result of "Project Jobs"—a federal crackdown last spring on illegal aliens in nine cities—one furniture manufacturer in Santa Ana, California, lost 113 employees in the raid but afterwards was able to attract applicants for only half of the openings. Former Senator S. I. Hayakawa, Republican of California, once predicted that "if the illegal aliens were thrown out

of Los Angeles today, three-quarters of the restaurants would be closed tomorrow morning."

Most studies suggest that the Mexican illegals—simply because they are young, healthy, and childless—are less of a drain on public services than are Americans. The U.S. Department of Labor estimated in 1976 that 73 percent of undocumented Mexican workers had federal income tax withheld from their paychecks. Three-quarters of them paid Social Security taxes—for retirement benefits that will rarely be collected. Fewer than four percent of the illegals had children in school, and not even one percent had received welfare benefits.

'Fortress America'

On the whole, then, the U.S. economy is probably not harmed by its undocumented work force. That is another way of saying that while some portions of the economy (and population) are harmed, enough others benefit to offset the damage. There are, as a result, many "interests" with a considerable stake in what the U.S. government decides to do about the "illegals"—and by extension, about immigration generally.

President Jimmy Carter learned this firsthand—his tutors included Sunbelt governors, black leaders, Hispanic groups, union chiefs, farm-state Senators, and big-city mayors, not to mention the President of Mexico and sundry Caribbean Prime Ministers—when he attempted to move an "immigration reform" bill through Congress in 1977. Concerned about high rates of unemployment among minorities as well as the security of U.S. borders, Carter proposed an immigration plan that he considered to be a compromise. In essence, his idea was to give amnesty to illegal aliens already in the United States while taking steps to better police the border with Mexico. The plan, however, was immediately opposed for different reasons both by "restrictionists" and by pro-immigration lobbies. The next year, Carter and Congress appointed a Select Commission on U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, chaired by the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame. One of the commission's implicit missions was to defer the whole issue until after the 1980 presidential election.

The immigration commission's report, when it appeared in 1981, contained three key recommendations.

First, it urged Congress to raise the annual worldwide ceiling on legal immigration by two-thirds to 450,000 for five years (thereby thinning out the vast backlog of accumulated applications). Then, while endorsing the 1980 Refugee Act's definition



Mike Peters/Dayton Daily News.

of a “refugee,” it recommended that the United States “not hesitate to deport those persons who come to U.S. shores—even when they come in large numbers—who do not meet the established criteria.” Finally, the commission suggested various means to deter the entry of illegal aliens: reinforcing the Border Patrol; establishing civil and criminal penalties for employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens; and devising some “more secure” form of worker identification so that employers could be sure job applicants were entitled to work in the United States.

Perhaps the most cogent point made by the immigration commission concerned the nature of the harm done by illegal immigration. The real problem, the commissioners agreed, was not economics, not bilingualism, not ethnic tensions, not national security, not any of the problems usually cited. “Most serious is the fact that illegality breeds illegality. The presence of a substantial number of undocumented illegal aliens in the United States has resulted not only in a disregard for immigration law but in the breaking of minimum wage and occupational safety laws, and statutes against smuggling as well.”

After reviewing the report, the Reagan administration floated its own recommendations, then threw its weight behind a bipartisan immigration bill sponsored by Senator Alan K. Simpson (R.-Wyo.) and Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli (D.-Ky.). The

Senate passed the measure in August 1982 by a vote of 81 to 18. The House has yet to act, but it is likely that if *any* immigration bill comes to the President's desk, it will resemble the bill passed by the Senate.

Briefly, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would raise the ceiling on legal immigration to 425,000—but include close relatives of U.S. citizens under it. Illegal aliens resident in the United States prior to 1977 would receive amnesty and be eligible for legal residence. Employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens would be subject to fines, and, if a “pattern or practice” of violation is involved, to a jail term of up to six months. The President, meanwhile, would be directed to establish within three years a “secure system to determine employment eligibility”—possibly involving a national identity card. Finally, a small existing “guest worker” program, under which some 36,000 foreign laborers toiled temporarily here in 1981, would be expanded.

The debate over the Simpson-Mazzoli bill is the kind that often results when an issue cuts across familiar political lines. In this case, some environmentalists, chauvinists, and union leaders find themselves on the same side; as far as a national identity card is concerned, so do Hispanics, conservatives, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Historically, immigration bills have embodied scores of uneasy compromises, yielding laws that may be unworkable or merely irrelevant. Still, insofar as immigration is not a real but a psychological affliction, the fact that Congress periodically steps in to “do something” about the problem may actually help solve it.

Illegal aliens, however, do not exist only in the imagination. There are, realistically, only two ways of ridding the United States of its undocumented workers—neither of which would enjoy widespread popular support. On the one hand, one could grant all comers legal status, thus redefining the problem out of existence. On the other, one could adopt a real “get-tough” policy. This, of course, would require regular policing of hundreds of thousands of small- and medium-sized businesses, plus a massive mobilization to patrol U.S. borders and coastlines. The cost of maintaining a “fortress America” would be enormous.

Ultimately, the United States probably must resign itself to a policy of muddling through, tinkering with the statutes as circumstances change—but never enacting a law that either commits us fully to our highest ideals or panders shamelessly to recurring fears. America has entered, perhaps forever, the era of the half-open door.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

IMMIGRATION

As long as there have been people, there has been mobility. "The country now called Hellas," wrote the Greek historian Thucydides in the fifth century B.C., "had in ancient times no settled population. On the contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence."

Yet no Greek or Roman or Mongol witnessed anything comparable to the mass movement of Europeans from the Old World to the New between the 17th and 20th centuries. In the 100 years after 1830 alone, some 60 million persons crossed the Atlantic, two-thirds of them bound for the United States.

"Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America," remarks Harvard historian Oscar Handlin in *The Uprooted* (Atlantic-Little, Brown, 2nd ed., 1973, cloth & paper), his classic account of the great wave of immigration to the United States. "Then I discovered that the immigrants *were* American history."

Handlin, a reigning figure in the field, has written or edited numerous works on immigration, among them *Immigration as a Factor in American History* (Prentice-Hall, 1965, out of print) and a study of *Boston's Immigrants* (Harvard, 1959, cloth & paper). Other general works: Philip Taylor's *Distant Magnet* (Harper, 1972, paper only) and Maldwyn Allen Jones's *American Immigration* (Univ. of Chicago, 1960).

"The spirit of American nativism," notes historian John Higham in *Strangers in the Land* (Greenwood, 1981, cloth; Atheneum, 1963, paper), "appeared long before the word was coined about 1840 and had its

deepest impact long after the word had largely dropped out of common parlance." Boston was the scene of anti-Catholic riots in 1823, 1826, and 1829, and in 1834, the Ursuline Convent in Charlestown was burned by local roughnecks who viewed the institution as a symbol of the new Irish competition they faced for jobs.

Yet in the case of the Irish, the nativist opposition backfired. Having arrived in America as "ready-made Democrats" with a taste for politics, the Irish were impelled by discrimination and nativist agitation "into citizenship and the ballot." So concludes George Potter in his sprightly *To the Golden Door* (Greenwood, 1974), a tale that ends with multitudes of Irish volunteers coming to the Union's defense in 1861. The Civil War, says Potter, represented an "ordeal by blood [that] sealed the Catholic Irish and the Republic indissolubly."

By the onset of World War I, German-Americans, too, had "made good" here—too good, in fact. As Richard O'Connor relates, *The German-Americans* (Little, Brown, 1968) were "serenely confident of their place in the national life"; they deluded themselves into thinking they could openly oppose U.S. involvement in the Great War without arousing nativist hysteria. The result: "A scar on German-Americanism which took almost half a century to heal."

Between 1820 and 1970, 6.8 million Germans immigrated to the United States—more than any other nationality. Yet, owing in part to the continuing depredations of the fatherland, notes La Vern J.

Ripley in his scholarly work **The German-Americans** (Twayne, 1976), Americans of German extraction de-emphasized their ethnic heritage. After the 1952 election and Dwight Eisenhower's victory, a distinct "German bloc" in the electorate largely disappeared.

The small but prosperous German-Jewish community in the United States viewed with alarm the arrival, starting in the 1880s, of two million lower-class Jews from Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere. As it happened, writes Irving Howe, literary critic and historian, in his best-selling **World of Our Fathers** (Harcourt, 1976, cloth; Bantam, 1981, paper), most of these east European Jews soon set up small businesses (women's garment shops, cleaning stores) and eventually escaped the slums of New York's East Side. Success, Howe contends, had its price: "American society, by its very nature, simply made it all but impossible for the culture of Yiddish to survive. . . . It allowed the Jews a life far more 'normal' than anything their most visionary programs had foreseen, and all that it asked—it did not even ask, it merely rendered easy and persuasive—was that the Jews surrender their collective self."

The Jewish migration was essentially a movement of families. By contrast, most of the four million Italians who legally entered the United States between 1891 and 1920 were men. Many of these young peasants from southern Italy, observes sociologist Joseph Lopreato in **Italian Americans** (Random, 1970, paper only), were so-called "birds of passage" who came not to settle permanently but only to earn a

modest fortune and return home.

The experiences of the Poles, the Hungarians, the Chinese, and many others who have come to the United States are in the **Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups** (Harvard, 1980), which provides detailed entries on nearly all of the newcomers, past and present. One flaw: The Harvard volume's contributors, as its editors note, tend to celebrate each ethnic group's achievements—and to slight any prejudices, fears, or hatreds except those of "the dominant society."

After studying **Assimilation in American Life** (Oxford, 1964, paper only), sociologist Milton M. Gordon concludes that most Americans (intellectuals aside) still tend to find their close friends within their own ethnic group and social class. Key works in the debate over the significance of ethnicity: Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's **Beyond the Melting Pot** (MIT, 2nd ed., 1970, cloth & paper) and Michael Novak's **The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics** (New York: MacMillan, 1973, paper).

It may be that the celebration of ethnicity is a luxury of the American-born, not one that most immigrants care to pursue. In **On Becoming American** (Houghton, 1978), writer Ted Morgan describes how he decided during the 1970s to renounce his French title (Count), change his name (from Sanche de Gramont), and become a U.S. citizen. "The true American," he writes, "is the immigrant, for he is American by choice. His nationality was not handed to him with his birth certificate. It came as the result of a deliberate effort. . . . The true American is the one just off the boat."

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

SIX ARMIES IN NORMANDY

by John Keegan
Viking, 1982
365 pp., \$17.95

Five years ago John Keegan's pioneering study, *The Face of Battle*, remedied one weakness of "traditional" military history by expanding its scope to include not only generalship—why battles were won or lost—but also the predicament of the soldier: why men stayed to fight at all, and what they experienced when they did. The battles he chose to analyze (Agincourt, Waterloo, the

Somme) varied widely in size, expanse, duration, weaponry (and therefore tactics), but all revealed similar patterns of human fear, inducements and coercion, and honor.

In this volume, Keegan concentrates on the Normandy invasion of World War II and the willingness of millions of men from several countries to position themselves at the "point of maximum risk" to repel Hitler. Among the military disasters of the Third Reich, Normandy was numerically and strategically the worst. Stalingrad cost the Germans 20 divisions, and the titanic White Russia offensive, 28. But the Western Allies in Normandy removed 27 of 48 infantry and 11 of 12 armored divisions from the German order of battle in the West. They denied Germany its richest economic plum (occupied France), closed down the submarine war by capturing the Channel ports, and put half a million Germans out of combat.

Keegan, professor of military studies at Sandhurst, chose the Norman battle of the nations because he wanted to know how the six armies there mirrored their societies, or, as in the case of the free French and Poles, served as last defiant symbols of their occupied nations. Hence the episodic narrative, broken into national epics: the American airborne assault in the darkness behind the D-Day beaches; the Canadians storming Juno beach, fearful of another Dieppe, which had devoured an entire brigade 22 months earlier; the Scottish and English yeomanry walking to their deaths in a premature breakout attempt; the enervated SS and Hitler Youth and simple German draftees struggling just to reach the battlefield through saturating air raids that killed or maddened half of them; the Poles fighting with a sense of holy sacrifice for three days and nights without relief, supplies, or sleep to plug the gap through which the Germans had hoped to retreat, thus dooming the very enemy that had torched their homeland and was at that moment crushing the Warsaw

uprising; finally, the Leclerc Division, restoring French honor in the liberation of Paris.

The vignettes are exquisite—surely this is our best account of the Battle of Normandy. But Keegan's first book taught us to reject the sort of military history that portrays masses acting in unison as if to a director's cues: charging bravely, retreating in panic, rallying at the critical moment. Yet here we read, "They were not numerous but willing to fight and . . . shot accurately." All of them willing? All good shots? "It was appropriate that the effect [German confusion] should have been produced by Americans." Why? Would not any skilled paratroopers have had the same effect, as the Germans did when they attacked and defeated the British on Crete in 1941?

Such a lapse may be explained by the attempt to describe a campaign rather than a day's battle. Because the scale is large (divisions and regiments), much of Keegan's time is necessarily spent with the generals. Occasional eyewitness accounts, especially of local actions on which larger outcomes hinged, fill in the picture, but compel one to ask how typical they are of common soldiers' experiences. The lesser emphasis on human details of battlefield existence may have derived as well from the overwhelmingly technological character of modern warfare. Aircraft, armored vehicles, rapid-fire guns, and rockets do battle; men are accessories, no longer in control of their environment. The invaders of June 6, especially paratroopers, tended to crawl away and sleep at the first opportunity; many subsequent casualties were psychological; the endless Allied air strikes invariably dropped a portion of their bombs on friendly troops—arbitrariness became the norm.

In the end, the national styles of warfare emerge less in battlefield behavior than in the a priori mentalities and a posteriori rituals of combat. When the 10 weeks' purgation ended, verdant Normandy was speckled with corpses. In time, the dead Americans were winnowed out and interred, with mass-productive regularity, beneath rows and rows of white cruciform headstones on the bluff above Omaha beach. Ten thousand Germans, on the other hand, found eternal community—*Gemeinschaft*—in collective graves marked by monumental, granite Iron Crosses. The British Imperial War Graves Commission, drawing on tradition and the models in Flanders and Picardy, seeded their dead among Crosses of Sacrifice, pergolas, mown walks, rose beds and flowering shrubs—English gardens on foreign soil.

If *Six Armies in Normandy* seems, despite its brilliance, to betray some of the faults of traditional military history, it was Keegan, after all, who taught us to sense those faults in the first place. And in his new book, he shares as before the common soldier's secret knowledge that (1) battle is insane; (2) insanity, sadly, has a place in a world unhealed. After Staff Sergeant Harrison Summers of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division had cleared a cluster of German strongpoints and accounted for 139 enemy deaths and prisoners while his men hung back in fear, a comrade asked him how he felt. "Not very good," said Summers. "It was all kind of crazy."

—Walter A. McDougall ('82)

**THE UNITED STATES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST:
Interests And Obstacles**

by Seth P. Tillman
Ind. Univ., 1982
333 pp. \$22.50

The late President Sadat of Egypt once recalled, back in 1971, that the first time he talked with Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco about the U.S. role in the Middle East, the American diplomat described it as being that of an "honest broker." Sadat said, "I can understand that." On his second visit, Sisco characterized the U.S. role as that of a "mailman." Sadat raised his eyebrows, but did not comment. Finally, on the third visit, the emissary came up with a new word—

"catalyst." Sadat, irritated by yet another change in metaphor, ordered, "Bring me a dictionary."

It is precisely for this subject—U.S. relations with the Middle East—that most of us need a dictionary, or at least a guiding hand. Without help, it is impossible to separate myth from reality, rhetoric from real intentions, or partisan views from objectivity. Tillman offers that help—and bravely does so at a time when any book on the subject risks being obsolete by the time it arrives in the bookstore.

A professor of international relations at Georgetown University and a former staff member of Senator William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee, Tillman combines in his study a strong historical perspective and a sense of day-to-day political exigencies. He begins his investigation with a helpful retrospective look at the long and arduous road leading to the Camp David accords. Tillman then moves on to the question of U.S. interests in the Middle East and how administrations since the 1940s have pursued them. He lists four basic U.S. goals: reliable access to the region's oil; the survival and security of Israel; détente with the Soviet Union; the "adherence to such principles as the peaceful settlement of disputes and the rights of peoples to self-determination." Tillman focuses, in his analysis of Washington's pursuit of these goals, on the Saudis, the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Russians. In the Saudi Arabia chapter, Tillman traces the history of U.S. relations with that oil-rich nation since the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. He also draws a psychological portrait of the present Saudi rulers that helps explain their ambivalent attitude toward the Palestinians (supportive yet wary) and their reasons (mainly a sense of Arab solidarity, or *umma*) for not joining the Camp David peace process.

Tillman's analysis of Israel's "politics of fear" helps to illuminate the events of last summer in Lebanon. Prime Minister Menachem Begin's involvement in the Zionist movement and his traditional belief in the special God of Israel make him loath to recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian claims to a homeland. Begin, who has made "defensible borders" the justification for his policy, is not alone among Israelis in viewing the Palestinian menace as greater than that of other Arab states: While the "latter threaten Israel with what they might *do*, the Palestinians threaten Israel with what they *are*, rival claimants to the same land."

Tillman shrewdly assesses the role of the Soviet Union in the region and concludes that a lasting Middle East settlement cannot be achieved without the cooperative efforts of both superpowers. As for the United

States, Tillman believes that it is time for it to trade the role of passive mediator for that of active arbiter of peace. Unless Washington is willing to place greater pressure on the Israelis to make concessions, the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region will most likely founder.

—*Mohamed I. Hakki*

**VOICES OF PROTEST:
Huey Long, Father
Coughlin, and the Great
Depression**

by Alan Brinkley
Knopf, 1982
348 pp. \$18.50

During Franklin Roosevelt's first term (1933–37), there flared up in national politics a bright light that transfixed millions of Americans, set a storm of violent words and lurid alarms racing through public life, then suddenly winked out. Huey Long (a U.S. Senator from Louisiana) and Father Charles Coughlin (an ambitious parish priest who began his radio ministry in a Detroit suburb) held immense radio audiences rapt with their separate but complementary calls for massive reforms of the nation's economic system. Widely popular and much-feared men, they urged taking swift public control of the banking and currency system, stripping all fortunes over \$1 million from the wealthy, and distributing the funds to those worth less than \$5,000. International bankers—evil, grasping men given to voluptuous opulence—were destroying the masses. Their rule must be swept away. They were driving people to the extreme of communism, that atheistic tyranny that threatened to sweep to victory in America. Long's "Share Our Wealth" campaign and Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice deeply alarmed FDR's advisers, and most histories of the period explain Roosevelt's abrupt leftward swing in 1935, his "Second New Deal," as an attempt to drain off their popular appeal. Then, in 1935, Long was assassinated. Coughlin's National Union Party and its presidential candidate, William Lemke, were buried in FDR's 1936 landslide victory. That suddenly, the phenomenon dissolved.

Brinkley, a young MIT historian, has done an unusual thing: He has taken this brief episode seriously. Giving us a readable narrative and judicious analysis, he makes us see deeply into American political life. Glowing even through Brinkley's modulated prose—primarily in well-selected quotations from letters to Long and Coughlin—is the passionate hatred toward plutocrats that the two demagogues released in their followers. Drawing an extended parallel with the Populist movement of the 1890s, Brinkley makes clear the almost unnoticed ideological and social shifts in American life which caused this partial revival of populist ideology to fail. He shows how the appeal of Coughlin, as the first exciting political voice in the new medium of radio, and then that of Long, could be emotionally powerful and broad, but finally shallow and vulnerable.

In sum, a rich slice of what may well have been the last hurrah, not simply of Huey Long, but of American populism.

—*Robert Kelley*

NEW TITLES

History

CRUSADERS FOR FITNESS:
The History of American Health Reformers
 by James C. Whorton
 Princeton, 1982
 359 pp. \$19.50

High protein diets, low protein diets, bicycling for health, sexual abstinence, "the no breakfast plan"—Americans have never suffered from a lack of fitness programs. Whorton, professor of biomedical history at the University of Washington, surveys the theories and influence of some of the more zealous health crusaders (doctors, scientists, and quacks) of the 19th century. Many, he finds, left the American public with enduring legacies (e.g., physical education, hygiene, preventive medicine); quite a few amassed healthy fortunes. Sylvester Graham (1794–1851), a minister and self-taught nutritionist whose name survives on cracker boxes, advocated meatlessness, sexual moderation, and whole wheat bread. Physiologist Mary Neal Gove recommended sex and championed the bloomer as a salubrious release from the corset. Followers of Horace Fletcher, inspired by the "Chewing Song," masticated their way toward digestive efficiency. Whorton offers more than a collection of anecdotes, however. He describes the health-reform wave of the 1830s as an outgrowth of Jacksonian Democratic idealism; that of the 1890s as an expression of the social optimism of the Progressive Era. Both movements played on the peculiarly American dream of the perfectible man—the new "Adam"—a dream that, with tofu and jogging, continues to flourish.




From *Medical Mirror* 11 (1900), 10.

LAND AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN, 1960–1980
 by Eric J. Hoogland
 Univ. of Texas, 1982
 191 pp. \$19.95

In 1962, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, instituted an ambitious program of agrarian reform. By its completion in 1971, 90 percent of Iran's tenant farmers had become freeholders. But when the revolution began in 1978, thousands of young rural villagers joined in anti-Shah demonstrations, while most of their elders remained indifferent to the Shah's fate. The reason, according to Hoogland, a political scientist at Bowdoin

College, was that the Shah let political motives dominate his reforms. Primarily interested in consolidating his regime (and in winning the support of reform-minded Iranians and Westerners), the Shah used land redistribution to weaken the power of absentee landlords and to increase Tehran's control over village affairs (e.g., local courts and markets). In the early, liberal stage of reform, some tenants, anticipating titles to land, openly defied their landlords. Fearing instability, the Shah revised his plan in 1964 and granted landlords more power. By 1972, landlords (many now cronies of Tehran officials) still owned half of Iran's crop land. Some 40 percent of the rural population—those who had no farming rights before 1962—had received no land at all. And most former tenants could not subsist on the paltry shares they had been given. The result: a classic pre-revolutionary condition, with rising expectations inadequately met.

**FIRE IN AMERICA:
A Cultural History of
Wildland and Rural Fire**
by Stephen J. Pyne
Princeton, 1982
654 pp. \$35



U.S. Forest Service Historic Photo Collection.

This original and exhaustive book asks us to recognize the extent to which human history has been influenced by fire. Though concentrating on its effects on our national past, Pyne, a University of Iowa historian, also considers the science and folklore of fire. He reminds us that modern science has often only rediscovered what the ancients took for granted: that lightning will strike and ignite oak and ash but not laurel (hence the Romans' fondness for the laurel wreath). Pyne divides the United States into nine regions, then organizes his study around the "fire regimes" (particular environments and their "regular patterns of fire behavior") of each. Among a score of topics, he discusses the domestic, agricultural, and industrial uses of fire (Indians taught European settlers how to hunt by setting fire to woods); the development of fire prevention; the role of fire in the westward expansion; and the politics, bureaucracy, and administration of forestry and fire management. Fire is an event, not an element, and man, even more than lightning,

is its catalyst. Understanding our cultural uses of fire may help us, Pyne concludes, in understanding that other powerful event—the splitting of the atom.

**BIG BUSINESS AND
PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: From FDR to
Reagan**

by Kim McQuaid
Morrow, 1982
383 pp. \$17.50

"Big Business" in 1980 was unenthusiastic about Ronald Reagan, just as it had been about Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Robert Taft in 1952. Why did U.S. business turn a cold shoulder to such conspicuous celebrants of free enterprise? McQuaid, a historian at Lake Erie College, offers an answer. After the jolts of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and a world war, corporate leaders realized that federal power was here to stay. To limit the "damage" and even turn governmental might to its own advantage, business had to accept the reality of an activist state and adopt a "yes, but" political strategy (e.g., agreeing that government should work for full employment while objecting to excessive efforts toward that end). Focusing on such organizations as the Business Council (a panel of more than 60 Chief Executive Officers, created in 1933) and the more aggressive Business Roundtable (which emerged in the early '70s), McQuaid traces Big Business's political and economic education since the 1930s. He also describes corporate triumphs: U.S. Steel's winning of antitrust protection from FDR; the conversion of the Kennedy administration to "conservative Keynesianism," which set the stage for a sequence of corporate and individual tax cuts.

Contemporary Affairs


**REVOLT AGAINST
REGULATION:**

**The Rise and Pause of
the Consumer Market**
by Michael Pertschuk
Univ. of Calif., 1982
165 pp. \$12.95

In 1964, when Pertschuk, then 31, joined the staff of the Senate Commerce Committee, the consumer movement was entering its heyday. Economic prosperity, combined with public outrage at business-related health and safety scandals (e.g., flammable infant wear, thalidomide) generated widespread support for regulation protecting the consumer.

Spurred by Ralph Nader and the investigative reporting of Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and others, the fledgling movement found allies not only in Congress but in industry. But by the mid-1970s, the enthusiasm had cooled. The newly created Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and an array of business political action committees devoted their considerable resources to fighting "big government" interference. Pertschuk, who served as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under President Jimmy Carter, explains how "stagflation" reawakened Congress to its traditional interest in business, the provider of jobs and prosperity. While accepting the validity of that interest, Pertschuk remains dismayed by the exquisite sensitivity of Congress to every business complaint (including one Congressman's fear that a proposed regulation would cut the funeral industry's productivity). Today, serving as a "plain commissioner," Pertschuk admits past mistakes, including undervaluing the economists' cost-benefit approach to regulation. Nevertheless, this "(mostly) unrepentant regulator" stands by consumerism, though he sees an increased local, rather than federal, role in its future.

**PASSING THE TIME IN
BALLYMENONE: Culture
and History of an Ulster
Community**
by Henry Glassie
Univ. of Pa., 1982
852 pp. \$29.95



*Drawing by Henry Glassie.
Reprinted from Passing
the Time in Ballymenone.*

When the sun sets over the fields of Ballymenone, the members of this farming community in Northern Ireland gather around kitchen hearths for poetry and songs, food and drink. Glassie, a folklorist at the University of Pennsylvania, lived among these people for seven years, sharing their "workaday reality"—farming by day and gathering for *ceilis* (visits) at night. Pushing beyond mere description of the saints and rebels who people Ballymenone's traditional tales, Glassie explains how the telling of stories serves both to entertain and to strengthen neighborly ties. In *ceilis*, in the design of houses (with front doors opening directly onto large, communal kitchens), in the eagerness of villagers to help one another with chores, in almost every facet of life, there is a

"conjunction of pleasure and social purpose." But Glassie's Ballymenone is on the brink of change. Endless civil strife, television, and automobiles are threatening social ties. Private enterprise and a drive for material prosperity are supplanting the spirit of cooperation. New houses are built with vestibules between kitchens and an increasingly inhospitable outside world. The days of storytelling and conviviality will soon be gone.

CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM

(Essays: 1972-1980)
by Richard Rorty
Univ. of Minn., 1982
237 pp. \$29.50 cloth,
\$11.95 paper

Rorty's controversial assessment of the history of his field, presented here and in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1981), is that attempts to find absolute and indisputable "truths" have led philosophy to become arcane, professionalized, and mired in unresolvable arguments. Drawing from Continental philosophy since G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), Rorty, professor of humanities at the University of Virginia, subscribes to the view that "truths" held by one age are replaced by others in the next. Standards of knowledge, he believes, should be based upon the needs of a particular society at a particular time. Thus Rorty sees the philosopher's task as a modest one, along the lines of John Dewey's pragmatism: to criticize the thought of current and past generations for the purpose of living better today.

Arts & Letters

**THE ARGOT MERCHANT
DISASTER: Poems**

New and Selected
by George Starbuck
Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1982
119 pp. \$8.95

The unusual title comes from a line in one of Starbuck's poems, an ode to Americana: "O / it isn't the cuisinart it's the cuisine argot / and I don't care if it's the argot as in the argot merchant disaster / or the argot as in What kinda colada makings the bar got here . . ." ("Sunday Brunch in the Boston Restoration"). Here, as elsewhere, Starbuck evokes mercantile America, its plenty and its strangeness. His poetry mingles the opulent and the underworldly, decorative language and slang, jazz rhythms and traditional

forms. He writes about food, the Bomb ("It's going to kill us, sure as gonif/and gizmo gravitate and groove"), sex and love, the "spell of spelling" ("Why do they always say heighth, but never weighth?"), American places (especially Boston), and American people. Starbuck's linguistic virtuosity, his witticisms, and his puns sometimes conceal his strongly moral vision. But in certain poems, he speaks with forceful directness: "Nations convulsing, their great thought gone static, / try your mere voices; try small work of hands."

MOZART

by Wolfgang Hildesheimer
trans. by Marion Faber
Farrar, 1982
408 pp. \$22.50



The work of Wolfgang Mozart (1756–91) attests, in Hildesheimer's words, to "perhaps the greatest genius in recorded history." Yet, insists the biographer, a German-born writer and artist, the music reveals almost nothing about the man; indeed, it camouflages an erratic, infantile, and obsessively scatological personality. Friends, relatives, and earlier biographers have further obscured the picture by bowdlerizing Mozart's lyrics and his letters. Hildesheimer's book, a labor of 20 years, dismantles many of the popular myths. Romantics of the 19th century portrayed Mozart as an otherworldly spirit, a creature of exquisite feeling. Hildesheimer exposes the cold, commercial motives behind such sublime works as *The Magic Flute*. Mozart was, in fact, surprisingly boorish and insensitive (he even used borrowed phrases in letters to his dying father). Some biographers have regarded Mozart as a revolutionary because of the irreverent depiction of the upper classes in *Figaro*. Hildesheimer explains that Mozart was merely working within the tradition of received texts. Content was always less important to him than theatrical potential. Without his intending it, *Figaro* did upset Vienna's nobility and thus hastened the composer's financial decline. But Mozart (contrary to legend) had never truly liked Vienna, and Vienna had appreciated him less as a composer than as a performer. As other, more well-mannered musicians rose in public fa-

vor, Mozart became increasingly solitary and, judging by letters to his wife, somewhat mad. Yet it was during these last years that he produced some of his more triumphant works, including *A Little Night Music* and *Don Giovanni*. Immediately upon Mozart's death, Viennese society, once tired of him, began hailing their "little genius." Then the myth-making began.

A BARTHES READER
edited and with an introduction by Susan Sontag
Hill & Wang, 1982
495 pp. \$20

Literary critic, semiotician, sociologist—these were but a few of the labels affixed to the name of one of France's leading intellectuals, Roland Barthes. Though a quiet and unassuming figure (unlike Sartre or Camus), he created a stir in France with his controversial book, *Writing Degree Zero* (1953). In it, he argued that literature should not serve political or utilitarian ends; the "utopia of language" was its own ample justification. Barthes seldom failed to be provocative, whether analyzing the allure of Greta Garbo's face, the language of fashion, or the treatment of death in Tacitus's *Annals*. In his more self-reflective essays, he lived up to the standards of Montaigne, discovering universal truths in personal quirks. His essay on Voltaire, "The Last Happy Writer," exposed the shallowness of that much-overrated philosophe: "He ceaselessly dissociated intelligence from intellectuality, asserting that the world is an order if we do not try too much to order it. . . . This conduct of mind has had a great career subsequently: We call it anti-intellectualism." Before his death in 1980, Barthes's lectures had become popular events. These 30 selections help explain why.

Science & Technology

THE TANGLED WING:
Biological Constraints
on the Human Spirit
by Melvin Konner
Holt, 1982
543 pp. \$19.95.

Somewhere between *Aegyptopithecus*, a small apelike monkey who lived some 30 million years ago and who "makes as good an Adam as any," and the Cro-Magnon people, who 25,000 years ago drew "masterpieces of realism" on cave walls, a distinctly human

brain evolved. To probe the biological foundations of behavior and emotions in our "brain-burdened species," Konner considers major scientific advances in anatomy, psychiatry, genetics, and his own field, behavioral anthropology. One aim of this comprehensive overview is to put a "human face" on the findings of pioneers in such controversial fields as neurobiology and behavioral genetics. Citing such works as G. Raisman and P. M. Field's 1973 demonstration of the structural differences between male and female brains, Konner argues that a frank acknowledgment of the physical bases of gender differences need not hinder women's progress toward equal rights. High testosterone levels in criminals and the role of heredity in schizophrenia are among other biological factors that should be considered by those who ordinarily look only at social and cultural determinants of behavior. Recognizing that behavioral biology has been speciously employed to support racial and sexual prejudices, the Harvard scientist likens his field to "a powerful, dangerous physic, potentially healing if used properly, poisonous if not."

**JOHN VON NEUMANN
AND NORBERT WIENER:
From Mathematics to the
Technologies of Life and
Death**

by Steve J. Heims
MIT, 1982
547 pp. \$10.95.

Child prodigies and personal friends, Hungarian-born John von Neumann and American Norbert Wiener were leading figures in 20th-century mathematics. Heims has taken their radically different careers as the substance of this meditation on the morality of science. Wiener (1894-1964), a Harvard graduate at 18 and the founder of cybernetics, made the search for patterns of statistical probability the focus of his work. His view of man as having incomplete information about the world undergirds "Wiener's Measure," an approach to making qualified predictions where experimental proof is not available. By contrast, von Neumann (1903-57) devoted his energies to constructing comprehensive axiomatic systems, two applications of which were computer and game theory (the latter adopted by economists and

political strategists). Von Neumann saw the world in terms of power games, a vision that author Heims, a historian of science, traces to the European "survivor" mentality. He served as a consultant to the Manhattan Project and stayed in the field of weapons development. Wiener, meanwhile, applied his training to the development of prosthetic devices. He also wrote three books advocating the humane uses of technology. Wiener emerges as Heims's ideal ethical scientist; von Neumann, as the ambitious technocrat more concerned with the progress of his career than with the moral implications of his work.

PLURALITY OF WORLDS:
The Origins of the
Extraterrestrial Life Debate
from Democritus to Kant
 by Steven J. Dick
 Cambridge, 1982
 246 pp. \$34



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 of Cambridge University Press.

In addition to providing popular culture with one of its more enduring and profitable themes, the possibility of extraterrestrial life has long been the subject of heated scientific debate. This, despite the unlikelihood of life elsewhere in our solar system or of planets, populated or barren, existing outside our solar system. Dick, an astronomer/historian at the U.S. Naval Observatory, considers the "interplay of theory, metaphysics, observation and imagination" in the evolution of the "plurality of worlds" debate through the 18th century. Classical Greek atomists, including Democritus, posited an infinity of worlds (*kosmoi*), while Aristotle and his followers insisted on the existence of only one world (*kosmos*), with the Earth at its center. Through the Middle Ages, the issue hinged on interpretation of the Scriptures. With Copernicus's revolutionary heliocentric model of the solar system, the moon and the planets became Earthlike, hence possibly habitable. And telescopic observations, from Galileo's time onward, fueled rather than resolved the controversy. Presenting Cartesian and Newtonian contributions to the argument, Dick shows that speculations about life on other planets, considered by many as mere scientific fantasy, are in fact qualitatively no "different from other scientific endeavours."

PAPERBOUNDS

A PICASSO ANTHOLOGY: Documents, Criticism, Reminiscences. Edited by Marilyn McCully. Princeton, 1982. 288 pp. \$9.95.

The radical stylistic metamorphoses of Pablo Picasso's art—from his cubist to his "Blue" and "Rose" periods, for example—have awed and bewildered critics. Hence the special merit of this anthology. McCully, an art historian, has organized into eight groups, corresponding to stages in Picasso's artistic development, more than 100 documents—reminiscences, letters, and commentary by friends, fellow painters, poets, and critics. Illuminating the artistic climate of the turn of the century, the Twenties, and other periods, they show how Picasso (1881–1973) contributed to each. In a concluding essay, critic John Richardson emphasizes the influence of Picasso's personal relationships (with artists, friends, and lovers) on his ever-evolving work. After 1918, for example, unusually swift changes in his style seemed to mirror "a pattern of amorous infidelity" in his life. McCully's selection sheds light not only on Picasso but also on those others—Gertrude Stein, Jean Cocteau, and Salvador Dali—who interpreted and influenced the master's art.

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress. By Jack N. Rakove. Johns Hopkins, 1982. 484 pp. \$8.95.

Shepherding 13 disparate colonies toward unity and independence, the Continental Congress (1774–89) framed the Declaration of Independence, steered the war effort, authored the Articles of Con-

federation, and set the stage for the Constitutional Convention of 1789. Some historians argue that all this was accomplished by a radical minority over the objections of moderates. Rakove, a Stanford historian, agrees that differences did exist between radicals such as John Adams and R. H. Lee, who demanded a sovereign state without delay, and more moderate leaders, notably Joseph Galloway and John Dickenson, who favored conciliation with Britain. But Rakove finds that neither group was disciplined enough to control a majority of congressional delegates. After the war, the Congress faced new, potentially divisive issues. Rakove shows how the need for pragmatic solutions triumphed over differences, thus establishing a tradition of consensus and compromise in American political life.

BAD BLOOD: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment—A Tragedy of Race and Medicine. By James H. Jones. Free Press, 1982. 272 pp. \$7.95.

In 1932, 616 black men in Macon County, Alabama, were recruited for a Public Health Service study of the effects of untreated syphilis. Of these, 414 had the disease; the rest had been selected as controls. None was told the real purpose of the study. Nor were the diseased subjects ever treated, even after penicillin was introduced in the 1940s. Not until 1972, when *Washington Star* reporter Jean Heller uncovered the story, was the Tuskegee Experiment brought to a belated end. In describing the events of the 30-year experiment, Jones, professor of history at the University of Houston, explores the assumptions, motives, and behavior of the doctors and administrators behind this travesty of medical ethics.

REFLECTIONS

Rousseau and the Ideology of Liberation

Few scholars deny the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) on modern Western ideas, from Marxism to educational theory, even as arguments persist over exactly what he gave us. Part of the problem comes from Rousseau's style. Believing himself incapable of cold, systematic thought, he relied on personal insight, intuition, and the powerful "impression of the moment." Critics accused him of inconsistency. But the Geneva-born writer who conceived both the "noble savage" and the "social contract" insisted upon the underlying unity of his work. Here, political philosopher Maurice Cranston agrees, as he describes Rousseau's life and two of his major preoccupations—music and civil society.

by Maurice Cranston

Rousseau has returned in recent years to public esteem. Between the two World Wars, he was condemned by Right and Left alike, seen as the forerunner at once of fascism and of communism, an enemy of science and of reason, responsible for both the excesses of romanticism and the horrors of the French Revolution.

But fashions change, in philosophy as in clothes, and events have conspired to make many of the main themes of Rousseau's writings disturbingly topical.

The invention of nuclear weapons has undermined faith in the benevolence of science; the pollution of nature by industry has made many people question the benefits of technology; the enlargement of bureaucracy has thwarted men's hopes of participatory democracy. We are

acutely aware today of problems that Rousseau in the 18th century was almost alone in discerning.

This renewed popularity has its negative aspect: There is a danger of Rousseau's being transformed again from a philosopher into an ideologue, the prophet of the alienated, the inspiration of revolutionary yearnings. Ironically, this is just the impact that Rousseau wished not to have. He sought not to propel men forward to revolution but to urge them to retrace their steps and to recover the moral virtues that had been valued in the ancient world.

Rousseau was born in Geneva—the city of John Calvin—in 1712; his mother having died after his birth, he was brought up by his father to believe that the city of his birth was a republic as splendid as ancient

Rome, and that it was surrounded by decadent kingdoms.

Rousseau senior had an equally glorious image of his own importance. After marrying above his modest station as a watchmaker, he was led into trouble with the civil authorities by brandishing the sword that his upper-class pretensions prompted him to wear, and he had to leave Geneva for good. The boy Rousseau remained behind in Geneva for six years as a poor relation of his dead mother's family, patronized and humiliated until he, too, at the age of 16 fled to live the life of an adventurer, and a Catholic convert, in the decadent kingdoms his father had taught him to despise.


He was fortunate in finding in Annecy, in the kingdom of Sardinia, a benefactress named Madame de

Warens, who not only provided him with a refuge in her home, and employment as her steward, but also furthered his education so that the boy who had arrived on her doorstep as a stammering, unschooled apprentice developed into a philosopher, a man of letters, and a composer, and, what is more, into one who was able to propel philosophy and the arts into new channels.

The Madame de Warens who thus transformed the adventurer into a philosopher was herself an adventuress. A Swiss convert to Catholicism, she had stripped her aristocratic husband of his money before fleeing to the kingdom of Sardinia with the gardener's son to set herself up in Annecy as a missionary, persuading young Protestants to obey Rome.

A portrait of Rousseau painted in 1766 by Allan Ramsay for English philosopher David Hume. When the two philosophers later quarreled, Rousseau complained that the painting made him look like "a Cyclops."

National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh.



Her morals distressed Rousseau, even when he slept with her, but she had remarkable taste, intelligence, and energy, and she brought out in him just the talents needed to conquer Paris at the time when Voltaire had made radical ideas fashionable.

Rousseau reached Paris at the age of 30, and he quickly rose to fame as a member of that group of intellectuals who are known as the philosophes and who were reforming, iconoclastic pamphleteers as much as they were metaphysicians.

From Idol to Hermit

Rousseau, the most unconventional of them all in his thinking, and the most forceful and eloquent in his style of writing, was soon the most conspicuous. His music, full of novelty, attracted the admiration of King and court; his writings, full of daring, made him the idol of the salons. But something in his Calvinist blood rejected worldly glory, so that as soon as he won it, he began increasingly to retreat from society into an almost hermit-like life with his illiterate mistress, Thérèse Le Vasseur, whose five children (whom he believed to be his) he dispatched at their birth to an orphanage.

The society that Rousseau attempted to reject, like the larger world of 18th-century Europe, was a progressive one. The great *Encyclopédie*, which Rousseau's best friend Denis Diderot edited, and for which he himself wrote many articles, was fully and enthusiastically committed to the doctrine of prog-

ress in technology, art, commerce, and industry. "Science will save us" was the motto not only of Diderot but of all the philosophes who dominated the Enlightenment.

Civilization's Discontents

But it was a motto with which Rousseau could not remain comfortable. At the age of 37, while walking to Vincennes to visit Diderot (who had been imprisoned on charges of irreligion), Rousseau had what he called an "illumination."

Rousseau says it came to him in a terrible flash that the arts and sciences had corrupted—not improved—men's morals, and he promptly lost all faith in progress. He went on to write his first important work, the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1749), in which he argued that the history of culture had been a history of decay.

This *Discourse* is by no means Rousseau's best work, but its central theme was to inform almost everything else he wrote. Throughout his life, he kept coming back to the idea that man is good by nature but has been corrupted by society and civilization. Rousseau did not mean that society and civilization were inherently bad but rather that both had taken a wrong direction and become harmful as they had become more advanced and sophisticated.

This idea in itself was not unfamiliar. Many Christians, especially Catholics, deplored the direction that European culture had taken since the Middle Ages. Disapproving

Maurice Cranston, 62, is professor of political science at the London School of Economics and a former Wilson Center Guest Scholar. Born in London, he was educated at Birkbeck College and Oxford. Among the many books he has written or edited are John Locke (1957), John Stuart Mill (1962), and Philosophy and Language (1970). The first volume of his biography of Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (Norton), will appear this winter.

François-Louise de La Tour, Baronne de Warens (1699–1769), was 29 when she first took in the 16-year-old Rousseau. Only two years before their meeting, she had converted to Catholicism and left her husband. The oil portrait was executed around 1730; the artist is unknown.



Musée Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Genève.

of modernity—the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the rise of science—they shared the hostility toward progress that Rousseau expressed, though very few shared his belief that man is naturally good.

But it was just his belief in natural goodness that Rousseau regarded as the most important part of his argument. He may well have received the inspiration for it from Madame de Warens, for although that unusual woman had become a communicant of the Catholic Church, she transmitted to Rousseau much of the sentimental optimism about human nature she had learned from mystical German Pietists who had taught her as a child.

At all events, this idea of man's natural goodness, as Rousseau developed it, set him even further apart

from both the progressives and the reactionaries. Even so, he remained for several years after the publication of his first *Discourse* a close collaborator with Diderot, and one of the most active contributors to successive volumes of the *Encyclopédie*.

Rousseau's specialty in the *Encyclopédie* was music. It was in this sphere that he first established his influence as a reformer, although scholars seem to have forgotten the importance his musical writings had at the time they were published.

Rousseau's *Confessions* (1782) contains a paragraph that has puzzled many readers: "In 1753, the *parlement* of Paris had just been exiled by the King; unrest at its height; all the signs pointed to an early uprising. My *Letter on French Music* was published, and all other quarrels were

immediately forgotten. No one thought of anything but the danger to French music, and the only uprising that took place was against me. The conflict was so fierce that the nation was never to recover from it. . . . If I say that my writings may have averted a political revolution in France, people will think me mad; nevertheless, it is a very real truth."

On the King's Side

It is ironic that the philosopher most often blamed for the French Revolution should have seen himself as a man who prevented a revolution, but there is no reason to think him mad for making the claim.

Already by 1753, the various political and social conflicts within France that were to burst out in the great revolution of 1789 were simmering beneath the surface. The attempt of Louis XV to dissolve the great chamber of the Paris *Parlement* and replace it with a Royal Chamber met with such furious resistance that the capital appeared to many responsible observers to be on the brink of a rebellion.

It was not a rebellion to command the sympathy of Rousseau or Diderot or anyone else connected with the *Encyclopédie*. The Paris *Parlements* were judiciary bodies, not to be confused with the British legislative body of similar name. They were composed of ennobled lawyers, often more eager than the royal government at Versailles to defend the Catholic Church and suppress books of the kind that the *Encyclopédistes* wrote. Between the King and the *Parlements*, the typical free-thinking Paris intellectual was disposed to prefer the former.

But is it conceivable that a dispute about music could have diverted aggression that would otherwise have

gone into a political rebellion? Others besides Rousseau believed it. Louis Sébastien Mercier in his *Tableau de Paris* wrote: "The operatic factions made all other factions disappear." And Melchior Grimm, in his *Correspondence Littéraire*, reported that the French public was "much more interested in the quarrel provoked by Rousseau's *Letter* than by the affair of the Royal Chamber."

Culture was taken seriously in 18th-century Paris, and a quarrel about music had already been brewing when Rousseau burst into print on the subject. This dispute, known at the time as the *querelle des Bouffons*, or war of the opera companies, dated from the arrival in Paris in the summer of 1752 of an Italian opera company to perform works of *opera buffa* (hence the name "*Bouffon*") by Giovanni Battista Pergolesi, Alessandro Scarlatti, Leonardo Vinci, and other composers new to France.

The Great Opera War

This event promptly divided the French music-loving public into two excited camps: supporters of the new Italian opera against supporters of the familiar French opera.

The *Encyclopédistes* entered the fray as champions of Italian music. And Rousseau, who knew more about Italian music than the others after the months he spent haunting the opera houses of Venice when he was attached to the French Embassy there in 1743 and 1744, and who was the principal expert on musical subjects for the *Encyclopédie*, emerged as the most forceful and effective combatant. He was the only one to direct his fire squarely at the leading living exponent of French music, Jean-Philippe Rameau.

Rousseau was quick to realize that the *querelle des Bouffons* was as

much an ideological as a musical one. This is what gave him the advantage over Rameau.

Rameau, already in his 70th year in 1752, was not only the leading composer of French opera; he was also, as the author of a *Treatise on Harmony* (1722) and other technical treatises, Europe's leading musicologist. Rousseau, by contrast, was a newcomer to music, with no professional training, no standing, and no authority. But in the end, none of these factors hindered his triumph. Rousseau entered the dispute as a reformer against a conservative, and it was as a reformer of musical taste that he made his first real mark in the world.

From Gods to Maids

The French opera that Rameau defended was not simply national; its music was traditional, authoritarian, academic. Its intellectual complexity had much in common with Descartes's philosophy of mathematical elaboration and rational order; its pomp expressed the self-esteem of the French kings.

Moreover, the *librettos* of French operas proclaimed the same Cartesian principles of order and the same Bourbon myth of *gloire*, the splendor of earthly princes being represented on the stage in the image of gods. Superior beings were impersonated by the actors and celebrated with the kind of music that appealed, with its intricate harmonies, to superior minds or that evoked martial feelings by the sounds of trumpets and drums. French opera spoke to the ear in the same manner in which the architecture of Versailles appealed to the eye.

In all such respects, the Italian *opera buffa* was different from the French. It was not imposing; it was

pleasing. In place of *déclamation*, it introduced arias or songs. And whereas French operatic music was both pompous and highbrow, the Italian was tuneful, simple, easily sung. The themes of *opera buffa* were domestic and familiar; instead of gods and kings, ordinary people occupied the stage.

Hearts Over Minds

Pergolesi's *La Serva Padrona*, with which the Italian company opened their season in Paris and which Rousseau himself edited for publication in France, is about a bourgeois bachelor being driven by jealousy into marrying his maid. One can well imagine that even the plot of this opera might alarm conservatives in Paris, if such people took seriously the moral of the tale, that a maid is as good as her "superiors."

Rousseau built up his case for the superiority of Italian music over French on one central principle: that melody must have priority over harmony. Rameau maintained just the opposite.

Now this was not a mere technical point, as both disputants realized. Rousseau, pleading for melody, was asserting what came to be recognized as a central belief of romanticism: namely, that the free expression of the creative spirit in art is more important than strict adherence to formal rules and technical precision. Rameau, pleading for harmony, was reaffirming the first principle of French classicism—that conformity to rationally intelligible rules is a necessary condition of true art.

In music Rousseau was a liberator. He not only argued for freedom in music in his pamphlets, he proved the possibility of adapting the Italian style of music to the French theater in a little opera he composed him-

self: *Le Devin du Village* (1752). This work met with immense success before the royal family at Fontainebleau and with the public in Paris.

Rousseau's Reform

It also proved an inspiration for later musicians. Christoph Gluck, who succeeded Rameau as the most important operatic composer in France, acknowledged his debt to Rousseau's teaching and example, and Mozart based his *Bastien et Bastienne* (1768) on Rousseau's *Le Devin du Village*. Rousseau had given European music a new direction: He put an end to the age of classicism and initiated an age of romanticism.

But, having composed *Le Devin du Village*, Rousseau decided to turn aside from composing music.* He would go on writing articles about musical subjects, but his creative talents he decided to devote henceforth entirely to literature and philosophy. It was all part of his "reform" or improvement of his own character, a process that took him back to some of the austere principles instilled in him as a child in the Calvinist republic of Geneva.

The political structure of Geneva was unique in Europe, and no one can understand what Rousseau felt and said about politics without paying attention to the circumstances of the political education he received.

Since the 16th century, the town-folk of Geneva had ruled their own city, at least in principle. In fact, the people quarreled so much among themselves that upper-class families took possession of all public offices. The population was increasingly composed of French Protestant refu-

gees, and Calvin himself appeared among them at a critical moment (1541) almost as a lawgiver, elaborating for Geneva both a constitution in which democracy, aristocracy, and theocracy were curiously balanced and institutions to ensure that government was honest and private morality upheld. Calvin's Protestantism was so fanatical, however, that the Catholic cantons refused to admit Geneva to the Swiss Confederation, so the city had to remain an independent state, despite its having a population of fewer than 25,000 people.

The Genevans consoled themselves with the thought that their little city was a free republic, like the cities of antiquity, as noble and splendid as Rome. Rousseau heard a great deal of this sort of talk when he was a boy. His father, a fervent patriot, encouraged him to read Plutarch and other classical authors who proclaimed the value of "republican virtues": courage, heroism, endurance, devotion, honor. Rousseau wrote later in *Emile* (1762): "I believed myself to be a Greek or a Roman."

A Civic Education

Rousseau seems to have been unaware when he was young that there were profound political dissensions beneath all these appearances of "Roman" freedom and splendor in the Genevan city state. Every adult male citizen—and there were about 1,500 of them when Rousseau was a boy—had, in principle, a share in the sovereignty of the republic and a right to participate and vote at meetings of the General Assembly. Yet despite Calvin's constitution, the old patriciate prevailed; all decisions were taken by the Small Council, which recruited its members exclusively from a few rich families. The

*He did not resume composition again until later life, when he devised in collaboration with Corancez a four-act pastorate, *Daphnis et Cloé*, and dozens of fragments of vocal music.



Bibliothèque publique et universitaire de Genève.

Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

The title page and an engraving from Rousseau's operetta. It was first performed before Louis XV's court at Fontainebleau in 1752. The work was well received.

constitution was a façade, although there were some citizens—including Rousseau's father—who chose not to see it as such.

There were others, liberals or champions of citizens' rights, who at different periods were openly or covertly trying to recover the lost rights of the ordinary citizens. But in the years immediately before Rousseau's birth, this liberal movement had been suppressed by the execution of its leaders, and Rousseau grew up at a time of tranquility, when the propaganda of the patrician regime went unchallenged.

Rousseau remained in most respects conservative in his politics. He kept his idealized vision of the character of the Genevan state (to which he briefly returned in 1754)

until his 50s; and then, dismayed at being attacked by the regime as a result of the publication in 1762 of both *Emile* and *The Social Contract*—books condemned in Geneva as irreligious—he criticized the government while continuing to plead for Geneva's national unity. Even in his strongest attack on the regime, his *Letters from the Mountains* (1764), a pamphlet written at the prompting of his friends in the liberal and radical factions, Rousseau condemned all factions and urged Genevans to think and act together as patriots.

Rousseau's most "revolutionary" publication, his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (1755), was dedicated to Geneva, and he always claimed that his *Social Contract* was inspired by the constitution of

Geneva. Empires, kingdoms, and principalities — institutions of the kind that were standard form in almost all parts of the world when Rousseau was born in 1712 — were truly alien to him. As a result, many of his ideas about politics seemed strange or unintelligible to others or, more often, were simply misunderstood.

One of the most important of these ideas was Rousseau's concept of freedom, which meant something different to him from what it meant to almost everyone else. People who talked about liberty in France or England or America meant the rights of the individual to do what he wanted to do, provided it was lawful; freedom was freedom from the constraints of the state. For Rousseau, freedom was the freedom the people of Geneva had obtained when they acquired sovereignty in the 16th century.

Modern vs. Ancient Freedom

Benjamin Constant (1767–1830), a fellow Swiss (though from the canton of Vaud), said Rousseau did not understand “modern freedom” but always thought in terms of “ancient freedom”—freedom as it was known in Greek city-states or the Roman republic, when freedom meant not “being allowed to do what you want to do” but “participating actively in the legislation of the city.”

Constant suggested that Rousseau was ruinously misguided in trying to revive this ancient concept of freedom. If the state were thought of as something that expressed one's will, then one would have no motive for working to diminish the activity of the state and might well want to enlarge it. Constant feared that freedom—which was seen by those who thought of “modern freedom” as

limiting the powers of the state for the protection of the individual—was a cause that would be abandoned by people who thought of freedom on the model of “ancient freedom,” and whose purpose was simply to make the state their own.

“Face-to-Face Society”

This is a fair criticism. For Rousseau, the political independence of Geneva was a good thing, though its small size made it vulnerable in international politics. Rousseau considered Geneva's size its merit. For only in a small community, in a “face-to-face society,” could all the citizens meet to make the laws they lived under, and, hence, if we follow Rousseau's conception of freedom, it was only in a small community that men could experience freedom.

The theory of freedom that he developed in depth in his *Social Contract* was simply not applicable to the large empires and kingdoms within which most Westerners lived. It could not apply even to Venice, which had grown from a city to the size of a small empire. It made no sense at all in France, where the population was 25 million.

And yet the French and others feasted on Rousseau's ideas.

David Hume, who became first a friend then an enemy of Rousseau, carried Rousseau's objections to the sovereignty of reason to their logical conclusion. Immanuel Kant, who knew Rousseau only through his books, recognized him as the pioneer of the intuitive sort of ethics that he himself developed into a formidable philosophical system. G. W. F. Hegel also admired Rousseau; indeed, German idealism, no less than German romanticism, looked on Rousseau almost as its founder.

Outside the realm of philosophy,

Rousseau did more than any other single writer to alter people's ways of thinking and feeling: He changed parents' attitudes to their children; he introduced warmth and demonstrativeness in personal relations that had hitherto been governed by "classical" ideas of restraint; he made religious sentiment more acceptable than religious dogma; he inspired men of all classes with a new passion for liberty. Few of them saw what Constant saw, that when Rousseau wrote of *liberté*, he meant something sharply opposed to what their own philosophers meant by *liberté*. It seems equally improbable that Rousseau's readers really grasped what he meant by *égalité*, another word that he propelled into the forefront of ideological language.

His *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* was a masterpiece of speculative anthropology. It followed up the argument of his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* by developing the proposition that natural man is good and by tracing the successive stages by which man has descended from primitive innocence to sophisticated corruption. Remarkably, in fewer than 100 pages, Rousseau outlined a theory of evolution that prefigured the discoveries of Darwin, opened new channels for the study of linguistics, and made a seminal contribution to political and economic thought.

In the Beginning

He began his inquiry by noting two kinds of inequalities among men: The first were natural inequalities arising from differences in strength, intelligence, and so forth; the second were artificial inequalities deriving from the conventions that governed society. It was the inequalities of the latter sort that he proposed to inves-


tigate in order to determine whether they were ethically justifiable.

Adopting what he considered the properly "scientific" (i.e., historical) method, he tried to reconstruct the first phases, or pre-history, of human societies. He suggested that original man was not social but solitary, and to this extent Rousseau agreed with Thomas Hobbes's account of the state of nature. But against the English pessimist's view that the life of man in such a state must be "poor, nasty, brutish and short," Rousseau claimed that original man, though admittedly solitary, was healthy, happy, good and free. The vices of men, Rousseau claimed, dated from the time when each entered into society and began to compare himself with his neighbors, to compete and covet, and to desire to dominate.

After the Fall

Thus Rousseau exonerated nature and blamed society for men's vices. Passions, which hardly existed in the state of nature, developed in society. It was "the calm of their own passions and their ignorance of vice" that preserved savages from evil. Society began when man started to build huts, facilitating cohabitation. Later, from cohabitation there arose the habit of living as a family and associating with neighbors. "Nascent society," as Rousseau called it, was good: It was the golden age of man. But it did not last. Neighbors started to compare their achievements, and this "marked the first step towards inequality, and at the same time, towards vice."

Men started to demand consideration and respect: Their innocent self-love became a culpable pride, as everyone wanted to be better than everyone else. The institution of property marked another decisive



From Genève: Images du passé—Images du présent by Pierre Bouffard, © Editions Pharos.

An anonymous pencil drawing of Geneva in the late 18th century. The first Rousseau to live there, Didier, arrived with other Huguenot refugees in 1549.

step toward modern inequality. In the primitive state, according to Rousseau, the earth belonged to everybody or to nobody, but the invention of agriculture led to claims for the rightful ownership of the piece of land that a particular farmer had cultivated. Thus was introduced the "fatal" concept of property, which in turn entailed institutions of law and government.

Rousseau lamented the rise of property: "What crimes, what wars, what murders, what miseries, what horrors the human race might have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch crying out to his fellow men: 'Beware of this impostor: you are lost if you forget that the fruits belong to all, and the earth to no one.'"

This is inflammatory language, and one can readily imagine that

such passages from Rousseau excited revolutionaries such as Robespierre and Lenin. But Rousseau was not in fact recommending that his contemporaries "cry out" the appeal. He never suggested that this appeal would have any relevance whatever to any other time than at that moment marking the passage from "nascent society" to "civil society."

"Civil society," said Rousseau, came into being to serve two purposes: to provide peace for everyone and to ensure the right to property for anyone lucky enough to have possessions. Securing tranquility, it enables the rich to enjoy their riches at the expense of the poor (in the context of civil tranquility). But it does not ensure happiness for either.

The savage, according to Rousseau, has only to eat, and he is at peace with nature "and the friend of

all his fellow men." Man in civil society is never happy because he is never satisfied. Society leads men to hate one another in proportion to the conflict between their interests, and "the universal desire for preference for oneself makes all men enemies."

It will be noticed that Rousseau treated the inequality between men as one of the characteristics of society, but he did not treat it in isolation. He saw it as one feature of a longer process, the progressive alienation of man from nature and innocence. He was certainly not pleading for equality to be introduced into modern society, since he made it plain enough that inequality lay at the very roots of society as such.

Nevertheless, in the "Dedication" that he wrote for the *Discourse on Inequality* in order to offer it to the "Republic of Geneva," Rousseau made clear what sorts of equality—and inequality—were desirable in a well-ordered state in the modern world. The arrangement he praised in Geneva was similar to that which Plato demanded for his ideal republic—namely, one whereby the best men were in the highest places. Referring to ancient Rome, "that model for all free Peoples," he went on to congratulate Geneva for having its wise men as its magistrates.

There were no "egalitarian" sentiments in Rousseau in the sense in which egalitarianism featured in later ideologies. He did not even hold with Jefferson, who was certainly in-

fluenced by Rousseau, that "all men are born equal." He held that they *were* born equal just as they *were* born free. But that was a long time ago. As to the measures of equality and liberty that men might be able to recover, Rousseau was nowhere very encouraging.

Having rejected the doctrine of progress, he could hardly believe that time would bring improvement. He left that optimistic thought to the more superficial *Encyclopédistes*, to philosophers such as Voltaire. Rousseau had no desire to tell people what they wanted to hear. He wanted to tell the truth. He believed that *civil* liberty, as distinct from a general liberty, and *civil* equality, as distinct from social equality, could be obtained in a genuinely republican state, but that such a state could only exist on the strength of the moral virtues of its citizens.

Man lost his natural goodness by entering into society, and to overcome the distinctive passions that society breeds, men must acquire virtues; every man must teach himself to be as disciplined, brave, upright, honest, and patriotic as the ancient Romans.

In his writings on music, Rousseau unveiled the smiling face of romanticism, its promise of freedom from all external constraints that bind the voice of the heart; in his writings on politics, he showed us the stern face of romanticism, its demand that a man who is not subservient to others fiercely govern himself.



Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

Presidential Images

It is a rare week on American television when viewers do not get at least a 20-second voice-and-picture glimpse of the Man in the Oval Office, and a rare night when they do not see the White House at least as a backdrop for a TV correspondent's brief "stand-upper" on the President's doings that day. All this has encouraged new notions in Washington of the power and importance of the "presidential image" in assuring the man's popularity and ability to govern. Here, David Culbert examines such images, past and present, and how Presidents have sought to shape them.

by David Culbert

During the Republic's early days, there were no mass media, no media consultants, no pollsters to impel George Washington and his immediate successors to worry about how they looked to the public at large. While malicious cartoons did appear, the target was generally White House policy; little attempt was made to mock a Chief Executive's physical appearance. The images we have of the Founding Fathers—portraits in oil or pen and ink, busts of marble—were done for posterity, not for political impact.

So it was when Presidents and former Presidents first confronted photography.

A photographic likeness partakes of reality, *seeming* to communicate a spirit of fact. And every photograph does freeze a moment in time.

During the early 1840s, hoping to capitalize on public fascination with newly developed camera images,

American daguerreotypers rushed to capture the likenesses of former Presidents. John Quincy Adams, by then in his 70s, sat for posterity, though he thought the camera made him look "hideous." Walt Whitman, studying a picture of Adams, thought otherwise: "those eyes of individual but still quenchless fire."

Today, it is a rare college history survey text that does not include a daguerreotype of Adams, sitting in his parlor, in Quincy, Massachusetts, a few months before his death. The intensity of Adams' gaze, so in keeping with his record of advocacy, seems a sign of the inner man.

Surviving daguerreotypes of Andrew Jackson, taken in 1845, are less kind. We see a dying man propped up in his chair, a camera portrait which intrudes upon final private moments, not a representation of character. And, if James Polk was the first President to have his camera

portrait taken while in the White House, the surviving image merely reflects the mask Polk always displayed to the outside world (he was dubbed by his critics "Polk the mendacious").


Yet, in a way that is hard to explain, the very fact that his features, and those of Jackson and Adams, are preserved photographically is important. The photographs change our perceptions, perhaps make these men seem more "real" than do monumental busts and oil portraits of their predecessors.

The President whom the camera best revealed was surely Abraham Lincoln. The noted portrait taken by Alexander Gardner is considered by the specialists to be the most significant photograph of Lincoln (more than 100 likenesses survive). In my view, it is the most valuable Ameri-

can photograph ever taken.

The story behind the photograph partakes of legend. Lincoln sat for a number of small portraits by Gardner in the latter's Washington studio on April 10, 1865, the day after Appomattox and four days before the assassination. At the conclusion of this session, Gardner moved his camera closer for a final large image. When he developed the picture, the glass plate cracked. In spite of this, Gardner managed to make a single oversized print before tossing away the glass negative. (Historian Lloyd Ostendorf believes the story not only partakes of legend but *is* legend—insofar as the date is concerned, at any rate, which he places in February. The matter remains in dispute.)

What does this photograph reveal? First, of course, it tells us that Lincoln was not just homely, but of sur-



McLellan Lincoln Collection,
John Hay Library, Brown University.

passing ugliness. Historical context heightens the meaning of the picture: the last image before death. Yet we see not a man a few days from martyrdom but one dying of sadness, wearing a deathlike mask, a deeply etched weariness from directing one part of the country's conquest of another. In the words of poet Wilfred Owen, the President's expression seems to be saying: "My subject is War, and the pity of War."

Wild Perfume

Walt Whitman was fascinated by photographs in general and by Lincoln's appearance in particular. He wrote that he had observed Lincoln at close hand 20 or 30 times during the Civil War years. In 1863 he described the "dark brown face, with the deep-cut lines, the eyes, always to me with a deep latent sadness." He later complained that no portrait, photographic or otherwise, "has caught the deep, though subtle and indirect expression of this man's face," though I think he was wrong. Whitman noted that there was no good portrait of Lincoln, but that some faces, "behind their homeliness, or even ugliness, held superior points so subtle, yet so palpable, making the real life of their faces almost as impossible to depict as wild perfume."

Lincoln is the true beginning of the "visual Presidency," for his symbolic meaning to all of us depends heavily on photographic detail. As perhaps our greatest President, Lincoln de-

mands iconic uniqueness, a symbol of martyrdom based on assassination but defined through photography. Contrast the pallid imagery of the Lincoln penny, itself based on a photographic likeness. The penny provides a general outline, but nothing of the suffering that Lincoln's symbolic image must convey. As Whitman noted, "I should say the invisible foundations and vertebra of his character, more than any man's in history, were mystical, abstract, moral and spiritual."

As printing improved and drawings and photographs got into the newspapers, Presidents began to be worried about the impression they made, via pictures, on the public. The first was Theodore Roosevelt. To the delight of photographers and cartoonists, Roosevelt in real life was a caricature: the oversized teeth, the thick glasses reflecting light, the bristling moustache, the substantial paunch despite all the talk about fitness. Roosevelt loved being President; he was always on stage, a natural ham.

From TR to FDR

In our photograph of TR, only the woman to the left of the retired officer seems to have let her attention wander, though two of the newsmen sitting beneath the podium seem already to have decided what they will report.

Roosevelt was the first President to seem warm and affectionate to a mass public and the first to be known

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The Bettmann Archive.

by his initials. Yet TR was careful about photographers and warned his bulky successor, William Howard Taft, about being shown playing golf (in a pre-Eisenhower age, the game connoted aristocratic tendencies): "I'm careful about that; photographs on horseback, yes; tennis, no. And golf is fatal."

TR's term of office marks the end of visual innocence: Presidents had become self-conscious about being "caught" by the camera.

Ahead of his own time was Franklin Roosevelt, whose understanding of publicity and persuasion remains unsurpassed. Roosevelt, the ablest political speaker of his generation, had an instinctive understanding of radio, the new medium, which

explained much of his enduring popularity. Voters knew that his legs were crippled by polio, but it seemed impossible that one who sounded so vigorous could be seriously handicapped.

Careful, defensive management of the "visual" helps to explain why. The White House discouraged the publication of photographs showing FDR from the waist down—and few such photographs appeared in print. Roosevelt's patrician artifices—the pince-nez and the cigarette holder—helped to make him look supremely self-confident.

In our pictures of Roosevelt, we see a man so sure of himself that his vitality bursts out of the frame. The props help: that so-called fighting

jaw, the angle of the cigarette holder, the rumpled hat. Roosevelt was our modern presidential salesman, the man who knew how to flatter and cajole.

Today, as during the 1930s and '40s, we can look, we can admire, but we cannot see inside. Turn back to Lincoln. Photographs invite us to examine the inner Lincoln; nobody ever saw the inner Roosevelt.

Nixon and Johnson

Dwight Eisenhower was, in his way, no less artful than FDR. World War II newsreels showed a serious General Eisenhower urging continuing sacrifice; the 1952 election campaign against Adlai Stevenson demanded beaming self-confidence. The newspaper photograph defined Ike's notable campaign asset, the grin, conveying a simple image of humanity and trustworthiness. That grin masked a shrewd, seasoned manager of men, but Eisenhower's photographs, then as later, never penetrated the genial exterior.

In 1953, Helen Keller, blind, deaf, and dumb almost from birth, asked to visit the White House so that she could "see" Eisenhower's smile. The image captures the pleasure of Miss Keller, who, unable to see, did not know how to appear shy in front of the camera. Eisenhower humanized himself by allowing Helen Keller to touch his face as he grinned. One can barely see the smile, but Ike's eyes and the laugh lines around his eyes and on his forehead all suggest it powerfully.

With Richard Nixon, as Eisenhower's running mate, television became part of our concept of "visual" politics and the "visual" candidacy. His famed "Checkers speech" of September 23, 1952, was an emotional rebuttal to Democratic charges of



Wide World Photos (Associated Press).

misappropriating campaign funds. Nixon's cocker spaniel, Checkers, was a supporting actor. Drawing an avalanche of favorable telegrams from the public, Nixon showed every politician how the new visual medium could inform and affect the American people directly. (Lyndon Johnson touched on the legacy of the Checkers speech when he told a network producer shortly before his death, "You guys. All you guys in the media. All of politics has changed because of you. You've broken all the machines and the ties between us in Congress and the city machines.")

Television images differ from still pictures, which allow time for study and reflection.

We show a photograph taken off a television monitor during the Checkers speech just before Nixon says, "One other thing I probably should tell you, because if I don't they'll probably be saying this about me too. . . . Our little girl—Trisha, the

six-year-old, named it Checkers." I studied a kinescope of the Checkers speech frame-by-frame, looking for any evidence of Nixon's character. There wasn't much. But just before he introduces Checkers, he momentarily touches his nose with his hand, and then his face fleetingly takes on an unhappy, almost haunted expression.

Television served Nixon in 1952 and, with elaborate White House staging, through most of his Presidency. Nixon served television on August 9, 1974, when he made a farewell speech to his White House staff after formally resigning. His rambling talk will continue to interest scholars because of how Nixon looked and what his appearance seemed to say about the impact of,

and responsibility for, Watergate.

Our TV image, also of poor quality, shows the moment when Nixon cries as he speaks of his mother: "Yes, she will have no books written about her. But she was a saint." In his *Memoirs*, Nixon says "the memory of that scene for me is like a frame of film forever frozen."

What does Nixon mean? That he remembers crying? And what does this image tell us? Nixon speaks of tragedy and suffering. Look one more time at the Lincoln photograph, then at this. Above all, Nixon's shows us failure; Lincoln's, sadness. No longer able to "shape" his image, Nixon stood humiliated before his favorite enemy, the news media, and admitted, to the extent that he was capable, that his quest for his mother's



U.P.I.

approval—his quest for a role in history—would not gain what he had sought.

What about Lyndon Johnson, the U.S. President most fascinated by the media? "Television and radios were his constant companions," biographer Doris Kearns tells us. "Hugging a transistor radio to his ear as he walked through the fields of his ranch or around the grounds of the White House, Johnson was a presidential teenager, listening not for music but for news."

His obsession with what others were saying stemmed from an inordinate concern with his own image, both aural and visual.

LBJ vs. JFK

Johnson seldom sounded convincing in public. Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill.) once observed that "[I] never saw Lyndon Johnson win a debate conclusively on the Senate floor, and I never heard him lose one in the cloak room." Johnson said that he felt uncomfortable before the TV camera because it allowed viewers to focus on his awkward physical appearance rather than on the substance of what he said.

Television also emphasized the way he spoke. Johnson's rise to prominence in the U.S. Senate coincided with the emergence of civil rights as a major issue. To talk "corn pone," he felt, ruined his attempt to sound credible on this issue to Northerners.

No device, whether new glasses, a new TelePrompter, a shirt of a different color, or a new backdrop, could turn Johnson into a winsome performer on television. Johnson's great skills in wheeling and dealing, however important in getting major legislation through Congress, failed to inspire confidence in him as the



Man in the Oval Office, his critics wrote. Johnson was the old dog who just could not learn new tricks. And his Texas accent and garbled syntax betrayed him, he thought, when he talked in public in anything like the same manner that he employed on the telephone or in private. The architect of the Great Society did not look or sound statesmanlike—he looked like a politician.

Johnson felt particular uneasiness over the endless unflattering comparisons, real or imagined, between him and his handsome predecessor, John Kennedy.

A New England accent, good looks, and playful banter during televised news conferences went a long way toward creating Kennedy's image of youthful vigorous leadership. Kennedy looked and sounded as though he could get results. He was photogenic (imagine Lyndon Johnson running along a beach), and his 1960 campaign speech (defending himself as a Catholic candidate) to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association looks good on film today. Yet Johnson ignored one fact: Just before his death, judging by the polls, Kennedy was no more popular than any other President, including LBJ, after 1,000 days in office.

Carter's Cardigan

Johnson was the first President to use video tape playback equipment to record TV broadcasts for later viewing. In our picture, he studies a replay of his November 17, 1967, press conference, in which he used a lavalier microphone so he could walk about the room. His aide, Walt Rostow, termed Johnson's performance "electrifying." But Johnson told his assistant press secretary, Robert Fleming, "You're trying to make me into an actor and I'm not an actor, I'm a President. I won't wear that god-damned microphone again." And he didn't.

Johnson's presidential image converged in photographs and cartoons, memorably in the notorious scar photograph of October 20, 1965, which fixed a portrait of Johnson as lacking Kennedy's elegance and presidential stature. The UPI caption read "President Johnson, in good spirits after a walk around the hospital grounds and buoyed by the thought of leaving [after a gall bladder operation], pulls up the tails of his sport shirt to show his

surgical bandage and to illustrate just where it was that the surgeons 'messed around' in his abdomen." The photograph appeared the next day in newspapers across America, in some instances with an enlargement of the scar "transmitted in answer to requests." Thousands wrote to protest the photograph's poor taste. What possessed Johnson to pull up his shirt remains a mystery.

The photograph later inspired David Levine's best-known cartoon. Levine exaggerated the size of the President's ears, the length of his nose (Pinocchio-like), the thinness of his hair, and gave him a pronounced double chin, along with watchful, shifty eyes. Levine's cartoon presumed a collective memory of the scar photograph and made the scar into a symbol of Johnson's Vietnam policies and the "credibility gap" plaguing his administration. In May 1968, Johnson told a group of edito-



rial cartoonists, "Thank goodness [columnist] Walter Lippmann never learned to draw."

Johnson tried assiduously—and in vain—to create a flattering visual image of himself. Staff photographers took more than 500,000 photographs during the White House years. A weekly 30-minute color film, *The President*, was produced at his orders from 1966 to 1969. The President regularly gave away inscribed pictures and had albums of White House activities prepared for visiting dignitaries.

He examined himself in picture after picture, looking for indications of credibility and Eastern urbanity. His aide, Harry McPherson, tells of a conversation with the President about one photograph. "God, look at that photograph," Johnson said.

It had what I call his John Wayne look—you know, the smile as we look into the Western sunset with Old Paint. It's the inverted "V"s in the brows and smile on the face: weathered, troubled, but still philosophical, Uncle Lyndon looks to the West. And he said, 'Have you ever seen anything phonier in your life?' And I said, 'No, I haven't.'

He had one of those smiles on, standing next to somebody, and he said, 'I didn't want to be there with that guy. I don't care anything about him; I didn't want to be there with the picture, and I knew that would show. So I tried to put on a smile. And every time I try to do that, I look phonier. It all comes through and I can't break it.'

Johnson finally got the photograph he was looking for after he left the White House. Taken at the LBJ ranch, it is filed at the Johnson



Yoichi Okamoto/Courtesy of LBJ Library.




Drawing by David Levine. Reprinted with permission from The New York Review of Books. Copyright © 1968 Nyrev, Inc.

Library in Austin under "John Wayne Photo." The photographer, Frank Wolfe, explains what Johnson liked about the image: the cowboy hat and shirt gave an "earthy look," making him appear "tall and robust." It is the image of a man who comes from the land—tough, grizzled, dependable, not given to boasting—the heroic figure John Wayne played in so many Hollywood productions. Apparently, Johnson decided that being an actor was not so bad after all.

That Lyndon Johnson was obsessed with his "image" tells us more about the man than it does about the impact of TV or photography. So do the calculations of the Nixon White House; returning from Peking in 1972, President Nixon sat in Air Force One for nine hours in Anchorage, Alaska, so that he could arrive home triumphantly in prime time. So do President Carter's revival of the fireside chat to discuss energy problems, dressed in a cardigan, and his early effort to show himself as a populist Chief Executive by spending the night with an ordinary family in Clinton, Massachusetts.

Oddly enough, Ronald Reagan, the first President to have been a professional actor, has largely eschewed such elaborate image-making, confining himself, Truman-like, to quips and fairly conventional political gestures. Indeed, he seems hardly to notice that he is on camera.

The modern Presidency, in fact, does not require an actor. It does require someone who is not terrified by television and able to make a coherent speech to rally public support for his programs. Photographs and TV



Frank Wolfe/Courtesy of LBJ Library.

coverage provide reminders of his role as our Chief Executive, and the President is expected to keep his shirt-tail tucked in. But the "image" in people's heads does not necessarily correspond to the pictures of the Man in the White House seen on television.

The perceived effects of presidential words or decisions (or indecision) soon tend to create their own popular images—and every President in the Age of Television has suffered almost the same steady erosion of popularity in the polls over time, regardless of White House "media events." In truth, presidential images are what *we* make of them.

COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the *Quarterly* and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

Reporters v. the People?

Your series of essays on "The News Media" [*WQ*, Special Issue 1982] is a timely, interesting treatment of the subject and has already influenced my thinking about the press. I would like, though, to argue with the critics of the press who claim that somehow reporters of major press organizations neither relate to nor understand the society to which they report. If there is a gap between reporters for these large organizations and the broad-reading public, it arises only from the fact that diligent reporters learn so much about current events that their attitudes are simply more complex than the attitudes of most Americans, who are too busy to spend the amount of time it takes to become familiar with the subtleties of the increasingly complex issues of modern life.

The claim by critics that the major news organizations are an arrogant elite whose ideas and values are alien to the "real majority" just does not hold water. It has been my experience, working with the 40-reporter Washington Bureau of the *New York Times*, that it is generally representative of the society on which it reports. The backgrounds of the individual members closely parallel the sexual, racial, educational, and ethnic make-up of the country.

In terms of political background and philosophy, it is a staff that has been shaped and molded by the major movements of society itself—shifting from Midwest populists, to World War II

patriots, postwar globalists, and civil-rights advocates. As conservatism has grown in the past decade, it, too, has been reflected in the social and economic outlook of reporters on the staff. If reporters for the major news organizations are to be set apart from society at large, it is in the sense that they more deeply study current events and through that study gain more information than their peers. If information is power, then you may argue they are more powerful.

Bill Kovach
Washington Editor
New York Times

Turkey: A Legacy of Change

Paul Henze and George Harris ["Turkey," *WQ*, Special Issue 1982] have mentioned the key forces that have shaped Turkey's domestic policies and foreign relations. I would like to deal with two sets of historical forces, the psychology of change and an Ottoman legacy in foreign affairs, which have a continuing impact on Turkey's domestic and foreign affairs.

First, the instability created by continuous change. Historically and politically, Turkey falls in a special class of her own, and to me at least, many of her problems (economic development, for instance) seem to be nurtured by the country's special historical background. Turkey has reached the contemporary stage not as a colony or as a protectorate of the West but as the remaining core of what used to be the Ottoman state. But in the Ottoman state, Turks never assumed a dominant position as an ethnic group, despite unsuccessful attempts by a group of intellectuals to do so in 1908–18. Consequently, the Turks' chief task in the Republic was to build a national state and reshape their political identities, culture, historical images, and future goals according to the blueprint of nationhood. In practice, this meant that the Turks living within the boundaries of the Republic had to rid themselves of their Ottoman past, of their traditional-historical at-

tachments and loyalties that had become their culture, and accept overnight the ethos of republicanism and Turkishness as the marks of political modernity. The result was psychological insecurity, alienation, and a sense of rootlessness which, though manifest mostly among the upper classes and the intelligentsia, eventually reached the rural areas.

The multiparty democracy introduced after 1945 shattered further the remaining pillars of the old order. There is hardly anything material or cultural in Turkey that has not been changed profoundly during the past 60 years. Change brought about the desire and demand for further and deeper change, usually on the part of the leftists, while the rightists demanded the retention of some traditional values, although what they defined as "traditional" had little to do with actual authenticity.

Change is an indispensable part of progress. But change for the sake of change becomes as harmful to the long-range welfare of a society as the lack of change and progress. Reforms introduced with great fanfare as the ultimate expression of modernity were denounced a few years later as the relics of a "feudal" past, and even more "advanced" proposals were put forth. In line with this incessant demand for change, the ultimate solution proposed by the radical leftists in the late 1970s was a dictatorship in the guise of democracy. Their demand for "permanent solution" took its nourishment from a popular yearning for stability. The military regime which took over on September 12, 1980, in a way answered Turkey's need for stability by following not the views of strident minorities but the wishes of a vast majority yearning for the minimum of democracy: security, prosperity and the preservation of basic freedoms.

Perhaps as an antidote to the expected psychological dislocation resulting from profound political and cultural change, Turkey's foreign policy has been geared towards achieving security and stability. Consequently, Turkey renounced any claim to former Ottoman lands (Mosul and Alexandretta were exceptions mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923) to prevent the

rise of disruptive irredentist movements in the country. The government abstained scrupulously from defending the rights and freedoms of millions of ethnic Turks residing in the Balkans, Syria, and Iraq, despite the fact that the new rulers subjected these Turks to incredible pressures and forced assimilation.

Yet, in spite of her efforts to renounce the Ottoman legacy and to conduct a *correct* foreign policy strictly in line with her national interest, Turkey's external relations are still determined to a good extent by her Ottoman past and her strategic position. Indeed, Turkey's major foreign policy disputes stem from claims or aspirations originating in the Ottoman era. For instance, Greece's policy towards Turkey (including the Cyprus dispute) is nurtured by Greece's 19th-century territorial ambitions. The Ottoman past determines also the simmering dispute with Syria over Alexandretta. Examples could be multiplied for practically every other neighboring country.

The key strategic position of Turkey in the Black Sea and the Middle East, which in more than one way determined the foreign policy of the Ottoman state, continues to shape modern Turkey's relations with the West and the USSR. Consequently, Turkey has found it impossible to avoid involvement in the global politics of the West or East, despite the fact that she managed somehow to maintain a low profile until 1945-46, when the USSR's demands for territory pushed her into the arms of the West.

Because Turkey's foreign policy has had a fundamental impact in determining her political regime and economic system, a drastic shift in Turkey's foreign policy would have an immediate and profound impact on her internal regime. On the other hand, the stability of Turkey's internal regime assures the stability of her foreign policy and vice versa, at least for the time being. The West can disturb this balance, but only at an incalculable risk for her own long-range interests and Turkey's own welfare.

Kemal Karpat
Department of History
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Vatican Looks East

Re: "The Vatican," by Francis X. Murphy and Dennis Dunn [WQ, Autumn 1982]:

In the present pontificate, the center of gravity has, as it were, shifted Eastwards. Pope John Paul believes that Poles, as Slavs by race but Latins by faith, have a special role as intermediaries with the Orthodox Churches and with the Slav peoples more generally. In Gniezno, Poland (June 3, 1979), he asserted their "spiritual unity," whatever the maps may say.

In Poland, and probably elsewhere too, Marxism in its communist form no longer corresponds to the will of the people. Solidarity was born of a type of "Christian humanism" which regards communism as an alien imposition. John Paul's *Ostpolitik* is potentially more risky and destabilizing than his predecessors', as events in Poland have already shown.

When John Paul turns to Latin and Central America, he sees signs that some "liberation theologians" are embracing the very Marxism that he rejected in Eastern Europe. Hence he is severe on the guerrilla movement in El Salvador (Letter of August 6, 1982), and even more on the concept of an "alternative or popular Church" that has been developed in Nicaragua (Letter of June 29, 1982).

Peter Hebblethwaite
Vatican Affairs Writer
National Catholic Reporter
Oxford, England

The Spiritual Dimension

Francis Murphy and Dennis Dunn give informative and generally well informed overviews of the Vatican and the papacy. What they largely leave out is the spiritual dimension. But only that dimension explains the loyalty of Catholics to an office and institution which in the course of nearly two milleniums have exhibited their share of human frailty as well as human excellence.

In the belief of Catholics, the pope is indeed the chief executive of a large in-

ternational organization, the quasi-monarchical ruler of a small and rather quaint sovereign entity, and the often harried head of a complex (not to say labyrinthine) administrative structure, which channels many intractable problems to his desk. He is, however, a great deal more.

Catholics believe the pope is the successor of Peter, the chief apostle, whom Jesus Christ chose to lead the visible community of faith—the Church—which He founded. In their belief, Christ's spiritual mandate to govern, teach, and sanctify the Church has been transmitted through history from the first Bishop of Rome to the present incumbent, John Paul II, and will continue to be transmitted to all future holders of the office until history's end. To revere the pope and to accept his spiritual authority do not reflect antiquarianism or denominational chauvinism; they are responses of religious faith.

In its Constitution on the Church, regarded by many as the capstone of its work, the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) said much about the pope. Its rich and complex teaching comes to a focus, though, on one simple statement: "The Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible source and foundation of the unity both of the bishops and of the whole company of the faithful." However edifying or exasperating (or both) one finds the history and current status of the papacy, only that accounts for the unique place which the pope holds in the world-view of Catholics.

Reverend Monsignor Richard K. Malone
National Conference of Catholic Bishops
Washington, D.C.

A Child-Centered Society?

Re: "Children" [WQ, Autumn 1982]:

While it is true that our society has become more child centered, appears to value children, and indeed studies them and restudies them, several questions about underlying collective social attitudes toward children must be raised.

For example, recent proposals to modify child labor laws may indeed help some students who are capable of working and who will benefit intellectually and financially from work. But marginally profitable businesses will perhaps be tempted to hire a younger work force because society has deemed it acceptable to pay children less than the minimum wage. A child who does an adult's job deserves an adult's pay; a sub-minimum wage for children suggests that children are sub-people.

The unfortunate truth is that many parents passively accept what society at large serves up for their children. What greater indication of this than parental indifference to nuclear issues? A truly child oriented society would never tolerate the prospect of annihilation or mutilation of future generations. Our society sees nuclear issues as global concerns when in fact they are familial concerns. In a truly child oriented society, there would be no confusion.

*Paula DiPerna
New York, New York*

Public Policy for Children

I disagree with Cullen Murphy's position in "Kids Today" [*WQ*, Autumn 1982] that government policies cannot play an effective role in improving the lives of poor American children. Public policies can reduce child poverty; indeed, they have done so in the past in the U.S. and are doing so in the present in other countries.

Almost one-fifth of all U.S. children are poor today, more than at any time since 1965, and the rate is even higher (22 percent) among children under six. Even if one counts food stamps as part of family income, the poverty rate is still very high, and it has grown substantially in the last two years after having remained stable at about 15 percent for more than a decade. Contributing to the decline in child poverty beginning around 1970 and the stability of the rate subsequently is a combination of public policy—improved access to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), increased AFDC benefit

levels, and an increase in the amount of earnings recipients can retain without losing part of their welfare grant—and individual initiative (more mothers working and having fewer children). Of course, the reduction in child poverty from 1959 to 1981 (27 to 19.5 percent) does not compare with the reduction in poverty among the elderly during those same years (35 to 15 percent); the latter was achieved almost exclusively through government policies such as higher social security benefits, more complete coverage, and indexing of benefits.

More than half of all poor children live with single parents, usually mothers. Government policies which increase the availability of jobs and decrease parental unemployment can make a difference for these children, as can policies like those in Sweden, West Germany, and France that provide child support payments for children whose fathers are not supporting them (a government agency collects, where possible, from those fathers subsequently). Public policies can also reduce child poverty by making available several different types of income transfers to supplement family income (the Earned Income Tax Credit, for example). The findings of our recently completed study of income transfers [*Income Transfers for Families with Children: An Eight-Country Study* by Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, 1983] underscores the growing use of government transfers for just this purpose. One result in countries making extensive use of such policies is less reliance on welfare as we know it; a second result is far less child poverty.

Clearly, government policies can reduce poverty for most poor children just as they have already for the elderly poor. The issue, therefore, is why Americans are less willing than people in other countries to do better by their children.

*Sheila B. Kamerman
Professor, Social Policy and Planning
The Columbia University
School of Social Work*

Mr. Murphy did not say that government "cannot play an effective role in improving the lives of poor children." He stated that

there is little that an American government can do "to eliminate divorce, abandonment, or out-of-wedlock births" which account for the majority of American children living in poverty. At most, he says, (p. 75) public and private agencies can treat "the more painful symptoms" with services and subsidies. As the research surveyed by Mr. Murphy makes clear, there is a strong connection between family stability and a child's well-being from the time of birth. Thus, the plight of the elderly poor and the plight of poor children have different causes and different long-term effects, even as each group needs help.—ED.

Money and Charm

One particularly vexing question emerges from the essays by Alan Brinkley, Bradford A. Lee, and William E. Leuchtenburg ["The New Deal," *WQ*, Spring 1982]. How can we account for the discrepancy between Franklin Roosevelt's reputation and popularity as President (the power Mr. Leuchtenburg attributes to his "shadow") and his actual accomplishments?

Lee has demonstrated that the New Deal failed to achieve its two pre-eminent goals: it neither guided the economy out of depression, nor substantially redistributed income and wealth. Yet despite these failures, the Roosevelt administration succeeded in its third aim—to make the Democrats the majority party.

In the general literature there are two basic explanations for Roosevelt's political success. The first focuses on Roosevelt's personality: his boldness, his magnetism, his willingness to experiment, his ability to generate confidence.

The second turns on New Deal spending. According to this view, New Dealers channeled money and programs where they would do the most political good. For example, economist Gavin Wright has shown that approximately 80 percent of the state-to-state variations in federal spending under the New Deal can be explained by political factors such as the closeness of past elections and the number of electoral votes per capita.

One means of probing this issue further is suggested by a recent study by Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flannigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, entitled *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (1980).

Clubb et al. present evidence indicating that so-called critical elections (such as 1860, 1896, 1932, and perhaps 1980) are really no different from other "deviating" elections—reflex actions against the party that happens to be in power at a time of economic crisis. But, like all deviating elections, they provide the newly victorious party with an opportunity.

What differentiates a critical election from the others is the effectiveness with which the new administration uses its control over the machinery of government to build itself a lasting base of support. The Democratic victory in 1932, for example, was not a vote for Roosevelt (whose statements in the campaign were virtually indistinguishable from Hoover's), but a backlash against Hoover, who was blamed for the severity of the Depression. It is considered a critical election because Roosevelt transformed this negative victory into a positive mandate, which would be ratified with large Democratic victories in subsequent elections.

How did he do this? Which was more important, personality or money? Clubb et al. demonstrate that the 1932 "revolution" took the form primarily of an across-the-board movement of voters from the Republican to the Democratic party—not a realignment of voting groups. Their findings tend to support the personality rather than the money explanation: If money was the main source of Democratic strength, we should observe a realignment of voting groups; groups that got the most federal dollars should have shifted most sharply in favor of the Democratic Party, and vice versa. The absence of such movements is consistent with the idea that Roosevelt had a charm whose appeal cut across lines of class, race, ethnicity, religion, and region.

Personality and money: The importance of this issue transcends the specific historical situation. If the inferences

I have made are incorrect, and government spending was the key to the Democratic Party's success in the 1930s, then the Reagan administration's efforts to cut the budget and build a new base of support for the GOP may be doomed. If personality was the key, however (and if Reagan does have charisma, as some observers have insisted), then we may be watching the beginning of a new era of Republican Party dominance—even if Reagan's economic recovery program fails, as did Roosevelt's.

Naomi R. Lamoreaux
Assistant Professor of History
Brown University
Providence, R.I.

Correction

I am afraid I must take strong exception to the revision of a portion of "Feminists and Child-Rearing" [*WQ*, Autumn 1982, pp. 58–59] excerpted from my book *The Erosion of Childhood*, in particular, the reference to Nancy Chodorow's *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978).

The version that I approved reads: "Nancy Chodorow employs a somewhat different focus and reformulates a female-centered Psychoanalytic model of development. She attacks the major theories of sex role acquisition and discusses the role of woman-as-mother and

this reproduction across generations."

In the version that appears in *WQ*, neither Chodorow's reformulation of a female psychoanalytic model is referred to, nor is the inaccurate statement "children absorb sex roles and thus later re-create their parents' family structure" one that I wrote.

Furthermore, the concluding paragraph, "What feminists must realize is that their struggle for the transformation of the family and the elimination of sexual inequality will be successful only when children are not allowed to become its victims" is an editorial distortion that alters both the theme and context of my remarks. As a feminist and child advocate, I find it peculiar that a critical set of reflections emphasizing the perspective and experiences of children should be simplistically reduced to an "I-them" moralistic conundrum. For the record, what I approved for publication was: "The struggle for the democratization of the family and the elimination of sex hierarchy and privilege will only be waged successfully when children become not victims, but participants in the creation of the new order. If not, age-old patterns of dominance and oppression will merely persist in altered form."

Valerie Polakow Suransky
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School of Education
University of Michigan

**LIFE
ISN'T
CHEAP.**

**GIVE TO THE
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(signed) Peter Braestrup, *Editor*

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